How the JCPOA Surpasses the Lausanne Parameters
Question Taken at the July 21, 2015 Daily Press Briefing
July 22, 2015
Question: In which specific cases did the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) exceed the parameters reached in Lausanne concerning Iran’s nuclear program?
Answer: The JCPOA not only met but exceeded the parameters we reached in the Lausanne Framework, putting additional constraints on Iran’s nuclear program for a number of years well into the implementation of the deal. The specific items where the JCPOA exceeded Lausanne are in three broad areas including: weaponization, metallurgy, and enrichment-related issues. The additional commitments from Iran above and beyond what we announced in Lausanne are listed below.
We have specific commitments in the text of this agreement that Iran will not engage in certain activities that could be used to design and develop a nuclear weapon. (Annex I, Section T, para 82.)
Iran has also agreed not to develop proficiency in uranium or plutonium metallurgy for at least 15 years. Without learning to do this, Iran will be unable to fabricate the uranium or plutonium parts for a nuclear weapon. (Annex I, Section E, para 24.)
Iran has also agreed to ship out all 20% enriched uranium not in fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor. (Annex I, Section J, para 58.)
Iran has agreed to let the IAEA monitor the production and stockpile of all heavy water in Iran. (Annex 1, Section C, para 16).
Iran has agreed to have only light water nuclear reactors (other than the converted Arak reactor) indefinitely. (Annex I, Section D, para 16.)
Iran has agreed to refrain from seeking highly enriched uranium or plutonium from abroad for any purpose for 15 years. (Annex I, Section E, para 25).
Iran has agreed not to cooperate with other countries on developing uranium enrichment technologies for 15 years. (Annex I, Section P, para 73).