1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

A. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN HOT-ROLLED STEEL PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS184/15/ADD.190)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on December 6, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.

- The United States has addressed the DSB’s recommendations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti-dumping margins in the hot-rolled steel anti-dumping duty investigation at issue.

- With respect to the recommendations and rulings of the DSB that have yet to be addressed, the U.S. Administration will work with the U.S. Congress with respect to appropriate statutory measures that would resolve this matter.
1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

B. UNITED STATES – SECTION 110(5) OF THE US COPYRIGHT ACT: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS160/24/ADD.165)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on December 6, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.

- The U.S. Administration will continue to confer with the European Union, and to work closely with the U.S. Congress, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter.

Second Intervention

- As we have noted at prior meetings of the DSB, by intervening under this item, China attempts to give the appearance of concern for intellectual property rights.

- We would refer delegations to our statements made at prior DS B meetings on China’s purported interest in protecting intellectual property rights, as well as our statement under item 8 for this meeting.
1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

C. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - MEASURES AFFECTING THE APPROVAL AND MARKETING OF BIOTECH PRODUCTS: STATUS REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION (WT/DS291/37/ADD.128)

- The United States thanks the European Union ("EU") for its status report and its statement today.

- The United States remains concerned with the EU’s measures affecting the approval of biotech products. Delays persist and affect dozens of applications that have been awaiting approval for months or years, or that have already received approval. While the United States notes and welcomes the approval of authorizations for three products in December 2018, we note that these products were subject to significant delays.

- We further note our concern that even when the EU finally approves a biotech product, EU member States continue to impose bans on the supposedly approved product. The EU maintains legislation that permits EU member States to “opt out” of certain approvals, even where the European Food Safety Authority (“EFSA”) has concluded that the product is safe. We continue to stress that at least seventeen EU member States, as well as certain regions within EU member States, have submitted requests to opt out of EU approvals.

- We again note a recent public statement issued by the European Union’s Group of Chief Scientific Advisors on November 13, 2018, in response to the July 25, 2018 European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling that addresses the forms of mutagenesis that qualify for the exemption contained in EU Directive 2001/18/EC. The Directive was a central issue in dispute in these WTO proceedings, and concerns the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, or GMOs. The EU Group of Chief Scientific Advisor’s statement recognizes that, “in view of the Court’s ruling, it becomes evident that new scientific knowledge and recent technical developments have made the GMO Directive no longer fit for purpose.” The United States urges the European Union to finally act in a manner that will bring into compliance the measures at issue in this dispute.

- The United States urges the EU to ensure that all of its measures affecting the approval of biotech products, including measures adopted by individual EU member States, are based on scientific principles, and that decisions are taken without undue delay.
1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

D. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES ON LARGE RESIDENTIAL WASHERS FROM KOREA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS464/17/ADD.12)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on December 6, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.

- On December 15, 2017, the United States Trade Representative requested that the U.S. Department of Commerce make a determination under section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to address the DSB’s recommendations relating to the Department’s countervailing duty investigation of washers from Korea. On December 18, the Department of Commerce initiated a proceeding to make such determination. Following initiation, Commerce issued initial and supplemental questionnaires seeking additional information.

- On April 4, 2018, Commerce issued a preliminary determination revising certain aspects of its original determination. Following issuance of the preliminary determination, Commerce provided interested parties with the opportunity to submit comments on the issues and analysis in the preliminary determination and rebuttal comments. Commerce reviewed those comments and rebuttal comments and took them into account for purposes of preparing the final determination.

- On June 4, 2018, Commerce issued a final determination, in which Commerce revised certain aspects of its original determination. Specifically, Commerce revised the analysis underlying the CVD determination, as it pertains to certain tax credit programs, in accordance with findings adopted by the DSB.

- The United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB relating to antidumping measures challenged in this dispute.
1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

E. UNITED STATES – CERTAIN METHODOLOGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO ANTI DUMPING PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING CHINA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS471/17/ADD.4)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on December 6, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.

- As explained in that report, the United States continues to consult with interested parties on options to address the recommendations of the DSB.
1. SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

G. UNITED STATES – ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN OIL COUNTRY TUBULAR GOODS FROM KOREA: STATUS REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS488/12/ADD.3)

- The United States provided a status report in this dispute on December 6, 2018, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU.

- As explained in that report, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a notice in the Federal Register indicating that it “is commencing a proceeding to gather information, analyze record evidence, and consider the determinations which would be necessary to bring its measures into conformity with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body … in United States—Antidumping Measures in Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from Korea.”

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- As the United States has noted at previous DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act – which includes a provision repealing the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 – was enacted into law in February 2006. Accordingly, the United States has taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings in these disputes.

- We recall, furthermore, that the EU has acknowledged that the Deficit Reduction Act does not permit the distribution of duties collected on goods entered after October 1, 2007, more than 10 years ago.

- With respect to the EU’s request for status reports in this matter, as we have already explained at previous DSB meetings, there is no obligation under the DSU to provide further status reports once a Member announces that it has implemented the DSB recommendations and rulings, regardless of whether the complaining party disagrees about compliance.

- The practice of Members confirms this widespread understanding of Article 21.6 as we see no status report submitted by any Member in any dispute this month, or for previous meetings, where the responding Member has claimed compliance and the complaining Member disagrees.

- The EU has explained that, in its view, the issue of compliance “remains unresolved for the purposes of Article 21.6.” Under such a standard, we would expect the EU to provide status reports in any dispute where there is a disagreement between the parties on the EU’s compliance, including the EU – Large Civil Aircraft dispute. Given its failure to provide a status report in that dispute again this month, we fail to see how the EU’s behavior is consistent with the alleged systemic view it has been espousing under this item for more than 10 years.

- As the EU is aware, the United States has announced in this dispute that it has implemented the DSB’s recommendations and rulings. If the EU disagrees, there would simply appear to be a disagreement between the parties to the dispute about the situation of compliance.
3. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB

A. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES

• The United States notes that once again the European Union has not provided Members with a status report concerning the dispute EU – Large Civil Aircraft (DS316).

• As we have noted at several recent DSB meetings, the EU has argued that Article 21.6 of the DSU requires that “the issue of implementation shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until the issue is resolved.” And the EU has argued that where the EU does not agree with another Member’s “assertion that it has implemented the DSB ruling,” “the issue remains unresolved for the purposes of Article 21.6 DSU.”

• This stated EU position simply contradicts the EU’s actions in this dispute. The EU has admitted that there remains a disagreement as to whether the EU has complied in this dispute.

• Under the EU’s own view, therefore, the EU should be providing a status report. Yet it has once again failed to do so. At this meeting, it should welcome the opportunity we are affording it to update the DSB with any detail on its alleged implementation efforts.
4. STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES ON THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF PANEL OR APPELLATE BODY REPORTS UNDER THE WTO AGREEMENT AND DSU

1. Madame Chair, for more than 15 years, the United States has sounded the alarm about the Appellate Body exceeding its authority and straying from the role agreed for it by WTO Members.

2. More recently, over the course of 2018, the United States has delivered detailed interventions here at the Dispute Settlement Body that have comprehensively outlined specific concerns.

3. In several meetings of the DSB, including at the February 28 meeting, we explained that the Appellate Body simply does not have the authority to deem someone who is not an Appellate Body member to be a member.²

4. At the June 22 DSB meeting, we highlighted how the Appellate Body has repeatedly issued its reports beyond the 90-day deadline mandated by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.³

5. At the August 27 DSB meeting, we outlined how the Appellate Body has consistently engaged in review of panel fact-finding, including the meaning of a Member’s municipal law, despite lacking the authority to do so.⁴

6. At the October 29 DSB meeting, the United States explained that the Appellate Body’s issuing advisory opinions by making findings that are not necessary to resolve a dispute is contrary to the DSU.⁵


7. Today, we will focus on the Appellate Body’s misguided insistence that its reports must serve as precedent “absent cogent reasons.”

8. Before moving to the detailed interpretive discussion under this agenda item, let me repeat the U.S. position expressed at last week’s General Council meeting: the United States is ready to engage with other Members on these and other important issues related to the proper functioning of the dispute settlement system.

9. As part of this process, it will be critical for Members to consider why the Appellate Body has felt free to depart from the clear rules we WTO Members have agreed to. Through such a discussion, we can consider how best to ensure that the dispute settlement system adheres to WTO rules as written.

I. Introduction: WTO Members have the exclusive authority to adopt authoritative interpretations in the Ministerial Conference, and the DSU does not assign precedential value to panel or Appellate Body reports

10. The United States requested this agenda item to draw Members’ attention to an important systemic issue, the concern that the Appellate Body has sought to change the nature of WTO dispute settlement reports from ones that assist in resolving a dispute, and may be considered for persuasive value in the future, to ones that carry precedential weight, as if WTO Members had agreed in the DSU to a common law-like system of precedent.

