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TRADE POLICY REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES Ambassador Linnet Deily At the World Trade Organization
I would also like to express my thanks to Ambassador Chung. He is a good friend, and good friends can present honest and objective feedback, which he did most capably and which we reflected carefully upon as we prepared for today’s session. It was with great sadness that we heard that he will be leaving us soon. He has not only been an extremely capable and effective representative of his government but he also has been steadfast in his commitment to supporting and strengthening the multilateral trading system. I would like to thank you and the Secretariat for preparing the list of themes to serve as the focus of today’s discussion. We found it helpful in preparing for today’s session. At the same time, I would note that we have received more than 600 written questions from Members, some as recently as 5:30 yesterday afternoon, and additional questions were raised at the meeting itself. Given the number of questions and the technical level of detail of many of them, we will not be in a position to respond to all of them today. We have provided a room document with many answers. Additionally, I will respond to each of the themes you have identified and respond to as many of the issues raised as possible. We will also provide written responses in a timely manner. If there was one point that stood out above all others in your comments, it was the importance of U.S. leadership in the multilateral trading system. We readily accept this responsibility as evidenced by the fact that President Bush made passage of Trade Promotion Authority one of his first and highest priorities upon coming to office. At the same time, it is clear that the trading system is a shared responsibility of all of us. To move forward, we all must work together. As is normal for a Trade Policy Review, we heard many comments on areas where Members would seek even greater access to our market or changes in other policies. While we will be responding to the specifics this morning, an overriding point is that we are prepared to work with others to strengthen the multilateral trading system and further liberalize trade, including making changes to our own trade regime. U.S. proposals in the DDA negotiations reflect an ambitious vision of the future.
Ambassador Chung and a number of Members’ written questions expressed concerns about, or made reference to, the U.S. federal budget and trade imbalances - the so-called twin deficits. Also, with reference to U.S. macroeconomic policy, and budget and trade imbalances, a number of Members at Wednesday’s meeting, expressed appreciation for U.S. actions in recent years to help sustain U.S. and global economic growth. Since the recent recession, the United States clearly used monetary and fiscal policies to fight recession and promote U.S. and global economic growth, even at the expense of increases in the trade deficit and weakening of our budget balance. We have kept our markets open as well, as noted by a number of Members at Wednesday’s meeting, in recent difficult times, even as U.S. manufacturing employment declined by some 16 percent. Let me say how much we appreciated the understanding shown by a number of Members of the context in which the twin deficits have recently increased and of underlying U.S. motivations to restore U.S. growth and help stimulate global economic expansion in the context of increasingly open global markets. I would like now to turn specifically to the budget deficit. The recession and weakness of recovery in its early phase by themselves would have shifted the U.S. budget position. Much of the shift from surplus to deficit has also come about as the result of what we believe to be a timely fiscal response to the weakening of the U.S. economy. Restoration of healthy growth has been a high economic priority for the United States and one which will benefit the global economy as well. The federal budget balance shifted from a $230 billion surplus in 2000 to an actual deficit of $370 billion in 2003 and an expected deficit of about $500 billion in 2004, a figure likely to somewhat exceed 4 percent of U.S. GDP. Deficits of this magnitude are obviously a legitimate subject of concern, and the United States fully intends to reduce the budget deficit. Under U.S. Administration policies, the deficit is projected to begin declining after this year. It is expected to be in a $300 billion range for 2005 and 2006. By 2009, the deficit is expected to fall to half its 2004 level, or around 1.7 percent of GDP. This is lower than the average deficit-to-GDP ratio over the last four decades. The ratio of government debt-to-GDP would decline over this period as well. This progress, of course, requires maintaining the fundamentals of strong economic growth together with spending restraints in the United States. Turning to the „twin deficits,“ let me note that the linkage between trade and budget deficits is not at all clear. This is true with respect to academic analysis as well as with respect to recent U.S. historical experience. For example, over the last seven years, the most significant increases in the U.S. trade deficit occurred during the years of fiscal surpluses. In the mid 1990s, the U.S. goods and services trade balance appeared to stabilize in the vicinity of 1.5 percent of U.S. GDP. In 1997, at $107 billion, the U.S. trade deficit represented just 1.3 percent of GDP. However, in the three years from 1997 to 2000, the U.S. budget surplus rose substantially while the U.S. trade deficit more than tripled to $375 billion, with its share of GDP rising from 1.3 percent to 3.8 percent. A number of factors during this period were consistent with the sharply rising U.S. trade deficit: The United States provided the market to absorb the bulk of import increases from countries involved in the Asian financial crisis and caught in rapid balance-of-payments