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Geneva March 25, 2004
Let me offer the very best wishes of the United States to Ambassador Inoguchi as she returns to Japan and the next exciting chapter of her life. Mister President, late next month many of us will participate in the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We expect the Committee to complete the necessary procedural and administrative preparations for the 2005 Conference and to engage in constructive exchanges on the many ideas and proposals for strengthening implementation of the NPT and achieving its universality. If we focus on accomplishing what is possible, this session of the Preparatory Committee will prepare us well for our task at the 2005 Review Conference. Since becoming the Special Representative of the President for the Non -Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I have been impressed with the seriousness of purpose that virtually all NPT parties bring to any discussion on this vital Treaty. We need that seriousness of purpose as the NPT is facing critical challenges. Certainly, developments related to the NPT over the past three months have been dramatic. Libya's decision to forgo its nuclear weapons program and come into compliance with the NPT is of great importance and significantly advances the Treaty's goals. However, the startling revelations about nuclear black market activities and Iran's continued unwillingness to cooperate fully with the IAEA are matters of serious concern to the international community. My government has worked with many states represented in this room at the IAEA, in the Security Council and in bilateral and multilateral discussions to address these and other NPT compliance questions, including North Korea's nuclear program. We do not always agree on the same approach, but I am confident that we will continue to work together for the same common purpose. The NPT will continue to serve our collective security only if we insist on strong verification and enforcement measures. I look forward to a constructive dialogue on these issues at
the upcoming session of the Preparatory Committee, including the
proposals put forward by President Bush on February 11. Of particular
importance is the need to strengthen the IAEA further as an effective
tool for ensuring compliance with NPT safeguards undertakings.
Equally vital to the NPT's future is the need to find a way for
parties to continue to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear
programs without undermining the NPT's central purpose of preventing
the further proliferation of Mister President, the main purpose of my remarks today is to underscore the strong commitment of the United States to meeting all of its obligations under the NPT. The U.S. Delegation to next month's session of the Preparatory Committee will provide more detailed information on what the United States has done and is doing to meet these obligations. Under Articles I and III, the United States will continue to ensure that its cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states does not assist them in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, we take very seriously our obligations under Article IV to assist other NPT parties in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty's nonproliferation undertakings. The United States is the largest contributor to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program, which is increasingly responsible for making the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy a reality for developing countries. Whether bilaterally or through the IAEA, the United States is proud of its numerous programs that contribute to the development and nuclear energy needs of nations around the world. Mister President, on Article VI, the United States has already offered considerable information at the first two sessions of the Preparatory Committee on its actions and policies relating to nuclear disarmament. We will continue that practice at next month's session in New York. Today, I will provide a brief overview of the strong U.S. record on Article VI. In the first instance, we must remember that Article VI applies to all NPT parties. While the nuclear weapon states have the primary responsibility to pursue measures related to nuclear disarmament, all parties can contribute meaningfully toward that goal by helping to fashion an international environment that is conducive to a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and to their eventual elimination. Moreover, we must also not forget that Article VI further requires NPT parties to negotiate a "Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Today we focus on a step-by-step approach to that seemingly distant goal. Even then we can all attest that progress is difficult and the task is one necessarily requiring the full cooperation of all nations. Second, achieving nuclear disarmament is a gradual process that will be long and difficult. Political realities and changes in science and technology are among the factors that make it so. The end of the Cold War led to the cessation of the nuclear arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union, an important milestone in the implementation of Article VI. It also led to progress in ridding the world of large nuclear stockpiles. Many nations are cooperating in this momentous task and we can all rejoice in their accomplishments. Yet, events of the past few years have introduced a new and destabilizing unpredictability into world affairs. I have already mentioned the nuclear activities of some states in violation of the NPT. