UPR Working Group Intervention for Georgia, 10th Session

Thursday, January 27, 2011

Delivered by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and Labor, Daniel Baer

The United States welcomes Deputy Minister Kaparadze and the Georgia delegation to the UPR Working Group and thanks Georgia for the completion of its national report and presentation today. We would like to offer the following comments.

While work remains to be done, the United States commends the measures Georgia has taken to improve its human rights situation in recent years. A reformed Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), Parliament’s strengthening of the Office of the Public Defender, and Georgia’s accession to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities are welcome developments.

Mr. President:

We take due note of your ruling on the point of order, but we must state that with regard to human rights, due to the Russia’s occupation of Georgia’s regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Government of Georgia is unable to promote and protect human rights in these regions, which sit within Georgia’s internationally recognized borders. Moreover, the lack of transparency and absence of international monitors prevents Georgia and the international community from assessing the human rights situation there.

On the issue of electoral reform, we welcomed some positive steps in the May 2010 municipal elections. However, we hope that Georgia will fully address areas where the OSCE/ODIHR noted needed improvement including the flawed election code, appropriate use of administrative resources, equitable access to media coverage, and accountability for election-related misdeeds. We acknowledge the Government of Georgia’s ongoing efforts to work with opposition parties to reform the electoral code, and would like to know the envisioned timeline for enacting reforms. We also encourage Georgia to ensure that such reforms incorporate the views of opposition parties and civil society.

On the issue of, the Venice Commission made recommendations to buttress the independence of the judiciary, including that the probation period prior to the lifetime appointment of judges be eliminated, and that Supreme Court judges be afforded lifetime tenure and be nominated by the High Judicial Council rather than the President. We would appreciate hearing Georgia’s views on these recommendations.

Bearing in mind these concerns, the United States would like to make the

following three recommendations:

1. That Georgia fully implement the Venice Commission and ODIHR’s electoral reform recommendations, in consultation with opposition parties and civil society groups, well in advance of the 2012 and 2013 elections.

2. That Georgia complete and enact the draft media law, such that it includes measures to increase media ownership transparency and financial transparency.

3. That Georgia implement changes that improve the independence of the judiciary, giving full consideration to the Venice Commission’s concerns, particularly by establishing more objective and transparent processes for the appointment, discipline, and removal of judges, including during any applicable probation period.

Press statement

June 8, 2010

Representatives of the United States participated in the eleventh round of the Geneva Discussions. We believe that the Geneva Discussions offer an important forum where international discussions on security and stability can lead to positive and practical developments on the ground, including regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and unfettered access for humanitarian assistance to the conflict areas.

Proposals on a possible non-use of force agreement and associated international security arrangements were among the topics discussed at the session. We note that the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement between President Saakashvili of Georgia and President Medvedev of the Russian Federation, mediated by President Sarkozy of France, already establishes the sides’ commitment to the non-use of force. Full implementation of that agreement – which we still await from the Russian Federation – would render an additional agreement unnecessary. The United States believes another non-use of force agreement among the relevant parties, including the Russian Federation, could improve the situation on the ground provided it meets the concerns of all parties, includes meaningful implementation measures, and avoids unnecessary politicization of the status issue.

Participants also discussed proposals to enhance trust and transparency, which we believe would help decrease tension and enhance stability. We welcome the openness various parties expressed to use the IPRMs for this purpose, and we encourage the active development of this channel. We urge the immediate resumption of the IPRM for South Ossetia.

We hope that future rounds of the Geneva Discussions will focus on completing the implementation of the August 12 commitments, including the provision of unfettered access for humanitarian assistance, to which the Russian Federation committed in the August 12 ceasefire agreement.

January 28, 2010

The United States was pleased to participate in the ninth round of the Geneva Discussions. We welcome the Co-Chairs’ efforts to identify interim steps that can both improve the security situation on the ground and lay the groundwork for more far-reaching arrangements. One such step the Geneva Process has already taken, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRM), has provided an important forum for addressing issues of concern on a regular and pragmatic basis. We regret, however, that the operation of the IPRM for South Ossetia has been suspended for three months, and we hope that all participants will agree to reconvene this important mechanism without delay.

The sixth round of talks in the Geneva Process on Georgia and the regulation of its separatist conflicts convened today (July 1). Nearly all participants conducted today’s discussion in a constructive spirit, seeking to increase stability and human welfare without forcing pronouncements on the political status of Georgia’s separatist regions.

