Delegation of the United States of America

To the UNGA First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee

October 18, 2010

Thank you, Mr. Chairman:

The United States Delegation takes the floor today to review the outcome of the recent High Level Meeting on “Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral negotiations.” I would also like to discuss how we believe the international community best can contribute to a decision by the CD when it reconvenes next January to adopt and Implement a Program of Work that includes a mandate for the early negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or FMCT.

We applaud the dedication of Secretary General Bank Ki-moon to the achievement of comprehensive and balanced disarmament goals as well as his initiative in calling a High Level Meeting. This desire to make progress is shared by the international community and most definitely by my government. I am honored to represent a President whose drive and passion has shaped an extraordinary agenda of disarmament and non-proliferation goals. From his first day in office, President Obama underscored his eagerness to engage fully in international fora.

Mr. Chairman, the Conference on Disarmament, once a respected institution, has fallen into dysfunction and ill repute after more than a dozen years of deadlock. Yet, it is vital that governments have an energetic and effective multilateral forum in which to conduct international arms control negotiations and discussions if we are to make serious progress toward a safe, secure world without nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The United States was highly encouraged when the CD in May 2009 approved by consensus a work program including mandates for FMCT negotiations and for substantive discussions on other issues before the Conference. Our delegation in Geneva was, and remains, eager to roll up our sleeves and get to work on the complicated and difficult negotiations for an FMCT. Unfortunately, the will of the majority in Geneva continues to be frustrated by at least one state unwilling to allow the CD initiate FMCT negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, our Government appreciates that an FMCT would have profound security implications for countries (including the United States) which have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Consequently, we expect that an eventual FMCT negotiation, at the CD or elsewhere, will have to explore fully these and other security issues. The United States envisions that every state participating in such negotiations will have ample opportunity to defend its interests and ensure that an FMCT does not harm vital national interests.

Once FMCT negotiations start, whether in the CD or elsewhere, they must proceed by consensus, and each participating state must retain the sovereign right to determine whether to adhere to the resulting treaty. With these principles in place, no country need fear the prospect of FMCT negotiations. Therefore, it strikes us as unwarranted for a single country to abuse the consensus principle and thereby frustrate everyone else’s desire to resume serious disarmament efforts. We believe that these negotiations will take years; therefore, we should get started as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, in April 2009 in Prague, President Obama laid out his agenda for practical steps to move toward a nuclear weapons free world. Since then, the United States and the international community have made notable progress. In the midst of this progress, however, the continuing stalemate at the CD sticks out like a sore thumb. Consequently, the United States fully supports the Secretary-General’s efforts to revive the Conference from its many years of stalemate. We share his view that the CD’s 2009 work program represents a common denominator, and that the Conference should adopt and implement it at its first plenary session next January. We also welcome the thoughtful proposal by the Secretary-General that his Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies make a thorough study of the broader arms control machinery. We would certainly hope that such a study would also look at the U.N. Disarmament Commission, whose output appears similarly inadequate to the great disarmament challenges facing us.

Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about making a world without nuclear weapons a reality, then we must start now by initiating work on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It remains the strong preference of the United States to negotiate an FMCT in the CD. However, after well over a decade of inaction in Geneva, patience is running out for many governments, including our own. If efforts to start negotiations in the CD continue to stall, then those government that wish to negotiate an FMCT will have to consider other options for moving this process forward.

Mr. Chairman, it is long past time for the Conference on Disarmament to get back to work. An FMCT is too important for the international community to allow the CD’s dysfunction and the needless objections of any one state to dictate the pace of progress on disarmament, so the United States will continue to support other international efforts to identify a way forward for consensus-based FMCT negotiations to begin early next year in Geneva.

Remarks by Ambassador Laura Kennedy
US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, September 15, 2010

Thank you, Senator. It’s a great pleasure to be here. We all know how much lies ahead of us on the road forward in terms of nuclear disarmament. I’ve been fortunate to have had a long and interesting career but it is a special honor to represent a President who feels so strongly about these issues, who has elevated disarmament, nuclear security, and non-proliferation to the very top of his agenda. He charted a very bold and comprehensive way forward in his seminal speech in Prague in 2009. I guess that’s about 15 months ago, and I think indeed much has been accomplished since then; we eagerly have reached out to work, not just with of course the other nuclear weapons states as defined by the NPT, but indeed the entire international community. This is a President who believes in international engagement and in multilateral organizations. We are all cognizant that this is a very complicated and long term process as my colleague Ambassador Eric Danon very eloquently and incisively has just described.

