

Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body

Geneva, October 29, 2018

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB
 - A. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN HOT-ROLLED STEEL PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS184/15/ADD.188)
 - The United States provided a status report in this dispute on October 18, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
 - The United States has addressed the DSB’s recommendations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty investigation at issue.
 - With respect to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that have yet to be addressed, the U.S. Administration will work with the U.S. Congress with respect to appropriate statutory measures that would resolve this matter.

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB
 - B. UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS160/24/ADD.163)
 - The United States provided a status report in this dispute on October 18, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
 - The U.S. Administration will continue to confer with the European Union, and to work closely with the U.S. Congress, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter.

Second Intervention

- As we have noted at prior meetings of the DSB, by intervening under this item, China attempts to give the appearance of concern for intellectual property rights.
- China's intervention is ironic, given agenda item 8, the request for establishment of a panel by the United States in the dispute, *China – Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights*. We will address China's purported interest in protecting intellectual property rights under that item.

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

C. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - MEASURES AFFECTING THE APPROVAL AND MARKETING OF BIOTECH PRODUCTS: STATUS REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/DS291/37/ADD.126)

- The United States thanks the European Union (“EU”) for its status report and its statement today.
- The United States remains concerned with the EU’s measures affecting the approval of biotech products. Delays persist and affect dozens of applications that have been awaiting approval for months or years, or that have already received approval.
- Even when the EU finally approves a biotech product, EU member States continue to impose bans on the supposedly approved product. As we have highlighted at several prior meetings, the EU maintains legislation that permits EU member States to “opt out” of certain approvals, even where the European Food Safety Authority (“EFSA”) has concluded that the product is safe. Of note, at least seventeen EU member States, as well as certain regions within EU member States, have submitted requests to opt out of EU approvals.
- The United States again urges the EU to ensure that all of its measures affecting the approval of biotech products, including measures adopted by individual EU member States, are based on scientific principles, and that decisions are taken without undue delay.

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

D. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON LARGE RESIDENTIAL WASHERS FROM KOREA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS464/17/ADD.10)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on October 18, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
- On December 15, 2017, the United States Trade Representative requested that the U.S. Department of Commerce make a determination under section 129 of the *Uruguay Round Agreements Act* to address the DSB's recommendations relating to the Department's countervailing duty investigation of washers from Korea. On December 18, the Department of Commerce initiated a proceeding to make such determination. Following initiation, Commerce issued initial and supplemental questionnaires seeking additional information.
- On April 4, 2018, Commerce issued a preliminary determination revising certain aspects of its original determination. Following issuance of the preliminary determination, Commerce provided interested parties with the opportunity to submit comments on the issues and analysis in the preliminary determination and rebuttal comments. Commerce reviewed those comments and rebuttal comments and took them into account for purposes of preparing the final determination.
- On June 4, 2018, Commerce issued a final determination, in which Commerce revised certain aspects of its original determination. Specifically, Commerce revised the analysis underlying the CVD determination, as it pertains to certain tax credit programs, in accordance with findings adopted by the DSB.
- The United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB relating to antidumping measures challenged in this dispute.

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

F. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO ANTI DUMPING PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CHINA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS471/17/ADD.2)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on October 18, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
- As explained in that report, the United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB.

Second Intervention

- The United States takes note of China's statement and will convey it to capital.
- The United States is willing to discuss this matter with China on a bilateral basis.
- To be clear, however, it is incorrect to suggest that the United States has taken no action. As we have reported to the DSB, the United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB. That internal process is ongoing.

1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB
 - H. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN OIL COUNTRY TUBULAR GOODS FROM KOREA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS488/12/ADD.1)
 - The United States provided a status report in this dispute on October 18, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.
 - As explained in that report, the United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB.

2. UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT OF 2000: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

- As the United States has noted at previous DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act – which includes a provision repealing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 – was enacted into law in February 2006. Accordingly, the United States has taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in these disputes.
- We recall, furthermore, that the EU has acknowledged that the Deficit Reduction Act does not permit the distribution of duties collected on goods entered after October 1, 2007, more than 10 years ago.
- With respect to the EU’s request for status reports in this matter, as we have already explained at previous DSB meetings, there is no obligation under the DSU to provide further status reports once a Member announces that it has implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings, regardless of whether the complaining party disagrees about compliance.
- The practice of Members confirms this widespread understanding of Article 21.5 as we see no status report submitted by any Member in any dispute this month, or for previous meetings, where the responding Member has claimed compliance and the complaining Member disagrees.
- The EU explained last month under this item that, in its view, the issue of compliance “remains unresolved for the purposes of Article 21.6.” Under such a standard, we would expect the EU to provide status reports in any dispute where there is a disagreement between the parties on the EU’s compliance, including the *EU – Large Civil Aircraft* dispute. The EU’s attempt to draw a distinction where a compliance proceeding has been initiated under Article 21.5 falls short, and has no basis in the text of Article 21.6: the EU has claimed compliance, and the US disagrees. Based on the position taken by the EU, the EU must file a status report for the *EU – Large Civil Aircraft* dispute.
- Given its failure to provide a status report in that dispute again this month, we fail to see how the EU’s behavior is consistent with the alleged systemic view it has been espousing under this item for more than 10 years.
- As the EU is aware, the United States has announced in this dispute that it has implemented the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. If the EU disagrees, there would

simply appear to be a disagreement between the parties to the dispute about the situation of compliance.

3. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

A. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES

- The United States notes that once again the European Union has not provided Members with a status report concerning the dispute *EU – Large Civil Aircraft* (DS316).
- The United States has raised this same issue at recent past DSB meetings, where the EU similarly chose not to provide a status report.
- As we noted at the September 26 DSB meeting, the EU has argued that Article 21.6 of the DSU requires that “the issue of implementation shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until the issue is resolved.” And the EU has argued that where the EU does not agree with another Member’s “assertion that it has implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings,” “the issue remains unresolved for the purposes of Article 21.6 of the DSU.”
- This stated EU position simply contradicts the EU’s actions in this dispute. The EU has admitted that there remains a disagreement as to whether the EU has complied in this dispute.
- Under the EU’s own view, therefore, the EU should be providing a status report. Yet it has failed to do so.
- The only difference that we can see is that, now that the EU is a *responding* party, the EU is choosing to contradict the reading of DSU Article 21.6 it has long promoted.
- The EU’s purported rationale is that it need not provide a status report because it is pursuing a second compliance panel under Article 21.5 of the DSU. But as the United States has explained at past DSB meetings, there is nothing in Article 21.6 of the DSU to support this position.
- In short, the conduct of every Member when acting as a responding party, including the EU, shows that WTO Members understand that a responding party has no obligation under DSU Article 21.6 to continue supplying status reports once that Member announces that it has implemented the DSB’s recommendations.
- As the EU allegedly disagrees with this position, it should for future meetings provide status reports. At this meeting, it should welcome the opportunity we are affording it to update the DSB for the first time with any detail on its alleged implementation efforts.

4. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY OPINIONS ON ISSUES NOT NECESSARY TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE

- The United States requested this agenda item to draw Members’ attention to an important systemic issue with significant implications for the operation of the dispute settlement system: the issuance by WTO panels and the Appellate Body of findings not necessary to resolve a dispute, including statements or interpretations that are not necessary or even on issues not presented in a dispute. These are often referred to as “advisory opinions”, which are commonly defined as “a non-binding statement on a point of law given by [an adjudicator] before a case is tried or with respect to a hypothetical situation.”¹
- The United States has long been concerned with the issuance by WTO adjudicators of such advisory opinions. Such advisory opinions often appear to be an attempt by a panel or the Appellate Body to “make law” rather than resolve a particular dispute. They are contrary to core principles enshrined in the text of the WTO Agreement² and the Dispute Settlement Understanding,³ setting out distinct roles for WTO Members, on the one hand, and WTO adjudicators, on the other. Advisory opinions also run directly counter to the specific mandate we WTO Members have agreed for WTO adjudicators, and therefore breach WTO rules.
- Through this statement today, the United States again attempts to facilitate a broader discussion among Members on whether we understand and respect the rules we have written and agreed to. To facilitate this discussion, in this statement we will highlight several aspects of this issue for Members.
- First, the United States will highlight the relevant text of the WTO Agreement and DSU that makes clear that the purpose of the dispute settlement system is not to produce interpretations or to “make law” in the abstract, but rather to help Members resolve a specific dispute. Accordingly, the text of the DSU specifically empowers a WTO panel to make findings that will assist the DSB in making a recommendation to a Member to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with WTO rules – but not to make other findings, statements, or interpretations.
- Second, we draw Members’ attention to the dispute settlement rules and procedures of the GATT, from which the relevant provisions of the DSU were drawn. The GATT

¹ See, e.g., Oxford Dictionaries, “advisory opinion” (https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/advisory_opinion).