11. This is an issue of fundamental importance to the WTO. It is not for WTO adjudicators to seek to change the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system as agreed by Members in the text of the DSU. A failure by WTO adjudicators to follow the agreed rules, including those rules that define the adjudicators’ role and authority, undermines Members’ support for the WTO dispute settlement system.

12. In short, the DSU does not assign precedential value to panel or Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB or interpretations contained in those reports. Instead, it reserves such weight to authoritative interpretations adopted by WTO Members in a different body, the Ministerial Conference or General Council, acting not by negative consensus but by positive consensus and under different procedures that promote awareness and participation by Members. The DSU explicitly notes that the dispute settlement system operates without prejudice to this interpretative authority.

13. The DSU states that it exists to resolve disputes arising under the covered agreements, not under panel or Appellate Body interpretations of those agreements, and that a panel or the Appellate Body is to apply customary rules of interpretation of public international law in

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6 WTO Agreement, Art. IX:2.
7 DSU Art. 3.9.
assisting the DSB in determining whether a measure is inconsistent with a Member’s commitments under the covered agreements. Those rules of interpretation do not assign to interpretations given as part of dispute settlement a precedential value for purposes of discerning the meaning of agreement text. In this, the DSU presented no change from the dispute settlement system under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947) (“GATT”), a point which the Appellate Body understood and expressed clearly in its early years.

14. Remarkably, the Appellate Body has more recently suggested that a panel must follow a prior Appellate Body interpretation absent undefined “cogent reasons” for departing from that interpretation. The Appellate Body’s statement is wrong under the DSU and the WTO Agreement, as we shall explain in detail.

15. WTO Members did not establish a common law system or a system of precedent, but rather reserved to themselves, in the Ministerial Conference, the authority to establish precedent through an “authoritative interpretation.”8 It is not for WTO adjudicators, through their reports, which are adopted by negative consensus, to change the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system, and certainly WTO adjudicators may not and must not alter the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements.9

16. What is more, the United States would not agree, as a matter of the design of an adjudicatory system, that assigning precedential weight (or a “cogent reasons” approach) is appropriate or positive for the WTO. The Appellate Body’s assertion diminishes the value of the work of panels. It inhibits the engagement of panels with the text of the covered agreements, contrary to a panel’s function to make an objective assessment of the applicability of and conformity with the covered agreements. The result of diminishing the role of each panel is that errors will become locked in, and persuasive interpretations are less likely to arise from the dispute settlement system.

17. To think otherwise would require one to consider that the first time the Appellate Body considers an interpretive issue, it will necessarily render not only a correct interpretation, but the best interpretation. The United States considers that proposition to be contrary to experience and human nature.

18. Through this statement today, the United States again attempts to facilitate a broader discussion on whether Members share a common understanding of, and respect for, the rules we have written and agreed to. To advance this discussion, in this statement the United States will highlight the relevant text of the WTO Agreement and the DSU. We then explain why recent Appellate Body reports do not provide a justification or legitimate basis for a panel or the

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8 WTO Agreement, Art. IX:2.
9 DSU Arts. 3.2, 19.2.
Appellate Body to disregard the pertinent provisions of the WTO Agreement or the DSU that do not accord precedential value to adopted dispute settlement reports.

**II. The DSU does not require, or even permit, a panel to apply as law or controlling “precedent” a prior Appellate Body interpretation**

19. The DSU does not assign precedential value to panel or Appellate Body reports adopted by the DSB, or interpretations contained in those reports. Instead, it reserves such weight to authoritative interpretations adopted by WTO Members in a different body, the Ministerial Conference or General Council, acting not by negative consensus but under different procedures. The DSU explicitly notes that the dispute settlement system operates without prejudice to this interpretative authority.

20. The DSU states that a panel or the Appellate Body is to apply customary rules of interpretation of public international law in assisting the DSB in determining whether a measure is inconsistent with a Member’s commitments under the covered agreements. Those rules of interpretation do not assign to interpretations given as part of dispute settlement a precedential value for purposes of discerning the meaning of agreement text. A panel is not required – nor is it permitted – to ignore this task and instead simply treat prior panel or Appellate Body reports as binding “precedent.”

**A. The function of panels and the Appellate Body under the DSU**

21. Fundamentally, the purpose of the WTO dispute settlement system is to resolve trade disputes between Members. In Article 3.7, WTO Members agreed: “The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.” To achieve this focused aim, Members established in the DSU particular processes for resolving disputes promptly, including panels, and the Appellate Body where appropriate, assisting the DSB for this purpose.

22. When a Member has not been able to resolve a dispute with another Member through consultations, it may request the DSB to establish a panel to examine a matter. Through the standard terms of reference for panels in Article 7 of the DSU, the DSB charges the panel with two tasks: to “examine … the matter referred to the DSB” in a panel request and “to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations” provided for in the DSU. Article 19.1 of the DSU is explicit in what the recommendation is: “Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.” Thus, it is through such a finding of WTO-inconsistency and through such a recommendation “to bring the measure into conformity” that panels carry out the terms of reference “to make such

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10 DSU Art. 7.1.
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations” provided for in the covered agreements.11

23. Members reinforced in Article 11 that the “function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under [the DSU].” In exercising this function, DSU Article 11 states that a panel “should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.” That objective assessment calls on the panel to weigh the evidence and make factual findings based on the totality of the evidence. That objective assessment also calls on the panel to interpret the relevant provisions of the covered agreements to determine how they apply to the measures at issue and whether those measures conform with a Member’s commitments.12

24. Article 3.2 of the DSU further informs the function of a panel established by the DSB to assist it. Article 3.2 explains that “Members recognize that [the dispute settlement system] serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.” Thus, it is “the rights and obligations of Members under th[ose] covered agreements” that are fundamental. And for purposes of understanding the “existing provisions” of the covered agreements – that is, their text – the DSU directs WTO adjudicators to apply “customary rules of interpretation of public international law,” reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention.

25. Thus, a panel’s task is straightforward and also limited. The Appellate Body’s task under the DSU is similarly limited to assisting the DSB in discharging its functions under the DSU, albeit more so than panels. Under Article 17.6, an appeal is “limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” Further, under Article 17.13, the Appellate Body is only authorized to “uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.” Since a panel’s function under DSU Article 11 is “to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities” under the DSU, the Appellate Body, in reviewing a panel’s legal conclusion or interpretation, is thus also assisting the DSB in discharging its responsibilities to find whether the responding Member’s measure is consistent with WTO rules.

**B. The DSU does not establish a system of precedent**

26. As is clear from the forgoing, there is no provision in the DSU that establishes a system of “case-law” or “precedent,” or otherwise requires that a panel apply the provisions of the covered agreements consistently with the adopted findings of previous panels or the Appellate

11 DSU Art. 7.1.
12 DSU Art. 11 (“Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements . . . .”).
Body.  Nor is there any provision that refers to “cogent reasons” or suggests that a panel must justify legal findings not consistent with the reasoning set out in prior reports.

27. Indeed, were a panel to decide to simply apply the reasoning in prior Appellate Body reports alone, it would fail to carry out its function, as established by the DSB, under DSU Articles 7.1, 11, and 3.2 to make findings on the applicability of existing provisions of the covered agreements, as understood objectively through customary rules of interpretation. In so doing, the panel would risk creating additional obligations for Members that are beyond what has been provided for in the covered agreements – an act strictly prohibited under Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU.

28. To say that an Appellate Body interpretation in one dispute is precedent or controlling for later disputes would effectively convert that interpretation into an authoritative interpretation of the covered agreement. But such an approach would directly contradict the agreed text of the WTO Agreement. In Article IX:2, the WTO Agreement provides that: “The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.” [italics added]

29. Through this provision, WTO Members reserved the “exclusive authority” to adopt interpretations to themselves acting in the Ministerial Conference (or General Council), not the DSB. The specification that the authority of the Ministerial Conference or General Council to adopt an authoritative interpretation is “exclusive,” and the requirements in the WTO Agreement for exercising this authority, make clear that such authority is not exercised by the DSB when it adopts a panel or Appellate Body report.

30. The WTO Agreement specifies the process for adopting such an authoritative interpretation. It provides that “[i]n the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1, [the Ministerial Conference or General Council] shall exercise their authority on the basis of a recommendation by the Council overseeing the function of that Agreement.” Proceeding in such a manner would provide for transparency, participation, and consent of all Members. It would permit all Members to become aware of the issue, to discuss the issue with other Members, and to participate – first in the relevant Council and then at the Ministerial Conference or in the General Council – based on instructions from capital reflecting input from all relevant stakeholders. And, critically, in light of the relevant decision-making rules and practice in the WTO, the recommendation by the relevant Council and the subsequent adoption by the Ministerial Conference or General Council would normally proceed based on the consensus of WTO Members. This would thereby ensure that Members consent to an interpretation that could serve as precedent in future disputes.