adjustment processes. Korea alluded to this point in its remarks on Wednesday. U.S. economic growth accelerated further to an average annual rate of 4.1 percent and was more rapid than that of many of its trading partners, contributing to greater U.S. demand for imports than foreign demand for U.S. exports. Net capital inflows to the United States more than doubled to $456 billion, with foreign direct investment accounting for more than two-thirds of the total increase. This increase in net capital inflow also is consistent with corresponding large increases in the current account and trade deficits. Between 2000 and 2002, under the impact of the U.S. recession and poor growth conditions in many foreign markets, the trade deficit changed relatively little, rising from $375 billion to $418 billion, or from 3.8 percent to 4.0 percent of GDP. With stronger U.S. economic recovery, however, in 2003, the goods and services trade deficit rose from $418 billion to an annualized $506 billion, or 4.6 percent of U.S. GDP. During the sharp increase in 2003, U.S. imports were rising three times faster than exports - clear evidence that U.S. demand growth fueled economic expansion around the globe. This recounting of the past six years in which the U.S. trade deficit has risen from $107 billion to $506 billion illustrates how the trade deficit increases reflect far more than the budget balance and have supported trade partners’ balance-of-payments adjustment requirements and economic growth. Let’s also remember, that any correction of trade and current account imbalances will likewise be related to many factors other than the budget balance, many of which are out of the immediate control of the government. These include changes in relative rates of economic and productivity growth among countries, relative inflation rates and exchange rates. One development having a positive effect on the U.S. external deficit would be a strengthening of economic growth rates in a number of other Member countries, especially among the group of high-income countries where growth has weakened. We believe no one at the present time would argue instead for policies to weaken U.S. economic performance in order to address the U.S. trade deficit. We also believe that further substantial multilateral trade liberalization, and its consequent domestic structural adjustments, could make a significant contribution to enhancing global growth - thereby reducing the recent growth disparities among countries that have contributed significantly to the increase in U.S. and global trade imbalances.
No doubt prompted by the large number and high visibility of free trade agreements initiated and concluded by the United States in 2002 and 2003, this was a topic of inquiry by our discussant, Ambassador Chung, and a concern risen by most delegations on Wednesday. As all WTO Members except Mongolia currently participate in, or are actively negotiating preferential trading arrangements, we understand the concern of other Members is not with our participation in free trade agreements per se. Rather, Members are seeking assurance that these regional and bilateral agreements are not viewed by the United States as a substitute for multilateral liberalization and that our agreements will be consistent with WTO rules. The United States does not see FTAs as a substitute for multilateral liberalization, but rather as a complement to it. We agree with others that the best way to ensure that FTAs are building blocks rather than stumbling blocks to multilateral liberalization is to negotiate agreements that are fully consistent with WTO rules. For that reason, the United States ensures that negotiations result in FTAs with coverage of „substantially all trade.“ While there has been much discussion in the WTO over the years over the definition of „substantially all trade,“ the U.S. standard on trade coverage in FTAs is indisputably among the highest. Moreover, U.S. agreements are fully consistent with WTO rules, including those on other restrictions of commerce as well. The U.S. view is that FTAs can and should accelerate multilateral trade liberalization. The United States believes the process of negotiating FTAs can re-orient the fundamental policy stance of participants towards trade liberalization and strengthen administrative and trade capacity. FTAs can also serve as laboratories for innovation. Many of the ideas embodied in the GATT 1947 originated in the reciprocal trade agreements the United States entered into between 1934 and 1945. Dispute Settlement The discussant and a number of delegations expressed interest in U.S. compliance with rulings by WTO dispute settlement panels. Since the creation of the WTO, U.S. measures have been found WTO-inconsistent on a number of occasions. In the large majority of those cases, the United States has brought its measures into full compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body within the reasonable period of time. At the same time, we recognize that implementation remains unresolved
in a number of disputes. The U.S. administration remains committed
to pursuing efforts to achieving For example, we note that some Members have asked questions about the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, also known as the „Byrd Amendment.“ The U.S. Administration proposed repeal of the Byrd Amendment in its budget proposal for fiscal year 2004. Legislation to bring the Act into conformity with U.S. WTO obligations has been introduced in the U.S. Senate. We will continue to work with the Congress to enact legislation, and we will continue to confer with the complaining parties in these disputes, in order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter. Similarly, we will continue to work with Congress to achieve further progress on other disputes that Members raised in their statements and questions, such as the Hot-Rolled Steel dispute and the 1916 Act dispute. Indeed, legislation that would repeal the 1916 Act is pending before both houses of Congress.
