U.S. Department of State
May 19.2012

G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group Summit Report

1. The Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG), established at Kananaskis Summit and responsible to Leaders, provides technically informed strategic policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Following the Deauville Summit, we remain committed to the objective of achieving the highest levels of safety and a culture of continuous improvement to nuclear safety and security.

2. We welcome continued cooperation, under the auspices of the IAEA with other relevant international organizations in this area, and will promote strong and competent national nuclear safety and security frameworks and cultures, by addressing both existing and emerging challenges and establishing partnership relations in these issues.

Nuclear Safety in the Aftermath of the Fukushima Accident

3. The Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent tsunami that severely affected the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station reminded the G8, and the world, of the importance of ensuring robust nuclear safety mechanisms in order to protect life, health and the environment and to prevent related adverse economic effects.

4. The NSSG welcomes the risk and safety assessments of nuclear installations conducted in G8 and other countries in response to the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station (Fukushima accident). This strong response to the Fukushima accident has already resulted in measures to improve nuclear safety.

G8 Support for the IAEA Action Plan and the Enhancement of Safety and Security Framework

5. The NSSG welcomes and endorses the IAEA’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (Action Plan), as it provides the most comprehensive roadmap for coordinating international efforts to strengthen and enhance existing nuclear safety programs in all countries in light of the Fukushima accident. The NSSG underlines that its implementation requires the concrete and determined commitment of states alongside the Secretariat of the Agency. The NSSG also recognizes the importance of the success of the Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in December 2012.

6. The NSSG is committed to working alongside the IAEA to fully implement the Action Plan in order to improve nuclear safety worldwide, and has decided to pursue a wide range of activities to further this objective.

7. The NSSG recognizes the role the regulator plays in providing an expectation that individuals and organizations performing regulated activities establish and maintain safety and security cultures commensurate with the significance of their activities and the nature and complexity of their organizations and functions. The NSSG further recognizes the role industry and operators play in creating a work environment at nuclear facilities and activities where nuclear safety is paramount and where plant employees are encouraged to place safety as their highest obligation. In an effort to demonstrate support for industry actions to improve nuclear safety, the NSSG acknowledges national initiatives for fostering and sustaining a safety culture, recognizing that these initiatives can provide the basis for a replicable, holistic approach to strengthening the safety culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. The NSSG acknowledges the valuable contribution of the IAEA peer review services to improve the safety culture.

8. The NSSG welcomes the actions that are being taken to enhance the international emergency preparedness and response system under the Action Plan. The NSSG recognizes, especially in view of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident, that the strengthened, effective, and sustainable national and international emergency preparedness and response programs are critical to ensuring protection of life, health, the environment, and the economy. The NSSG urges countries not only to review their existing emergency preparedness and response programs and to make necessary improvements, but also to support the strengthening of regional and international emergency preparedness systems. The NSSG is fully committed to ensuring a comprehensive worldwide emergency preparedness and response system and encourages all countries to support the implementation of strategies arising from the IAEA International Action Plan for Strengthening the International Preparedness and Response System for Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies. The NSSG also supports strengthening national, regional and international communications and assistance within a sustainable infrastructure.

9. The NSSG supports ongoing initiatives based on a coordinated approach to nuclear safety and security practices. The NSSG also encourages the full consideration of emergency preparedness and response when addressing nuclear safety and security in order to further maximize benefits of these programs while reducing duplication and redundancies.

10. The NSSG resolves to enhance and strengthen the effectiveness of the international legal framework by the most efficient and practicable means available, making full use of the upcoming review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, as well as the extraordinary meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In addition, measures to strengthen the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency should also be considered. In so doing, the NSSG acknowledges the importance of working proactively to apply lessons learned from the Fukushima accident on current nuclear safety practices.

11. The NSSG recognizes the importance of a global nuclear liability regime based on the principles set forth in the relevant international instruments. The national laws of all countries should be consistent with those principles and should assure the availability of appropriate compensation for victims which would be provided in a single forum in a prompt, equitable, and non-discriminatory manner with minimal litigation. The NSSG commits to working toward establishing a global nuclear liability regime by promoting universal adherence to one or more relevant international instruments appropriate for each country.