31. The level of transparency, participation, and consent by Members in the process of adopting an authoritative interpretation does not resemble the process for adopting reports under the DSU. One obvious difference concerns the participation by Members. Whereas the process
for adopting an authoritative interpretation would involve all Members, a report adopted by the DSB may reflect varying degrees of participation by only a handful of Members.

32. And, as discussed, WTO Members set out a special decision-making rule for adopting an authoritative interpretation, which is different from the negative consensus adoption that applies to reports under the DSU. Given the important implications that flow from an authoritative interpretation, it makes sense that Members would have agreed to the process set out in Article IX:2, which envisions participation by the full Membership and informed consent. At the same time, it makes little sense to suggest given these provisions and the structure described that a particular interpretation contained within a report that reflects input from only a limited subset of Members, and that has been adopted by negative consensus, could similarly be regarded as setting out an authoritative interpretation for all disputes and all Members.

33. That Article IX:2 reserves to WTO Members in the Ministerial Conference the critical authority to adopt authoritative interpretations has been emphasized by Members. In the discussion on “amicus procedures” promulgated by the Appellate Body, for example, numerous WTO Members spoke in the General Council to argue it was for Members to exercise their exclusive authority to adopt an authoritative interpretation under Article IX:2 should Members consider it appropriate to permit amicus submissions in disputes generally.13

34. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement is conclusive that there is but one means in the WTO to obtain an authoritative interpretation. But if this were not enough, the DSU also expressly confirms that panel and Appellate Body reports do not set out authoritative interpretations.

35. Article 3.9 of the DSU states that “[t]he provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.” Thus, WTO Members again expressed that the adoption by negative consensus of an interpretation contained in a panel or Appellate Body report does not make that interpretation authoritative, which could only be adopted by the Ministerial Conference (or General Council) acting according to different decision-making rules. Put differently, if the DSB does not have the authority under the DSU to adopt an authoritative interpretation, then a panel or the Appellate Body assisting the DSB does not have this authority either.

36. This does not mean that the United States considers a prior panel or Appellate Body interpretation to be without any value. For example, to the extent that a panel finds prior Appellate Body or panel reasoning to be persuasive, a panel may refer to that reasoning in conducting its own objective assessment of the matter. Such a use of prior reasoning would likely add to the persuasiveness of the panel’s own analysis, whether or not the panel agrees with

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13 See Minutes of Meeting of the General Council on 22 November 2000, WT/GC/M/60.
the prior reasoning. But considering an interpretation in a prior Appellate Body report is very
different from a statement that the interpretation is controlling or “precedent” in a later dispute.

III. Panel Reports Were Not Treated as Precedent under the GATT Dispute Settlement
Rules and Procedures

37. The United States notes that not treating an interpretation in an adopted report as
controlling or a precedent is consistent with the treatment of reports under the GATT dispute
settlement rules and procedures.

38. There was no question that GATT dispute settlement did not treat reports as binding
precedent. For example, a Report by the Chairman of the GATT Negotiating Group on Dispute
Settlement noted that “[s]everal delegations express the view than an appeals procedure might
lead to the dilution of the importance of panels and, unless the appellate decisions were
submitted for adoption by the Council, of the authority of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” But
the Chair went on to record that “[o]ther delegations note that despite the creation of an appellate
body, the CONTRACTING PARTIES would retain their authority to interpret the General
Agreement pursuant to Article XXV [of the GATT].”14 A draft text on dispute settlement
prepared by the GATT Secretariat at the request of the Negotiating Group recorded the same
view: “The CONTRACTING PARTIES retain their authority to interpret the General Agreement
pursuant to Article XXV.”15

identical to analogous provisions of the DSU – confirm that GATT panels functioned to assist
the Contracting Parties in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
the GATT – not to provide authoritative interpretations.

40. Paragraph F(b)(1) of the Montreal Rules provided that GATT panels would have standard
terms of reference.16 Just like DSU Article 7.1, this text made explicit that GATT panels
functioned to assist the Contracting Parties in making the recommendations to bring a measure
found inconsistent with the GATT into conformity with those rules. The terms of reference of
GATT panels, like WTO panels today, did not empower them to make interpretations that would
be considered precedent for future panels.

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14 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement: Report by the Chairman, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/43, para. 7 (18 July
1990).
15 Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement: Draft Text on Dispute Settlement, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/45 (General
Rules”), para. F(b)(1) (“To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES by (name of contracting party) in document L/... and to make such findings as will
assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in
Article XXIII:2.”).
Paragraph A1 of the Montreal Rules\textsuperscript{17} included language identical in relevant part to the language in DSU Article 3.2 on the WTO dispute settlement system preserving the rights and obligations of Member and serving to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements. The use of “clarify” in this text did not authorize GATT panels to provide interpretations that would constitute precedent. Rather, it was simply a statement of what Contracting Parties agreed flowed from the GATT dispute settlement system when it operated in accordance with the agreed provisions.

The DSU also carried forward the GATT’s understanding that the “aim of the CONTRACTING PARTIES [in dispute settlement] has always been to secure a positive solution to the dispute”\textsuperscript{18} – not to render authoritative interpretations.

The approach to dispute settlement under the GATT was never understood as giving adjudicators the authority to make interpretations that would constitute precedent for the Contracting Parties and future adjudicators. That authority was understood to reside in the CONTRACTING PARTIES acting under Article XXV. The GATT dispute settlement language carried forward into the DSU does not provide panels and the Appellate Body such authority. And as noted previously, WTO Members agreed to provisions in both the WTO Agreement, in Article IX:2, and the DSU, in Article 3.9, that made explicit what had been understood and practiced in the GATT.

IV. The Appellate Body’s own reports do not support a proposed “cogent reasons” approach

With increasing frequency, the Appellate Body has summarily suggested that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body should “resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.”\textsuperscript{19} In doing so, the Appellate Body would seem to consider the interpretation found in Appellate Body reports to be authoritative. Yet, in claiming this authority, the Appellate Body has not grappled with the relevant legal text, discussed above, or even with the Appellate Body’s own prior reports.

As we will discuss, these reports do not provide a basis for a panel to disregard pertinent provisions of a panel’s function under the DSU. The Appellate Body, in its report in \textit{Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II}, properly understood the value the DSU assigns to prior reports. However, several years later, and without any change in the relevant text of the DSU or the WTO Agreement, the Appellate Body asserted a very different approach in \textit{US – Stainless Steel}.

\textsuperscript{17}Montreal Rules, para. A1 (“Contracting parties recognize that the dispute settlement system of GATT serves to preserve the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the General Agreement and to clarify the existing provisions of the General Agreement. It is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”).

\textsuperscript{18}Annex: Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement, L/4907, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB)}, para. 160.
(Mexico), without explaining the basis for that changed approach. The statements in that report, in addition to constituting obiter dicta, are fundamentally flawed and provide no support for a “cogent reasons” approach. Ironically, if the Appellate Body actually believed that any prior interpretation in an adopted report must be followed absent cogent reasons, it would not have, without any explanation, departed from its understanding in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II.

A. The Appellate Body report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II explicitly recognized that adopted panel and Appellate Body reports do not create binding precedent

46. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body explicitly found that adoption of reports under the WTO did not create “precedent” or assign a special status for interpretations reached in reports. Rather, the Appellate Body noted that status has been reserved for authoritative interpretations reached by the Ministerial Conference. The Appellate Body’s report in that appeal directly contradicts the Appellate Body’s later statements concerning “cogent reasons”.

47. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body was confronted with a question concerning the status of panel reports adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties and the WTO DSB. Looking first to the GATT, the Appellate Body expressed the view that the GATT Contracting Parties, in deciding to adopt a panel report, did not intend that their decision would constitute a definitive interpretation of the relevant provisions of the GATT. It then added the following: “Nor do we believe that this is contemplated under GATT 1994.” The Appellate Body stated the “specific cause for this conclusion” was Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement. The Appellate Body stated the following with regard to this provision:

The fact that such an “exclusive authority” in interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication or inadvertence elsewhere.

We agree. It is remarkable that the Appellate Body later contradicted this statement in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), without explaining any basis for so doing, such as that it considered that it had wrongly decided Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II.

48. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body also explained that the decisions to adopt panel reports under Article XXIII of the GATT was different from joint action of the Contracting Parties under Article XXV of the GATT. The Appellate Body considered that under

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20 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB), p. 12.
22 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB), p. 13.
the WTO Agreement the nature of adopted panel reports continued to differ from interpretations made under the WTO Agreement by the Ministerial Conference or the General Council. According to the Appellate Body, “[t]his is clear from a reading of Article 3.9 of the DSU.” We also agree, as Article 3.9 confirms that panel and Appellate Body reports do not set out authoritative interpretations.