The commitment’s there, the record’s there, and we’re building on it. START of course, will bring down, for example, our warheads 84 percent. As you know, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee is poised to vote on Thursday before bringing the treaty to the Senate as a whole for ratification. The President and Secretary of State have said that they want to get this done by the end of the year, and I think we’re on track. We were delighted, of course, that START was signed here in Geneva—negotiated, during many long seven-day work weeks and months here in Geneva. In addition to START and Security Council Resolution 1887, there is the Nuclear Security Security Summit with 47 states, and the success of the NPT Review Conference. In that regard, I am honored and pleased to see the President of the NPT Review Conference, Amabassador Libran Cabactulan here . He played an absolutely pivotal role at that month-long endeavor, which was quite an achievement in terms of coming up with an action plan of no fewer than 64 steps, including a conference on Middle East issues in 2012.

The CTBT was mentioned earlier. We’re committed to its ratification.

The FMCT has been part of the President’s Prague agenda since he enunciated it in 2009, and all of us here have been working hard in the Conference on Disarmament to get an agreed program of work that would allow us to start negotiations on that, and indeed tackle the whole range of core issues. As we all know, that has not happened. I think Ambassador Danon talked about the fact that when it’s the will of the Permanent five, it will happen. I would put it in a different way. I would say that absolutely, yes, the five nuclear weapons states have indeed subscribed to the goal of negotiating an FMCT. I would also talk about the international community, though. Again, going back to the work that Ambassador Cabactulan did with all of us iat the NPT Review Conference in New York, there were 189 nations there, 189 nations endorsed again, the necessity of starting an FMCT negotiation. So, I would say that there is indeed a massive international commitment in favor of negotiating an FMCT. The issue is, we believe, that the FMCT is the next logical step on the way towards global zero.

A nuclear weapons convention was mentioned, something indeed that I think is worthy of discussion. I noted its inclusion in the brief of the Middle Power Initiative. A convention is going to be a huge endeavor. We do not believe that the situation is ready now to start a negotiation on that. We think that would be a distraction from the step-by-step work that needs to be done, but certainly, it is worth discussing because the ramifications are so huge. We are actually at a stage where we are talking about zero, getting down to zero. Going from 100 warheads to zero is going to be the most complex thing that we have ever undertaken. So, even now on an FMCT, people say “Oh, that’s no big deal. The P-5 are already not producing this stuff.” However, verification of a legally binding prduction ban alone, I can tell you, will be a huge and complex endeavor. Just look at START, which is a relatively simple and straight-forward treaty that is built on decades and decades of experience. This took 11 months of work on teams, which I think probably hit about a maximum of 70 team members on our side, working occasionally 7 day work weeks at the height of negotiations and that was just for a relatively straightforward treaty. So, the work is huge and it is complex. For example, we need to think about how deterrence will work when you get down, to say, 500 warheads. So, is absolutely vital that governments and groups like yours are thinking about these difficult issues

We believe very much in a step-by-step approach of different frameworks that will complement each other: the CTBT, the FMCT, bilateral negotiations. Eric (Ambassador Danon) talked about the fact that up to now, nuclear reductions had either been done unilaterally or bilaterally. That’s true. I would say, on the other hand, there’s a lot the P-5 collectively can do even at this early stage. For example, at the NPT Review Conference, the P-5 put out a Joint Communiqué, in which we mentioned the conference in London that was held awhile back where the P-5 met and talked about things like transparency and confidence building. In other words, we are addressing some of the first steps you need to think about when you look down the road. So, I’d say that in a way, thinking about this is definitely going on.

Negative security assurances is another area where we are moving forward. Just look at what the U.S. administration has done in this area. There was a huge, massive, intensive review done on our nuclear posture, which yielded a big step forward in terms of revising our doctrines. Secretary Clinton announced our intention to move forward with ratification for two regional nuclear weapons free zones and our desire to engage on two others. Transparency is a principle that we believe in very much. Recently, as you know, we revealed our stockpile numbers and data.

We are looking towards the high-level meeting that the Secretary General is having in New York to address the CD. We very much appreciate the attention that this Secretary General and his High Representative, the very distinguished Sergio Duarte, have spent thinking about the importance of arms control for the international community. So, we very much welcome the fact that he is setting aside a day of his very valuable time in such an intense period in New York to talk about the Conference on Disarmament. The fact that it’s been stuck for all these years—this institution just sticks out when there is so much dynamism and so much that has been happening elsewhere. We don’t have any expectations that five hours of discussions are going to yield some magic bullet, but we appreciate very much the effort the Secretary General is putting into this and highlighting the issues because a way has to be found to move negotiations forward, and ideally, that should be in the CD. It’s an organization with lots of great talent at hand and it’s got the key stakeholders there. It is the world’s only standing multilateral arms control body. But if FMCT talks can’t be done there, for reasons we all know , if it’s stuck, then we for one will simply look for other ways to get it done. Ideally we would like to see the Conference on Disarmament move forward, not only on negotiating FMCT, but again tackling all those core issues that we are certainly eager and willing to engage on. Thank you very much.