Agreement was reached to convene the first meeting in Abkhazia of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism on July 14, 2009 in Gali. This mechanism aims to reduce tension, increase military transparency, and deter violations of law and human rights.

Unfortunately, participants from South Ossetia refused to agree to convene another session of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in South Ossetia, and demanded as a precondition that Georgia recognize the independence of South Ossetia. Convening this mechanism to reduce military tension is of particular importance as Russia embarks on Kavkaz, the largest military exercise ever conducted by Russia in the North Caucasus.

The parties did agree to explore a comprehensive plan to address humanitarian and security concerns of the populations displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including in areas from which Russia committed to withdraw its troops in the August 12 cease fire agreement but has failed to do so.

We call on all parties to facilitate unhindered humanitarian access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as outlined in the August 12 cease fire agreement between Russian and Georgia and in UN Security Council Resolution 1866.

The United States urges all parties to focus on ways to address the serious humanitarian difficulties confronting populations displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the basis of status-neutral proposals. We regret that Russia was unable to join the overwhelming consensus supporting status neutral proposals to extend the mandates of the UN and OSCE monitoring missions in Georgia. The United States, Russia, and Georgia all expressed support for the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.

——

Palais des Nations
Geneva, Switzerland

February 18, 2009

Assistant Secretary Fried: Good afternoon. Thank you for staying for I think now the third in a row press appearance.

The Georgia talks here at Geneva have experienced an intensive day of work, day and a half of work. We had a significant success, agreement on proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms. That is a significant step forward. It’s positive, it’s practical. Agreement on this document was achieved despite the fundamental differences between the parties on the ground about status, but in spite of this we have recorded an achievement.

Now a word of caution about the mechanisms. They are not self-executing documents. Putting them into effect will depend on good will on all sides and we’ll have to see whether the good will that existed today in sufficient quantity to reach this achievement continues, particularly on the ground. So I have to inject a note of caution, but nevertheless, to have come this far is a positive step. It’s a step forward and I welcome it.

The second working group on IDPs and humanitarian issues unfortunately did not reach an agreement on a document that proposed opening up access for humanitarian aid into South Ossetia from both the north and the south. I regret this. It is too bad, frankly, that the second working group could not reach agreement on humanitarian assistance. This was due to one party at the talks blocking consensus. As I said, I find this regrettable.

Security Council Resolution 1866 calls for free humanitarian access, and I don’t think that today’s result in the second working group meets the standard set for us by the Security Council Resolution.

On the other hand, and I don’t want to be completely negative about work in the second working group. There have been some achievements in this group since we last met. Gas is now flowing in the pipeline north from the rest of Georgia into South Ossetia. This is good. The parties have agreed to work on water issues coming from South Ossetia down south into the rest of Georgia. This is good. There’s been some work done in providing more shelters for some of the IDPs in Abkhazia in the Gali District, and that is good.

So it was, I wouldn’t say a triumphant day for peace in the South Caucasus, but it was a day with a step forward, and considering that six months ago we were dealing with a war, I’ll take the good news where I can.

Now we have a very long way to go in restoring security and peace on a long term sustainable basis in Georgia. The situation along the administrative lines, particularly between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia is unsatisfactory, even dire, with attacks, raids, violence. This is a serious problem and we saw last summer that violence can quickly get out of control.

The situation in South Ossetia proper has been well and tragically documented by groups like Human Rights Watch and OSCE reports. There are reliable reports of massive depopulation of the once rather large town of Akhalgori, from 7,000 to only a couple of hundred residents. We have reliable reports of a tense situation in the Gali District in Abkhazia. Reports of local gangs putting pressure on local people. Eleven Georgian policemen have been killed, some of them with high caliber sniper rifles. In short, the situation there cannot be left on autopilot and things in Georgia, if neglected, tend to get worse.

It was therefore heartening that in the first working group agreement was reached on the subject for the next round of Geneva talks. There was agreement in the group that security, generally understood, including the principles of non use of force, principles accepted by all sides, and questions of how to improve security, how to establish new security mechanisms, will be discussed. That’s good news. I regret that we were unable to come to terms on a date for the next round of Geneva, but we have agreed that this important issue, a critical issue, will be the next one tackled. The issue of non use of force and the issue of security has to be dealt with broadly. There are issues of the militias crossing over from South Ossetia into the rest of Georgia. There are concerns which the European Union and my government have expressed about Russian military forces in Gudauta and Ochamchire.

