

The First CCW Review Conference, 1995-1996

Key Issues and Lessons Learned

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Overview of Presentation

1. Process and Outcomes of First RevCon

2. Key Lessons Learned

The First Review Process

1. Initiation of process by request of France to UNSYG (as CCW depositary) in 1993
2. CCW Parties ask UNSYG to establish Group of Experts
3. Group of Experts holds four sessions between February 1994 and January 1995
4. Group's recommendations forwarded to RevCon in Vienna in October 1995
5. RevCon extended from October 1995 to two 1996 sessions
6. RevCon results in adoption of Amended Mines Protocol II and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons in May 1996

Key Lessons of First CCW Review Conference

1. Decisionmaking by consensus
2. Balancing of military and humanitarian concerns.
3. Prioritizing to accomplish meaningful results.
4. Technical and financial concerns not a barrier to meaningful progress.

Decisionmaking by Consensus

1. The critique:

- Small number of objectors may block progress.
- A lowest common denominator approach.

2. The advantage:

- Enables wider circle of adherents.
- Requires accounting for the interests of all parties.
- Contributes to broad consultative process.

Balancing of Military and Humanitarian Concerns

1. CCW designed to integrate military and humanitarian concerns
2. Process integrated military, diplomatic and legal expertise
3. Participation of ICRC and interested NGOs

The Necessity of Meaningful Results

1. Must prioritize

- What can be done, diplomatically, militarily and technically?

2. Show meaningful progress

- First session of RevCon in 1995 concluded the Protocol on Blinding Lasers
- Amended Mines Protocol followed in May 1996

Overcoming Technical and Financial Concerns

1. Technical and financial issues related to mines were a major concern for many parties.
2. Rigorous consultations were held with major mine-manufacturing and mine-using States.
3. Detectability and self-destruction/self-deactivation concerns resolved

How were technical issues resolved?

1. Detectability

- Expert process underscored why non-detectable mines are a major humanitarian problem without any countervailing military requirement.
- Process also illustrated the low cost of making mines detectable.
- Recognition that the requirement applies to use.
- Option of transition period.

How were technical issues resolved (cont'd)?

2. Self-destruction and self-deactivation

- Experts process underscored the problem of mines that remain armed on a battlefield after conflict.
- Option of transition period.
- The value of close consultation and hard negotiation.

Conclusions

1. What should be the priorities for the Second Review Conference?

- Adoption of strengthened restrictions on anti-vehicle mines.
- Expansion of the scope of the Convention.
- Initiation of an experts process for “explosive remnants of war”.

Conclusions (cont'd)

2. How may technical issues be resolved?

- For landmines, the issues are no different than they were in 1995 - 1996.
- The same kinds of solutions may be available.
- Close consultations among key mine-manufacturers and -users.

Conclusions (cont'd)

3. Special issues related to “explosive remnants”

- States’ at a relatively early stage in their consideration, as compared to mines.
- Unlike mines, “remnants” has yet to be fully defined.
- Initiation of experts process a priority.