49. Thus, the Appellate Body in an early report shortly after conclusion of the Uruguay Round made clear that the DSB cannot supplant the “exclusive authority” of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council to adopt, by positive consensus, an “authoritative interpretation” of a covered agreement, as explicitly established in DSU Article 3.9 and WTO Agreement Article IX:2.

50. The Appellate Body report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II also made clear that adopted panel reports are often considered by subsequent panels, and may be taken into account where they are relevant, but “they are not binding”. As stated earlier, the United States considers that a panel may take into account the reasoning in prior reports and, to the extent a panel finds the reasoning persuasive, rely on that reasoning in conducting its own objective assessment of the matter. To be clear, the United States would encourage this and expects prior reports may have valuable insight. This is why parties to a dispute often cite to prior reports for their persuasive value. But this is very different than saying panels are bound to follow the prior Appellate Body reports, or that they may rely on those reports instead of conducting their own objective assessment.

B. The Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) does not support the “cogent reasons” approach

51. The Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) contains the Appellate Body’s first effort to introduce the concept of “cogent reasons.” The Appellate Body’s articulation of the “cogent reasons” approach comprised several disparate statements; key among them is the contention that “[e]nsuring ‘security and predictability’ in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.” The United States explains how this report does not support a “cogent reasons” approach for several reasons. The Appellate Body’s statement is, by definition, an “advisory opinion” or

24 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB), pp. 13-14.
26 DSU, Art. 3.9 (“The provisions of this Understanding are without prejudice to the rights of Members to seek authoritative interpretation of provisions of a covered agreement through decision-making under the WTO Agreement or a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral Trade Agreement.”).
27 WTO Agreement, Art. IX:2 (“The Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”).
29 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 160
*obiter dicta* that, even under the Appellate Body’s logic, cannot serve as a precedent. More importantly, the “cogent reasons” approach is fundamentally flawed and at odds with the text of the DSU and WTO Agreement.

1. **The Appellate Body’s Statements Concerning Cogent Reasons in *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)* are *Obiter Dicta***

52. As an initial matter, and even setting aside for a moment the fundamental flaws under the DSU with the “cogent reasons” approach, the United States would see no basis to cite and follow Appellate Body statements that have appeared in *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)*. In *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico)*, the discussion of “cogent reasons” appears in the context of Mexico’s appeal under DSU Article 11.\(^{30}\) Mexico argued on appeal that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU by failing to follow what it considered was “well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence.”\(^{31}\)

53. The Appellate Body did *not*, however, make a finding on Mexico’s Article 11 appeal. Rather, it exercised judicial economy on Mexico’s claim.\(^{32}\) Thus, there was *no* “legal finding” on Mexico’s claim of error, and the Appellate Body’s discussion is *not* reasoning “resolv[ing a] legal question.” The “cogent reasons” approach (as explained by the Appellate Body) would thus *not even apply* to the Appellate Body’s own statement on “cogent reasons”.

54. That the Appellate Body made no legal finding on Mexico’s appeal is made explicit by the Appellate Body’s conclusion at paragraph 162 of its report, where it stated the following:

> Since we have [elsewhere in the report] corrected the Panel’s erroneous legal interpretation and have reversed all of the Panel’s findings and conclusions that have been appealed, *we do not*, in this case, *make an additional finding* that the Panel also failed to discharge its duties *under Article 11 of the DSU*.\(^{33}\)

Therefore, the entire discussion of “cogent reasons” and any reasoning leading up to the conclusion *not* to make a finding on Mexico’s appeal is, by definition, an “advisory opinion” or *obiter dicta*.

55. As the United States explained in its statement to the DSB on October 29, 2018, “advisory opinions” are commonly defined as “a non-binding statement on a point of law given

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\(^{30}\) *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB)*, para. 154.

\(^{31}\) *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB)*, para. 154.

\(^{32}\) *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB)*, para. 162.

\(^{33}\) *US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB)*, para. 162 (italics added).
by [an adjudicator] before a case is tried or with respect to a hypothetical situation."34 Obiter dictum has been defined as “an opinion not necessary to a judgment; an observation as to the law made by a judge in the course of a case, but not necessary to its decision, and therefore of no binding effect.”35 Given that the Appellate Body expressly declined to make any finding on Mexico’s Article 11 appeal, the preceding discussion – including on “cogent reasons” – is, by definition, merely advisory, or dicta.

56. In this regard, we note that the Appellate Body itself elsewhere confirms that, on its approach, statements that are not necessary to “resolve [a] legal question” would not be subject to its approach. At paragraph 158 of its report, the Appellate Body itself states the following:

It is well settled that the Appellate Body reports are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties. This, however, does not mean that subsequent panels are free to disregard the legal interpretations and the ratio decidendi contained in previous Appellate Body reports that have been adopted by the DSB.36

57. The implication of this statement, particularly the second sentence, is that the Appellate Body in this report considers panels may not disregard the “ratio decidendi” contained in previous reports adopted by the DSB. Given that the Appellate Body did not make findings on Mexico’s Article 11 claim, the Appellate Body’s “cogent reasons” analysis did not and could not form part of the “ratio decidendi” of the report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico).

58. Therefore, even under the Appellate Body’s own approach, its discussion of “cogent reasons” is “not binding” on a subsequent panel, and a panel is “free to disregard” it.

2. The Appellate Body’s Statements Concerning Cogent Reasons in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) are Profoundly Flawed

59. More fundamentally, however, the Appellate Body’s statement concerning “cogent reasons” in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is profoundly flawed in several respects. These include:

(1) a failure to properly appreciate the functions of panels and the Appellate Body within the WTO dispute settlement system;

35 Wharton’s Law Lexicon (14th Ed. 1993).
36 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 158.
(2) an erroneous interpretation of Article 3.2 of the DSU that does not reflect the text of that provision;

(3) a reliance on reports that do not support a “cogent reasons” approach;

(4) a misunderstanding (or misstatement) of why parties cite prior reports;

(5) inappropriate and incomplete analogies to other international adjudicative fora; and

(6) incorrect assumptions concerning the existence of a hierarchical structure that does not reflect the limited task assigned to the Appellate Body in the DSU.

We will discuss each of these in turn.

a. First Error: The Appellate Body’s failure to properly appreciate the functions of panels and the Appellate Body within the WTO dispute settlement system, including Article 11 of the DSU

60. First, the Appellate Body’s statements concerning “cogent reasons” reflect a failure to properly appreciate the tasks assigned to panels and the Appellate Body by the relevant provisions of the DSU. Although the Appellate Body purports to “begin [its] consideration with the text of Article 11 of the DSU,” the Appellate Body subsequently ignores the limitations of this text.

61. As discussed, Article 11 of the DSU stipulates that “[t]he function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities” under the DSU and the covered agreements. In exercising this function, DSU Article 11 states that a panel is to conduct “an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.” An objective assessment calls for the panel to weigh the evidence and make factual findings based on the totality of the evidence. An objective assessment also calls for a panel to interpret the relevant provisions of the covered agreements to determine how they apply to the measures at issue and whether those measures conform with a Member’s commitments.

62. As noted previously, nowhere in this article is a panel’s objective assessment linked to prior Appellate Body interpretations. Nor does the context of Article 3.2 (which we discuss next) or the structure of WTO Agreement Article IX:2 or DSU Article 3.9, support reading into Article 11 a requirement for panels to establish “cogent reasons” to depart from findings by the Appellate Body in a separate dispute. The Appellate Body makes no real attempt to ground such a requirement in the text of Article 11 of the DSU.
b. Second Error: The Appellate Body’s erroneous interpretation of Article 3.2 of the DSU

63. Second, the Appellate Body relies on an interpretation of Article 3.2 of the DSU that fails to reflect the plain reading of that provision. At paragraph 160 of its report, the Appellate Body states that “[e]nsuring ‘security and predictability’ in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated by Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.”

64. There are a number of evident flaws in this assertion. First, the statement that Article 3.2 “implies” an approach reveals the weakness of the Appellate Body’s argument. The Appellate Body through this language concedes that Article 3.2 does not require or even set out a “cogent reasons” approach.

65. Second, the statement that Article 3.2 implies a “cogent reasons” approach to past Appellate Body interpretations plainly contradicts the Appellate Body’s own understanding of the DSU in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB). In that report, after examining Article 3.9 of the DSU and Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, the Appellate Body correctly concluded that “[t]he fact that such an ‘exclusive authority’ in interpreting the treaty has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication or inadvertence elsewhere.” Apparently, what the DSU “implies” can and did change for the Appellate Body.