Chornobyl Projects

12. The NSSG remains committed to the timely and cost-efficient completion of the ongoing projects at Chornobyl, which are managed on behalf of the donor community by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), to convert the destroyed reactor unit into a stable and environmentally safe state. The NSSG resolves to remain seized with this issue. Meanwhile the NSSG views it as critically important that the Government of Ukraine makes the required institutional and financial provisions to ensure the efficient and successful implementation of the projects.

Safety Upgrade of Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plants

13. The NSSG welcomes the safety upgrades of all Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). The ultimate objective is for Ukrainian NPPs to satisfy internationally recognized nuclear safety standards. The program is currently ongoing and is expected to be completed in 2017. Ukraine has submitted a request to Euratom and the EBRD for loans for the project; the due diligence review is ongoing. The program review of the safety and environmental impact has been completed.

Geneva,
May 15, 2012

Mr. President,

I hope you can convey our thanks to the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Ambassador Al-Nasser, for addressing the Conference on Disarmament.

Like many of his predecessors, he voiced the frustration broadly shared by the international community, including most of us in this room, with the CD’s inability to perform its mandate of conducting disarmament negotiations.  The Secretary-General has also repeatedly urged the CD to fulfill this core responsibility as has our own Secretary General of the CD.

Sadly, we have heard this lament for more than 15 years and despite our best efforts, we appear no closer now to meeting this responsibility than we were three years ago in the CD, when we finally reached consensus on a finely-balanced program of work in CD 1864, under the able Presidency of Algeria.

We have been flexible, working with others, including recently our Egyptian President who energetically put forward CD 1933, in an effort to find a further compromise, and one which we decided we could support.   As the president of the U.N. General Assembly just urged us, we supported an approach which was designed to be in President’s words, “consensual and realistic” although not “necessarily perfect.”

And yet we remain stuck.  We are all evaluating our options.  For our part, we are working with partners to galvanize the CD, in an effort to find a way forward.  We cannot lose sight of the international community’s long-term goal to begin FMCT negotiations.  Others are looking at other options, including within an UNGA framework.  For our part, it is essential that any option for an FMCT be predicated on a consensus working basis and include key stakeholders, such as those with the capacity to produce fissile material, to meet the objectives of the treaty.

We are not dedicated to preserving the CD for the sake of preserving the CD.  Nor do we think the UNGA will have all the answers.  It would not be productive for the UNGA, for example, to simply re-plow ground long covered here in Geneva.

Let me reiterate that we are open to substantive discussions on the agreed core issues, but the international community has long been ready to negotiate an FMCT.   Indeed, as far back as SSOD I, 34 years ago, and the foundation of the CD, it has been an international priority. In other fora,  such as the NPT, States parties also highlighted this immediate disarmament priority at the 2010 Review Conference, and again in the last two weeks at the 1^st Prepcom in Vienna which was so effectively chaired by our colleague, Australian Ambassador Woolcott.

We hope, perhaps against the odds, that the CD in the time remaining for this session will allow work to proceed on an FMCT.  Our governments did not send us here to endlessly discuss procedure and negotiate phantom programs of work, they, or certainly my government, sent us here to negotiate substance, beginning with this next step for nuclear disarmament.  Failure to take this next step will not move us closer to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.  If we cannot take this next step in the CD, all those who share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, will have to find another means to accomplish it.

Thanks again to the President of the UN General Assembly for sharing his perspectives; we look forward to working with him in the fall.

Let me extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues from Bulgaria, Finland and Italy. I ask my new Bulgarian colleague to convey best wishes to our former colleague and friend, Ambassador Ganchev.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Remarks by Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
National Defense University Congressional Breakfast Seminar

Washington, DC
May 11, 2012

Reinforcing Stability through Missile Defense

Thank you so much for inviting me to speak today. I attended a number of these breakfasts as a Congressional Hill staffer myself, so I’m very pleased to be on the opposite side of the podium today.

At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense. In that capacity, it was my responsibility to negotiate the details of the BMD agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach. I will touch more on this later in my presentation, but suffice to say that I have been focused over the last couple of years on ensuring that we are able to meet the vision the President laid out in his 2009 announcement regarding the European Phased Adaptive Approach.

Missile Defense Policy

Today, the threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to our deployed forces, allies, and partners is growing. This regional threat is likely to increase in both quantitative and qualitative terms in the coming years, as some states are increasing their inventories, and making their ballistic missiles more accurate, reliable, mobile, and survivable.