The Russian government has expressed concerns about what it calls buildup of Georgian military forces. In this context I should refer to the agreement between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia providing for transparency of and limits on all Georgian military deployments in the region near Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This is a constructive agreement. As far as I know it’s being honored. And the head of the EU Monitoring Mission, Ambassador Haber, was clear that he is satisfied with it.

But that said, there are concerns on all sides about security and all of these concerns on all sides have to be addressed. So I look forward to the next round at Geneva. The Geneva process has functioned more slowly than some would like but it has not tread water or gone in circles. If the will is there on all sides there is the basis to work ahead.

Now I will add something about the context of Geneva in U.S.-Russian relations. As you know, President Obama and the weekend before last Vice President Biden referred to our desire in the United States to press the reset button on U.S.-Russian relations which is a metaphoric way of saying we’re going to try to deal with the areas of overlapping interest constructively, particularly in arms control and START, and also deal with the tough issues like Georgia where we do disagree in a practical and constructive manner. That’s certainly the intention of the U.S. administration. I will be able to report to my leadership that we had a step forward today, and there is the basis for further practical work, even on these tough issues.

So with all of the cautionary notes, all of the problems, all of the regrets that I have that we don’t have a date for the next round and that the second working group didn’t achieve what it could have, nevertheless we’ve taken a step forward and we have the basis to keep moving in the right direction.

With that, I’d be happy to take some questions.

Question: Since there is no fixed date for a next meeting, do you think that the next opportunity that Russian and U.S. diplomats will have to speak about the issue of Georgia will be when Secretary of State Clinton comes to Geneva and meets with Mr. Lavarov in two weeks time? Will that be a topic then?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I can never predict what ministers will talk about, and it’s dangerous to make such predictions because they’re not ministers for nothing.

Seriously though, we have discussed, obviously the ministers may well discuss Georgia, but in the mean time my counterpart and I, Deputy Minister Grigoriy Karasin, have had regular and productive straightforward contacts. We don’t hesitate to pick up the phone whenever we need to and discuss things. So we don’t have to wait two weeks. If something went wrong or something went right, we would be, I think it’s a fair prediction that we would be on the phone with each other pretty quickly. In addition, Ambassador Beyrle in Moscow has discussed Georgian issues with the Russian Foreign Ministry and others on a pretty regular basis. So this does come up.

We don’t lack for channels. I think with the new American administration there will be ample opportunities.

Question: A follow-up to Frank’s question. Would you say when the Secretary of State meets her counterpart, nuclear disarmament would be the main issue? And can you confirm the date it would be the 6th after the NATO meeting in Brussels that you will be coming here?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I don’t believe, unless it’s happened in the past 48 hours since I’ve left Washington, I don’t believe there’s been a formal announcement, so I won’t make one here. But I am aware, let us say, of the rumors. Some rumors have more basis than others.

With respect to the topics, it’s not at all a secret that the Obama administration intends to work on a follow-on to the START agreement. We’ve had discussions with our Russian colleagues about this. We think there is the basis to do so. There’s certainly the will on both sides to do so.

For those of you who followed U.S.-Russian relations, you may recall the Sochi Document signed by then Presidents Putin and Bush last year. That remains a valid agenda for progress and arms control and START have certainly been confirmed by this American administration as a priority area. So I think it’s fair to say this will come up among other issues.

Question: Could you just elaborate a little bit on what has prevented agreement on the date for the next meeting?

Assistant Secretary Fried: We had a discussion of how quickly we could do this. There was some sentiment that we should hold the next Geneva round within the next two months. Others thought we had a lot of work to do outside of Geneva to advance the decisions we’ve made today, particularly about the conflict prevention and incident management mechanisms. So there was not agreement reached, and I hope that there will be in the next future.

The Geneva process is useful, and of course it was endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 1866. That resolution encouraged the participants to reach practical results. I think we’ve met that standard today because we do have a practical result. But given the backing of the Security Council I think we should move ahead promptly with this discussion of security and the non-use of force. I don’t see what we’re waiting for.

Question: If I can just get back to the humanitarian issue for a second and the direct connection between what was reached today and the possibility of moving ahead on the humanitarian front.

How does the partial agreement reached today, the elements of communication between the sides, how do you see that contributing down the line to the humanitarian aspect? Particularly regarding the refugees? And do you see a protracted refugee situation occurring because of the disagreements between the sides?