Click on the image above to read documents related to U.S. policy on nuclear strategy

Treaty must be at center of efforts to stop spread of nuclear weapons

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

May 28, 2010

The United States welcomes the agreements reached at the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

The NPT must be at the center of our global efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons around the world, while pursuing the ultimate goal of a world without them. This agreement includes balanced and practical steps that will advance non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which are critical pillars of the global non-proliferation regime. It reaffirms many aspects of the agenda that I laid out in Prague, and which we have pursued together with other nations over the last year, and underscores that those nations that refuse to abide by their international obligations must be held accountable.

The document includes an agreement to hold a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The United States has long supported such a zone, although our view is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and nonproliferation obligations are essential precursors for its establishment. We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardize Israel’s national security.

The greatest threat to proliferation in the Middle East, and to the NPT, is Iran’s failure to live up to its NPT obligations. Today’s efforts will only strengthen the NPT as a critical part of our efforts to ensure that all nation’s meet their NPT and non-proliferation obligations, or face consequences. Together, we must work for a world where nation’s benefit from the peaceful power of nuclear energy, while also being secure from the threat posed by nuclear proliferation.

Read More:
Facts on Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference Final Document

U.S. Statement to Main Committee Subsidiary Body I

By Ambassador Laura Kennedy

U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

May 10, 2010

The United Nations

New York, NY

Thirteen months ago in Prague, President Obama highlighted the nuclear dangers of the twenty-first century and laid out a pragmatic agenda to confront those dangers. He reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, and pledged to take concrete steps to achieve that goal. The United States is unequivocally committed to this goal.

In my earlier statement I outlined some of the steps the United States has taken and plans to take, as well as the actions we must all take together if we are to achieve in this aim. Among these steps, President Obama expressed his determination to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy. The Nuclear Posture Review and the New START agreement make good on this commitment.

The United States is reducing the role of nuclear weapons in several ways. First, we have revised our “negative security assurance,” which now states that as a matter of national policy the United States will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. And in the context of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, we are prepared to make this commitment legally binding. We have done so by adhering to the relevant Protocol for the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and we are now seeking the U.S. Senate’s consent to ratification of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, which we have signed. As Secretary Clinton stated last week, we are also prepared to consult with the parties to the nuclear weapons free zones in Central and Southeast Asia.

Second, we have made clear that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the United States or against U.S. allies and partners. The Nuclear Posture Review has affirmed that the United States would consider the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent while actively working to create the conditions under which a world without nuclear weapons is possible.

Third, the United States has, and will continue to take steps to reduce the risk that nuclear weapons might be used accidentally or by miscalculation. To that end, all U.S. heavy bombers have been taken off full-time alert and all U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs are either off alert or targeted on the open ocean so that in the highly unlikely event of an accidental or unauthorized launch, destruction would be minimized. And to further reduce those risks, the United States is committed to finding ways to maximize the time available to the President to consider whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, we are undertaking a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world without nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.

Once the New START Treaty enters into force, it will reduce U.S. strategic warheads to levels not seen since the 1950s. Our lead negotiator, Rose Gottemoeller, will offer a briefing tomorrow on New START and the way ahead with her Russian counterpart, Anatoliy Antonov.

In signing this treaty, President Obama acknowledged that it is just one step on a longer journey that will set the stage for further cuts. Going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. And we will pursue high-level dialogues with both Russia and China, aimed at fostering more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships that will help build confidence and create the conditions for further nuclear reductions and eventually for multilateral negotiations that involve other nuclear weapon states.

The United States is working to achieve the long-sought disarmament goal of a ban on nuclear testing. We have committed to maintain our nuclear testing moratorium, pending entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. We are making preparations for securing Senate approval for ratification of the CTBT and working globally to convince other hold-out states to bring that treaty into force. We are also working in the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to complete preparations necessary to implement the CTBT.

The elimination of nuclear weapons will not be achieved quickly, and will take patience and persistence. And until we reach that point, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. We have done so for nearly twenty years without nuclear tests, and the Nuclear Posture Review confirms that we will not test in the future. Nor will we develop new nuclear weapons or new missions or capabilities for existing weapons.