Recognizing the seriousness of the ballistic missile threat, the United States seeks to create an environment, based on strong cooperation with allies and partners, which will eliminate an adversary’s confidence in the effectiveness of ballistic missile attacks. This will devalue and provide a disincentive for the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles. To that end, President Obama has made international cooperation on missile defense a key priority, and we are pursuing a region-by-region approach based on the following three principles:

1) First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon solid cooperative relationships with an eye toward efficiently incorporating assets and structures that our partners already have today or are seeking.

2) Second, the United States will pursue Phased Adaptive Approaches (PAAs) within key regions that are tailored to their unique deterrence requirements and threats, including the scale, scope, and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. We will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner.

3) Third, recognizing that our supply of missile defense assets cannot meet the global demand we face, the United States is developing mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat and provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.

Missile defense plays an important role in the broader U.S. international security strategy, supporting both deterrence and diplomacy. Missile defense assures our allies and partners that the United States has the will and the means to deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited ballistic missile attack against the U.S. homeland and regional ballistic missile attacks against our forward deployed troops, allies, and partners.

NATO and European Missile Defense

I’d like to focus today on our work in Europe, which continues to receive a great deal of attention. In order to augment the defense of the United States and a future long-range threat and provide more comprehensive and more rapid protection to our deployed forces and European Allies against the current threat, the President outlined a four-phase approach for European missile defense called the European Phased Adaptive Approach or EPAA. Through the EPAA, the United States will deploy increasingly capable BMD assets to defend Europe against a ballistic missile threat from the Middle East that is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The EPAA will protect our deployed forces and our allies and partners in Europe, as well as augment the defense of the U.S. homeland against a potential by ICBMs from the Middle East in several ways. As part of Phase 1, we have deployed to Turkey missile defense radar, referred to as the AN/TPY-2 radar, which will provide data earlier in the engagement of an incoming ballistic missile from the Middle East. This radar enhances the homeland missile defense coverage of the United States provided by our Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) capabilities in Alaska and California.

A year ago last week, we concluded negotiations with Romania to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 BMD interceptor site, designed to provide protection against medium-range ballistic missiles. The land-based SM-3 system to be deployed to Romania is anticipated to become operational in the 2015 timeframe. We also reached an agreement with Poland to place a similar U.S. BMD interceptor site there in the 2018 timeframe.

Defense of the homeland will be further augmented by the basing in Poland of the SM-3 IIB interceptor, which is a future evolution of the SM-3 series of interceptors. The SM-3 IIB interceptor will provide us an opportunity for an early-intercept against potential long-range missile launched from the Middle East. It is important for everyone to know that we are already protected from limited ICBM attacks by the GBIs we have deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg, California.

The EPAA will eventually provide us with additional protection, ensuring that we can take multiple shots at a long-range missile heading to the United States. The EPAA – in all of its phases – also provides protection to for the thousands of U.S. military personnel based in Europe.

The Obama Administration is implementing the EPAA within the NATO context. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a new Strategic Concept and decided to develop the capability to defend NATO European populations and territory against the growing threat from ballistic missile proliferation. The Allies also welcomed the EPAA as a U.S. national contribution to the new NATO territorial missile defense capability, in support of our commitment to the collective defense of the Alliance under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the Lisbon Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also decided to expand the scope of the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program to serve as the command, control, and communications network to support this new capability. NATO allies have committed to investing over $1 billion for command, control, and communications infrastructure to support NATO missile defense.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective defense. Our Allies possess land- and sea-based sensors that could be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense. For example, Germany and the Netherlands each have Patriot PAC-3s while Spain and Greece have Patriot PAC-2s. Turkey is also considering Patriot PAC-3s to address its air defense and BMD requirements. On the sea-based side, the Dutch announced in September 2011, their intention to upgrade the SMART-L air search radars on their De Zeven Provinciën-class frigates with an extended long-range (ELR) mode. In December 2006, the Dutch frigate Tromp participated in an Aegis BMD test during which it demonstrated the capability of a modified radar to track ballistic missiles.

