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Opening Statement from April 3, 2001 (Begin text) Briefly, we are proposing the following: First, a requirement that all anti-vehicle mines, these are mines which are not subject to the Ottawa Treaty, be constructed or modified so as to be detectable by commonly available means. Second, we are proposing a requirement that all remotely-delivered anti-vehicle mines be equipped with self-destruction capabilities with back-up self-deactivation features. Third, we propose to enhance the technical specifications of self-destruction and self-deactivation features to reduce further the risk to civilians and friendly military forces caused by the use of all remotely-delivered landmines. Fourth, the United States is proposing a compliance mechanism to deal with legitimate complaints related to the misuse of mines, booby-traps and other devices. Fifth, we have a proposal to expand the scope of the Convention so its rules and restrictions apply in non-intemational armed conflict, civil wars, as well as international conflicts. Let me touch on each of these in turn and give you some additional details. First, detectability. We are proposing a requirement that all landmines be constructed or modified so as to be detectable by commonly available means. The Protocol requires a metallic signature equivalent to that of 8 grams or more of iron for anti-personnel mines; our proposal adopts the same standard for detectability of mines other than anti-personnel landmines. Why make such mines detectable? We believe that detectability of anti-vehicle mines would have a significant military value, decreasing casualties among peacekeepers and friendly military forces. Detectability of anti-vehicle mines would have little if any impact on the anti-tank mines' utility in blocking, turning or channeling enemy mechanized forces. From a humanitarian perspective, we believe such a requirement would greatly facilitate the detection and clearance of anti-vehicle mines on roads used by civilian traffic. The ICRC reported in September of this year, at a meeting in Nyon, that although the number of civilian casualties associated with anti-vehicle mines is less than AP mines, there are major effects in terms of denial of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, as a result of anti-vehicle mining. The ICRC pointed out also that disruption of normal food distribution can persist long after a conflict has ended as a result of anti-vehicle mining. According to the report that the ICRC is releasing this week, "A survey of ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Society operations reveals a total of 20 incidents involving anti-vehicle mines in 11 countries during the 1990s. Each of these incidents resulted in the cancellation of relief operations for already vulnerable populations. A total of 16 staff were killed and 63 injured in these incidents. When relief had to be delivered by air due to mined roadways the financial costs to the ICRC increased between 10 and 20 times." Second, self-destruction. We are proposing a requirement that all remotely-delivered anti-vehicle mines be equipped with self-destruction capabilities with back-up self-deactivation features. Long-lived remotely-delivered anti-vehicle mines pose serious risks to the civilian population, since they could remain active and unmarked on roads used by civilians long after they had served the military purpose for which they were laid. Once again, the use of self-destruction and self-deactivation features makes sense from a military point of view as well, in that it minimizes civilian casualties without compromising legitimate military uses and reduces risks to one's own forces. Third, reliability of self-destruction. The Protocol currently requires that all remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines be equipped with a self-destruction device that operates within 30 days with a dependability of 90 percent and with self-deactivation features ensuring, within 120 days at a dependability of 99.9 percent, that the mine is no longer capable of functioning as a mine. These features are designed to reduce the risk to civilians and friendly military forces caused by the use of long-lived mines that remain a threat long after the military purpose for which they were laid has been served. We believe that these specifications can be improved. We also believe they can be applied to all remotely-delivered landmines without degrading legitimate military requirements and that they are technically realistic and practical. Fourth, compliance. The United States is proposing a compliance mechanism to deal with legitimate complaints related to the misuse of mines, booby-traps and other devices. Our proposal is limited, non-intrusive and includes procedural protections to accommodate national security and constitutional concerns and to counter abuse. Finally, scope of application. There are still significant differences in the rules on use of weapons in armed conflict depending on whether the armed conflict is "international" or "internal". We don't think that makes sense. We agree with the view on this issue expressed by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. It wrote: "…elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife." Our proposal calls for applying the rules of the Convention, including its protocols, in all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or internal. These are our proposals. And we believe, again, that, if adopted, they would significantly improve the protection of civilians, peacekeepers and friendly armed forces. We have a web site with the proposals themselves, as well as background information, at www.itu.int/us/missions/ccw. I'm happy to take questions. (End text)
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