² *Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization* (“WTO Agreement”).

³ *Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (“DSU”).

dispute settlement language was substantially the same, and there is no question that the GATT did not provide for advisory opinions.

- Third, we will draw attention to the fact that WTO Members have not given panels or the Appellate Body the power to give “advisory opinions,” and this is significant in contrast with what parties have agreed for some other international tribunals.
- Fourth, we will draw Members’ attention to troubling instances of advisory opinions issued by the Appellate Body and note that some Members have recognized and criticized any such approach to this important issue.
- Fifth, we will conclude by explaining the serious consequences for the WTO dispute settlement system of the failure of panels and the Appellate Body to only make those findings necessary to resolve a dispute.

I. The Purpose of WTO Dispute Settlement is to Resolve Trade Disputes, Not Make Law

- Members established the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to administer the WTO dispute settlement system in accordance with the DSU.⁴
- The dispute settlement system, which is but one component of the larger multilateral trading system, plays an important, but focused role. The DSU defines the purpose of the dispute settlement system. In Article 3.7, WTO Members agreed: “The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.” Thus, the aim of the dispute settlement system is *not* to produce interpretations or “make law” in the abstract. And as we will discuss, within this focused role, WTO panels are charged with a specific task – assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the DSU – and the Appellate Body is similarly charged with assisting the DSB (albeit in an even more limited, focused capacity).
- In contrast to the focused role of dispute settlement “to secure a positive solution to the dispute”, WTO Members did create a mechanism to provide interpretations of the WTO agreements in the abstract. In Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, WTO Members reserved for themselves acting in the Ministerial Conference or General Council “the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations” of the WTO agreements.

⁴DSU Art. 2.1.

- If this were not clear enough, the DSU expressly provides that the dispute settlement mechanism is “without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation” of the WTO agreements through that process under the WTO Agreement.⁵
- To achieve the focused “aim of the dispute settlement mechanism ... to secure a positive solution to a dispute,”⁶ Members established in the DSU particular processes for resolving disputes promptly, including panels, and the Appellate Body where appropriate, assisting the DSB for this purpose.
- Where a dispute between Members arises, the dispute settlement process typically begins with a request for consultations submitted in accordance with Article 4 of the DSU. As Members are aware, the request for consultations must include an “identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the complaint.”⁷ Even at this early stage, Members are required to identify the measures at issue, and not simply request consultations concerning an abstract interpretative legal issue. This is reinforced by Article 3.3 of the DSU, which makes clear that WTO dispute settlement involves “situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member.”
- If consultations fail to resolve a dispute, a Member may then submit a request to the DSB, in which the Members ask the DSB to establish a panel.⁸ In that request, the Member is required to “identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.”⁹ So here again, the DSU is not concerned with hypothetical measures or abstract legal questions. A complainant “shall ... identify” with specificity the measures at issue and “shall ... provide” the legal basis for the complaint. A panel request would not comply with the DSU if it merely requested the DSB to establish a panel to provide an

⁵ Article 3.9 of the DSU provides that “[t]he provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.”

⁶ *See also*, DSU Art. 3.3 (making clear that the prompt settlement of “situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member” is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO.); DSU Art. 3.4 (providing that the DSB’s recommendations and rulings “shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.”).

⁷ DSU Art. 4.4.

⁸ DSU Art. 6.

⁹ DSU Art 6.2.

interpretation of a covered agreement in the abstract or make a finding on a hypothetical measure.

- The DSU establishes standard terms of reference for a panel in Article 7. The DSB charges the panel with two tasks: to “examine ... the matter referred to the DSB” in the panel request and “to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations” provided for in the DSU.¹⁰
- And Article 19.1 of the DSU is, again, explicit in what that recommendation is: “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” Thus, a finding that a challenged measure is inconsistent with a WTO rule set out in a covered agreement necessarily leads to a recommendation to bring the measure into compliance with that agreement.
- It is through such a finding of WTO-inconsistency and through such a recommendation “to bring the measure into conformity” that panels and the Appellate Body carry out the terms of reference “to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations” provided for in the covered agreements.¹¹
- Members reinforced in Article 11 that the “function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under [the DSU].”¹² Members reinforced that a panel assists the DSB through the tasks set out in the panel’s terms of reference. In particular, DSU Article 11 states that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter and such findings “as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.”¹³
- Thus, the text of the DSU establishes that the DSB tasks a panel only with making those findings as would assist the DSB in making the recommendation provided for in the covered agreements – that is, to bring a measure found to be inconsistent with a WTO agreement into conformity with that agreement.
- The inverse is equally clear: it would *not* be within a panel’s terms of reference under Article 7.1, nor would it be consistent with a panel’s function under Article 11, to make findings that *cannot* “assist the DSB in making [its] recommendations” to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with WTO rules. Put more succinctly, a panel

¹⁰ DSU Art. 7.1.

¹¹ DSU Art. 7.1.

¹² DSU Art. 11.

¹³ DSU Art. 11.

would act contrary to these articles by issuing advisory opinions, or findings on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute.

- The same applies to the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body’s task under the DSU is limited to assisting the DSB in discharging its functions under the DSU. Under Article 17.6, an appeal is “limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel”. Further, under Article 17.13, the Appellate Body is only authorized to “uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.”
- Since a panel’s function under DSU Article 11 is “to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities” under the DSU, the Appellate Body, in reviewing a panel’s legal conclusion or interpretation, is thus also assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities to find whether the responding Member’s measure is consistent with WTO rules.¹⁴
- And so just as a panel may not ignore its terms of reference as established by the DSB to make findings that cannot “assist the DSB in making [its] recommendations”, so too the Appellate Body is not authorized to go beyond the panel’s terms of reference to issue findings on issues unnecessary to resolve a dispute.
- At this point, it is worth noting two provisions of the DSU that some have misunderstood as suggesting panels and the Appellate Body can render advisory opinions.
- The first is the reference to “clarify[ing] the existing provisions of the covered agreements” in Article 3.2 of the DSU. Article 3.2 provides in relevant part:

The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.
- The “it” in the second sentence of Article 3.2 refers to the subject of the first sentence, “the dispute settlement system of the WTO”. In other words, Members recognized that *the dispute settlement system of the WTO* – as set out in the DSU – serves to preserve the

¹⁴ Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, DSU Article 19.1 provides in mandatory terms that “*it shall* recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.”

rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and *the dispute settlement system of the WTO* – as set out in the DSU – serves to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements.

- As we have seen, the dispute settlement system – as set out in the DSU – charges panels and the Appellate Body with making such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendation set out in the DSU, and through that function it serves to preserve Members’ rights and obligations and to clarify existing provisions.
- Furthermore, this text of Article 3.2 is neither a directive to panels or the Appellate Body nor an authorization for them. There is no “shall” or “may” in this text. Instead, it is a statement of what Members have agreed flows from the system when it operates in accordance with the provisions agreed by Members.
- The second provision that is sometimes misread is Article 17.12 of the DSU, which provides that “[t]he Appellate Body shall address each of the issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate proceeding.”
- The ordinary meaning of “address” is to “[t]hink about and begin to deal with (an issue or problem)”.¹⁵ That is, to address an issue is not necessarily to resolve that issue. This term can also be contrasted with the immediate context of Article 17.13, which refers to a panel’s “legal findings and conclusions”. That is, Article 17.12 does not direct the Appellate Body to “make legal findings and conclusions” on each of the issues raised in the appeal.
- Similarly, it is useful to note that Article 7.2 of the DSU also states that “panels shall address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute.”
- As WTO Members well know, panels and the Appellate Body have often “addressed” an issue through the exercise of judicial economy. As the Appellate Body stated more than 20 years ago in endorsing judicial economy: “Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU [to settle disputes], we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.”¹⁶

¹⁵ Oxford Dictionaries, “address” (third definition) (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/address>).

¹⁶ *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (AB)*, WT/DS33/AB/R, at 19.

- If a finding would not assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with a covered agreement, the only proper way to “address” such an issue would be to refrain from issuing a finding. Thus, it would be incorrect to read the word “address” as permitting the Appellate Body or a panel to make findings on issues that would not assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities.
- Neither DSU Article 3.2 nor DSU Article 17.12, then, provides any authority to give advisory opinions.