Germany also has the SMART-L and Active Phased Array Radars (APARs) on its F-124 frigates and may decide to pursue a BMD capability in the future, while Spain has frigates equipped with a version of the SPY-1 radar used on our Aegis BMD ships. In June 2007, the Spanish frigate Méndez Núñez, participated in a BMD test off of Kaui, Hawaii, during which it was able to detect and track a ballistic missile with a minor modification to its Aegis Weapon System. Italy and Germany are also working with the United States to develop a Proof of Concept for MEADS, which will allow all three nations to harvest the advanced technologies of MEADS for follow-on systems.

Later this month on May 20-21, the NATO Heads of State and Government will meet in Chicago for the NATO Summit. Our goal is to declare an interim NATO MD capability at the Summit. What this means is that the United States could transfer select missile defense assets to NATO operational control should conditions warrant which results in a limited NATO missile defense capability. Over time, through additional contributions by the United States and other Allies, NATO missile defense will become even more capable.

Separate from the EPAA, it is important to note that our European allies are contributing directly to the defense of the United States today. The United Kingdom and Denmark each host an Upgraded Early Warning Radar at Fylingdales and Thule, Greenland, respectively. These radars are critical to the defense of the United States against a potential long-range missile threat from the Middle East. I would also note that U.S. EPAA capabilities will provide protection for these important assets. Therefore, I think it’s fair to say that the defense of the U.S. homeland is linked to the defense of Europe.

Russia

An update on missile defense cooperation with Europe should also include a discussion of our efforts to pursue cooperation with Russia. Missile defense cooperation with Russia is a Presidential priority, as it has been for several Administrations going back to President George H.W. Bush in the early 1990s.

When President Obama announced his new vision for missile defense in Europe in September 2009, he stated that “we welcome Russia’s cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic interests.” Missile defense cooperation with Russia will not only strengthen our bilateral and NATO-Russia relationships, but also could enhance NATO’s missile defense capabilities. Successful missile defense cooperation would provide concrete benefits to Russia, our NATO Allies, and the United States and will strengthen – not weaken – strategic stability over the long term.

This means it is important to get Russia inside the missile defense tent now, working alongside the United States and NATO, while we are in the early stages of our efforts. Close cooperation between Russia and the United States and NATO is the best and most enduring way for Russia to gain the assurance that European missile defenses cannot and do not undermine its strategic deterrent.

Through this cooperation, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for the ballistic missile threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems will not threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capabilities. Cooperation will also allow Russia to see that the EPAA is designed to be flexible. Should the ballistic missile threat from nations like Iran change, our missile defense system can be adapted accordingly. Working together on missile defense would also send a strong message to proliferators that the United States, NATO, and Russia are working to counter their efforts.

That said, Russia has raised the issue of a legal guarantee with a set of “military-technical criteria” that could, in effect, create limitations on our ability to develop and deploy future missile defense systems against regional ballistic missile threats such as those presented by Iran and North Korea. We have also made it clear to Russia that we cannot and will not accept limitations on our ability to defend ourselves, our allies, and our partners, including where we deploy our Aegis ships. These are multi-mission ships that are used for a variety of purposes around the world, not just for missile defense.

The United States cannot accept any Russian proposal that limits the operational areas of U.S. or allied ships. Such limits are contrary to international law on navigational rights and freedom of the sea. We also will not accept limitations on the capabilities and numbers of our missile defense systems. Let me be clear, our missile defense capabilities are critical to our ability to counter a growing threat to our deployed forces, allies, and partners; therefore, no nation or group of nations will have veto power over U.S. missile defense efforts.

And while we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that under the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO alone will bear responsibility for defending the Alliance from the ballistic missile threat. This is why the United States and NATO cannot agree to Russia’s proposal for “sectoral” missile defense. Just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory.

We would, however, be willing to agree to a political framework including a statement that our missile defenses are not directed at Russia. Any such statement would be politically binding and would publicly proclaim our intent to work together and chart the direction for cooperation, not limitations. Our bottom line is that missile defense cooperation with Russia will not come at the expense of our plans to defend against regional ballistic missile threats or our plans for the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Conclusion

Today’s ballistic missile threats continue to increase in number and sophistication. This increasing threat reinforces the importance of our collaborative missile defense efforts with partners around the world, which not only strengthen regional stability, but also provide protection for our forces serving abroad and augment the defense of the United States.

Thank you for your time and attention. I look forward to your questions.

