

**GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS OF  
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION  
ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON  
THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL  
WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE  
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO  
HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS**

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Working Group on Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

**Considerations relating to the blowing up of motor vehicles  
belonging to humanitarian missions**

**Prepared by the Russian Federation**

1. Further to our discussion of the effects of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) on the activities of humanitarian missions, we would like to make some observations.
2. In the view of the Russian Federation, motor vehicles are being blown up because practically all the humanitarian missions are carrying out their activities in areas of peacekeeping or similar operations in an independent manner, without coordinating those activities with the military authorities in charge of the area of operations.
3. This is due, in the first place, to the fact that some international organizations, for example ICRC, are obliged by their statutes to be neutral and therefore cannot involve military personnel in their activities.

4. But it is unsafe to make any movements within an area in which military activities have taken place without route reconnaissance. Consequently, even if all mines were detectable, it would hardly be possible to avoid incidents involving the blowing up of motor vehicles without undertaking appropriate route reconnaissance and the neutralization of emplaced explosive devices.

5. Secondly, many humanitarian organizations simply do not wish to cooperate or coordinate their activities with the military authorities in charge of areas where peacekeeping operations are being carried out.

6. For example, there were more than 300 different humanitarian missions and organizations in Kosovo at the beginning of the peacekeeping operations there, but only a few of them maintained contacts with the military command of the peacekeeping forces and negotiated their movements.

7. In such circumstances incidents involving explosions cannot be avoided, and the adoption of a new protocol on MOTAPM will do little to solve this problem.

8. Against this background we would like to point out to our colleagues that the most efficient measures aimed at reducing risks for humanitarian missions could be as follows:

- Cooperation between representatives of humanitarian missions and organizations and the military authorities in charge of the area of peacekeeping operations;
- Movements along recommended routes in the company of military specialists capable of detecting and neutralizing explosive devices of various kinds.

9. The efficiency of these measures has already been demonstrated in practice, and following this guidance will make it possible to ensure the success of humanitarian missions in areas in which military activities have taken place.

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