II. Advisory Opinions Were Not Permitted under the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures

- The United States also notes that the lack of authority for panels and the Appellate Body to issue advisory opinions in WTO dispute settlement is consistent with the lack of such authority under the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures.
- In fact, the text of several provisions of the DSU are carried over directly from the GATT procedures as reflected, for instance, in the *Decision of 12 April 1989 on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures* (or “Montreal Rules”). There was no question that GATT dispute settlement did not authorize advisory opinions.
- Provisions of the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures – provisions nearly identical to analogous provisions of the DSU – confirm that GATT panels functioned to assist the Contracting Parties in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the GATT.
- For example, paragraph F(a) of the Montreal Rules required panel requests to “indicate whether consultations were held, and provide a brief summary of the factual and legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” Just like DSU Article 6.2, this demonstrates that GATT dispute settlement was not concerned with hypothetical measures or abstract legal questions.
- Paragraph F(b)(1) of the Montreal Rules provided that GATT panels would have following standard terms of reference:

To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by (name of contracting party) in document L/... and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2.

- Just like DSU Article 7.1, this text made explicit that GATT panels functioned to assist the Contracting Parties in making the recommendations to bring a measure found inconsistent with the GATT into conformity with those rules. The terms of reference of GATT panels, like WTO panels today, did not empower them to make interpretations in the abstract.

- In addition, paragraph A1 of the Montreal Rules provides the following:

Contracting parties recognize that the dispute settlement system of GATT serves to preserve the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the General Agreement *and to clarify the existing provisions of the General Agreement*. It is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.

- This is identical, in relevant part, to the language in DSU Article 3.2 on the WTO dispute settlement system preserving the rights and obligations of Members and serving to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements. The use of “clarify” in this text, like its use in DSU Article 3.2, did not authorize GATT panels to provide interpretations in the abstract, on issues not necessary to resolve the particular dispute. Rather, it was simply a statement of what Contracting Parties agreed flowed from the GATT dispute settlement system when it operated in accordance with the agreed provisions.
- That much of the DSU text tracks the GATT dispute settlement rules and procedures is not surprising as the DSU, as reflected in the provisions we have examined, carried forward the understanding that the “aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES [in dispute settlement] has always been to secure a positive solution to the dispute”.¹⁷ By choosing the same structure and words, the Contracting Parties were choosing to maintain an approach to dispute settlement under the GATT through the DSU. That approach under the GATT was never understood as giving adjudicators the authority to make interpretations in the abstract that are not necessary to resolve a dispute. That same language when carried forward into the DSU also does not provide panels and the Appellate Body any authority to give advisory opinions.

III. WTO Members have not given panels or the Appellate Body the power to give “advisory” opinions as some international tribunals have.

- The text of the DSU and WTO Agreement make clear that panels and the Appellate Body do not have the authority to issue advisory opinions. This stands in contrast to the

¹⁷ Annex: Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement, L/4907, para. 4.

authority explicitly provided to some other international tribunals in their respective legal texts.

- For example, the United Nations Charter explicitly provides that the International Court of Justice may be requested to provide “an advisory opinion on any legal question”.¹⁸ And the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is annexed to and an integral part of the United Nations Charter¹⁹, explicitly provides that the International Court of Justice may provide an advisory opinion:

The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.²⁰

- The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea sets out in Articles 159²¹ and 191²², that the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea may give “an advisory opinion on the conformity with th[e] Convention of a proposal” or on other legal questions.
- The explicit authority to provide advisory opinions can also be found in the constitutive texts of certain other international adjudicative fora, including the European Court of

¹⁸ See UN Charter, Art.96(a) (“The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.”) and Art. 96(b) (“Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.”).

¹⁹ UN Charter, Art. 92 (“The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.”).

²⁰ Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art.65.

²¹ Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Art. 159(10) (“Upon a written request addressed to the President and sponsored by at least one fourth of the members of the Authority for an advisory opinion on the conformity with this Convention of a proposal before the Assembly on any matter, the Assembly shall request the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to give an advisory opinion thereon...”).

²² Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Art. 191 (“The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.”).

Human Rights²³, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights²⁴, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.²⁵

- Unlike the agreement governing these other tribunals, however, the DSU contains no provision authorizing a panel or the Appellate Body to provide an advisory opinion. To the contrary, as we have seen, the DSU sets out specific terms of reference for the panel and Appellate Body, charging them to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with a covered agreement. A WTO adjudicator's findings are therefore limited to those findings necessary to resolve a given dispute.

IV. The Appellate Body's Issuance of Advisory Opinions

- Members agreed the DSB would assign a specific function to a panel and the Appellate Body – to make such finding as will assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with a covered agreement. Early on, the Appellate Body appeared to recognize this important but limited role for WTO adjudicators.
- In an early dispute – *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses* – the Appellate Body framed the work of the Appellate Body and panels in the following manner:

Given the explicit aim of dispute settlement that permeates the DSU, we do not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to “make law” by

²³ European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 31 (“The Grand Chamber shall... (c) consider requests for advisory opinions submitted under Article 47.”) and Art. 47 (“The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto.”).

²⁴ Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 4(1) (“At the request of a Member State of the OAU, the OAU, any of its organs, or any African organization recognized by the OAU, the Court may provide an opinion on any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission.”).

²⁵ American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 64 (“1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international instruments.”); Statute of the Inter-American Court, Art. 2 (“The Court shall exercise adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction: 1. Its adjudicatory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 61, 62 and 63 of the Convention, and 2. Its advisory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Article 64 of the Convention.”).

clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a particular dispute. A panel need only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.²⁶

We note, furthermore, that Article IX of the WTO Agreement provides that the Ministerial Conference and the General Council have the ‘exclusive authority’ to adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements.²⁷

- The Appellate Body appropriately recognized the distinction between the role of Members – with the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO agreements – and the role of a panel and the Appellate Body to assist the DSB in resolving a particular dispute.
- Similarly, in *US – Customs Bonding*, the Appellate Body observed that “it is certainly not the task of either panels or the Appellate Body to amend the DSU or to adopt interpretations within the meaning of Article IX:2 of the *WTO Agreement*. Only WTO Members have the authority to amend the DSU or to adopt such interpretations.”²⁸
- Over time, however, the Appellate Body has departed from the limited role agreed to by Members. Beyond assisting in resolving the dispute before it, the Appellate Body has improperly stepped into the role of the Membership: increasingly, the Appellate Body first wades into issues not necessary to resolve the dispute, and then circulates interpretations of the WTO Agreements that it considers binding on Members.
- As Members know, the United States has been raising concerns about advisory opinions by WTO adjudicators, and increasingly by the Appellate Body, for over 16 years.²⁹ Despite the complexity that such advisory opinions can add to a report, and the need to understand a dispute in some detail in order to discern when an adjudicator has given an advisory opinion, we find numerous instances when Members have detected an advisory opinion by the Appellate Body and spoken out against those efforts. The range of Members speaking out on this issue is informative.
- For example, in *Canada – Continued Suspension* and *United States – Continued Suspension*, 10 WTO Members spoke in the DSB to question the authority of the

²⁶ *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (AB)*, page 19.

²⁷ *US – Wool Shirts and Blouses (AB)*, pages 19-20.

²⁸ *US – Customs Bonding (AB)*, para. 92.

²⁹ See 2018 President’s Trade Policy Agenda, at 26-27.

Appellate Body to “recommend” that the DSB request that certain Members initiate further dispute settlement proceedings. The so-called “recommendation” served no purpose in assisting the DSB to resolve the dispute before it and was directly contrary to Article 19.1 of the DSU. The United States and other Members were critical of the Appellate Body’s approach:

- For example, Canada stated: “Since no finding of inconsistency existed, the Appellate Body’s recommendation ... could not constitute a recommendation within the meaning of Article 19.1 of the DSU and was, therefore, without legal consequence.”³⁰
 - Argentina recalled that “the authority to make recommendations in Article 19.1 was contingent on the prior conclusion that a measure was inconsistent with a covered agreement.” That being the case, Argentina asked, “[i]n the case at issue, there was no finding of inconsistency, so on what grounds could the Appellate Body recommend, let alone suggest, to the parties what action they should take with respect to their dispute?”³¹
 - Chile “regretted the inclusion of that recommendation, which in Chile’s view did not help to settle this dispute.”³²
 - Australia³³, Costa Rica³⁴, Ecuador³⁵, Korea³⁶, Japan³⁷, and Mexico³⁸ all made similar statements questioning the authority of the Appellate Body to make a recommendation absent any finding of inconsistency with respect to the measures at issue in these disputes.
- In the same disputes, the Appellate Body also strayed from the issues necessary to resolve the dispute to opine on the application of the DSU in the post-suspension stage of a dispute. Even where some Members agreed in principle with the Appellate Body’s

³⁰ DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 43.