Read more: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/05/201205125572.html?distid=ucs#ixzz1uqysCsdd

The United States was pleased to participate in the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting of Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) held in Vienna, April 30 – May 11.  The U.S. interagency delegation was led by Ambassador Susan Burk, the President’s Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, and included Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; Ambassador Laura Kennedy, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; and Robert Wood, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna.

The PrepCom provided the opportunity for a valuable, substantive exchange of views on all aspects of the NPT, including disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  National and group presentations illuminated the actions that many nations have taken to follow up on the 2010 NPT Review Conference, to implement the 2010 NPT Action Plan, and to establish priorities for the 2015 Review Conference.  Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller co-chaired a joint panel on U.S.-Russian implementation of the New START Treaty, and Ambassador Burk moderated a discussion of technical cooperation and assistance available to NPT Parties in implementing IAEA safeguards agreements.

All NPT parties have a responsibility to contribute to the achievement of the NPT’s fundamental goals and to the vitality and durability of the global nonproliferation regime.  At the PrepCom the United States reaffirmed its commitment to implement the 2010 NPT Action Plan as well as its obligations under Article VI of the NPT.  In this connection, the United States announced it would host a third conference of the five NPT Nuclear Weapon States (P5) in Washington June 27-29, 2012, where discussions on key disarmament and nonproliferation topics will progress.  The United States reaffirmed its support for a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction, and for a successful conference that includes and has the full support of all countries in the region.  The United States will continue to address the serious challenge of cases of noncompliance with Treaty obligations, and will continue to support expanding access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in areas as human health, water resources, agriculture, and food security.  The United States is the largest single contributor to IAEA peaceful uses programs, and has pledged an additional $50 million to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, which seeks to expand support for peaceful uses programs by $100 million before the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

(end text)

Remarks by Thomas Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
First Session of the Preparatory Committee, 2015 Review Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Vienna, Austria
May 8, 2012

Middle East Issues

Thank you Mr. Chairman,

The United States fully supports the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction. This support is unequivocal and I can assure you that my government is prepared to take practical measures that can move us toward this goal. A Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction is an achievable goal, but a long-term goal. It will not occur overnight or without a concerted effort in the region and internationally to make it a reality. Just as our efforts to seek peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons will not be realized quickly, we understand that a WMD free zone in the Middle East can only be achieved once essential conditions are in place, most critically a comprehensive and durable peace and full compliance by all countries in the region with their nonproliferation obligations.

We remain committed to the objectives of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The United States has consistently demonstrated its readiness to address the serious issues standing in the way of ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Since the adoption of the Middle East Resolution in 1995, the United States has worked with other concerned parties to help build the confidence needed to address the underlying security issues in a way that could give rise to real, constructive progress. We also continue to address the multiple instances of Treaty non-compliance that have arisen from the region. If not appropriately addressed by member states, these cases of non-compliance threaten not only prospects for a Middle East free of WMD but also the very credibility of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman, the United States will continue to work with the other cosponsors of the 1995 Resolution and the regional parties to fulfill our commitment made at the 2010 Review Conference to convene a Conference on the Establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. Such a Conference has the potential to foster official dialogue on regional security issues where none currently exists.

The United States has full confidence in Under Secretary Laajava and welcomes his report. We commend him for his diligent work and extensive consultations to date and have no doubt that he, together with the conveners, will continue to advance the procedural steps necessary for holding a Conference. However, neither Under Secretary Laajava nor the conveners can make the Conference a reality and a success unless the regional states begin now to take the political steps to create the conditions necessary for a successful and constructive Conference.

In this regard, I would like to restate the views President Obama expressed in 2010 regarding what might contribute to a successful Conference. First, a Conference can only take place if all countries feel confident that they can attend; continued efforts to single out Israel or any other State will make a Conference increasingly less likely. All regional parties must attend the conference on an equal basis, regardless of their status vis-a-vis the various international arms control treaties. Second, for the Conference to be constructive, its purpose should be to exchange views on a broad agenda, including regional security issues, adherence, verification and compliance, and all categories of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery. Third, the Conference should draw its mandate from the countries in the region in keeping with the internationally recognized principle that regional zones must be based on arrangements freely arrived at by states in the region and should originate from the region itself. A zone cannot be imposed from the outside or mandated by a decision of the NPT review process. Finally, to ensure the Conference takes into account the views of all regional participants, the Conference must operate by consensus of the regional countries, to include agreement on any possible further discussions or follow-up actions, which logically can only take place with the consent of those countries.