66. Third, the Appellate Body statement that Article 3.2 “implies” a “cogent reasons” approach also rests on a misunderstanding of the text of Article 3.2. Article 3.2 provides in relevant part:

The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.

67. The “it” in the second sentence of Article 3.2 refers to the subject of the first sentence, “the dispute settlement system of the WTO.” In other words, Members recognized that the dispute settlement system of the WTO – as set out in the DSU – serves to preserve the rights and

37 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 160 (italics added).
38 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB), p. 13.
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and the dispute settlement system of the WTO – as set out in the DSU – serves to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements.

68. This text of Article 3.2 is neither a directive to panels or the Appellate Body nor an authorization for them. There is no “shall” or “may” in this text. Instead, it is a statement of what Members have agreed flows from the system when it operates in accordance with the provisions agreed by Members in the DSU. Moreover, the text of Article 3.2 does not contain any mention of precedent or cogent reasons, and immediate context in DSU Article 3.9 (and WTO Agreement Article IX:2) reinforces that these concepts cannot be inserted through implication in Article 3.2.

69. Finally, the United States notes that the Appellate Body does not appear to take seriously its own statement on “cogent reasons.” Aside from the Appellate Body’s own failure to resolve the issue of the value of prior adopted reports the same way it had resolved that question in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body statement confuses the “adjudicatory body” at issue.

70. The passage reads: “Article 3.2 of the DSU, implies that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case.” This statement describes “an adjudicatory body” – for example, the Appellate Body. But it does not address a different adjudicatory body, such as a panel. Thus, whether or not the Appellate Body statement could be correct as applied to “an adjudicatory body,” it says nothing about the approach of a different “adjudicatory body,” like a panel.

71. On the other hand, if the Appellate Body considered the DSB to be “an adjudicatory body,” the Appellate Body’s logic would suggest that, once a panel has given a legal interpretation adopted by the DSB, then the Appellate Body would need to follow that adopted panel interpretation “absent cogent reasons.” But the Appellate Body has never suggested it would accept that outcome. The Appellate Body report thus does not address or explain the discrepancy in using the phrase “an adjudicatory body” to imply something about a panel’s relationship to a prior Appellate Body interpretation.

72. For all these reasons, the Appellate Body’s reasoning on Article 3.2 does not support a “cogent reasons” approach to dispute settlement.

c. Third Error: The Appellate Body’s reliance on prior Appellate Body reports that do not support a “cogent reasons” approach

73. Third, the Appellate Body, in its discussion of cogent reasons, also cites to its reports in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), and US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews. However, these reports provide no basis for a “cogent reasons” approach.
i. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II

74. The Appellate Body’s report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, in particular, is contrary to such an approach. In fact, the Appellate Body provides no “cogent reasons” for departing from the reasoning in that prior report. This obvious failure to follow its own approach supposedly based on a systemic understanding of the DSU rather suggests the “cogent reasons” approach is directed towards an outcome of ensuring panels follow Appellate Body statements, regardless of the lack of basis in the DSU for that approach.

75. Rather than focus on the thrust of its decision in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body draws attention to its statement in that report that adopted panel reports are “an important part of the GATT acquis.”39 We have heard some Members quote this statement, without any explanation, as if its mere recitation provides the answer to the question of precedent. But what does it actually mean to say a report forms part of the GATT acquis? Very little in isolation. Given the way it has been misunderstood and misused, it is important to recall the context in which it was made, which makes clear it contradicts, rather than supports, the assertion for which it is often cited – and for which the Appellate Body appears to cite it in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB).

76. The statement appears in a paragraph of the report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II where the Appellate Body is discussing the coming into force of the WTO Agreement and whether this has changed the character and legal status of adopted reports. The Appellate Body begins this paragraph by stating that Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement brought forward the experience and legal history under the GATT into the WTO.40 The Appellate Body considered this to “affirm the importance to the Members of the WTO of the experience acquired by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the GATT 1947 – and acknowledges the continuing relevance of that experience to the new trading system served by the WTO.”41

77. The Appellate Body then stated that “[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis.”42 Read in context with the preceding statements, this reflects the view that the reports adopted under the GATT are an important part of the experience acquired by the Contracting Parties to the GATT. It says nothing about the precedential weight, if any, to be accorded to such reports.

78. Continuing on, however, the Appellate Body makes the statements quoted in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), and then immediately states:

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However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute. In short, their character and their legal status have not been changed by the coming into force of the WTO Agreement.43

79. It is unfortunate, and perhaps telling, that the Appellate Body in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB) omits this key text from its selective quotation of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB). This full text makes abundantly clear that the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB) considered that adopted reports, notwithstanding their status as part of the “GATT acquis,” are not binding on future panels. To suggest now that adopted reports are precedent precisely because they are part of the “GATT acquis” is to turn the original statement in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB) on its head.

ii. US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia)

80. The second report cited by the Appellate Body – US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) – similarly does not support a “cogent reasons” approach. The Appellate Body cites to paragraph 109 of that report, which follows a quotation from the report in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II concerning the status of adopted panel reports. Paragraph 109 of the report in US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia) provides in part:

This reasoning applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well. Thus, in taking into account the reasoning in an adopted Appellate Body Report – a Report, moreover, that was directly relevant to the Panel's disposition of the issues before it – the Panel did not err. The Panel was correct in using our findings as a tool for its own reasoning.44 [italics added]

81. With regard to the first sentence of this paragraph, the United States would agree that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II concerning the status of adopted panel reports also “applies to adopted Appellate Body Reports as well.”45 That is, a panel may rely on them, but they are not binding and should not be understood as supplanting the “exclusive authority” of the Ministerial Conference (or General Council) to provide authoritative interpretations of the covered agreements.

82. In the second and third sentences of the paragraph, the Appellate Body points out that the panel in that dispute did not err by “taking into account” the reasoning of an adopted Appellate Body report. Here too, we would agree for the reasons explained. Moreover, it is critical to note that the Appellate Body explained the panel was correct in relying on prior findings “as a tool for

In other words, the panel did not use those prior findings as a substitute for its own reasoning or in place of conducting its own objective assessment, and the Appellate Body did not suggest it would be appropriate or permissible under the DSU for the panel to do so. Thus, rather than support the Appellate Body’s statement concerning “cogent reasons”, this report too contradicts it.

iii. US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews

83. The third report cited by the Appellate Body in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) is no more helpful. In US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, the Appellate Body found that it was appropriate for the panel to rely on a conclusion made by the Appellate Body in a prior dispute in determining whether a particular policy bulletin is a measure.46

84. In particular, the Appellate Body stated that “following the Appellate Body’s conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, but is what would be expected from panels, especially where the issues are the same.”47 This assertion, which is not explained or supported in the text of the Appellate Body report, would seem to itself contradict earlier statements by the Appellate Body, including in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (AB). There is a significant difference between stating that one would expect panels to reach similar conclusions where the issues are similar (i.e., conducting their own objective examination, they may reach a similar outcome), on the one hand, and saying that one would expect a panel to simply follow a prior decision without conducting an objective examination of its own, on the other. There is no support in the DSU for the latter approach.

85. This statement by the Appellate Body is also problematic in its use of the phrase “especially where the issues are the same.” The report thus implies that following a prior conclusion “is not only appropriate” but is also “what would be expected” from a panel even “where the issues are [not] the same.” There is no explanation given for this implication of the statement in the report.

86. Further, the Appellate Body report’s use of the passive voice – “is what would be expected from panels” – avoids expressing who expects this from a panel. It is understood that the Appellate Body expects this as the author of the passage. But this Appellate Body expectation is irrelevant. What matters in the dispute settlement system is the expectations of WTO Members as specifically expressed through their agreement in the DSU. The Appellate Body cites to no language in the DSU that suggests that WTO Members expect panels to disregard the text and structure of the DSU, as elaborated earlier in this statement.

46 US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (AB), para. 188.
47 US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (AB), para. 188.
87. Thus, the United States considers that none of the reports cited provide any legal basis for the Appellate Body to depart from the text of the WTO Agreement and the DSU in adopting a “cogent reasons” approach.

d. Fourth Error: The Appellate Body’s misunderstanding (or misstatement) on why parties cite to prior reports

88. Fourth, in its discussion of cogent reasons, the Appellate Body also misunderstands or misrepresents why parties often cite to adopted panel and Appellate Body reports in dispute settlement proceedings.48 There is nothing surprising about the fact that parties in WTO disputes cite to reports to the extent they may consider them persuasive. As mentioned, we would expect this, and expect panels to do the same. But there is no support for the proposition that parties cite to reports because they consider them somehow binding on or precedential for subsequent panels and the Appellate Body, which is what the Appellate Body appears to imply. Here again, the Appellate Body ignores that there is a significant difference between citing a report for its persuasive value, on the one hand, and arguing that the report is binding or precedential for future panels, on the other.