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the deadly menace of terrorism have brought new dangers to all of us. The nexus of these threats poses a risk to the very pillars of civilization. This unhappy truth of our age should steel our resolve to move as one against this gathering threat. These developments do not mean the nuclear disarmament process needs to stop; indeed, the United States and the Russian Federation continue to reduce stockpiles even as these new threats intensify. But it illustrates the obvious point that disarmament of any type does not take place in an international security vacuum and reinforces the conclusion that sweeping, unfocused approaches to disarmament such as a nuclear weapons convention or setting timetables are illusory and will not work. As history teaches us, progress will come only through incremental approaches that take account of states' threat perceptions. The challenge is to foster real changes in regional and global security conditions that afford the opportunity for sustained, step-by-step disarmament of all kinds, nuclear and conventional. The trend lines are positive in this regard, but much work remains to be done; let us make an ally of perseverance and eschew maneuvering for political advantage. Mister President, we can all take satisfaction in the realization that unparalleled progress on Article VI has occurred since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The political ramifications of that event and subsequent developments led to historic cooperation between the United States and Russia to halt the nuclear arms race, reduce the number of nuclear weapons, and remove tons of fissile material from military stockpiles. Large numbers of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons were withdrawn from deployment in the last decade and the last of these withdrawn weapons was dismantled last year. The United States alone has dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia have removed enough fissile material from military stockpiles to build 30,000 nuclear weapons. President Bush took a dramatic step forward on Article VI by announcing in 2001 that the United States would unilaterally reduce its nuclear forces to the lowest levels in decades. The President's approach reflected the reality that the Cold War was over and that our relationship with Russia needed to be transformed. President Putin followed President Bush with a similar announcement. Ultimately, they codified their decisions to reduce nuclear forces in the Moscow Treaty, which was signed by them in 2002 and entered into force on June 1 of last year. It calls for strategic nuclear warheads to be reduced to 1700-2200 on each side by December 31, 2012, a reduction of almost two-thirds below current levels. Implementation of the Treaty has begun, and we will provide details in connection with next month's session of the Preparatory Committee. It is of symbolic and substantive importance that the preamble of the Moscow Treaty declares that the United States and Russia are "mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." This reflects a commitment at the highest political level in both countries to Article VI implementation. Mister President, many other U.S. policies and actions continue to reinforce progress in implementation of our Article VI commitments. The President's decision to transform deterrence into a new "triad" of offensive forces, defenses, and a revitalized defense infrastructure represents an historic break from the past. We are integrating our non-nuclear strategic capabilities into our offensive forces and thereby reducing dependence on nuclear weapons. The development and deployment of active and passive defense capabilities will afford new means for the United States to deny an aggressor the ability to achieve its objectives. And an improved defense infrastructure, including nuclear facilities, will demonstrate to any adversary that an attempt to secure strategic advantage against the United States will ultimately fail and will help dissuade it from such an endeavor. In the words of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld when forwarding the Nuclear Posture Review to the Congress in 2002, "these investments can make the United States more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons." Mister President, there is much more we can and will relate on
our compliance with Article VI. There is growing cooperation among
the United States and other nations in disarmament activities.
Cooperative threat reduction programs have yielded enormous dividends
to our collective security over the past decade. The risk that
states or terrorists might acquire WMD has added new urgency to
this effort. The Global Partnership adopted by the G-8 countries
in 2002 is expanding amid a growing realization that dedicated
efforts to identify, secure and dispose of WMD and related materials
in Russia, other former Soviet states and beyond, are essential
to the security and safety of all our people. The resource commitment
by The policies and actions I have outlined today are the results of decisions and directions from the highest levels of the United States government. They reinforce the NPT and make the world a safer place. In their totality, they provide an unambiguous record of strict compliance with our obligations under Article VI. We look forward in the coming weeks to providing more details about ongoing U.S. policies and actions that are further strengthening the NPT and implementation of Article VI. Mister President, I conclude by reaffirming the commitment of the United States to the NPT and to its enduring preambular undertaking "to make every effort to avert the danger of nuclear war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples." Thank you, Mister President.
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