³¹ DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 25.

³² DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 31.

³³ See DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 27.

³⁴ See DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 33.

³⁵ See DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 15.

³⁶ See DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 28.

³⁷ See DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), paras. 23-24.

³⁸ DSB Meeting Minutes November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 17.

statements, the United States and other Members criticized the Appellate Body's overreach:

- Chile, after recalling the ongoing work by Members on the very issue of post-retaliation in the context of negotiations to amend the DSU, observed that “the Appellate Body was imposing its own authority over and above the work which was being carried out by Members, and which was solely their responsibility, and by determining which procedures should, in its opinion, be followed in such circumstances, the Appellate Body was creating new rights and obligations for all WTO Members. Furthermore, in setting out a new procedure, it had established new courses of action with practical application or implications that had not yet been evaluated, as was the case when each party initiated its own proceedings.”³⁹
- Argentina agreed, stating that “the evaluation of the appropriateness of the different options offered by the DSU was not only the responsibility of Members, but required the type of analysis which, in particular circumstances, nobody could perform better than Members.”⁴⁰
- In another instance, *China – Publications and Audiovisual Products*, the Appellate Body made findings on the applicability of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994 to a claim under China's Protocol of Accession. The Appellate Body made this finding despite the fact that both parties had indicated during the appeal it was not necessary to resolve this issue, and the panel had appropriately avoided resolving it.
 - In its statement to the DSB, Japan stressed that “there would be a risk that the complex issue of law, the novel one in particular, could be prematurely, and possibly improperly, decided by [an] adjudicative body of appellate jurisdiction in situations where the issue was not well presented by the parties and not fully explored or developed by lower tribunals.” Japan concluded that “the resolution of the availability of Article XX defense should have been saved for another day when the resolution of the issue was absolutely necessary and the issue would be more properly presented and fully explored.”⁴¹
- A further example is the Appellate Body's report in *Argentina – Financial Services*. This appeal raised a number of issues under the GATS provisions on national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and the prudential exception. The Appellate Body resolved the appeal on the first, threshold issue of “likeness.”

³⁹ DSB Meeting Minutes, November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 30.

⁴⁰ DSB Meeting Minutes, November 14, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/258), para. 26.

⁴¹ DSB Meeting Minutes January 19, 2010 (WT/DSB/M/278), paras. 83-84.

- The United States addressed this report extensively in its statement to the DSB. Members may recall that, despite resolving the appeal on the initial threshold issue, the Appellate Body went on to consider issues that the Appellate Body itself considered not necessary to resolve the dispute. As the report states:

Our reversal of these findings [on likeness] means that the Panel's findings on "treatment no less favourable" are moot because they were based on the Panel's findings that the relevant services and service suppliers are "like". Moreover, as a consequence of our reversal of the Panel's "likeness" findings, there remains no finding of inconsistency with the GATS. This, in turn, renders moot the Panel's analysis . . . pursuant to Article XIV(c) of the GATS and . . . paragraph 2(a) of the GATS Annex on Financial Services.⁴²

- But after clarifying that all of the Panel's findings other than "likeness" were rendered moot, the Appellate Body one paragraph later stated that: "[S]everal of the issues raised in Panama's appeal have implications for the interpretation of provisions of the GATS. With these considerations in mind, we turn to address the issues raised in Panama's appeals."⁴³ The Appellate Body then undertook an analysis – 46 pages – that was in the nature of obiter dicta.
- In other words, the Appellate Body acknowledged that (1) it had already considered all issues necessary to help resolve the dispute, yet (2) it would nevertheless address additional interpretive issues under the GATS.
- *Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes*, adopted last year, offers another example. The Appellate Body made a threshold finding concerning Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 that alone resolved the dispute. Indeed, the United States explained in its submission that the Appellate Body's analysis should end there if it made this threshold finding. Several third parties also suggested the Appellate Body should address only those issues necessary to resolve the dispute. Yet, the report went on to substantively address other claims, the outcome of which would have no effect on the recommendations in the dispute, as the Appellate Body itself acknowledged.⁴⁴
- Most striking was a GATT 1994 Article XX claim appealed by Indonesia, where the Appellate Body expressly *agreed* with the United States that addressing the claim was

⁴² *Argentina – Financial Services (AB)*, para. 6.83.

⁴³ *Argentina – Financial Services (AB)*, para. 6.84.

⁴⁴ *Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (AB)*, paras. 5.63, 5.102-103.

not necessary.⁴⁵ The report nonetheless discusses the legal standard under Article XX at some length and then, without analysis or further explanation, declares the Panel's findings moot and of no legal effect.⁴⁶ The preceding discussion of Article XX, therefore, was unnecessary to resolve the dispute.

- Lastly, we note the appellate report in *EU – PET (Pakistan)*.
- The EU appealed the panel's issuance of findings in this dispute. The EU argued that "WTO dispute settlement proceedings are intended to secure a positive solution to a dispute and should not serve as a vehicle to obtain 'advisory opinions' on legal matters."⁴⁷ The EU observed that "[t]here are other procedures that allow Members to obtain an authoritative interpretation of particular provisions of a covered agreement."⁴⁸ The EU argued at length that it is not the role of the dispute settlement system to offer advisory opinions not necessary to resolve a dispute. Yet, the Appellate Body did so anyway.
- The United States agreed with the EU that the approach of the panel and the Appellate Body raise serious concerns. Pakistan had made clear that it did not seek a recommendation on the EU measure that expired in the course of the panel proceedings. This fact alone confirms that there was no dispute between the parties. In that sense, Pakistan was seeking an advisory opinion regarding the application of the Subsidies Agreement in the future. As Pakistan requested findings with respect to the interpretation and application of the Subsidies Agreement, but no recommendation on the challenged EU measure, the panel and the Appellate Body should have found Pakistan's request to be outside the terms of reference. There was no finding that would assist the DSB in making the recommendation because Pakistan had requested no recommendation be made.
- As with the other reports discussed, the reports in the *EU – PET (Pakistan)* dispute were not necessary to resolve a dispute, but rather – as the EU rightly pointed out in its appeal – an exercise in making advisory opinions.
- These examples are just a few of the instances in which the Appellate Body has taken it upon itself to offer interpretations not necessary to the resolution of a dispute.

⁴⁵ *Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (AB)*, paras. 5.102-103.

⁴⁶ *Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes (AB)*, paras. 5.91-101, 5.103.

⁴⁷ *EU – PET (Pakistan) (AB)*, para. 5.31.

⁴⁸ *EU – PET (Pakistan) (AB)*, para. 5.31.

- Under the guise of providing clarifications to assist Members in future disputes, the Appellate Body's conduct contravenes the limited role agreed to by Members: to review issues of law and legal interpretation covered in a panel report that will assist the DSB in finding whether the responding Member's measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement.

V. Conclusion

- In conclusion, the text of the DSU and WTO Agreement make clear that panels and the Appellate Body are only to issue those findings necessary to resolve a dispute, and specifically, findings that will assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a measure found to be inconsistent with a WTO agreement into conformity with that agreement.
- WTO Members reserved for themselves the exclusive authority to issue authoritative interpretations of the WTO agreements, and they agreed they would adopt such interpretations in the Ministerial Conference or the General Council, not the DSB.
- The United States has long expressed concerns with the issuance of advisory opinions by WTO adjudicators, and increasingly by the Appellate Body, and we have reviewed certain reports in which other Members recognized those concerns.
- This is another example of a failure by the Appellate Body to follow the rules agreed by Members in the WTO agreements. Several immediate consequences flow from this problem. To list a few:
 - As with other systemic problems identified by the United States, advisory opinions will add time to a proceeding and move the system further away from the principle of prompt settlement reflected in DSU Article 3;
 - Advisory opinions add to the complexity of a report and add to the burdens of Members in future disputes when considering past reports bearing on a legal issue;
 - Advisory opinions risk adding to or diminishing a Member's rights and obligations under the covered agreements, inconsistent with DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2; and
 - By opining on issues that are not before it, and on which the parties may not have engaged fully, or for which relevant facts may not have been fully developed, an advisory opinion risks not taking into account all the facets of an issue.