89. The Appellate Body also asserts that “when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members take into account the legal interpretation of the covered agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate Body reports.”49 The report cites no evidence for this proposition. To the extent the Appellate Body statement intended to refer to compliance actions taken by Members, those Members would be looking to the recommendations of the DSB in a particular dispute. More generally, we would expect Members to look first to the text of the covered agreements in enacting or modifying their national measures. And Members are entitled to act according to the text of those agreements embodying their commitments, as understood through customary rules of interpretation, rather than according to an interpretation rendered in a dispute settlement report. This is particularly so given the probability that some interpretations may be in error, and panel or Appellate Body findings may not add to or diminish the rights or obligations of Members under the covered agreements.

e. Fifth Error: The Appellate Body’s inappropriate and incomplete analogies to other international adjudicative fora

90. Fifth, to support its statement that Article 3.2 of the DSU implies that “absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case”, the Appellate Body report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) includes a lengthy footnote that attempts to draw significance from how consistency of disputes may be regarded in

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48 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 158.
49 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 160.
other international fora for dispute settlement. This attempt is incomplete, at best, and misguided.

91. In footnote 313 of its report, the Appellate Body cited tribunal decisions from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Arbitration Tribunal, apparently as support for why precedent should be adopted in WTO dispute settlement. These examples, however, are of no relevance.

92. First, the Appellate Body provides no explanation as to whether or how the relevant rules and structures of these fora are relevant for understanding the WTO dispute settlement system. The United States notes, for example, that the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is, just that, a tribunal, and therefore structured differently from the DSB administering the DSU and making recommendations based on panel and Appellate Body reports. Thus, the grounds for treating prior tribunal interpretations as precedent that may apply to an entity like the Tribunal are not applicable to the DSB.50

93. In stating that the Tribunal should follow its prior legal interpretations absent cogent reasons for departing from that interpretation, the Tribunal reasoned that the Security Council envisaged a tribunal comprising three trial chambers and one appeals chamber.51 That is, while the Appeals Chamber has a particular function, the different “Chambers” are all part of one “Tribunal”, which should resolve a legal question in one way. As explained, this structure does not exist in the DSU; there is no one tribunal with trial and appellate chambers.

94. The Appellate Body also cited to a decision by the ICSID Arbitration Tribunal, in which the Tribunal stated that “[i]t believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases.”52 But the Appellate Body report provides no explanation for the basis on which the ICSID Tribunal considered “it has a duty” to follow prior interpretations. The Tribunal also went on to state that “[i]t also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law.” Whatever the reasons for that belief, this statement reveals that this Tribunal would consider that the “specifics of a given treaty” should prevail for its interpretive approach and outcome. As we have seen, the

50 The ICTY is the first international war crimes tribunal since Nuremberg. It was established by the UN Security Council as a result of a 1993 resolution finding the existence of widespread humanitarian law violations in the former Yugoslavia and directing the creation of the Tribunal as a means to contribute to the restoration of peace and stability in the region.

51 See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, at para. 113 (24 March 2000).

DSU does not support an approach in which prior Appellate Body interpretations are treated as binding, or precedent.

95. To the extent the Appellate Body intended to suggest “precedent” was reflective of customary international law, the United States would note that the statement of two tribunals would not establish the existence of such a rule. Moreover, under international law, treaty text will prevail over customary law as between parties to the treaty. Customary law cannot override clear treaty text as to rights and obligations between parties to the treaty. The view that a “cogent reasons” approach is justified based on customary international law would conflict with the text of Articles 3.2, 3.9, 11 and other relevant provisions of the DSU and WTO Agreement. The approach of the DSU – that prior reports are not binding or precedent – would therefore prevail.

f. Sixth Error: The Appellate Body’s incorrect assumptions concerning the existence of a hierarchical structure that does not reflect the limited task assigned to the Appellate Body in the DSU

96. Finally, the Appellate Body’s discussion of “cogent reasons” is based on an asserted “hierarchical structure contemplated in the DSU” that fails to accurately reflect the important, but limited, role assigned to the Appellate Body, and is divorced from the text of the DSU.

97. At paragraph 161 of the report in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), the Appellate Body suggests that it was created by Members and “vested with authority” pursuant to Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU so as to promote security and predictability in the dispute settlement system. And so, according to the Appellate Body, a panel’s “failure to follow previously adopted Appellate Body reports addressing the same issues undermines the development of a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence clarifying Members’ rights and obligations under the covered agreements as contemplated by the DSU.”

98. Articles 17.6 and 17.13 of the DSU do not “vest” the Appellate Body with broad authority to develop “a coherent and predictable body of jurisprudence.” The latter phrase does not appear in those provisions – nor is there any hint of them.

99. In fact, those articles are limitations on the parameters of appellate review and on the permissible actions of the Appellate Body. For example, Article 17.6 provides that “[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations.” And

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53 A rule of customary law is understood to comprise widespread and consistent State practice and “opinio juris” (or “a belief in legal obligation”). See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reps, 1969, p. 3 at 44.
54 US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) (AB), para. 161.
56 DSU Art. 17.6 (emphasis added).
Article 17.13 limits the Appellate Body’s functions by saying it “may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.” Of course, this list of authorized actions does not include issuing authoritative interpretations that must be followed by subsequent panels.

100. Given these limitations, it is not consistent with these texts to read them to provide the Appellate Body the authority to render an interpretation in one dispute that would relieve a panel of the responsibility it has to the DSB to conduct an objective assessment of the applicability of a covered agreement, using customary rules of interpretation, in a separate dispute. Rather, as discussed, authoritative interpretations of the covered agreements are reserved exclusively to WTO Members acting in the Ministerial Conference (or General Council).

101. The notion of a “hierarchical structure” in the dispute settlement system also fails to acknowledge the role of the DSB. It is the DSB that establishes a panel and charges it with making those findings necessary for the DSB to provide a recommendation to bring a WTO-inconsistent measure into conformity with the WTO agreements.\footnote{DSU Art. 7.1 (“Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise within 20 days from the establishment of the panel: To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in document . . . and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).”)}. It is the DSB that panels and the Appellate Body assist by carrying out their functions as set out in the DSU.

102. As noted above, panel findings adopted by the DSB are of equal legal status as findings by the Appellate Body that are adopted by the DSB. The Appellate Body has never suggested that it would accept that it is bound to follow adopted panel findings as a consequence of the “hierarchical structure” of the DSU – likely because this would restrict its influence in the dispute settlement system. But the United States views the notion of a hierarchical structure in the DSU to be misguided, in any event.

103. DSB recommendations resulting from panel or Appellate Body findings, or arbitration awards under Article 25, are of equal value and directed at resolving a dispute between Members. Should a Member wish to obtain an authoritative interpretation that will serve as precedent in a future dispute, it must have recourse to the different process set out in Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement for the hierarchically superior body, the Ministerial Conference.

3. Members’ reactions to the US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) report

104. When the reports in US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) were considered by the DSB, the United States expressed that its “systemic concern was of . . . enormous institutional significance for the dispute settlement system.” The United States elaborated its concerns that the approach
of the Appellate Body would transform the WTO dispute settlement system, contrary to the structure set out in the DSU and WTO Agreement.\textsuperscript{58}

105. Some Members, while agreeing with the Appellate Body’s substantive findings in that dispute, expressed concern that the Appellate Body’s statements regarding “cogent reasons” not be understood as “crossing the line” of suggesting prior reports were binding on panels. For example, the minutes of the DSB meeting reflect the following statement by Chile:

In keeping with Chile's line of thought, the Appellate Body had confirmed that its reports created legitimate expectations among Members and should, therefore, be taken into consideration, although they were not – he reiterated not – binding. Chile thanked the Appellate Body for its confirmation in this regard and for refraining from crossing the “obligation” line... By crossing the line in stating that previous reports would provide a mandatory framework in subsequent disputes, according to the wish of some Members, the Panel would have not only prejudged future disputes and even tied the hands of future panels, but it would have also created rights and obligations when the Membership alone could do so.

That being said, certain phrases in the Report gave Chile some cause for concern. According to paragraph 160, “[e]nsuring “security and predictability” in the dispute settlement system, as contemplated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, implied that, absent cogent reasons, an adjudicatory body would resolve the same legal question in the same way as had been done in previous cases.” Paragraph 162 likewise stated as follows: “We are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues.” Such phrases could lead to unfortunate conclusions regarding the nature of the dispute settlement system, and Chile hoped that this would not become a trend likely to constrain panels in future disputes, and above all, that this would not alter the nature of the rights and obligations negotiated by the Membership.\textsuperscript{59}

106. In a similar vein, Colombia welcomed the Appellate Body’s substantive findings but expressed its disagreement with the “cogent reasons” approach on systemic grounds:

\textsuperscript{58} Minutes of the Meeting of the DSB on May 20, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), paras. 50-55.