Assistant Secretary Fried: The disagreement in the second working group was about the provision of humanitarian assistance, including from the south. Hopefully progress on the mechanisms will produce a feeling of greater security which will in turn help the South Ossetian authorities to be more comfortable allowing humanitarian assistance to arrive. I don’t understand why they would be unwilling to allow it to arrive. The Security Council resolution calls for the sides to refrain from placing any impediment to humanitarian assistance. So I regret that we were unable to find a way forward, but we have to take this a step at a time, and perhaps the progress we made today in the first working group will unblock the second working group. But we have a lot of work to do, it’s clear.

Question: And the refugee situation, it’s becoming a protracted situation?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, I wish I could tell you that I was confident it wouldn’t be, but the situation in South Ossetia, especially causes great concern. There are a limited number of UN monitors in Abkhazia. There are no regular monitors whatsoever going into South Ossetia. There have been visits of the OSCE, but no regular monitoring. The situation there is somewhere between difficult and dire. I do not believe that the conditions exist in the real world on the ground in South Ossetia for the refugees from the recent war to feel secure in going back to their homes, and this is a dreadful situation.

I wish I could say that the situation will improve. I hope it will improve, but it is not a good situation and we need to work on both security and humanitarian issues so the situation doesn’t linger. Things in that part of the world, if they are neglected, tend to get much worse. We’ve seen what happens when they do get worse.

So all of the parties have a responsibility to move ahead as fast as possible to improve the situation on the ground.

Question: On the evidence from the four sessions of talks here and obviously all the evidence you have at your disposal from your embassies in Moscow and Georgia, the stumbling block seems to me to be the Russian refusal to contemplate withdrawing its forces. Do you see any prospect of them changing their mind?

Assistant Secretary Fried: There are two aspects, well several aspects of Russian forces in Georgia. There are of course, the provisions of the ceasefire of August 12th negotiated by President Sarkozy of France. It is our belief that those provisions have not yet been met in full and that Russian forces are in places beyond their positions of August 7th before the war. It is our view, the view of the American government, that the Russian forces should withdraw to the positions held on August 7th.

There is also the problem of the buildup of Russian forces, both air forces at the Gudauta base and the talk about some sort of small naval base or facility in Ochamchire. I do not expect that the Russian forces will fully vacate Georgia, that is South Ossetia and Abkhazia, for a long time. They’ve said as much. So we and the Russians have a fundamental disagreement. That disagreement need not prevent our working together in other areas, and one of the bases that we have approached these talks on is an understanding that we can disagree fundamentally with Russia about the causes of the war, about their recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and nevertheless work together to stabilize the situation, prevent the use of force, and improve the situation on the ground so that refugees can return. Despite the disagreements.

Now that requires both a lot of work, a lot of creativity, because we could easily fall into a shouting match each time we discuss Georgia, but that doesn’t get us anywhere. So although I can register these disagreements, I’m also emphasizing that there is an area of overlapping or potentially overlapping U.S.-Russian interests upon which we can build.

I should say that the Georgian delegation made similar points. They said we have very deep disagreements, but we’re not here to dwell on them, we’re here to make progress. And I think all sides, and I include the Russian delegation also, approach these talks in that spirit sufficiently that we made some substantial progress yesterday and today.

Question: Just a quick follow-up. During the course of these two days have you had a bilateral meeting with your counterpart, Mr. Karasin, to specifically discuss what the U.S. and Russia can do to build up its relations with the new administration naturally in place?

Assistant Secretary Fried: We did not have a formal bilateral agreement, but we talked quite a bit on the margins. We discussed both how we can work together and discussed the possibility of future work together. We’ve enjoyed a good working relationship and a productive one and I expect this will continue.

Thank you very much.

# # # #

Press Conference
Palais des Nations

Geneva, Switzerland

December 18, 2008

Assistant Secretary Fried: Good afternoon. I believe you have already heard from the co-chairs and you have heard from Minister Karasin, so I will not repeat what they said, but I will first give thanks to the co-chairs and appreciation especially to Ambassador Pierre Morel who has done and did yesterday and today an excellent job of making as much progress as could have been made.

It was an intensive two-day session. We got close to an important agreement on a mechanism for settlement and investigation of disputes, and I regret that we did not achieve this agreement. We did get close.

Let me say that the background of these talks is still a very difficult and even dangerous situation on the ground in Georgia. Incidents including shooting incidents occur almost daily. Some of these incidents, I’m sad to say, involve deaths. An OSCE vehicle was fired upon just last week.

