Background Information Brief on AV Mines

By Steve Solomon
Deputy Legal Adviser
Office of Legal Affairs
U.S. Mission Geneva

Is there a humanitarian problem associated with the irresponsible use of AV mines?
The answer is clearly yes. There is a serious problem associated with such use of AV mines.

AV mines are legitimately employed to deny the use of roads and territory to an enemy or to channel an enemy into certain routes where they will be vulnerable to attack and destruction. However, because of their heavy destructive power they can, if they are difficult to detect or irresponsibly used, have a widespread and harmful effect, disproportionately large compared to the numbers used, on the civilian transportation infrastructure. This is the infrastructure which underpins economic recovery efforts, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance and relief efforts.

Such AV mining results in a loss of confidence in the transportation infrastructure itself and has a psychological effect that extends the effects of their use far beyond their actual emplacement. For example, an isolated anti-vehicle mine strike can result in the abandonment of a road for kilometers in either direction from the blast location. This, in turn, has a negative effect on the movement, cost and availability of goods and services; the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance from the international donor community; even the ability to attract foreign investment crucial to economic recovery efforts.

The impact is particularly severe on the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and can significantly affect the provision of humanitarian assistance to them as they attempt to rebuild their lives and re-establish their methods of earning a livelihood in a war-torn environment.

The transportation "work-arounds" that are necessary to avoid known or suspected AV mined routes are generally more expensive -- dramatically more expensive if the "work-arounds" involves air delivery -- and in all cases impact humanitarian assistance and economic reconstruction efforts.

The use of alternate and generally less satisfactory routes slows down refugee and IDP returns, increases the time and costs associated with the delivery of humanitarian assistance, reduces the access which humanitarian assistance agencies have to needy populations, and elevates the time and costs for companion economic recovery efforts.

As the careful reporting of the ICRC has demonstrated, there are major effects as well in terms of denial of basic humanitarian assistance as a result of irresponsible anti-vehicle mining.

In July 13th, just two days before the July 2002 CCW experts meeting began, a distressing illustration of this point occurred in Angola.

This is a quote directly from the Angola Press report.

"Cuito (Kwee-toe), Saturday, July 13th, 2002 -- A vehicle column at the service of the World Food Program was today interdicted in the city of Cuito ... from traveling to the municipality of Camacupa (Cama-coopa) because it came across an anti-tank landmine on this road. . . ."

Still quoting from the report. "The column was transporting more than 200 tons of goods such as maize, beans, cooking oil, soya, among others, destined to assist more than 100,000 needy people living on the outskirts of Camacupa municipality, situated 82 km east of Cuito. Witnesses said that the landmine could have been planted long ago because fighting has taken place in this area. These needy people are without humanitarian assistance for quite some time due to the events."

It is worth underscoring that in this incident alone, 200 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies for 100,000 needy people were turned back 75 kilometers short of their destination because 1 AV mine was detected on the road.

This incident on July 13th, 2002, actually compounded a pre-existing humanitarian problem. A second AV mine incident occurred just three days earlier, on July 10th, in the same area.

All humanitarian assistance operations have been cancelled until, according to reports, "the situation is clarified." This means that, in all likelihood, until someone is actually able to sweep the road for mines, it will remain closed for humanitarian operations.

Sweeping the road for mines is, of course, a time-consuming process even if demining teams are available and even if the mines are detectable.

This is just one incident but it is representative of many.

Furthermore, irresponsible use of AV mines can and do have a deadly impact on international peacekeeping and security forces. Several Swedish SFOR peacekeepers lost their lives last year when their vehicle hit a mine in Bosnia driving on a road which was thought to be clear. This year as well these forces continue to pay a tragic and needless price.

It bears noting that even if doubt remains about the humanitarian impact, the CCW is structured to prevent future harms, as well as to address current problems. Both protocol I and IV, dealing respectively with non-detectable fragments and blinding lasers, are preventative in nature, designed to reduce the risks of proliferation and of prospective harms.

Indeed, concerns about proliferation of AV mines are legitimate and growing. It has been suggested that the decreasing availability of anti-personnel mines may actually spur the production and use of anti-vehicle mines. Such concern gives added weight to the arguments in favor of concerted action within CCW to address the issue of AV mines with due speed.

It is clear that the presence of irresponsibly used AV mines can dramatically disrupt transportation infrastructure, imposing significant humanitarian costs to both the affected country and the international community. These "secondary" costs are often orders of magnitude greater than the costs of clearance and can be measured in terms of delayed refugee returns, increased humanitarian expenses for support for refugee populations, limited access to populations in need, disruption of local trade and food production as well as a host of other economic and reconstruction impacts

In sum, the U.S. and our cosponsors see a serious humanitarian problem here; we see legitimate concerns about proliferation and increasing risks to civilians; but most importantly, we see an opportunity to do something about it. We hope we seize that opportunity.