\textsuperscript{59} Minutes of the Meeting of the DSB on May 20, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), paras. 67-68 (statement of Argentina).
Colombia wished to express its views on the systemic issue as to whether … panels were required to follow the Appellate Body's findings. In this connection, Colombia agreed with the reasoning of the Panel that there was no provision in the DSU that required WTO panels to follow the findings of previous panels or of the Appellate Body on the same issues brought before them. In fact, a panel or Appellate Body decision bound only the parties to the relevant dispute[, and] the Ministerial Conference and the General Council alone were empowered to adopt authoritative interpretations. 60

107. The complaining party in the Stainless Steel dispute, while minimizing the concerns being raised, did not endorse the “cogent reasons” approach (that it had not even argued for), but merely stated that a panel “must pay attention to” prior Appellate Body interpretations. 61

108. Unfortunately, the Member that held an expectation at the time of the adoption of the Stainless Steel report that the Appellate Body would not “cross the line” of suggesting an adopted Appellate Body report is binding misunderstood the meaning of that report. Although the Appellate Body avoided using the word “binding,” the meaning of its dicta and phrases such as “the panel’s failure to follow” was clear – Appellate Body reports should be treated as precedent. But neither wishing Appellate Body reports to have a different status, nor repeating the Appellate Body’s dicta, makes the analysis and statement of the Appellate Body any less erroneous.

109. It is simply inconsistent with the text and structure of the DSU and the WTO Agreement for a panel to treat prior interpretations in Appellate Body reports as binding, or precedent.

V. Certain Panels Have Followed a “Cogent Reasons” Approach Without Considering the Basis for Such an Approach

110. Before concluding, the United States would note with concern that, in several recent panel reports, certain panels have simply applied the Appellate Body’s dicta on “cogent reasons” as the Appellate Body intended. In those reports, the panels have failed to engage with the legal text of the DSU and WTO Agreement the United States has discussed in this statement. 62 This

60 Minutes of the Meeting of the DSB on May 20, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), para. 72 (statement of Colombia).
61 Minutes of the Meeting of the DSB on May 20, 2008 (WT/DSB/M/250), para. 73 (statement of Mexico) (“With regard to certain comments made by some delegations at the present meeting, Mexico pointed out that the decision by the Appellate Body should not be quoted out of its context. Panels must pay attention to the Appellate Body's findings particularly when dealing with the same legal questions.”).
raises grave concerns for the dispute settlement system as it suggests that serious, systemic errors are increasingly being made without any consideration of the actual text that WTO Members have agreed to. If these errors are being made by panels at the urging of a party to the dispute, then certain WTO Members bear responsibility for promoting this breaking of WTO rules. These panel errors also reinforce the danger to the WTO and the dispute settlement system from the issuance of advisory opinions by the Appellate Body – an issue we have discussed at length\(^6^3\) – as this “cogent reasons” approach contradicts the clear text of the DSU and the WTO Agreement.

VI. Conclusion: The Appellate Body’s “Cogent Reasons” Approach Usurps Authority Expressly Reserved to Members

111. In conclusion, the United States recalls the role of WTO Members, on the one hand, and WTO adjudicators, on the other. The text of the WTO Agreement and the DSU make clear that only Members, acting in the Ministerial Conference or the General Council – and not the DSB – have the right to issue authoritative interpretations.

112. The role of WTO adjudicators is different. The Appellate Body and panels are only to issue those findings necessary to resolve a dispute, and specifically, findings that will assist the DSB in making a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with a WTO agreement. Those findings are to be based on the text of the covered agreements, not the text of prior appellate reports.

113. While DSB recommendations resulting from reports “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements,”\(^6^4\) the Appellate Body’s approach would set the system on a path of departing from the agreed rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement. Where the Appellate Body has not made a correct interpretation, panels would nonetheless be required to follow it. Those errors would accumulate over time, and where


\(^{64}\) DSU Art. 3.2.
the Appellate Body in a subsequent appeal builds its interpretation on a flawed interpretation, the interpretations and resulting findings would become more and more removed from what Members agreed. This is exactly the opposite of the system that Members agreed to.

114. The United States has long been concerned with actions by the Appellate Body that seek to usurp the authority expressly reserved to Members. In claiming the authority to issue authoritative interpretations through its “cogent reasons” approach, the Appellate Body upsets the careful balance of rights and obligations that exist within the WTO agreements. This is yet another example of a failure by the Appellate Body to follow the rules agreed by Members, undermining support for a rules-based trading system.
6. RUSSIAN FEDERATION – ADDITIONAL DUTIES ON CERTAIN PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (WT/DS566/2)

- The United States has explained that the U.S. actions taken on imports of steel and aluminum pursuant to Section 232 are to address a threat to its national security.

- Every sovereign has the right to take action it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security. This inherent right was not forfeited in 1947 with the GATT or in 1994 with the creation of the WTO. Instead, this right was enshrined in Article XXI of the GATT 1994. The actions of the United States are completely justified under this article.

- What remains inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, however, is the unilateral retaliation against the United States by various WTO Members including Russia. These Members pretend that the US actions under Section 232 are so-called “safeguards,” and claim that their unilateral, retaliatory duties constitute suspension of substantially equivalent concessions under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.

- Just as these Members appear to be ready to undermine the dispute settlement system by ignoring the plain meaning of Article XXI and 70 years of practice, so too are they ready to undermine the WTO by pretending to follow its rules while imposing measures that blatantly disregard them.

- This is all too apparent, not only to the United States, but to the Members themselves. Russia, for example, has not addressed whether its action is in response to an alleged “safeguard” taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports. If there was an absolute increase, the right to suspend substantially equivalent concessions under the Safeguard Agreement may not be exercised for the first three years of the safeguard measure.

- There is no doubt that Article XIX of the GATT 1994 may be invoked by a Member to depart temporarily from its commitments in order to take emergency action with respect to increased imports. The United States, however, is not invoking Article XIX as a basis for its Section 232 actions and has not utilized its domestic law on safeguards. Thus, Article XIX and the Safeguards Agreement are not relevant to the U.S. actions under Section 232.
Because the United States is not invoking Article XIX, there is no basis for another Member to pretend that Article XIX should have been invoked and to use safeguards rules that are simply inapplicable.

The additional, retaliatory duties are nothing other than duties in excess of Russia’s WTO commitments and are applied only to the United States, contrary to Russia’s most-favored-nation obligation. The United States will not permit its businesses, farmers, and workers to be targeted in this WTO-inconsistent way.

For these reasons, the United States requests that the DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.
7. **SAUDI ARABIA – MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS**

A. **REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY QATAR (WT/DS/567/3)**

- Saudi Arabia has again today indicated that its measures are justified on the basis of essential security.

- As the United States observed at the December 4 DSB meeting and previously, from the very beginning of the international trading system, Members have understood that each WTO Member retains authority to determine for itself the actions it considers necessary to protect its essential security interests under provisions such as TRIPS Article 73.

- A WTO panel’s review of a Member’s invocation of its essential security interests would be contrary to the text of TRIPS Article 73, which – like GATT 1994 Article XXI – makes clear that this provision is self-judging, meaning that every WTO Member has the right to determine, for itself, what actions are in its own essential security interests.

- Under these circumstances, the United States considers the parties should resolve the issues raised in this dispute outside the context of WTO dispute settlement.
8. UNITED STATES – TARIFF MEASURES ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA

A. REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY CHINA
   (WT/DS543/7)

- The United States has serious concerns with China’s request for establishment of a panel.

- First, in bringing this dispute, China seeks to use the WTO dispute settlement system as a shield for a broad range of trade-distorting policies and practices not covered by WTO rules. In doing so, it is China, and certainly not that the United States, that is threatening the overall viability of the WTO system.

- Second, China’s request is hypocritical. China is currently retaliating against the United States by imposing duties on over $100 billion in U.S. trade. China cannot challenge U.S. tariff measures for being “unilateral” and WTO-inconsistent, while at the same time openly adopting its own tariff measures in connection with the very same issue.

- Third, in these circumstances, the outcome of any dispute settlement proceeding would be pointless. As we have noted, China has already taken the unilateral decision that the U.S. measures cannot be justified, and China has already imposed tariff measures on U.S. goods.

- China’s unfair trade practices with respect to forced technology transfer are well-documented. China cannot credibly dispute their existence; their unfairness; or their distortionary impacts on world trade. The United States has previously addressed China’s technology transfer policies at the DSB meetings held in March, April, and May of this year. In addition to our intervention today, we refer Members to those U.S. statements.