Under these very difficult circumstances, the participants in the Geneva talks yesterday and today sought to focus our work on a mechanism to deal with the incidents that do occur. We all agreed to avoid debate about the hard and at this stage unresolveable political issues having to do with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the, in our view, unfortunate Russian recognition of their independence — a step that the United States and Europe has condemned. We all agreed to avoid these issues and focus instead on practical steps forward. It was in that spirit that we made considerable progress toward such a mechanism. We did get close.

At the end of the discussions Ambassador Morel made a fervent and very persuasive plea for all the delegations present to swallow hard, to put aside the various frustrations, and agree to what was agreeable and to the text on the table.

The Georgian delegation pointed out that the text was less than they had hoped for, but nevertheless it was sufficient for them to agree to it.

The Americans, and I’m speaking for myself and my delegation, agreed that the text outlining the dispute resolution investigation mechanism could have been much stronger, but it was much better than nothing. It was a solid piece of work. We also agreed.

While I cannot speak for Minister Karasin, I had the strong sense that the Russians also wanted an agreement and would have been prepared to accept this text.

The South Ossetians and the Abkhaz, for their own part, were unable to accept it and so the text with two substantive issues outstanding out of at least ten, perhaps twelve as of this morning, stands but as an incomplete and therefore not agreed document.

As Pierre Morel and Ambassador Verbeke said earlier today, the mechanism outlined has a number of practical advantages, and there was a strong sense in the room that we need to try to put these to work as best we can.

As I said, the situation on the ground is dangerous. The EU monitoring mission is doing the best it can. But the lack of access on a regular basis to South Ossetia, and only very limited international access to Abkhazia are problems that we need to address, and we also need to address the problem of ease of communications on the ground between the relevant authorities.

We will continue to work to improve the situation on the ground and improve coordination between the various actors on the ground. Certainly despite these serious disagreements we have with the Russian Federation over the origins of the conflict and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the United States will work with Russia especially to try to help stabilize the situation, working with the EU, the UN, the OSCE and of course the government of Georgia so that incidents are minimized and the danger of increased and even out of control violence is put behind us.

I want to thank again the co-chairs for organizing the work of the past two days, express my thanks to them and to all the participants. Although we did not achieve the agreement, we did make some progress.

The Geneva Process remains the sole venue where all the parties to the conflict get together and we worked in a practical way over the last two days so this process has proved its worth.

With that, I’ll be happy to take some questions.

Question: I have a question. Actually today a classified report from the Pentagon was saying that within the Georgian army there was a great problem of mismanagement. Does this problem of mismanagement have a big impact on the ground? And does it make a resolution of the problems more difficult?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I read the article that appeared in the New York Times. Certainly the Georgian military has made great progress in the past few years, but many of the problems identified in that article are real and much progress remains to be made.

As you know, my government believes that the causes of the conflict, of the Russo-Georgian conflict, were complicated. We have always said it was a mistake for Georgia to move into Tskhinvali on the night of August 7th/8th, but there had been severe provocations, attacks, violent acts, both by South Ossetian forces and over the past year even involving Russian forces.

But today the Georgian military has not been, to my knowledge, involved in the incidents that I was referring to earlier.

The incidents are numerous but many of them seem to involve irregular forces from north of the administrative line in South Ossetia that come across the border and raid and shoot.

There are a lot of people with guns who aren’t particularly careful how they use them. There was agreement by all, all the representatives, including the Russians, Georgians, Abkhaz, South Ossetian representatives that the current situation is not satisfactory. So it was on that basis that all of us were able to make the progress that was made.

Question: I want to be really clear about where the agreement fell down. There were two issues. Was it over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Or could you clarify that issue?

Also, one of the chairmen mentioned that there were preliminary talks about freedom of movement on crossing points. Does that mean Georgians and South Ossetians going back and forth? You speak in forked tongues so it’s a little hard to understand some of this. Not, you, but — [Laughter].

Assistant Secretary Fried: There was a discussion not so much of freedom of movement but the need to increase the security at the crossing points. And the lack of regular recognized crossing points and a lack of security at these points can give rise to all kinds of problems. So there was a brief discussion of the need to tackle this issue.

But there was also general agreement that the first thing we need to do is put in place mechanisms to improve security on the ground and deal with incidents that do occur. So that’s where the bulk of the work was concentrated.

There were issues of – Well, status issues constitute some of the underlying problems we deal with all the time. These issues kept cropping up.

There are also issues of access and visits to sites of incidents. There was a great deal of sensitivity expressed, especially by the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz.

Now the Georgians said throughout the discussions that they welcomed robust and frequent international visits, including in cases of, as they put it, accusations. As the Georgians put it repeatedly throughout yesterday and today, if there are concerns about anything Georgia is doing there needs to be prompt access by international observers to investigate these and help build confidence. So they did not seem as sensitive to outside observers.