- Ultimately, the failure of a WTO adjudicator to follow the rules set out in the DSU governing their role and function risks further eroding support for the dispute settlement system and the WTO as a whole.
- We look forward to engaging with Members on this important issue.

8. CHINA – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS542/8)

- The United States recalls that all WTO Members, including China, have committed through the *Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights* (TRIPS Agreement) to provide certain protections for intellectual property rights, a core element of a free and fair international trading system. Among those intellectual property rights are the commitments to protect exclusive rights of patent holders and to accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favorable than that the Member accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.
- China agreed to these commitments when it acceded to the WTO. However, for the past several years, the United States has repeatedly raised concerns about China's policies relating to technology licensing that do not comport with China's WTO commitments.
- China's policies consistently seek to disadvantage foreign companies for the benefit of Chinese industry. The policies deny foreign patent holders, including U.S. companies, basic patent rights to stop a Chinese entity from using the technology after a licensing contract ends. China also imposes mandatory adverse contract terms that discriminate against and are less favorable for imported foreign technology.
- These policies, reflected in Chinese legal instruments, are inconsistent with Articles 3 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement because they fail to provide the intellectual property rights to which China committed when it acceded to the WTO.
- Prior to initiating this dispute, the United States attempted to resolve these issues with China bilaterally. The United States and China also held formal dispute settlement consultations in July. However, these efforts failed to resolve the U.S. concerns.
- Accordingly, the United States is requesting that the DSB establish a panel to examine the matter set out in our panel request with standard terms of reference.

9. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY CHINA (WT/DS544/8)

- The United States is not surprised that China has submitted a panel request in this dispute. China's actions follow a pattern of using the WTO dispute settlement system as an instrument to promote its non-market economic policies.
- Those non-market policies and practices have been widely recognized by WTO Members as leading to massive excess capacity and distortions of world markets. Those non-market policies and practices are damaging the interests of market-oriented economies, our businesses and workers.
- China's policies have created and maintained excess capacity in steel and aluminum and undermine the basic fairness of international trade.
- China's non-market policies also have led to global conditions in which core U.S. industries, which are vital to our national security, are not able to survive and invest for the future on market-based terms.
- The United States President has determined that, under these conditions, imports of steel and aluminum threaten to impair U.S. national security.
- We will not allow China's Party-State to fatally undermine the U.S. steel and aluminum industries, on which the U.S. military, and by extension global security, rely.
- The United States has given detailed explanations that the measures at issue are justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that these imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- WTO Members are well aware that the steel and aluminum sectors have been suffering under conditions of massive excess capacity. China's non-market economic system, driven by its industrial policy, has created new plant and maintenance of existing production contrary to market signals. In this circumstance, it is impossible for market economic actors in WTO Members such as the United States, the European Union, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and others, to earn a sufficient return on the market to remain viable over the longer term.

- The United States is not the only WTO Member with these concerns. A joint proposal from the European Union, Japan, Mexico, and the United States warned that “overcapacity is a major cause of distortions to international trade. [I]t has societal consequences which are a contributing factor to negative sentiment regarding international trade.”⁴⁹
- China’s non-market economic system and the policies it generates in the steel and aluminum sectors are recognized as a global problem. The September 2018 Global Steel Forum Ministerial Report stated: “[E]xcess steelmaking capacity ... depresses prices, undermines profitability, generates damaging trade distortions, jeopardizes the very existence of companies and branches across the world, creates regional imbalances, undermines the fight against environmental challenges and dangerously destabilizes world trading relations.”⁵⁰
- This year, the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting reached a similar conclusion: “[S]evere excess capacity in key sectors such as steel and aluminum are serious concerns for the proper functioning of international trade, the creation of innovative technologies and the sustainable growth of the global economy. This is exacerbated by government-financed and supported capacity expansion, unfair competitive conditions caused by large market-distorting subsidies and state owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and local content requirements and preferences.”⁵¹
- The United States reached out to China, year after year, in our bilateral dialogues and asked China to address the problem of excess capacity in the steel and aluminum industries.
- The United States has discussed with China, year after year, the importance of completing the transition to a market economy and the commitments China made to do so from the very first day that it joined the World Trade Organization as a Member.
- Year after year, China made promises it did not keep, and year after year, China has avoided taking actions that would have addressed the crisis affecting global steel and aluminum.

⁴⁹ G/SCM/W/569.

⁵⁰ Global Steel Forum Ministerial Report, Sept. 20, 2018, p. 1.

⁵¹ OECD 2018 Ministerial Council Meeting, Statement by the Chair of the Ministerial Council Meeting.

- The result is a staggering level of global overcapacity in steel and aluminum that is directly attributable to China. According to the OECD, between 2000 and 2016, China added new steelmaking capacity equivalent to the combined steelmaking capacity of the rest of the world. And since 2008 alone, China has added more than 500 million metric tons in new capacity – that is more than the combined capacity of the United States, European Union, and Japan.
- The aluminum market has faced these same disturbing trends: In 2016, China accounted for well over 50 percent of global aluminum capacity, and since 2008, China has added 30 million metric tons in new capacity – that is more than the current combined capacity of the nine largest producers after China.
- For all these reasons, the United States had no choice but to take action to address these crises. The U.S. measures are national security actions, taken pursuant to a national security statute. And the clear and unequivocal U.S. position, maintained consistently for over 70 years, is that issues of national security are political in nature and are not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement system.
- Some Members have expressed concerns that invoking the national security exception would undermine the international trading system. This is erroneous, and completely backwards. Rather, what threatens the international trading system is that China is attempting to use the WTO dispute settlement system to prevent any action by any Member to address its unfair, trade-distorting policies.
- China's choice to pursue dispute settlement against Members defending their legitimate interests would make WTO rules an instrument for China to protect its non-market behavior, rather than promoting fair, market-based competition that improves the welfare of all our citizens.
- As we explained at the April 2018 DSB meeting, the WTO dispute settlement system should not be used as a defense for those Members that choose to adopt policies that can be shown to undermine the fairness and balance of the international trading system. If this is the case, then the WTO and the international trading system will lose all credibility and support among our citizens.
- For these reasons, we will not agree to establishment of a panel today.

10. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/DS548/14)

- The United States is deeply disappointed that the European Union has submitted a panel request in this dispute. This action is misdirected. It does not address the damage to the international trading system posed by the creation and maintenance of non-market economic conditions in the steel and aluminum sectors.
- In fact, rather than support the international trading system by taking action to resolve the underlying concerns, the European Union is undermining the trading system by asking the WTO to do what it was never intended to do. It is simply not the WTO's role, nor its competence, to review a sovereign nation's judgment of its essential security interests.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- In March 2018, the United States provided information to the Council on Trade in Goods in relation to the proclamations issued by the President of the United States pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, consistent with the Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 30 November 1982.⁵²
- In the U.S. reply to the consultation requests challenging the 232 measures, the United States clearly stated: "Issues of national security are political matters not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement."⁵³ We therefore do not understand the purpose of this request for panel establishment, seeking WTO findings that the United States has breached certain WTO provisions. The WTO cannot, consistent with Article XXI, consider those claims or make the requested findings.

⁵² GATT Council, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement – Decision of 30 November 1982, L/5426 (2 December 1982).

⁵³ See e.g., WT/DS548/13.

- The clear and unequivocal U.S. position, for over 70 years, is that issues of national security are not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement system.
- No WTO Member can be surprised by this view. For decades, the United States, as well as other WTO Members, has consistently held the position that actions taken pursuant to Article XXI are not subject to review in GATT or WTO dispute settlement. Each sovereign has the power to decide, for itself, what actions are essential to its security, as is reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI.⁵⁴ Not surprisingly, this has also been the view of the European Union and its member States.
- For instance, in 1949, with respect to a dispute with the then-Czechoslovakia, the view of the United States was that the claim alleging a breach of GATT commitments could not be reviewed consistent with Article XXI. The United Kingdom agreed, explaining that “since the question clearly concerned Article XXI, the United States action would seem to be justified because every country must have the last resort on questions relating to its own security.”⁵⁵
- Indeed, in 1982, when certain European actions were before the GATT Council, this is precisely the position that the European Economic Community took. The Community stated that Article XXI was a reflection of a Member’s “inherent rights.” They stressed that “the exercise of these rights constituted a general exception, and required neither notification, justification, nor approval, a procedure confirmed by thirty-five years of implementation of the General Agreement . . . [since] every contracting party was – in the last resort – the judge of its exercise of these rights.”⁵⁶ Lest anyone consider this was not an official position, the European Community then communicated the same views to the GATT Contracting Parties through a written communication.⁵⁷
- At that same meeting, the United States supported the European Community’s position. The United States stated that the “GATT, by its own terms, left it to each contracting

⁵⁴ GATT 1994 Article XXI(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action *which it considers necessary* for the protection of *its essential security interests* . . . (italics added).