- In March 2018, the United States released a comprehensive report on four aspects of China’s policies regarding technology transfer. The report is over 200 pages in length, and is based on public testimony, public submissions, and other evidence. The report supported the following conclusions.

  - First, China uses foreign ownership restrictions, such as joint venture requirements and foreign equity limitations, and various administrative review and licensing processes, to require or pressure technology transfer from foreign companies. China’s foreign ownership restrictions prohibit foreign investors from operating in certain industries unless they partner with a Chinese company, and in some cases, unless the Chinese partner is the controlling shareholder. China’s

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65 The report is available at: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF
requirements lay the foundation for China to require or pressure the transfer of technology. Pressure is applied through administrative licensing and approvals processes which must be completed in order to establish and operate a business in China.

- Second, China’s regime of technology regulations forces foreign companies seeking to license technologies to Chinese entities to do so on non-market-based terms that favor Chinese recipients. These rules do not apply to technology transfers occurring between two domestic Chinese companies.

- Third, China directs and unfairly facilitates the systematic investment in, and acquisition of, foreign companies and assets by Chinese companies to obtain cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property and generate the transfer of technology to Chinese companies. The role of the Chinese state in directing and supporting this outbound investment strategy is pervasive, and evident at multiple levels of government – central, regional, and local. China has devoted massive amounts of financing to encourage and facilitate outbound investment in areas it deems strategic. China employs tools such as investment approval mechanisms and a system of encouraged sectors to channel and support outbound investment.

- Fourth, China conducts and supports unauthorized intrusions into, and theft from, the computer networks of foreign companies to access their sensitive commercial information and trade secrets. Through these cyber intrusions, China has gained unauthorized access to a wide range of commercially-valuable business information, including trade secrets, technical data, negotiating positions, and sensitive and proprietary internal communications. China has used cyber-enabled theft and cyber intrusions to serve its industrial policy objectives.

- In November 2018, the United States issued a 50-page supplemental report. The supplemental report explains that China has not fundamentally altered its unfair, unreasonable, and market-distorting practices that were the subject of the March 2018 report. Indeed, certain practices, such as cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, appear to have grown worse.

- These four technology transfer policies harm every Member, and every industry in every Member, that relies on technology for maintaining competitiveness in world markets.

- From the outset of the U.S. technology transfer investigation, the United States was clear that where a Chinese policy appeared to involve WTO rules, the United States would

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pursue the matter through WTO dispute settlement. The investigation revealed that the concerns with China’s technology licensing measures appear to be amenable to WTO dispute settlement. Accordingly, immediately following the issuance of the March 2018 report, the United States initiated a WTO dispute.\textsuperscript{67} Consultations did not resolve the matter, and the DSB established a panel at the November 2018 meeting.

- As China is well aware, the United States has made no findings that the licensing measures at issue in the WTO dispute are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations. Further, the U.S. trade measures taken in subsequent phases of the U.S. investigation are unconnected to the matters covered in the ongoing WTO dispute involving China’s technology licensing measures.

- In contrast, the three other categories of policies covered in the U.S. investigation do not appear to implicate WTO obligations. And, China has had many opportunities to argue otherwise. For example, at the March DSB meeting, the United States invited China to inform the DSB if China believed that the technology transfer policies addressed in the U.S. investigation could amount to breaches of WTO rules. To date, China has not responded to this invitation.

- As the United States has repeatedly stated, the goal of the U.S. technology transfer investigation is to obtain the elimination of the unfair acts, policies, and practices adopted by China. China, however, is trying the use the WTO system not as a means for promoting conditions for fair trade, but rather as a shield to defend China’s unilateral, unfair, and economically damaging technology transfer policies. These efforts by China, and not actions taken by the United States to address China’s unfair and economically damaging policies, constitute the real threat to the viability of the WTO system.

- Second, China’s decision to bring this matter to the DSB is hypocritical. On the one hand, China complains that the United States is being “unilateral” in adopting trade measures as part of the U.S. investigation. At the very same time, however, China has openly adopted retaliatory trade measures on over $100 billion in U.S. goods.

  o On June 16, 2018, China issued \textit{State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on $50 Billion of Imported Products Originating from the United States}.\textsuperscript{68} Through this legal instrument, the Government of China announced two lists of tariff subheadings subject to an

\textsuperscript{67} China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (DS542).
\textsuperscript{68} State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on $50 Billion of Imported Products Originating from the United States (State Council Customs Tariff Commission 2018 Public Notice No. 5, June 16, 2018).
additional 25 percent duty on U.S. goods. The 25 percent additional duties on the first list – containing 545 tariff subheadings – went into effect on July 6, 2018. According to China, this list applies to U.S. goods with an annual trade value of $34 billion.

- On August 8, 2018, China issued *State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on $16 Billion of Imported Products Originating from the United States.*\(^{69}\) Under this notice, China is imposing additional tariffs of 25 percent on U.S. goods with a purported trade value of approximately $16 billion dollars.

- Most recently, on September 18, 2018 – the same date as China’s letter requesting supplemental consultations in this dispute – China issued *State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on Approximately $60 Billion of Products Originating from the United States.* Under this announcement, China is imposing additional tariffs of either 5 percent or 10 percent on over 5,000 products, with a purported trade value of approximately $60 billion dollars.\(^{70}\) These tariffs took effect on September 24, 2018.

- In sum, China is currently imposing retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods with an annual trade value of approximately $110 billion. These retaliatory duties cover more than half of all U.S. exports to China. China has made no claim of any WTO justification for taking these measures. It is hypocritical to the extreme that, with respect to the very same matter, China attempts to invoke WTO rules, while at the same time ignoring those rules by imposing retaliatory duties on more than $100 billion in U.S. goods.

- Third, and finally, given that China has already taken the decision to retaliate against U.S. goods, any findings in a dispute settlement proceeding would be pointless. At most, a Member that prevails in a WTO dispute can obtain the authority to suspend WTO concessions. But here, China has already taken the decision to suspend tariff concessions owed to the United States by imposing increased duties on most U.S. goods exported to China.

- In conclusion, we have arrived at this point because China has chosen to adopt aggressive, unfair policies regarding technology transfer in pursuit of its industrial policy goals. As Members are likely aware, the Leaders of the United States and China have

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\(^{69}\) *State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on $16 Billion of Imported Products Originating from the United States,* Public Notice No. 7 (August 8, 2018).

\(^{70}\) *State Council Customs Tariff Commission Public Notice on Additionally Imposing Tariffs on Approximately $60 Billion of Products Originating from the United States,* Public Notice No. 8 (September 18, 2018).
agreed to enter into negotiations to address these issues. It is those discussions, and certainly not a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, that are the appropriate forum for addressing the technology transfer issues covered by the U.S. investigation.

- For these reasons, the United States will not agree to establishment of the panel requested by the China today.
10. APPELLATE BODY APPOINTMENTS: PROPOSAL BY VARIOUS MEMBERS (WT/DSB/W/609/REV.7)

- The United States thanks the Chair for the continued work on these issues.

- As we have explained in prior meetings, we are not in a position to support the proposed decision.

- The systemic concerns that we have identified today and in past DSB meetings remain unaddressed. As the United States has explained at recent DSB meetings, for more than 15 years and across multiple U.S. Administrations, the United States has been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body’s disregard for the rules set by WTO Members.

- We recognize the proposals presented by some WTO Members at the December 12 meeting of the General Council. These proposals to some extent acknowledge the systemic concern the United States has been raising in the WTO for years – namely, that the Appellate Body has strayed from the role agreed for it by WTO Members.

- As we have noted in detailed statements in the Dispute Settlement Body over the past year, and again today, many WTO Members share this concern, whether on the mandatory 90-day deadline for appeals, or review of panel findings on domestic law, or issuing advisory opinions on issues not necessary to resolve a dispute, or the treatment of Appellate Body reports as precedent, or persons serving on appeals after their term has ended.

- However, on a close reading, the proposals would not effectively address the concerns that WTO Members have raised. The United States has made its views on these issues very clear: if WTO Members say that we support a rules-based trading system, then the Appellate Body must follow the rules we agreed in 1995.

- For many years, the United States and other WTO Members have also been sounding the alarm about the Appellate Body adding to or diminishing rights or obligations under the WTO Agreement in areas as varied as subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties, standards under the TBT Agreement, and safeguards. Such overreach restricts the ability of the United States to regulate in the public interest or protect U.S. workers and businesses against unfair trading practices. The United States shares the view that it is “the collective responsibility of all Members to ensure the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body.”

71 See WT/GC/W/754.
As we have stated many times in the Dispute Settlement Body, we are ready to engage with other Members on the important issues raised. We look forward to further discussions with Members on these critical issues.