The South Ossetians and the Abkhaz seemed much more sensitive. Had there been more time I suspect that a formula might have been worked out. These differences did not seem to me ultimately unbridgeable, they just were unbridgeable today. And they were sensitive. And some delegations, some representatives made the point that after all, emotions are running pretty deep and it will take time to work out all these issues, or time to make progress on any of them.

So I’m giving you a sense. I don’t know whether I’m speaking in tongues, but I’m trying to be as straightforward as I can.

Question: Sir, could you elaborate a little bit more about what you’ve just told about those irregular forces involved in the recent incidents. This sounds quite serious. First, in terms of number. How many of them are there? Secondly, in terms of ambition. Are they free to act as they want, or are they playing a kind of specific role?

Assistant Secretary Fried: That is a very good question. If I could give you a precise answer the problem would be half solved. If we knew precisely what the situation was, if we knew exactly what kind of groups were doing what and what their intentions were, solving the problem on the ground would be a lot easier.

I’m not on the ground. I was in Georgia about a month ago so my first-hand information is already a month old. But the reports we have are that in many cases there are irregular armed formations, or gangs, that cross the border and are responsible for a lot of the shooting.

There are, of course, accusations that there may be some official involvement in some of these groups. I don’t know the answer. I can’t speak to every incident. But the incidents are a problem, and one of the problems we’ve noticed all along is that the potential for the situation on the ground to deteriorate is high and deterioration can be very swift. But the diplomatic progress of solving problems, setting up structures to manage them, has been relatively slow. It’s this gap that causes all of the concern by many parties.

Question: If I can just focus on the issue of some of these border crossings as well, my understanding right now, and correct me if I’m wrong, is that there’s only so far that you can go without engaging with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities, which I guess you are already doing as part of these negotiations.

Where do you think the line will be drawn in the inability to make any more progress without solving this very tense diplomatic issue of the independence of these regions?

Assistant Secretary Fried: No country in the world other than Nicaragua has joined Russia in recognizing Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence and it’s been now quite a while. So the issue is not resolving the issue of their status, because Europe, the United States, the G7 Foreign Ministers, have all condemned Russia’s recognition. However, in a practical way we are, after all, here in Geneva as you said, sitting down at the table with representatives from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We all perfectly well recognize that we have to deal on the ground with people who are in control on the ground, and it’s important to be practical and not let every question fall on issues of principle while maintaining our principles.

And I have to say that the Georgians also have come to Geneva in that practical spirit. We have to be practical. We’re prepared to be practical. But practicality does not mean giving away points that are points of deep principle, and we won’t do so. Still there is ample room for arrangements to increase security. The fact is, we cannot and should not hold all progress hostage, including progress to stabilize the situation for resolution of harder issues. It will be a very long time before the issues of the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are resolved.

In the mean time we have to do what we must and what we can do to stabilize the situation and prevent further conflict. Now that often involves either a constructive ambiguity or difficult formulas, but that’s what people like me are paid to do. That is, find a way to get done what needs to be done. That is certainly the practical spirit in which we approached these talks and will continue to approach them.

Question: Minister Karasin has just told us that Russian troops occupy and will continue to occupy their present positions out of the conviction, the Russian conviction, that this constitutes the best guarantee for the security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This to me, sir, doesn’t seem to leave much room for maneuver, or does it? Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Fried: I’ve already spoken to the disagreement between Russia on one hand and the United States and Europe on the other with respect to its decision to recognize these two territories and the concern we have about the buildup of Russian military forces in these two territories which we do not consider to be consistent with the ceasefire of August 12th. That said, we are nevertheless prepared to work with Russia to help stabilize the situation.

Russia does have responsibilities, having put forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to see to it that the situation is indeed stabilized. And it is, well, the Russians can speak for themselves how easy it is in their current situation, but we look to them to play a helpful role. As I said, despite the disagreements in principle we have, we’re willing to work with Russia in a practical way. It seems to me that is the only practical way forward.

The Georgian government approach these talks in the same spirit. It was this sense of practicality that enabled us to have two days of talks. In the room were Georgians, Russians, South Ossetians, Abkhaz, the Americans, and the international co-chairs, and no one was walking out. Everyone was working forward. No one was engaged in that kind of — No one engaged in antics.

So there is a practical spirit which still prevails despite the very difficult issues.

Thank you for your time.