Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr.
United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
August 31, 2000

Mr. President, may I congratulate you as you assume the presidency for the final month of our session this year. My delegation and I look forward to working with you as you guide us in the drafting of our Conference's annual report, and later on, as we begin our preparations for the 2001 session. You also have our sympathy that the luck of the alphabet has placed you in the longest presidency of the year.

Mr. President, I would like to speak today on outer space, a topic of great interest to all members of this Conference.

The American space program was born at the height of the Cold War amid a looming rivalry for supremacy in missiles and space. Even then, much of our space effort was directed toward strictly scientific exploration and international cooperation. The plaque left behind by the crew of the Apollo 11 -- the first men on the moon -- said "We came in peace for all mankind." Now more than ever, with the Cold War a part of history, we still view our space activities primarily as an instrument of human advancement and international cooperation.

Having sent astronauts to the Moon, robots to Mars, and spacecraft to the farthest reaches of our solar system, we are today engaged in a partnership of 16 nations to build an International Space Station. Permanent Space Station crews will per-form long-term research in a range of scientific disciplines, seeking to ad-vance under-standing of life sciences, earth sciences, and materials pro-cessing. The International Space Station will provide a focal point for space opera-tions among the partner nations well into the new century, while serving as a steppingstone for potential exploration of the solar system.

Current uses of outer space involve an unprecedented degree of coop-era-tion. There is a grow-ing marketplace in space for commer-cial services, including tele-com-muni-cations, weather forecasting, and imaging of the earth's surface globally. The United States is pleased to have contributed sub-stan-tially to these efforts, and we will continue to pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in this area.

Mr. President, free access to and use of space for all are central to the preservation of peace and the protection of every nation's security, civil, and commercial interests. The United States strongly endorses Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which expressly allow for the free exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies by all nations. The United States sees no justification for limitations on the right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space, and we consider purposeful interference with space systems an infringement on sovereign rights.

The United States is committed, through its National Space Policy, to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. For us as for others, "peaceful purposes" does of course allow for activities that support defensive purposes and serve national security goals. Improving our ability to support military operations worldwide, monitor and respond to military threats, and monitor arms control and non-proliferation agreements and activities are key priorities for our national security space activities.
These activities, moreover, strengthen international stability and security.

Like others, we rely heavily on satellites to provide early warning against missile attack. Satellites are also indispensable in monitoring arms control agreements. Verification of compliance with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1972 SALT I Agreements -- including the ABM Treaty -- and the START I and II Treaties is highly dependent on remote sensing satellites to monitor activity. In the future, verification of CTBT compliance will depend in significant respects on our satellite-based national technical means of verification. These treaties acknowledge the legitimacy of this use of space as "national technical means of verification."

Lawful military uses of space can enhance international peace and secur-ity in significant ways and provide broad benefits to the international community. Examples include communica-tions, global positioning, navigation, environmental monitoring, and the ability to track move-ments of large groups of refugees and displaced persons. Other examples include helping states to monitor treaty compliance, combat terror-ism, and cooperate in enforcing UN Security Council sanctions.

A number of standing agreements regulate military activities in outer space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 requires parties not to conduct nuclear weapon tests or other nuclear explosions in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 puts celestial bodies off limits to all nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and prohibits placing in orbit or stationing such weapons in outer space -- a far-reaching non-proliferation measure in itself. It also limits the use of celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes and prohibits their use for military establishments or maneuvers, or for testing any type of weapons. This regime provides the basis for keeping outer space free from the most threatening weapons. The ABM Treaty of 1972 prohibits space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or components. In addition, in the 1997 Demarcation Agreements -- which have yet to enter into force -- the United States, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine agreed that, to preclude ambiguous situations or misunderstandings related to compliance with that ABM Treaty provision, they would not develop, test, or deploy space-based components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, a standing body of the UN General Assembly, are also germane to our consideration of outer space in this body. While it does not deal with disarmament and arms control aspects of outer space, COPUOS is concerned with promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of space.