⁵⁵ GATT/CP.3/SR.22, p. 3.

⁵⁶ C/M/157, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Communication to the Members of the GATT Council, L/5319/Rev.1 (noting “the European Community and its Member States, Australia and Canada, wish to state the following for the information of members of the Council . . . (b) they have taken these measures on the basis of their inherent rights of which Article XXI of the General Agreement is a reflection”).

party to judge what was necessary to protect its essential security interests in time of international crisis. This was wise in the view of the United States, since no country could participate in GATT if in doing so it gave up the possibility of using any measures, other than military, to protect its security interests.”⁵⁸

- It is striking that the U.S. position on Article XXI today is consistent with the U.S. position in 1982, when European actions were challenged, and consistent with the U.S. position in 1949, when U.S. actions were challenged. It is only the *European* position that has changed today. But *nothing* has changed in the text of Article XXI. We therefore see no principled basis for the EU position today.
- It is not the WTO’s function, nor within its authority, to second guess a sovereign’s national security determination. WTO Members did not abdicate their responsibilities to their citizens to protect their essential security interests when they formed the WTO.
- Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by the European Union. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. We therefore do not see any reason for this matter to proceed further.
- The United States nonetheless would take a few moments to express how misguided this request is in terms of the EU’s own economic interests.
- As noted under the previous item, WTO Members are well aware that the steel and aluminum sectors have been suffering under conditions of massive excess capacity.
- WTO Members have recognized that this situation is untenable, and has resulted in a crisis for the global economic system.
- It is striking that this view has been expressed particularly forcefully by the European Union itself. For example, in the 2017 Global Steel Forum report prepared for the G20, the European Union described the situation in crisis terms: “[G]lobal overcapacity has reached a tipping point—it is so significant that it poses an *existential threat* that the EU *will not accept*. This requires *urgent solutions* addressing its structural causes.”⁵⁹
- We agree with the European Union that overcapacity “poses an existential threat” and “requires urgent solutions.” We wonder how the European Union understands the terms

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report, November 30, 2017, prepared under the direction of the Chair of the G20, para. 126.

“existential threat” and “urgent solutions”, however. Because the United States understands “existential” as “relating to *existence*” and “urgent” as “requiring *immediate* action,” we view the EU’s diagnosis as, in fact, *supporting* the U.S. actions on steel and aluminum.

- Together with the European Union, we have also participated in the Global Steel Forum on Excess Capacity for years, but, let us be honest: no effective solutions have been found. And so, this ongoing “existential threat” calling for “urgent solutions” that the EU “will not accept” has in fact been going on for years, draining public support for an international trading system that permits devastating economic harms to occur – *for years* – without effective remedies.
- We would welcome effective solutions and coordinated actions to address these problems. Rather than working together with us to address the source of non-market economic conditions, however, some Members that share long-standing security relationships with the United States are working to challenge a U.S. national security determination. This is a blatant misuse of the WTO dispute settlement system. We find it troubling and regrettable that the European Union would risk such damage to the WTO – contrary to the longstanding European position on Article XXI.
- The United States has invoked Article XXI for its measures taken pursuant to Section 232. We implemented these measures only after long and careful analysis, and after all trading partners had the chance to address our concerns.
- While the United States has acted in accord with its commitments to protect its legitimate security interests, other WTO Members have not. Rather than work with the United States, they have retaliated with tariffs designed to punish U.S. companies and workers. We will provide remarks on these unjustified and WTO-inconsistent retaliatory tariffs under separate items on the agenda today.
- The United States wishes to be clear: if the WTO were to undertake to review an invocation of Article XXI, this would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO as a whole.
- Infringing on a sovereign’s right to determine, for itself, what is in its own essential security interests would run exactly contrary to the WTO reforms that are necessary in order for this organization to maintain any relevancy.
- For these reasons, the United States will not agree to establishment of the panel requested by the European Union today. We would encourage the European countries to consider carefully their broader economic, political, and security interests.

11. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY CANADA (WT/DS550/11)

- The United States is deeply disappointed that Canada has requested establishment of a panel in this dispute.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- As Canada knows, the position of the United States for over 70 years has been that actions taken pursuant to Article XXI of the GATT 1994 are not subject to review by the WTO. Each sovereign has the power to decide, for itself, what actions are essential to its security, as is reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI.⁶⁰
- As Canada also knows, it has also been the position of Canada that the invocation of Article XXI is not reviewable in dispute settlement. In the same 1982 GATT Council discussion in which the European Community expressed its view that the invocation of Article XXI was self-judging, Canada made a similar and unequivocal statement: “Canada’s sovereign action was to be seen as a political response to a political issue” and “the GATT had neither the competence nor the responsibility to deal with the political issue which had been raised” under Article XXI.⁶¹
- Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by Canada. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. We therefore do not see any reason for this matter to proceed further.
- For these reasons, we cannot agree to establishment of the panel requested by Canada today.

⁶⁰ GATT 1994 Article XXI(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action *which it considers necessary* for the protection of *its essential security interests* ... (italics added).

⁶¹ C/M/157, p. 10.

- The United States notes that Canadian and U.S. authorities have been engaging in constructive discussions towards resolving concerns surrounding these matters, and the United States is hopeful these discussions may be concluded satisfactorily.

12. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY MEXICO (WT/DS551/11)

- The United States is disappointed that Mexico has requested establishment of a panel in this dispute.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- As explained in previous items, the position of the United States for over 70 years has been that actions taken pursuant to Article XXI of the GATT 1994 are not subject to review by the WTO. Each sovereign has the power to decide, for itself, what actions are essential to its security, as is reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI.⁶²
- Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by Mexico. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. We therefore do not see any reason for this matter to proceed further.
- For these reasons, we cannot agree to establishment of the panel requested by Mexico today.
- The United States notes that Mexican and U.S. authorities have been engaging in constructive discussions towards resolving concerns surrounding these matters, and the United States is hopeful these discussions may be concluded satisfactorily.

⁶² GATT 1994 Article XXI(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action *which it considers necessary* for the protection of *its essential security interests* ... (italics added).

13. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY NORWAY (WT/DS552/10)

- The United States is disappointed that Norway has submitted a panel request in this dispute. This action is misdirected. It does not address the damage to the international trading system posed by the creation and maintenance of non-market economic conditions in the steel and aluminum sectors.
- In fact, rather than support the international trading system by taking action to resolve the underlying concerns, Norway is undermining the trading system by asking the WTO to do what it was never intended to do. It is simply not the WTO's role, nor its competence, to review a sovereign nation's judgment of its essential security interests.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- In the U.S. reply to the consultation requests challenging the 232 measures, the United States clearly stated: "Issues of national security are political matters not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement."⁶³ We therefore do not understand the purpose of this request for panel establishment, seeking WTO findings that the United States has breached certain WTO provisions. The WTO cannot, consistent with Article XXI, consider those claims or make the requested findings.
- The clear and unequivocal U.S. position, for over 70 years, is that issues of national security are not matters appropriate for adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement system.
- No WTO Member can be surprised by this view. For decades, the United States, as well as other WTO Members, has consistently held the position that actions taken pursuant to Article XXI are not subject to review in GATT or WTO dispute settlement. Each

⁶³ See e.g., WT/DS548/13.

sovereign has the power to decide, for itself, what actions are essential to its security, as is reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI.⁶⁴

- As noted previously, in 1982, when certain European actions were before the GATT Council, the European Economic Community and its member States stated that Article XXI was a reflection of a Member’s “inherent rights.” They stressed that “the exercise of these rights constituted a general exception, and required neither notification, justification, nor approval, a procedure confirmed by thirty-five years of implementation of the General Agreement . . . [since] every contracting party was – in the last resort – the judge of its exercise of these rights.”⁶⁵
- In that same discussion, Norway supported the EEC and its member States, Canada, and Australia, in their invocation of Article XXI, stating that “in taking the measures . . . [they] did not act in contravention of the General Agreement.”⁶⁶
- As also noted, the United States in the same meeting also supported the European position, stating that the “GATT, by its own terms, left it to each contracting party to judge what was necessary to protect its essential security interests in time of international crisis.”⁶⁷ The position of the United States remains the same in 2018 as it was in 1982, 1949, and indeed during the negotiation of the GATT itself.
- Because the United States has invoked Article XXI, there is no basis for a WTO panel to review the claims of breach raised by Norway. Nor is there any basis for a WTO panel to review the invocation of Article XXI by the United States. We therefore do not see any reason for this matter to proceed further.
- The United States wishes to be clear: if the WTO were to undertake to review an invocation of Article XXI, this would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO as a whole.