However, looking forward rather than backwards, the 2002 U.S.
NAMA proposal makes clear that we are prepared to eliminate all
our tariffs, on every line of non-agricultural goods, if others
- including developing countries - will undertake a similar degree
of liberalization and ensure that our exporters can gain access
opportunities to new markets. How we accomplish our collective
goals for results in NAMA is a subject for further negotiation. I would remind my colleagues that the U.S. proposal for NAMA was developed in close consultation with Congress and the private sector, who believe strongly that realizing the market access opportunities of the DDA will be the litmus test for success for both developed and developing countries.
Many delegations raised concerns regarding the possibility that recently implemented U.S. security procedures might affect adversely the free flow of international trade. I can confirm that President Bush and Secretary Ridge are sensitive to this issue and fully understand the need to work closely with the international trade community to ensure this does not happen. To address more thoroughly your concerns, I would like to take
this opportunity to explain briefly to you how some of the recently
implemented security measures actually work. U.S. Customs and
Border Protection takes a step-by-step approach to the examination
and screening of arriving international cargo. It is fully recognized
that the U.S. economy, as well as the global economy, cannot thrive
without the expeditious movement of international trade. These
initiatives have been designed to identify and carefully screen
high-risk cargo shipments while facilitating the expeditious movement
of legitimate trade. Many of you mentioned the 24-hour rule. To
comply with the 24-hour rule, shipment specific information is
provided electronically to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
24 hours prior to lading on board the importing sea carrier. Although
there was some initial skepticism, this requirement, which has
been in force almost one full year, has been implemented successfully
by the international trade community. The information received
via the 24-hour rule requirement enables the electronic screening
of international cargo destined to the United States during the
time it is in transit to the foreign port of departure or while
it is being prepared for loading on board the vessel which will
transport it to the United States. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is another initiative to which a number of delegates referred. Every year some 200 million sea containers move among the world’s top seaports. In the United States, nearly 50 percent of the value of all imports arrives via sea container. In January 2002, U.S. Customs launched the Container Security Initiative to help prevent the global containerized cargo system from being exploited by terrorists. CSI involves the placing of U.S. officers at the world’s busiest seaports to screen, jointly with the host government Customs Service, cargo destined for the United States. Now within the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection continues to implement CSI at major ports around the world. I am pleased to tell you that many of the countries here already have CSI operational at your ports of entry or have signed declarations of principles which will enable U.S. personnel to be assigned to ports to work jointly with Customs officers to identify and examine, where necessary, high risk containers. The program is fully reciprocal and all countries where U.S. officers are assigned are welcome to send their Customs officers to the United States to work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to screen cargo destined for their countries. So far, both Japan and Canada have stationed Customs officers in the United States to do so. While CSI is a great example of government-to-government cooperation, the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, abbreviated as C-TPAT, is an excellent example of industry/government cooperation. C-TPAT participants, including importers, Customs House Brokers and freight forwarders, carriers, warehouse proprietors, port authorities, terminal operators and foreign manufactures complete a self-assessment of their internal security procedures and agree to work to improve any identified weaknesses. They also agree to share their supply chain security procedures with others in their supply chain. For example, an importer is encouraged to ensure that the Customs House brokers and freight forwarders to whom they entrust their shipments share their commitment to ensuring the security of their shipments. CBP considers the participation of entities involved in the international trade supply chain in the C-TPAT program when assessing the risk associated with specific importations. It should be emphasized that participation in C-TPAT is strictly voluntary. Interestingly, though, many involved companies have found that when they examine procedures associated with their respective international trade supply chain operations for C-TPAT purposes they identify additional opportunities for savings in areas such as loss prevention. The United States has fully engaged in open dialogue on these and other security measures with third country Customs Services through the multilateral forum provided by the World Customs Organization. In addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection maintains an ongoing, open dialogue with the international trade community through a variety of mechanisms, including the Commercial Operations Advisory Committee, to ensure that potential problems or scenarios, that might lead to any delays, are quickly identified and addressed. We are committed to ensuring both the security and facilitation of the international trade supply chain. We are exceptionally pleased with the cooperation we have received from other governments, from the many entities in the importing and exporting communities and from other international organizations.