Another key step will be to negotiate and bring into force a worldwide treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The United States stopped such production decades ago. We are committed to maintain that moratorium, and call on others to do likewise.

But there is no substitute for a legally binding and verified treaty to ban the production of the essential ingredients for nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would cap global nuclear stockpiles and help us reduce those stockpiles over time. Like most of you, we are frustrated that the Conference on Disarmament remains unable to make progress in negotiating this treaty, but we are sparing no effort to persuade our essential partners to allow negotiations to begin.

These are the main steps the United States is continuing to pursue on nuclear disarmament. It is an ambitious agenda, and the progress we have made has taken a tremendous effort and persistence.

Some have argued that progress on disarmament has been too slow and that we need to begin work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, or a timetable of specific steps, in order to accelerate that progress. The United States does not share that view. A Nuclear Weapons Convention is not achievable in the near term and therefore is not a realistic alternative to the step-by-step approach we are taking. Trying to combine all the issues into a single negotiation would be a formula for deadlock, as the Conference on Disarmament has demonstrated over the last decade, and such an effort would distract our energy and attention from practical, achievable steps.

Negotiating and implementing each step toward disarmament is hard work. Each step builds on preceding steps and takes into account changes in the international security environment. We cannot predict what new opportunities may open up along the way, or what unexpected challenges we may encounter. Therefore, we cannot map out every step of the disarmament process, nor can we define a schedule for achieving them.

No one should mistake this inability to foresee the future for an unwillingness to move boldly to pursue future disarmament steps. As we do so, there are certain principles that guide us along the way.

One of these principles is irreversibility. While not every step can be irreversible, we know that making key steps permanent helps build the confidence needed for further progress. It is worth recalling that the United States has shut down and decommissioned virtually all the facilities – the production reactors, enrichment and reprocessing plants – that we once used to produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons, and has permanently removed over sixty tons of plutonium and nearly four hundred tons of highly enriched uranium from weapons.

Last month, the United States and Russia signed a protocol to amend a 2000 agreement to eliminate at least 34 metric tons each of excess weapons-grade plutonium in fuel for civil nuclear power plants, starting later this decade. I encourage you to read the U.S. information paper for more information on U.S. disarmament actions.

Another key principle is the need for transparency and verification, which provide the confidence necessary for states to act together, with common purpose, towards disarmament. This need becomes more acute and the challenges more complex as we get closer to that goal. The comprehensive national research and development program that I mentioned earlier will help us develop technologies and methods to meet that need.

Finally, we must recognize the enormity of the challenges to be overcome in order to uphold our commitment to disarmament. Because nuclear weapons pose such a serious threat, deterrence has become deeply embedded in international security. As a consequence, eliminating nuclear weapons requires a transformation of security in a way that eliminating chemical or biological weapons has not.

In seeking concrete progress toward disarmament, we need to reduce tensions and seek to transform hostile and adversarial relationships into peaceful partnerships, as the United States and Russia have done.

In closing, let me assure every delegation of the unequivocal U.S. commitment to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. But we cannot do this alone, and we look forward to working with each of you to make that goal a reality.

(end text)

Ambassador Laura E. Kennedy

2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

U.S. Statement to Main Committee I (Disarmament)

By Ambassador Laura Kennedy

U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

May 7, 2010

The United Nations

New York, NY

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I would like to congratulate Ambassadors Chidyausiku and Marschik on their election as Chairmen and pledge our support as they undertake these important duties.

This Review Conference provides an opportunity for all of us to rededicate ourselves to the central purpose of this treaty: to prevent the devastating effects of nuclear war. This is the underlying purpose of our efforts here, and of all of our collective efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and ultimately to eliminate them. It is also is why the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review stressed the importance – not just for the United States but for all nations – of extending forever the 65-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons.

But preventing nuclear war is not something that we or any other nation can accomplish alone. Every nation – indeed every person on this planet – benefits from our efforts to confront global nuclear dangers, and every nation can contribute to their success. Indeed, we all have a responsibility to act with unified purpose to ensure that these efforts succeed. As a part of that collective effort, my government and those of the other nuclear weapon states collaborated on a wide-ranging and balanced statement designed to identify areas of common concern and to identify ways in which we can make progress together. We have read with great interest the many papers and proposals that have been put forward. The Australia-Japan paper just presented by our Australian and Japanese colleagues provides one example of a balanced and realistic starting point.