In sum, we can conclude that there already exists an extensive and comprehensive system for limiting the uses of outer space to those that are peaceful and providing a framework for the legitimate military uses of outer space. We are therefore not persuaded that the multilateral arms control regime as it impacts on outer space requires augmentation.

Why, then, do we hear calls for the immediate nego-tia-tion of a new outer space treaty?

Certain Member States have insisted that the Con-ference on Disarmament should not and cannot resume negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty unless it also conducts negotiations on outer space issues. This is inappropriate. Member States have agreed on terms of reference for FMCT negotiations, and they have committed themselves in this Conference and in other fora to the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations. By contrast, they are far from agree-ment on terms of reference for any possible negotiations on outer space. In fact, even among those who favor negotiations on outer space, there is substantial disagreement on what should be covered.

Those who call for outer space negotiations are putting the cart before the horse. The next logical step would be for Member States to conduct a thor-ough discussion of possible measures related to outer space, to iden-tify proposals for further protections -- if there are any -- that may be desirable and feasible. Such discus-sion would have to take into account the need to enhance international peace and security while simultaneously protecting the secur-ity interests of states that have sub-stantial assets in outer space and that carry out impor-tant activities there. Unless and until there is a convergence of inter-ests and views on this issue, it is impractical to insist that the Conference must negotiate a treaty.

Thus, we do not understand how the objective of such calls can be to bring about negotiations on a topic that is far from ripe and that has not benefited from thorough discussion by this Conference. We are, rather, of the view that that holding FMCT hostage to negotiations on outer space is simply a poorly disguised effort to block FMCT nego-tiations altogether.

On two previous occasions, the Conference, acting by consen-sus, estab-lished an Ad Hoc Commit-tee mandated to conduct negotia-tions on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. In 1998, the UN General Assem-bly, also acting by consensus, adopted a reso-lution that called on the Conference to reestablish its FMCT Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of its next session. Furthermore, at the May 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Con-ference, the 155 participating NPT Parties urged this Conference to agree on a work program that would include the immediate com-mencement of FMCT nego-tiations, "with a view to their conclusion within five years."

If we combine these commitments with the assurances that we are all aware of in our discussions, it is clear that all of the Conference's Member States have agreed to support FMCT negotiations. Many delega-tions, including my own, believe the Conference needs to resume the negotiations indepen-dently, on their own merits. In other words, we believe the decision to negotiate a cutoff treaty should not be linked to anything else. A case-by-case approach is how the Conference has conducted business when it really meant business, and we believe Member States should return to that practice.

Others, however, have argued that the Conference must address three priority topics -- FMCT, nuclear disarmament, and outer space --- and that the Conference's decision to resume FMCT negotiations should be accompanied by parallel deci-sions to establish- subordinate bodies that will deal with nuclear dis-arm-ament and outer space.

Although the United States remains skeptical that Conference work on these subjects will prove productive, we have made a serious effort to find a middle ground in order to get FMCT nego-tiations started. With this goal in mind, we have stated that the United States could agree to simultaneous estab-lishment of subordinate bodies to discus-s nuclear dis-arm-ament and outer space issues under appropriate mandates. We also agree that the CD work program should include a range of other topics: negative secur-ity assurances, anti-personnel land-mines, trans-par-ency in armaments, and three procedural questions -- agenda reform, mem-ber-ship expan-sion, and "improved and effective functioning."

What more must Member States do before the Conference on Disarmament can get down to work? It is no secret to any in this room that this Conference is facing a crisis of credibility. To us, the way ahead seems simple: get to work in areas where there is agreement to do so. Do not hold everything hostage to everything else.

Mr. President, many of your predecessors have wrestled with the chal-lenge of developing appropriate mandates that would permit organized discussion of nuclear disarmament and out-er space issues. In June 1999 we all benefited from insightful proposals by Alger-ian Ambassador Mohamed-Salah Dembri -- influ-en-tial ideas even though they re-mained entirely informal. In June 2000, Ambassador Jean Lint of Belgium, proposed wording refinements that drew on Ambassador Dembri's efforts and adopted the same fundamental formula: FMCT negotiations plus dis-cussions on nuclear dis-armament and outer space. It is significant that Ambassadors Dembri and Lint both reached the same conclusion: FMCT is ripe for negotiations in the Conference, while nuclear disarmament and outer space are not. Your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, also reached an identical conclusion after yet further work.
With regard to a mandate for discussions on nuclear disarmament, I believe Member States have come very close to agreement. A few words remain to be worked out, but I am confident that if the terms of ref-erence for consideration of nuclear disarmament were the only outstanding issue, Member States could resolve it expeditiously.