The bio terrorism Act serves a legitimate public purpose in helping protect residents of the United States from the use of the food supply as means to terrorist attack. Its registration procedures apply to domestic and foreign facilities alike. Registration requires little more than provision of name, address, emergency contact information, product identification and the name of the individual authorized to submit the registration form to the FDA. This collection of information may be submitted electronically or by mail. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration made every effort to minimize the burden while meeting the requirements of the Act. It consulted with both domestic and foreign stakeholders, including numerous foreign embassies in the United States.
Ambassador Chung and several Members commented on the U.S. use of measures available under the WTO Agreements on antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures, and safeguards. Several Members called upon the United States to exercise restraint in launching investigations that could lead to the imposition of trade remedies. As a preliminary matter, the United States cannot predict and has no control over the number of petitions filed by private parties from year to year. Further, domestic law provides that investigations should be initiated if the petitions satisfy statutory requirements. That said, the numbers of antidumping cases initiated during the years covered by this trade policy review, 2002 and 2003, were significantly lower than the number of such cases initiated in 2001. These variations do not represent any change in policy by the U.S. government, but merely shifts in the number of adequately supported petitions filed by private parties with the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission. However, if this recent decrease in filings reflects a decrease in the use of unfair trade practices, it is indeed welcome. The U.S. policy in this area has been consistent for many years: Trade remedies will be imposed where an objective and transparent examination of the facts reveals that such a measure is warranted under the relevant WTO Agreements and U.S. law. In this regard, a review of the number of U.S. preliminary and final measures imposed as a result of initiations is useful. The Secretariat’s report notes that over the review period, no provisional measures were taken in almost a quarter of the antidumping cases initiated, and in over half of final measures were taken. The numbers for countervailing duty investigations are similar. Some might argue that these statistics demonstrate that some cases should not have been initiated, but the complex facts necessary to establish whether injurious dumping or subsidizations have taken place are established only during the course of a thorough investigation. The number of cases in which measures are not imposed reflects the due process provided to respondents, as well as the stringent examination of the facts required of the ITA and ITC before any measures may be imposed. The Agreements recognize antidumping and countervailing duties as legitimate tools to counter unfair trade practices. However, we agree that these measures should not be abused. In this spirit, we intend to maintain the strong procedural protections for firms involved in U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. We note that some of these protections go well beyond what is required of us under the Agreements, and we will work to ensure that U.S. exporters involved in foreign trade remedy actions are afforded similar protections. Another key aspect of the U.S. policy with respect to antidumping and countervailing duty measures is the use of administrative reviews to ensure that the duties being applied are based on recent pricing patterns. Several Members have also asked about the Sunset reviews used by the United States under Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement and 21.3 of the S.M. Agreement to determine whether, after five years, a trade remedy measure continues to be necessary to offset dumping or countervail able subsidization and to prevent material injury. Such reviews are also subject to stringent procedural protections, and the Secretariat’s report notes that during the review period 38 percent of the measures subject to sunset review were revoked. The dispute settlement system has not overturned the results of any sunset review which has been challenged. I should also like to take this opportunity to correct a misimpression about WTO challenges of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty measures. While some have said that WTO dispute settlement panels have found most such measures to be WTO-inconsistent, in fact the vast majority of those measures have never even been challenged. With respect to safeguards, the United States has applied safeguards
measures in six of its ten safeguards investigations under the
WTO Safeguards Agreement. Only one such measure, on certain steel
products, has been applied since the last trade policy review,
and there have been no investigations initiated during this period.
The United States continues to believe that the Agreement on Safeguards
plays an essential role within the WTO framework and remains committed
to the use of the mechanism in conformity with our domestic legislation
and WTO rules. As noted by the discussant and some Members, the
measures challenged in the WTO have been found inconsistent with
Safeguards Agreement requirements. However, it must be noted that
the dispute settlement body has yet to find any safeguard measure,
by any country, to have been applied consistently with WTO rules. Finally, the United States has also been one of the most active participants in the Rules negotiating group, where we have proposed for further discussion numerous provisions of the Agreements where clarification and improvement may be possible in ways which minimize the opportunity for misuse of trade remedy measures while also increasing the effectiveness of those remedies. The United States will continue its active engagement in this area.