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama made clear the U.S. commitment to his intent to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy and to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. He identified three areas where the international community needs to work together to reduce nuclear dangers: disarmament, nonproliferation, and nuclear security.

On disarmament, he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He acknowledged that achieving this goal would not be easy and might not take place in his lifetime. It will require patience and persistence to overcome the obstacles to this vision.

President Obama identified specific steps the United States will pursue to achieve this goal. These include the New START Treaty he and Russian President Medvedev signed in Prague last month. My distinguished colleague, Ambassador Antonov, presented on behalf of our two delegations a statement on New START. This treaty demonstrates the continuing commitment of the world’s two largest nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals and advance the objectives of Article VI. I am delighted that the two lead negotiators, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov, will offer a briefing to the Conference on May 11.

We will also seek to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to encourage others to do the same, in order to bring that treaty into force. My President just welcomed Indonesia’s decision to move forward on ratification of the CTBT to whom we all say “terima kasih” – thank you.

We have redoubled our efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which would put an end to the production of the essential ingredients in nuclear weapons. I will have more to say on these disarmament efforts in my statement to the Subsidiary Body of this Committee.

On nonproliferation, President Obama committed the United States to strengthen the NPT as the basis for international cooperation to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. “The basic bargain is sound,” he said. I would like to examine that bargain more closely and examine what makes it so important to all of us.

It is often said that the key bargain for non-nuclear-weapon states is that, in exchange for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, they gain a commitment from the nuclear-weapon states to disarm. This is an important part of the NPT bargain, but it is a bargain that works both ways. The nonproliferation undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon states help create a stable and secure international environment that makes it possible to work confidently toward the goal of nuclear disarmament.

That is why we need to work together to halt nuclear proliferation and to strengthen international safeguards in order to provide stronger assurances that states are meeting their non-proliferation obligations and stronger tools to respond if they do not. Our efforts cannot succeed if violators are allowed to act with impunity. Therefore, we will need to establish effective, internationally supported mechanisms for discouraging and reversing noncompliance.

In addition to working together to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and reverse the spread of nuclear weapons, we also must work together to resolve regional disputes that may motivate rival states to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons. This will help reduce mistrust and build momentum for the further reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

To put it simply, nonproliferation is one of the essential conditions for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. This is one reason why the disarmament undertakings in Article VI apply to all Parties to the Treaty.

Another important part of the NPT bargain, just as important and much more immediate, is the bargain among the non-nuclear-weapon states, who commit to one another not to acquire nuclear weapons. This is arguably the greatest and most immediate benefit to the security of most of the states party to the NPT.

To extend these security benefits as broadly as possible, we remain committed to the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty. While we pursue that goal, we call on those states that have yet to sign the NPT to adopt the standards and practices embodied in the NPT and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime.

We also call on North Korea – the one state that has announced its withdrawal from the Treaty – to return to compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards, as called for in the September 2005 Joint Statement from the Six-Party Talks and in successive resolutions of the UN Security Council.

There are other connections between the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the Treaty, particularly in the area of verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency has decades of experience in applying safeguards to verify that peaceful nuclear activities are not diverted to weapons use. This experience can be brought to bear in the nuclear disarmament process in two critical ways.

First, nuclear-weapon states may choose to place under IAEA verification material they identify as no longer needed for weapons purposes, and can invite the IAEA to verify that it is converted into forms no longer suitable for nuclear weapons use, as the United States has done. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has down-blended nearly 118 tons of highly enriched uranium removed from defense programs – enough for roughly 3,000 weapons – to produce low-enriched uranium reactor fuel. Much of that down-blending took place under IAEA safeguards or in facilities available for IAEA inspection. Together with Russia, we are working to dispose of at least 68 tons of plutonium from weapons programs – enough for over 17,000 weapons – and we foresee a critical verification role for the IAEA in that disposition.

Second, the IAEA could – and in our view should – be given the responsibility to verify that states are not producing new fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. A verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty could place under IAEA monitoring all of the most sensitive fuel cycle facilities – enrichment and reprocessing facilities – that are capable of producing fissile material.

These important steps by the IAEA could make an important contribution in promoting international confidence that nuclear material and facilities formerly dedicated to nuclear weapons programs are now devoted entirely to peaceful purposes.

Alongside nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the third element of President Obama’s Prague agenda is nuclear security. To address the nuclear dangers that we face, we need to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, not just by states but by violent non-state actors. The potential availability of weapons-usable materials, and the widespread knowledge of how to manufacture a simple nuclear explosive make this a real and pressing threat.

