REMARKS
BY
AMBASSADOR ERIC M. JAVITS
TO
THE CONFERENCE ON FUTURE SECURITY IN SPACE
NEW PLACE, ENGLAND, MAY 29,
2002
Opening Remarks:
Thank you all so very much for the kind introduction and the
opportunity to come here to the United Kingdom to discuss future
security in space with key opinion shapers, members of the Academy,
and government officials from around the world. It's great to
be here. Thanks also are due to both the Monterey Institute and
the Mountbatten Center for planning and organizing this interesting
and rich discussion.
I'm pleased to sit on a panel with my Russian and Chinese colleagues
to discuss this important matter in an informal setting.
The U.S., Outer Space, and the CD:
The United States continues to recognize the common interest
of all countries in the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes, as declared in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
When our astronauts walked on the moon for the first time, they
left the message that they "came in peace for all mankind."
The United States and other nations have sent unmanned probes
to explore outer space and the celestial bodies, to explore the
surfaces and atmospheres of the other planets in our solar system
in order to understand the environment beyond our world.
The exploration and use of space has not looked solely outward.
Satellites orbiting the Earth monitor the weather, the climate,
the growth of crops, and the impact of drought and land use. Communications
satellites make possible rapid global sharing of information.
Satellites have revolutionized terrestrial navigation and provided
a new and powerful tool for accurate surveying of the Earth's
surface. The peaceful exploration and use of outer space have
also resulted in technological spin-offs that would take days
to enumerate in their entirety.
The commitment of the United States to the exploration and use
of outer space by all nations, for peaceful purposes and for the
benefit of humanity, is clear. But the peaceful exploration and
use of space obviously does not rule out activities in pursuit
of national security goals.
The security and well being of many nations depend on the ability
to operate in space, and Article 51 of the UN Charter makes it
clear that all Member States have the inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense. The global responsibilities of the
United States, and the new threats facing it in today's world,
require that that right be exercised both on the Earth and above
it. As Under Secretary Bolton told the Conference on Disarmament
in his January 24 statement, the security and well being of the
United States and its allies depend on the ability to operate
in space. And we are not alone in having military space programs.
Russia and China, for example, have such programs, too.
National security is the highest responsibility of a government,
and each nation must decide on the elements of its security policy.
Arms control and disarmament are not ends in themselves but tools
to enhance security. Our discussion should be framed in that context.
Free access to space and use of space by space-faring nations
are central to the preservation of peace and the protection of
civil, commercial and security interests. The United States sees
no justification for limitations on the right of sovereign nations
to acquire all forms of information from space.
We fully understand that maintaining international peace and
security is an overarching purpose that guides activities on earth
as well as in outer space, but in the final analysis preserving
national security is likewise necessary and essential. For these
reasons, the United States sees no need for new outer space arms
control agreements and opposes negotiation of a treaty on outer
space arms control.
Some suggest that a new forum might be the appropriate place
for outer space arms control efforts. We do not share this view.
Changing venues would not change national positions. States would
still have the same concerns that they have in existing fora.
The Existing Outer Space Regime is Sufficient:
A number of standing agreements already sufficiently regulate
military activities in outer space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty
of 1963 prohibits parties from conducting nuclear weapon test
explosions or other nuclear explosions in outer space. The activities
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which facilitated
the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty itself, also reinforce
the existing regime. The Committee on Peaceful Uses does not deal
with disarmament and arms control aspects of outer space, of course;
but it is concerned with promoting international cooperation in
the peaceful uses of space.
Most important, however, is the Outer Space Treaty, to which
the United States remains firmly committed. The Outer Space Treaty
puts celestial bodies off limits to all nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction and prohibits States Parties from
placing in orbit or stationing such weapons in outer space - a
far-reaching non-proliferation measure in itself. It also provides
that celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
and prohibits their use for military establishments or maneuvers,
or for testing any type of weapons. In addition, the Outer Space
Treaty clearly establishes that States Parties retain jurisdiction
and control over objects they have launched into outer space,
and have international responsibility for national objects in
outer space, including whatever damage the launched item may cause.
In sum, there already exists an extensive and comprehensive system
for limiting the uses of outer space to those that are peaceful
and providing a framework for the legitimate military uses of
outer space. We believe that this existing multilateral arms control
regime adequately protects states' interests in outer space and
does not require augmentation. There simply is no problem in outer
space for arms control to solve. The problems we all need to address
are right here on earth--the need for effective implementation
of, and full compliance with, key regimes that tackle the very
real threat of weapons of mass destruction--above all the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological
Weapons Convention.
The United States is committed, through its national space policy,
to ensuring that exploration and use of outer space remain open
to all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all
humanity. For us as for others, "peaceful purposes"
does of course allow for activities that support and serve national
security goals. Improving our ability to support military operations
worldwide, monitor and respond to military threats, and monitor
arms control and non-proliferation agreements are key priorities
for our national security space activities -- and they help strengthen
international stability and security. The lawful military use
of space provides broad benefits to the international community
in the areas of communications, global positioning, navigation,
environmental monitoring, combating terrorism, and cooperating
in enforcement of UN Security Council sanctions.
Time to Move On:
The United States continues to hear calls for immediate negotiations
in the CD to forestall all manner of ills: 1) the possibility
that missile defense would upset strategic stability, leading
to a new arms race here on earth; 2) the potential for disruption
of the arms control process; and 3) the risk of an arms race in
outer space. The United States has always believed these concerns
are groundless.
Clearly, missile defense has not upset strategic stability or
led to a new arms race. The Treaty signed in Moscow on May 24
shows that. Importantly, the Treaty of Moscow also demonstrates
that pursuit of missile defense and the demise of the ABM Treaty
are not an impediment to further reductions in nuclear weapons
or to increased U.S.-Russian cooperation. Clearly also, U.S. missile
defense efforts, and the various systems under development, are
not directed against Russia or China. Rather, they are designed
to defend against limited ballistic missile attack in a world
where increasing numbers of states are striving to be able to
threaten such an attack. Finally, as we have tried to make clear,
it is not a replacement for deterrence through response or retaliation,
but a supplement to it-adding a new dimension to deterrence. Indeed,
if a non-state actor knew that a limited attack on the United
States was not likely to succeed, they would be much less inclined
to develop weapons of mass destruction. A system capable of defending
against a large-scale attack with sophisticated weapons would
be both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that which
the United States is pursuing.
The United States remains committed to the arms control and disarmament
process. The landmark strategic arms reductions agreement: signed
by Presidents Bush and Putin in Moscow on May 24 has reaffirmed
that commitment and finally laid to rest the Cold War world and
the arms race it spawned. There is no contradiction between that
process and pursuit of a limited MD system. And while the United
States and Russia have had different views on the merits of the
ABM Treaty, its disappearance is simply not a problem. The reality
is that U.S.-Russian relations are broad and strong enough to
weather this sort of disagreement. As the Moscow Summit showed,
it is a new and better day.
Summation:
The United States continues to recognize the common interest
of all mankind in the furtherance of the exploration and use of
outer space for peaceful purposes, as declared in the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. We see no need for further outer space treaties.
We should move on to other themes that address immediate and serious
threats to mankind.