Several questions focused on both general and specific aspects related to Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. Clearly, all Members are increasingly confronted with these complex issues arising due to disease or health risks associated or believed to be associated with food and agricultural products traded internationally. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has substantially increased staffing and resources to perform and review risk assessments, and thus in many cases further open market access. Unfortunately, the demand for this specialized work also continues to increase. In order to provide a maximum of information and transparency in this process, for example, the USDA now allows anyone to track on its web site the requests for pest risk assessments. At the same time, the United States continues to provide major SPS technical assistance to a large number of developing countries.
I was struck by one comment made on Wednesday suggesting that U.S. policy toward agricultural reform in the WTO has been inconsistent. This is simply not the case. We have been clear from the outset of the DDA that agricultural reform is to us the lynchpin of the negotiations. The U.S. negotiating proposal on agriculture calls for fundamental reform in all three pillars. This proposal reflects in depth consultations with our Congress and agricultural community. Last August we were called upon by many Members to work with the EU to bridge the substantial differences in our positions. The result was not put before Members as a take it or leave it propositions but rather as a platform on which to build. While Members raised concerns with the joint text, it nevetheless stimulated engagement. I don’t dwell on the Cancun experience today - suffice it to say that the United States has had, and will continue to have, a high level of ambition for the DDA negotiations on agriculture on all three pillars as Ambassador Zoellick’s letter to his counterparts made clear.
Many delegations expressed concern that the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (the 2002 Farm Act) increases federal transfers to U.S. farmers, which they believe contrasts in approach with U.S. proposals for substantial reductions in production-distorting domestic support in the Doha Development Agenda Round (DDA). First, it is important to note that the United States is on record in every forum and on every occasion that we will honor our Uruguay Round commitment on agriculture. The 2002 Farm Act allows us to meet these commitments, and we will honor all of them. Second, for the reasons we have explained, the 2002 Farm Act does not increase support; the USDA net outlays show trade-distorting domestic support trending downward; and our farm programs are still oriented toward fewer trade-distorting forms of support. Finally, with full knowledge and understanding of the potential implications for U.S. farm policy, U.S. farmers and ranchers have expressed their willingness to reform further and liberalize by supporting and developing with the Administration the U.S. agriculture negotiating proposal.
A number of delegations have raised concerns that the United States has been slow to submit agriculture notifications to the WTO. We accept the criticism with regard to our domestic support notifications. Our most recent domestic support notification was for support during marketing year 1999. Let me reassure you that the United States is currently preparing domestic support notifications for submission to the WTO Secretariat and will submit them as soon as possible. We are committed to the timely notification set out for agriculture support and ask your indulgence as we attempt to bring our notifications current.
Some delegations have pointed to the very limited number of U.S. agricultural products where producers are afforded substantive tariff-based protection, in particular, the sugar and dairy sectors, or where we apply non-ad valorem tariffs or tariff escalation. In general, U.S. agricultural tariffs are low, very low when compared to most other WTO Members. The average bound U.S. tariff is 12 percent, while the average foreign tariff is 62 percent. Nonetheless, certain „sensitive“ sectors do receive tariff protection in excess of the U.S. average. We wish to point out, however, that we do not shut foreign suppliers out of these sensitive markets. In these sectors, we provide effective market access opportunity through tariff rate quotas (TRQs). U.S. administration of agricultural TRQs is transparent, fair, and seeks to provide the conditions to permit foreign suppliers maximum access to U.S. TRQs. The United States has complied with all of its Uruguay Round commitments regarding TRQs and agricultural market access, and stands ready to provide additional market access as all WTO Members move to open their markets upon conclusion of the DDA negotiations. We also remain committed to the elimination of tariff escalation and simplification of tariff application, including the elimination of the Special Agricultural Safeguard.
The issue of product labeling is not new to this house. Indeed, we have all dedicated considerable thought and work over the past two years in efforts to ensure clarity on the existing rules, as well as discussing options for additional understandings in this area. In the broadest sense this includes both direct product labeling as well as product documentation to assure proper product designations in the marketplace. Several different questions have been raised in this regard to pending U.S. Country of Origin Labeling. At present, only fish and seafood labeling are funded and scheduled for implementation in 2004 under this program, while additional reflection is necessary for the other designated products. For those following the debate in the United States, you are aware that this is a complicated issue, and the underlying thrust is how to provide meaningful information to the consumer and the product’s respective production, processing and retail segments, while not allowing the costs to exceed the value-added.