This is why President Obama established the goal of securing the most sensitive nuclear materials in the world within four years. The Nuclear Security Summit last month brought together leaders from forty-seven countries and three international organizations to make concrete commitments to advance this goal.

Alongside nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, nuclear security is an essential part of our efforts to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, a goal to which we must all rededicate ourselves here. This must be our common vision, and achieving it will require concerted efforts by all countries, nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states alike.

The three pillars of the NPT provide a solid architecture for our broader efforts to confront nuclear dangers worldwide. But this structure cannot endure if we pick and choose which parts of it we want to support, and withhold support from others. Our choice is clear: we must work together to reinforce all three pillars of the Treaty to ensure that its benefits endure for future generations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

"On this 40th anniversary, the United States reaffirms our resolve to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet the challenges of the 21st century as we pursue our ultimate vision of a world without nuclear weapons." President Barack Obama

Statement by President Obama on the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

March 5, 2010

President outlines three pillars to stop the spread of nuclear weapons

Forty years ago today, in the midst of a Cold War, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force, becoming the cornerstone of the world’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Today, the threat of global nuclear war has passed, but the danger of nuclear proliferation endures, making the basic bargain of the NPT more important than ever: nations with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, nations without nuclear weapons will forsake them, and all nations have an “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy.

Each of these three pillars — disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses — are central to the vision that I outlined in Prague of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and seeking a world without them.

To promote disarmament, the United States is working with Russia to complete negotiations on a new START Treaty that will significantly reduce our nuclear arsenals. Our forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review will move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, even as we maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. In addition, we will seek to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiate a treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

To prevent proliferation, we will build on the historic resolution that we achieved at the United Nations Security Council last September by bringing together more than 40 nations at our Nuclear Security Summit next month with the goal of securing the world’s vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. At this spring’s treaty review conference and beyond, we will continue to work with allies and partners to strengthen the NPT and to enforce the rights and responsibilities of every nation, because the world cannot afford additional proliferation or regional arms races.

Finally, to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the United States seeks a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation among nations, including an international fuel bank and the necessary resources and authority to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. For nations that uphold their responsibilities, peaceful nuclear energy can help unlock advances in medicine, agriculture and economic development.

It took years of focused effort among many nations to bring the NPT into force four decades ago and to sustain it as the most widely embraced nuclear agreement in history. On this 40th anniversary, the United States reaffirms our resolve to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet the challenges of the 21st century as we pursue our ultimate vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

Ellen Tauscher speaks at the Global Zero Summit in Paris, France

Obama embraces vision of a world without nuclear weapons

Ellen Tauscher
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Global Zero Summit
Paris, France
February 3, 2010

As prepared

Thank you. It’s an honor to be here in Paris at the Global Zero Summit and see so many old friends. Many of you have known and worked with me when I served as a member of Congress from California and it’s an honor to be here today representing the Obama administration.

I want to thank Richard Burt for this invitation and I want to thank all of those who are here today that I have worked with in the past. Thank you for your patriotism and your hard work.

I want to recognize the Student Movement and its leaders who are a part of this conference. Thank you for your passion and engagement.

I know Global Zero has set itself an ambitious goal of wanting to eliminate nuclear weapons during the next 20 years.

The goal is admirable, and I thank you for the time and energy each and every one of you is putting into this effort.

The nuclear arms race that characterized the Cold War cast a shadow over the lives of people everywhere—especially those living in Europe and the United States. But today there is universal agreement that, as Secretary Clinton said last week in this great city, “People everywhere have the right to live free from the fear of nuclear destruction.”

And President Obama set forth an ambitious agenda in his speech in Prague last year. The president has embraced the vision of John Kennedy and Ronald Reagan of calling for a world without nuclear weapons.

Those are not just abstract words for him. This issue animates the president, it’s not one of those issues that an aide had to tell him about. He has put his political capital and muscle behind that vision.

But he acknowledged then, just as he did in his statement to you yesterday, that it would not be easy and that it will take a long time. It will likely will exceed twenty years and that it might not happen in his lifetime.

Nuclear disarmament is not the Holy Grail. It’s only worth pursuing in so far as it increases our national security.

I believe that the journey on the road to zero is perhaps more important – than the goal itself.

It’s those concrete steps that we take that will enhance the national security of the United States and make the world a more stable place.

So just don’t look at what we say, look at what we’re going to do over the next few months.

We’re at the end game of negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia. Nobody said this was going to be easy and as someone who has negotiated a few deals in my day, this is one that isn’t very contentious or complicated.