⁶⁴ GATT 1994 Article XXI(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action *which it considers necessary* for the protection of *its essential security interests* . . . (italics added).

⁶⁵ C/M/157, p. 10.

⁶⁶ C/M/157, p. 10.

⁶⁷ *Id.*

- Infringing on a sovereign's right to determine, for itself, what is in its own essential security interests would run exactly contrary to the WTO reforms that are necessary in order for this organization to maintain any relevancy.
- For these reasons, the United States will not agree to establishment of the panel requested by Norway today.

14. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (WT/DS554/17)

- The United States refers to the statement made under the previous agenda item.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- In the U.S. reply to the consultation requests challenging the 232 measures, the United States clearly stated: “Issues of national security are political matters not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement.”⁶⁸ We therefore do not understand the purpose of this request for panel establishment, seeking WTO findings that the United States has breached certain WTO provisions. The WTO cannot, consistent with Article XXI, consider those claims or make the requested findings.
- The United States has noted that, for decades, the U.S. position has been that actions taken pursuant to Article XXI are not subject to review in GATT or WTO dispute settlement. Each sovereign has the power to decide, for itself, what actions are essential to its security, as is reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI.⁶⁹ The position of the United States remains the same in 2018 as it was in 1982, 1949, and indeed during the negotiation of the GATT itself.
- In requesting this panel, however, Russia does not even act consistently with the view it expressed in 2017, *less than one year ago*. In another dispute, the United States agreed with Russia’s understanding of Article XXI that a determination that an action is necessary for the protection of a Member’s essential security interests, and a

⁶⁸ See e.g., WT/DS548/13.

⁶⁹ GATT 1994 Article XXI(b) (“Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action *which it considers necessary* for the protection of *its essential security interests* ... (italics added).

determination of what are those essential security interests, is at the sole discretion of that Member.⁷⁰

- The text of Article XXI has not changed in the past year – only Russia’s interests have. That is not a sound basis for understanding WTO rules, nor for preserving the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
- For these reasons, the United States will not agree to establishment of the panel requested by Russia today.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., U.S. Third-Party Submission Regarding GATT Article XXI (Nov. 7, 2017) (available at <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/wto-dispute-settlement/pending-wto-dispute-35>).

15. CANADA – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS557/2)

- Under previous items of the agenda, certain Members have claimed that the United States is breaching WTO rules. That view is erroneous as we have explained that the U.S. actions taken pursuant to Section 232 are fully justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as national security actions.
- At the same time, several of those same WTO Members are unilaterally retaliating against the United States. They pretend that the US actions under Section 232 are so-called “safeguards,” and further pretend that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute suspension of substantially equivalent concessions under the WTO Safeguards Agreement.
- This is hypocritical. Just as those Members appear to be ready to undermine the dispute settlement system by throwing out the plain meaning of Article XXI and 70 years of practice, so too are they ready to undermine the WTO by suggesting they are following WTO rules while taking measures blatantly against those rules.
- And we know from their own actions that many of these Members do not seriously believe that the U.S. actions under Section 232 are safeguard measures. Canada has not even notified the Council for Trade in Goods of its suspension of concessions and other obligations, as it would be required to do under Article 12.5 of the *WTO Agreement on Safeguards* if its duties were in response to a U.S. safeguard action. Thus, even were its action permissible under the Safeguards Agreement, which it is not, Canada does not even follow the WTO rules that would apply to that action.
- To be clear: Article XIX of the GATT 1994 may be invoked by a Member to depart temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased imports. The United States, however, is not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 actions. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are not relevant to the U.S. actions under Section 232, and the United States has not utilized its domestic law on safeguards to take the actions under Section 232.
- Because the United States is not invoking Article XIX, there is no basis for another Member to contend that Article XIX should have been invoked and to use safeguards rules that are simply inapplicable.

- The additional, retaliatory duties are nothing other than duties in excess of Canada's WTO commitments and are applied only to the United States, contrary to Canada's most-favored-nation obligation. The United States will not permit its businesses, farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO-inconsistent way.
- For these reasons, the United States requests that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.

16. CHINA – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS558/2)

- Under previous items of the agenda, certain Members have claimed that the United States is breaching WTO rules. That view is erroneous as we have explained that the U.S. actions taken pursuant to Section 232 are fully justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as national security actions.
- At the same time, some of those very same Members are unilaterally retaliating against the United States, based on the pretense that the actions taken by the United States are so-called “safeguards.” Those WTO Members engage in the further pretense that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute a suspension of substantially equivalent concessions pursuant to the WTO Safeguards Agreement.
- This is hypocritical. Just as those Members eagerly seek to undermine the dispute settlement system by throwing out the plain meaning of Article XXI and 70 years of practice, so too are they prepared to undermine the WTO by taking measures blatantly against WTO rules, all the while pretending they are following the rules.
- China is a prime example. China pretends that it is entitled to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions pursuant to the Safeguards Agreement, but China has not complied with the most basic elements of the Safeguards Agreement that would be necessary for such action. Suspension of concessions and other obligations under the Safeguards Agreement requires a multi-step process that must take place within 90 days from the application of a safeguard measure. That process entails certain procedures and considerations that China has not satisfied to put its suspension of concessions into effect.
- If China truly considered the U.S. actions under Section 232 to be safeguards, it would certainly have respected an obligation to allow 30 days for consultations and to wait 30 days to implement its suspension of concessions. But China did not comply with either of these obligations.
- Moreover, China has not even attempted to address whether its action is in response to an alleged “safeguard” taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports. If there were an absolute increase in imports, the right to suspend substantially equivalent concessions under the Safeguards Agreement may not be exercised for the first three years of the safeguard measure.

- China's blatant disregard for these provisions of the Safeguards Agreement prove that China is not serious about its contention that the U.S. actions under Section 232 are safeguard measures or that China is exercising a right under the Safeguards Agreement.
- To be clear: Article XIX of the GATT 1994 is not applicable to the U.S. actions under Section 232. Article XIX may be invoked by a Member to depart temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased imports. The United States, however, is not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 actions. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are not relevant to the U.S. actions under Section 232, and the United States has not utilized its domestic law on safeguards to take the actions under Section 232.
- Because the United States is not invoking Article XIX, there is no basis for China to pretend that Article XIX should have been invoked and to use safeguards rules that are simply inapplicable.
- China's additional, retaliatory duties are nothing other than duties in excess of China's WTO commitment and are applied only to the United States, contrary to its most-favored-nation obligation. The United States will not permit its businesses, farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO-inconsistent way.
- For these reasons, the United States requests that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.

17. EUROPEAN UNION – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS559/2)

- Under previous items of the agenda, certain Members have claimed that the United States is breaching WTO rules. That view is erroneous as we have explained that the U.S. actions taken pursuant to Section 232 are fully justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as national security actions.
- At the same time, some of those very same Members are unilaterally retaliating against the United States, based on the pretense that the actions taken by the United States are so-called “safeguards.” Those WTO Members engage in the further pretense that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute suspension of substantially equivalent concessions under the WTO Safeguards Agreement.
- This is hypocritical. Just as those Members eagerly seek to undermine the dispute settlement system by throwing out the plain meaning of Article XXI and 70 years of practice, so too are they prepared to undermine the WTO by taking measures blatantly against WTO rules, all the while pretending they are following the rules.
- The European Union’s willingness to disregard WTO rules is apparent in its characterization of the U.S. actions under Section 232 as safeguard measures. This fiction requires the European Union to ignore the facts that contradict its narrative.
- The U.S. actions on steel and aluminum were taken under Section 232, a national security statute that expressly relates to imports that threaten to impair the national security of the United States. The United States President made his determinations on the basis of lengthy and detailed reports by the responsible government department. The U.S. actions were not taken pursuant to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 that authorizes the imposition of a safeguard measure under U.S. domestic law.
- To be clear: Article XIX of the GATT 1994 on safeguards may be invoked by a Member to depart temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased imports. The United States, however, is not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 actions. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are not relevant to the U.S. actions under Section 232.