We appreciate the comments from Members concerning the quota phase-out program. We again urge Members not to lose sight of the fact that the important, watershed event of the completion of the quota phase-out program required by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) is 11 months away. Several delegations have raised questions about the manner in which the United States has implemented its commitments under the ATC. The main concern appears to be the hardy perennial of the textile debate in Geneva: Why has the United States decided to integrate the most sensitive products on 1 January 2005? The answer is the same, the United States never viewed integration as the primary way to liberalize textile restraints. Rather, liberalization was designed to occur as a result of progressively accelerating quota growth rates at the beginning of each successive stage of the ATC. The benefits for exporting countries has been more than impressive. U.S. textile imports have grown by 122 percent since the start of the ATC. This increase in imports has led to an intense process of structural adjustment for the textile and apparel sectors. Textile employment in 2002, at 557,000 workers, was 25 percent below the 1994 level. Apparel employment in 2002, at 395,600 workers, was 56 percent below the 1994 level. Textile and apparel employment declined 42 percent between 1994 and 2002, for a total job loss of 697,800. The United States has continually reaffirmed to its trading partners that we will fully and faithfully implement the ATC as scheduled, and we are prepared to do so again today. While we can continue to debate how the ATC has been implemented, with the end of the ATC less than a year away it would seem wiser to look forward rather than back. Several delegations also pointed out that U.S. textile and apparel tariffs remain high at an average rate of 15 percent. Although this is high compared to our overall industrial tariff average, it is low compared to the rates maintained on textile products by many exporting developing countries. We believe that the ATC provided for the liberalization of import restraints for all WTO Members. The barriers our textile exports continue to face is a severe disappointment for us . This is one of the reasons our trade imbalance in this sector has become so lopsided. For those exporting countries that want to reduce U.S. textile tariffs, the DDA provides another opportunity to harmonize and/or eliminate textile and apparel tariffs and eliminate non-tariff barriers. Given the sensitivity of these products for a large number of WTO Members, progress in this area can only be achieved in the context of broad participation encompassing key players, both developed and developing. This could be facilitated by a sectoral approach. Financial Services The United States has received a number of detailed questions regarding banking, securities and insurance. We have answered many and intend to quickly respond on the remaining ones. In regard to questions on the number of foreign banks licensed in the United States, over 70 foreign bank applications have been approved by the Federal Reserve since April 1, 2001. We understand that those banks also obtained any necessary additional licenses at the federal or state level. Let’s be clear: the United States is very open to foreign participation in the U.S. banking sector. In fact, foreign banks hold approximately 18 percent of all U.S. banking assets. In connection with the securities sector, delegations requested information on U.S. corporate governance issues, specifically regarding implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission has reached out aggressively to foreign regulators and market participants to understand more fully how the requirements of the Act relate to local law or local stock exchange requirements. Where appropriate, the SEC has made accommodations for foreign market participants, including for audit committee requirements and internal controls reporting. Regarding comments on U.S. state level regimes, the United States already provides quite good access through its current GATS commitments. That said, in some areas, the U.S. states have liberalized further, as evidenced in our initial GATS offer on services. The United States will continue its active outreach to the U.S. states for the purpose of the GATS negotiations. The United States was questioned about a specific aspect of the U.S offer on financial services. We have put on the table the possibility of enabling mutual funds in the United States to obtain investment advice and portfolio management services from financial services suppliers located outside the United States. U.S. willingness to pursue this issue will depend on whether other countries also are interested in binding such access. 5. CONCLUSION Madame Chair, I would like to thank you for your hard work and good humor in chairing this meeting. I would also like to repeat my thanks to Ambassador Chung for his valuable contribution as discussant and to the Secretariat for their excellent work in preparing for this meeting. Last, but not least, I would like to thank all the Members who have participated in this review for making it an interesting and rewarding experience. We have taken careful note of all the points that were made during the course of the review and we will reflect further upon them as we look to the future. As each Trade Policy Review tends to demonstrate, there is a lot more work to be done if we are to achieve the objectives that we set out for ourselves in creating first the GATT and then the WTO. Such a reminder is particularly timely at this time, since the DDA presents a once in a generation opportunity to make a significant advance towards those goals, with enormous potential benefits in terms of economic growth and development. The United States is fully committed to working with our fellow Members to seize this opportunity.
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