Both sides are working well together and if the measure of a good deal is that both sides are willing to do another deal, then we’re in good shape.

As President Obama said in his statement to you the other day, “this is just a start.”

On March 1, the Obama administration will release its Nuclear Posture Review, which will reduce role and number of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. For the first time, there has been significant State Department participation in the Nuclear Posture Review. We have made sure to fully address all matters relating to our nuclear posture. We also have spent a significant amount of time consulting our allies because it is our goal to strengthen their security as well.

At April’s Nuclear Security Summit, the President will bring 44 nations together to advance his goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, so that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.

In May, we will strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime at the Review Conference and work with allies and partners to ensure that the rights and responsibilities of every nation are enforced.

We are also working to start negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to halt fissile material production, so that we don’t add to global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium.

And, when we’re ready, we will ask the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Looking back, the United States and, for that matter, Russia, have not gotten enough credit for the steps we have taken to disarm. They have been substantial even though we all know we have a long way to go.

There’s also reason to look up.

More than 180 countries have foresworn nuclear weapons. More countries have given up or been denied nuclear weapons programs than those that have acquired weapons over the past 40 years.

That’s why we cannot let our guard down now. My friends, George Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, who some call the Four Horsemen or the Four Wise Men have compared the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons to the summit of a very tall mountain.

It’s hard to see that peak from where we stand today, and so we first must make forward progress that allows us to see that goal as attainable and realistic. We have a long journey ahead of us and it’s a journey that won’t be easy, but with your help and your energy I believe that we can get there.

Thank you very much.

White House Chart Showing Declines in US and Russian Nuclear Arsenals

Nonproliferation Resource List Selection of leading institutions, web sites, publications

Institutions, Organizations and Think Tanks:

Alsos Digital Library on Nuclear Issues

The Acronym Institute on Nuclear Nonproliferation

The Arms Control Association

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) on Getting to Zero

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on Nonproliferation

The Center for International Security and Cooperation on Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism

The Center for Strategic and International Studies on the Project on Nuclear Issues

The Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Defense Department on Nuclear Matters

The Federation of Atomic Scientists on a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

The Friends Committee on National Legislation’s Nuclear Calendar

The Institute for Science and International Security on Nonproliferation

The International Atomic Energy Agency on Promoting Safeguards & Verification

The International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM)

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

The National Counterproliferation Center

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

The Ploughshares Fund

The State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)

The State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation (VCI)

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on Nuclear Weapons

Union of Concerned Scientists on Nuclear Weapons

USEC Inc. Megatons to Megawatts (M2M) Program

Texts, Transcripts and Articles:
Obama Seeks World Free of Nuclear Weapons

Secretary of State Clinton at the U.S. Institute for Peace

Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov

Gottemoeller’s Remarks at the Conference on Disarmament

U.N. Security Council Commits to Global Nuclear Disarmament

Ambassador Rice on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Joint Understanding for START Follow-on Treaty
July Moscow Summit Seeks to Reduce Nuclear Arsenals

Reducing Nuclear Arsenals Is a Critical U.S.-Russian Concern

U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration

Statement from Obama, Medvedev on Reductions of Nuclear Weapons

President Obama’s Speech in Moscow
Obama, Russia’s Medvedev Announce New Arms Control Plan
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Reduction Talks Begin

U.S.-Russia Cooperation to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Books, Journals and Articles:

Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate

The Armageddon Test: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism

CISAC News on The Global Nuclear Future

Congressional Research Service Reports on Nuclear Weapons

The Defense Department on the Nuclear Posture Review

In the Eyes of the Experts:  Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture

The Nonproliferation Review

The State Department’s Nonproliferation Reading List

Today’s Nuclear Equation

World Public Opinion Report on U.S.-Russian Nuclear Weapons Elimination

Blogs:
Arms Control Wonk

Martin Senn’s Arms Control Blog

Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Russian version)

Totalwonker

Verification, Implementation and Compliance

Video:

Arms Control TV

Plowshares Fund President Joe Cirincione: Current Trends in U.S. Nuclear Policy

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

(Excerpt of Portions Related to START)

1:37 p.m. EST

Briefer: Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs

MR. CROWLEY: Good afternoon.  Good afternoon and welcome to the Department of State, and happy December 22^nd to all of you.

Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State (Official Portrait)

A couple of things before we take your questions.  Just to note, since we haven’t chatted in several days because of the weekend and the snow here in Washington, over the weekend the U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller has returned for a recess from the START negotiations in Geneva.  The team has gone through an intensive period of negotiations with their Russian counterparts over more than two months.  Our goal remains to conclude a solid treaty for the President’s signature as soon as possible, and we expect that the teams will resume their negotiations in Geneva in mid-January.

