Statement by Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
September 14, 2000

Mr. President, I regret to be compelled to speak again at this stage of our deliber-a-tions, but the statement just made by the distinguished representative of China must be addressed promptly.

The ABM Treaty

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was concluded in 1972 by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was negotiated and signed in a very different era, under political and military circumstances which are now a matter of history and which have little to do with the world today.

The Treaty has been amended before and can be amended again. The amend-ments that the United State is proposing will bring the Treaty up to date. They will also enable it to continue fulfilling its essential purpose: Making sure that the strategic nuclear deterrent forces of the United States and of the Russian Federation are not threatened by missile defense capabilities of the other country. This basic understanding makes it possible for the United States and the Russian Federation to continue our mutual reductions in offensive nuclear arms, and to negotiate further agreements for that purpose.

As a political and diplomatic reality dating from 1972, the ABM Treaty regime did not contemplate the new threats that are emerging now and that affect the safety and well-being of the people of the United States. If the ABM Treaty regime were to fail, the responsibility for that - and for all the results that might ensue - would rest with those who were insisting that the regime had to remain static and could not be adapted to meet current realities.

In diplomacy, as in real life, factors that do not continue to evolve and grow are ultimately doomed to decline and die.

National Missile Defense

When I spoke on August 31, I emphasized that the limited system of national missile defense which the United States Government is considering would defend the people of the United States against a small-scale ballistic missile attack from certain countries of concern. I also stated quite explicitly that this limited system of national missile defense is not designed to defend against the ballistic missiles of Russia or China.

With these realities in mind, I am puzzled at the intensity of the concerns that have been expressed.

We reject allegations that actions or plans of the United States attest to a desire for hegemony, or any intent to carry out nuclear black-mail, or any supposed quest for absolute freedom to use force or threaten to use force in international relations.

These assertions have no basis in reality. A limited system of national missile defense does not give anyone "hegemony." Indeed, in today's world "hegemony" is unattainable in any case. The world is too diverse, too complex, too open to new ideas for "hegemony."

The era of empires is over, as is the era of one-party States. Information and ideas cannot be controlled by any Party or by any Government. People of all backgrounds have the opportunity, the capability, and the right to make up their own minds. Rote repetition of slogans and clichés that distort reality can-not change this essential fact.

In the end, Mr. President, the plans of the United States are exactly as I have described them. That is all they are, and there is nothing more to infer or imply.

Outer Space

In the agenda adopted on January 18 by the 66 Member States of the Conference on Disarmament, the third item reads as follows: "Prevention of an arms race in outer space."

The United States agrees that it is appropriate for the Con-fer-ence to keep this topic under review. On the other hand, we have repeatedly pointed out that there is no arms race in outer space - nor any prospect of an arms race in outer space, for as far down the road as anyone can see.

In the statement I gave on August 31, I explained that the United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. This is specifically provided in our National Space Policy.

-It would serve no useful purpose to repeat all the remarks I made on August 31, but I recommend that statement to anyone who desires to review the facts. One salient point may bear repeating: Plans of the United States for a possible system of national missile defense do not involve emplacing any weapon in outer space. To the contrary, the missile defense system we are considering is essentially a terrestrial system that would use land-based interceptors, launchers, and radars.

Satellites of whatever description are not weapons. Any discussion of the overall purposes and functions of satellites could not be limited to a small number that might provide early warn-ing information or data about threat missiles. As I pointed out on August 31, many countries have satellites orbiting the earth that provide various types of data for military purposes to ships, aircraft, and ground forces worldwide. This includes some Members of the Conference who are strong advocates of active negotiations on a new outer space treaty.

Discussions in a subordinate body of the Conference would have to take this reality into account. In a broader sense, such discussions would have to grapple with the need to enhance international peace and security while simultaneously protecting the security interests of states that have substantial assets in outer space and that carry out impor-tant activities there.

These questions are not trivial. Nor are they easy to answer. Until the Member States of the Conference have worked out answers that satisfy us all, it serves no constructive purpose to insist that the Conference must conduct negotiations on a new outer space treaty.

Work Program

Much energy has been devoted to developing an overall menu of activities, so the Conference on Disarmament can finally get down to substantive work. Although I deeply regret that these efforts did not succeed in the year 2000, the proposals of two former Presidents of the Conference - Ambassador Lint of Belgium and Ambassador Amorim of Brazil - have given all of us substantial hope for early agreement in 2001.

The plain and simple fact is that all Members of the Conference have committed themselves to supporting negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. In addition, they have already agreed on terms of reference for such negotiations.

Many successive Presidents of the Conference have reached the conclusion that a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is ripe for negotiations in the Conference, whereas nuclear disarmament and outer space are not.

There has not yet been agreement on the wording of draft mandates for sub-ordi-nate bodies that would deal with nuclear disarmament and outer space. On the other hand, Member States appear to be very close to reaching agreement on terms of reference that would permit thorough and far-reaching discussions.

If we are to speak of overall priorities, it is important to bear in mind that many Members of the Conference attach very great importance to the establishment of a subordinate body on nuclear disarmament. The United States is not among that group of countries, but we share their commitment to the underlying long-term goal. Further, we understand their desire that the Conference address the subject of nuclear disarmament in a structured and systematic way.

Over the past two years, the delegation of the United States has made substantial efforts to reach a compromise that would accommodate this desire of theirs. As I said on August 31, I am confident that if the terms of ref-erence for consideration of nuclear disarmament were the only outstanding issue, Member States could resolve it expeditiously.

In practice, it is the unwise and unrealistic insistence on immediate negotiations on a new outer space treaty that keeps the Conference from establishing an ap-pro-priate subordinate body to discuss nuclear disarmament.

The longstanding deadlock likewise prevents negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and I have repeatedly expressed intense concern about that.

As a final paradox, the un-wise and unrealistic insistence on immediate negotia-tions on a new outer space treaty also prevents the Conference from conduct-ing organized and sus-tained discussions on outer space issues. In other words, in-sistence on immediate nego-tiations on a new outer space treaty is actually block-ing a necessary step that would have to occur before any such negotiations could con-ceivably begin.

This is counter-productive, at best. But even that amounts to a serious under-state-ment. After all, the word counter-productive implies that delegations who have taken a certain position really do wish to produce constructive results.

To us, at least, this seems to be an unwise and unwarranted assumption. Instead, we believe that the delegations employing these tactics may actually intend to produce utter paralysis, for the sake of block-ing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. And if, in practice, the tactics of these delegations likewise pre-vent the Conference from conducting organized delibera-tions on nuclear disarma-ment, they appear to be entirely willing to sacrifice that priority of a wide range of other Member States.

Mr. President, I realize that this is a stark analysis - and a rather unpleasant one. But in all frankness I must submit to you, sir, that the analysis I have given is neither more stark, nor more unpleasant, than the excruciating and extended paralysis that still afflicts the Conference.

Thank you, Mr. President.