- Because the United States is not invoking Article XIX, another Member cannot simply act as if Article XIX had been invoked and use that sham pretense to apply safeguards rules that are simply inapplicable.
- The European Union's additional, retaliatory duties are nothing other than duties in excess of the EU's WTO commitments and are applied only to the United States, contrary to its most-favored-nation obligation. The United States will not permit its businesses, farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO-inconsistent way.
- For these reasons, the United States requests that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.

18. MEXICO – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS560/2)

- Under previous items of the agenda, certain Members have claimed that the United States is breaching WTO rules. That view is erroneous as we have explained that the U.S. actions taken pursuant to Section 232 are fully justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994 as national security actions.
- At the same time, some of those very same Members are unilaterally retaliating against the United States, based on the pretense that the actions taken by the United States are so-called “safeguards.” Those WTO Members engage in the further pretense that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute suspension of substantially equivalent concessions under the WTO Safeguards Agreement.
- This is hypocritical. Just as those Members appear to be ready to undermine the dispute settlement system by throwing out the plain meaning of Article XXI and 70 years of practice, so too are they prepared to undermine the WTO by taking measures blatantly against WTO rules, all the while pretending they are following the rules.
- And we know from their own actions that many of these Members do not seriously believe that the U.S. actions under Section 232 are safeguard measures. Mexico has not even notified the Council for Trade in Goods of its suspension of concessions and other obligations, as it would be required to do under Article 12.5 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards if its duties were in response to a U.S. safeguard action. Thus, even were its action permissible under the Safeguards Agreement, which it is not, Mexico does not even follow the WTO rules that would apply to that action.
- To be clear: Article XIX of the GATT 1994 is not applicable to the U.S. actions under Section 232. Article XIX may be invoked by a Member to depart temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased imports. The United States, however, is not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 actions. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are not relevant to the U.S. actions under Section 232, and the United States has not utilized its domestic law on safeguards to take the actions under Section 232.
- Because the United States is not invoking Article XIX, there is no basis for Mexico to pretend that it should have been invoked and to use safeguards rules that are simply inapplicable.

- The increased, retaliatory duties are nothing other than duties applied only to the United States, contrary to Mexico's most-favored-nation obligation. The United States will not permit its businesses, farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO-inconsistent way.
- For these reasons, the United States requests that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.

19. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM PRODUCTS

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY TURKEY (WT/DS564/15)

- The United States refers to the statements made under agenda items 13 and 14.
- The United States has explained that it considers the Section 232 measures necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, and they are therefore justified under Article XXI of the GATT 1994. In particular, we have explained that the U.S. President has determined that these measures are necessary to address the threatened impairment that imports of steel and aluminum articles pose to U.S. national security.
- In the U.S. reply to the consultation requests challenging the 232 measures, the United States clearly stated: “Issues of national security are political matters not susceptible to review or capable of resolution by WTO dispute settlement.”⁷¹ We therefore do not understand the purpose of this request for panel establishment, seeking WTO findings that the United States has breached certain WTO provisions. The WTO cannot, consistent with Article XXI, consider those claims or make the requested findings.
- We would welcome effective solutions and coordinated actions to address the problems created by non-market economic policies and practices creating massive excess capacity in the steel and aluminum sectors. Rather than working together with us to address the source of non-market economic conditions, however, some Members that share long-standing security relationships with the United States are working to challenge a U.S. national security determination. This is a blatant misuse of the WTO dispute settlement system.
- While the United States has acted in accord with its commitments to protect its legitimate security interests, other WTO Members have not. Rather than work with the United States, they have retaliated with tariffs designed to punish U.S. companies and workers. The United States recently requested supplemental WTO consultations with Turkey on its unjustified amended retaliatory tariffs.
- The United States wishes to be clear: if the WTO were to undertake to review an invocation of Article XXI, this would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and even the viability of the WTO as a whole.

⁷¹ See e.g., WT/DS548/13.

- Infringing on a sovereign's right to determine, for itself, what is in its own essential security interests would run exactly contrary to the WTO reforms that are necessary in order for this organization to maintain any relevancy.
- For these reasons, the United States will not agree to establishment of the panel requested by Turkey today.

20. APPELLATE BODY APPOINTMENTS: PROPOSAL BY VARIOUS MEMBERS
(WT/DSB/W/609/REV.5)

- The United States thanks the Chair for the continued work on these issues.
- As we have explained in prior meetings, we are not in a position to support the proposed decision.
- The systemic concerns that we have identified remain unaddressed.
- As the United States explained at the DSB meeting on August 27, 2018, for more than 15 years, across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's disregard for the rules set by WTO Members.
- Through persistent overreaching, the WTO Appellate Body has been adding obligations that were never agreed by the United States and other WTO Members.
- The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda outlined several longstanding U.S. concerns.⁷²
 - The United States has raised repeated concerns that appellate reports have gone far beyond the text setting out WTO rules in varied areas, such as subsidies, antidumping duties, anti-subsidy duties, standards and technical barriers to trade, and safeguards, restricting the ability of the United States to regulate in the public interest or protect U.S. workers and businesses against unfair trading practices.
 - And as we explained under an earlier agenda item, the Appellate Body has issued advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute. Furthermore, we have explained that the Appellate Body has reviewed panel fact-finding despite appeals being limited to legal issues. And the Appellate Body has asserted that panels must follow its reports although Members have not agreed to a system of precedent in the WTO, and continuously disregarded the 90-day mandatory deadline for appeals – all contrary to the WTO's agreed dispute settlement rules.
- And for more than a year, the United States has been calling for WTO Members to correct the situation where the Appellate Body acts as if it has the power to permit ex-Appellate Body members to continue to decide appeals even after their term of office – as set by the WTO Members – has expired. This so-called "Rule 15" is, on its face, another example of the Appellate Body's disregard for the WTO's rules.

⁷² Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2018 President's Trade Policy Agenda, at 22-28.

- Our concerns have not been addressed. When the Appellate Body abuses the authority it was given within the dispute settlement system, it undermines the legitimacy of the system and damages the interests of all WTO Members who care about having the agreements respected as they were negotiated and agreed.
- The United States will continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system, and will continue our efforts and our discussions with Members and with the Chair to seek a solution on these important issues.

Second Intervention

- Contrary to what some Members have indicated, it is clear that there needs to be a DSB decision to launch the selection process for these vacancies. The decision to appoint an Appellate Body member is a decision of the DSB.
- Furthermore, in looking at what is entailed in establishing a selection process, there are a number of issues that need to be decided, and that decision is one for the DSB. This is why the very first selection process was one established by a decision of the DSB.⁷³
- For example, what is the deadline for nominations? Will there be a selection committee? If so, who will comprise the selection committee? What is the expectation for when recommendations would be made?
- So, again, it is clear that there needs to be a DSB decision to launch a selection process.

⁷³ See WT/DSB/1.

21. FOSTERING A DISCUSSION ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE APPELLATE BODY (JOB/DSB/2): STATEMENT BY HONDURAS

- The United States thanks Honduras for its non-paper and for placing this item on the agenda for today's meeting.
- We look forward to hearing other Members' views on options for addressing the concerns that the United States has been raising for over a year. We appreciate that the non-paper provides some of the possible options and that it recognizes that there may be other possible approaches.
- We remain interested in hearing of other approaches that Members are considering.
- We take this opportunity to reiterate our views on one of the questions presented in Honduras's non-paper: *who* decides how to respond to the situation where the term of an Appellate Body member appointed to a division expires before the report in that appeal is signed?
- The United States has reiterated that this is the responsibility of WTO Members. In this regard, we recall that it is the DSB, not the Appellate Body, that has the authority to appoint Appellate Body members and to decide when their term in office expires under Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the DSU. Accordingly, it is up to the DSB, not the Appellate Body, to decide whether a person who is no longer an Appellate Body member can continue to serve on an appeal.
- We note that one of the options listed in the non-paper would be for the Appellate Body to continue to apply Rule 15. This would not address the issues we have been raising for over a year. A solution to the Appellate Body's abuse of its authority under the DSU will require Members to exercise their responsibility for the system. Continuing to ignore such abuses – or perhaps worse, accommodating or ratifying them – is not tenable.
- We look forward to continuing to discuss these issues with other Members.