————————

….

QUESTION: Just on START, if you could – this is now the second deadline that’s been missed.  You had the 5^th and then you’ve been saying you want one before the end of the year.  It’s not going to happen.  How disappointed are you?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we continue, I think, to faithfully carry out the charge that was given to us by President Obama.  The 5^th was a point at which the existing treaty expired by agreement between the two countries.  We are abiding by the spirit of that agreement as we continue these negotiations.  They’re being done in good faith.  We had hoped to resolve the complex issues that these treaty negotiations present by the end of the year.  I don’t think that we’re particularly concerned, given the complexity of these issues, that it’s taking a longer period of time.

Clearly, over the course of these two months, we have made dramatic progress.  There are still issues that we continue to work through, so there’s still more work to be done.  But I think we remain confident that given good faith and the ongoing efforts of both sides, that this will get done.

QUESTION: And what’s your current assessment of when you think that might happen?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, we’ll – I think we expect to pick it up again in mid-January.  And taking a break, it gives us a chance to kind of come back and understand what the unresolved issues are and to come back to the table in January with new proposals on both sides.

QUESTION: So you have no goal?  I mean, you –

MR. CROWLEY: Well –

QUESTION: This could go on forever as far as you’re concerned as long as you –

MR. CROWLEY: I can’t – well, we – the fact – I mean, the fact that the 5^th came and went because we have an understanding with Russia that we are going to continue with the status quo – I mean, we’re not talking about an environment of 20 years ago when we were doing this before.  This is a much different environment than we exist in today.  We have confidence in the good faith on the Russian side.  I think they have confidence in the good faith on our side based on not only the working arrangement that the two teams have developed, but also the ongoing consultations that – and high level that we’ve had, including the meeting between President Obama and President Medvedev in Copenhagen last week.

But we are going to continue to work on this, and there are complex issues.  I think we’re confident that we will arrive at a satisfactory conclusion and a new treaty that meets our national interests and meets Russia’s national interests.  And – but when it gets done is when we are finally able to overcome the last couple of hurdles that still confront us.

QUESTION: It sounds like there’s no goal.  I mean, that’s what I’m trying to get at.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, the goal –

QUESTION: I mean, there isn’t a goal as far as timeline.  I mean –

MR. CROWLEY: Kirit, remember the goal is to get a treaty not only that we arrive at an understanding between the United States and Russia, but we also have to arrive at a treaty that is clearly in our interest, that we can present to the United States Senate and receive its advice and consent.  So we’re not negotiating just to get a treaty – any treaty.  We’re negotiating to get a treaty that is in the interest of the United States and, we believe, in the interest of Russia.

So it’s not something you can sweep a wand at and say, “Okay, we’ll just solve this problem.”  The issues that we’re working through in terms of numbers and verification and the complex issues regarding these kinds of systems, it does take significant time to work through.  It’s very, very complex.  But we continue to work on them.  We’ve made progress.  We think we’re in a pretty good position.  But we thought that after a couple of months of very intensive work, it was useful to take a break, and we’ll resume this in early January.

1:23 p.m. EDT

Briefer: Ian Kelly, Spokesman

QUESTION: No? Okay. Then is there any update on the P-5+1, when or whether they will meet again with the Iranians?

MR. KELLY: I know that there was a telephone conversation today with the political directors from the six countries. Of course, Under Secretary William Burns participated from our end. They discussed the need for unity of the P-5+1 in our approach to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. They also discussed the way forward on arranging a follow-on meeting to the Geneva meeting, but that’s very much now still in the works. It’s a matter of discussion between Mr. Solana and the Iranian authorities, but nothing’s been set in terms of follow-on –

QUESTION: Is the U.S. position that if the Iranians don’t accept in full what was presented to them on the LEU deal, that there shouldn’t be another meeting?

MR. KELLY: I am not sure that there is any linkage, per se on that – of course, the agreement that was reached in Geneva – to have a proposal go to the Iranians from the IAEA. This was a very important outcome from that meeting of a few weeks ago. But I’m not sure that I would draw any direct linkage between the two.

QUESTION: But doesn’t that mean –

MR. KELLY: Yes, Jill.

QUESTION: — that they are not fulfilling what they were supposed to fulfill?

MR. KELLY: Well, I think you saw what Mr. El Baradei said on Friday, that they asked for a little more time to review the proposal. And he indicated that we expected an answer by mid-week. So we’ll hold off to see what comes out of that.