Unfortunately, however, the principle of outer space discussions has not been accepted. To the contrary, we continue to hear calls for imme-diate negotiations. These are urgently required, we hear, to prevent several grave consequences that might result from U.S. plans for a National Missile Defense: 1) the possibility that NMD would upset strategic stability, leading to a new arms race here on Earth; 2) the risk of an arms race in outer space; and 3) the potential for disruption of the arms control process. It is important, Mr. President, that we be perfectly clear about what the U.S. is proposing and why these concerns are groundless.

The U.S. NMD system under consideration is not designed against Russia or China but to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack from certain countries of concern. A system capable of defending against a large-scale attack with sophisticated weapons would be both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that which the U.S. is considering. Moreover, we believe that confidence-building and transparency measures will provide added assurance that the U.S. is not contemplating a "rapid breakout" to attempt to build a complete defense.

Regarding the risk of an arms race in outer space, as I mentioned earlier, the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty already prohibit key activities associated with many concerns about putting "weapons" in outer space. The U.S. fully respects those treaties' constraints. The weapons of the ballistic national missile defense systems that the U.S. is considering are terrestrial, not space-based. The proposed U.S. NMD system would use land-based interceptors, launchers, and radars. It would use satellites only to provide early warning and data on threat missiles. This is a far cry from the "weaponization" of outer space. Satellites belonging to a number of countries here, including those strongly supporting outer space negotiations, already orbit the earth by the dozens, providing various types of data for military purposes to ships, aircraft, and ground forces worldwide. Should we prohibit these, too?

The U.S. remains committed to the arms control and disarmament process and sees no contradiction between that process and pursuit of a limited NMD system. The ABM Treaty is an integral part of our mutual efforts with the Russian Federation to reduce offensive nuclear arms. Twenty-eight years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States and Russia are convinced that the ABM Treaty re-mains an important element in our plans for further reductions. Representatives of our two countries have been discussing how to preserve and strengthen the Treaty in ways that will maintain its funda-mental effec-tive-ness under strategic and political circumstan-ces that have changed dramatically in the last three decades. During these discussions, the United States has proposed modifications to the Treaty that would permit the deployment of the initial NMD system. The United States remains firmly committed to these bilateral discussions. As I mentioned earlier, the objectives of the ABM treaty are to ensure that each party's strategic nuclear deterrent is not threatened by the missile defenses of the other party and to promote reduction of offensive nuclear arms. The limited NMD that we are developing would not threaten Russia's strategic deterrent and will promote further nuclear arms reductions. The arms control process would not be undermined.

The U.S. is convinced that the existing treaty regime for outer space has served the international community well. There is no arms race in outer space -- rather, there is unprecedented cooperation. Nonetheless, we are aware of the concerns expressed and we are prepared to exchange views on this issue. We are not opposed to the estab--lishment of an appropriate subordinate body for such discussions, in the context of active negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

The U.S. is also convinced that an agreed work program along the lines proposed by Ambassadors Dembri, Lint and Amorim is supported by the vast majority of the Conference and provides the best way - and perhaps the only way - to get this Conference back to work. Those who are not prepared to accept reasonable compromises will bear a heavy responsibility if this Conference continues to be prevented from negotiating multilateral arms control agreements.

Mr. President, I am confident that in your efforts to lay the groundwork for an overall agree-ment on a work program at the beginning of the 2001 session, you will continue to promote the same fundamental approach as your distinguished predeces-sors. In expressing great hope for the success of your efforts, I pledge the active cooperation of my delegation.

Thank you, Mr. President.