

2012 Global Partnership Biological Security Deliverables

The 2011 G8 Summit at Deauville agreed to extend the Global Partnership (GP) beyond 2012 based on the areas of focus enunciated at Muskoka, including nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, scientist engagement, and facilitation of implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The 2011 G8 Summit also produced an *Assessment and Options for Future Programming* document that highlighted biological security work that could be done originating from a proposal made previously under the auspices of the Canadian G8 Presidency to strengthen global biological security. In 2012, under the US G8 Presidency, the Global Partnership members have focused on five corresponding deliverables. These efforts are promoted by GP members with the support of relevant international organizations taking part in the GP informal Biological Security Working Sub-Group. These international organizations include the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Implementation Support Unit, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE). With this in mind, the GP members agree on the following set of activities to be annually reviewed and the outcome assessed after a period of five years, taking into account support voluntarily provided by GP members to countries and international organizations, upon their request, for implementing these activities in accordance with Kananaskis Principles and Guidelines.

1. ***Secure and account for materials that represent biological proliferation risks.*** Assistance includes implementing existing international and developing national systems for managing biological materials, including stores of pathogens/toxins that represent proliferation risks in a safe and secure manner, with the goal that all nations may adhere to existing international standards and/or guidelines for biorisk management and oversight appropriate to their circumstances.
2. ***Develop and maintain appropriate and effective measures to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the deliberate misuse of biological agents.*** In recognition that full and effective implementation of international health regulations, standards and guidelines as well as national and international biosafety and biosecurity regulations contribute to preventing, preparing for, detecting, reporting, and responding to biological attacks, assistance includes building and strengthening sustainable national capacities to meet these requirements, taking into account multisectoral approaches.
3. ***Strengthen national and global networks to rapidly identify, confirm and respond to biological attacks.*** Assistance includes supporting the identification and implementation of shared approaches for deploying and strengthening coherent national and global biosurveillance, information systems, and networks to better detect, identify, confirm, and respond to biological attacks, with the ultimate goal of achieving near real-time identification and reporting for potential biological attacks.
4. ***Reinforce and strengthen biological nonproliferation principles, practices and instruments.*** Assistance includes promoting the universalization and full implementation of existing non-proliferation obligations, such as under the BTWC, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, and ensuring the effectiveness of existing tools, such as the UN Secretary General's mechanism, to investigate alleged uses of biological and chemical weapons.
5. ***Reduce proliferation risks through the advancement and promotion of safe and responsible conduct in the biological sciences.*** Recognizing that, while life sciences research is essential to advances that underpin improvements in the health and safety of the public, animals, and the environment, some research may provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misused for harmful purposes. Assistance includes supporting implementation of practicable and shared approaches to advance safe and responsible conduct in the life sciences to lower these risks.