Our approach should be one of setting realistic expectations and encouraging serious engagement on a difficult set of issues. A successful Conference can lead to a continuing process. An unsuccessful Conference cannot lead to a process. And the success of the Conference depends primarily upon the efforts of the states of the Middle East, in the next few months, to lay the groundwork for full participation and consensus of regional states.

To plan for a successful Conference it will be necessary to address the lack of confidence among regional states that all in the region are ready to approach the key issues in a constructive manner. The ability of the facilitator and conveners to foster this confidence is extremely limited. The states of the region themselves must take responsibility. All regional states must work together and engage each other directly, at a political level, to address this lack of confidence, and take steps to assure each other that the Conference would address this issue in a constructive manner. If the regional states view this Conference as just another venue to repeat the same political points and arguments we have heard in various multilateral fora for years, if they continue to place a higher priority on confrontation than on cooperation, they will have squandered a unique opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, we would be remiss if we did not take into consideration the historic events unfolding in the region. The political atmosphere and security situation in the region in 2012 are much different from those of May 2010.

2011 and the first few months of 2012 have witnessed many significant and historic developments in the Middle East. Egypt and Tunisia are going through the beginning stages of establishing new democratic governments. Yemen is undergoing a fragile transition. Libya is just beginning to emerge from decades of Qaddafi rule and the Asad regime in Syria reminds us of the brutal and inhuman lengths to which some will go to maintain their hold on power.

The timing and pace of these fundamental political shifts will be a factor in determining how to move forward on the Helsinki Conference in a manner that is most conducive to a constructive dialogue and positive outcome.

Likewise, we cannot ignore the corrosive effect of Treaty non-compliance on efforts to rid the region of weapons of mass destruction and on the Treaty itself. Implementation of the 1995 Resolution is inextricably linked to efforts to address cases of Treaty compliance in the region. States in the region must be able to trust that others will fulfill their international obligations. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, most of the cases of NPT non-compliance have come from the Middle East. Currently, two states in the region, Iran and Syria, are in noncompliance with their nonproliferation obligations and have failed to take the necessary steps to address international concerns about the true nature and scope of their nuclear activities.

We join the international community in expressing deep concern over Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its nonproliferation obligations, including IAEA safeguards obligations and UN Security Council resolutions. We welcome the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, begun in Istanbul April 14. We seek a sustained process that produces concrete results, and expect Iran to bring to the table the same serious and constructive attitude that the 6 partners bring. The NPT forms a key basis, together with the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, for what must be serious engagement on Iran’s nuclear program, to ensure that Iran meets all of its nonproliferation obligations. To be clear, Iran’s engagement with the P5+1 is separate from the equally urgent obligation for Iran to cooperate fully with the verification efforts of the IAEA. Iran continues to delay and obstruct that process, and has not agreed to grant the IAEA access to all relevant sites, materials, information, documents and personnel necessary to resolve questions about its nuclear program, including concerns about its possible military dimensions reported by the IAEA in November 2011. Iran is not fully implementing all of its responsibilities under its safeguards agreement, in particular the modified Code 3.1. We stress the urgent need for Iran to engage directly with the IAEA on the Agency’s concerns and reach agreement on a structured approach, based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve all outstanding issues.

IAEA Director General Amano reported in May 2011 that the facility destroyed in 2007 at Dair Alzour, Syria was “very likely” an undeclared nuclear reactor. Consequently, in June 2011 the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, referred the matter to the UN Security Council. To date, Syria has not taken any concrete steps to provide the access sought by the IAEA to additional locations or address the outstanding questions about its clandestine nuclear activities.

It is critically important that Iran and Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA and return to full compliance with the NPT and their safeguards agreements. And, as agreed in the 2010 Action Plan, it is vitally important that all NPT Parties support the resolution of all cases of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards and other nonproliferation requirements. The Treaty and the regime are only as strong as the Parties’ will to maintain the Treaty’s integrity.

Mr. Chairman, our approach to implementing the 1995 Resolution is based on realism, and on an objective assessment of the obstacles that must be overcome to make real progress towards ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction. These obstacles are not insurmountable, but they cannot be ignored. Failing to acknowledge and address the underlying political and security realities in the region will diminish the prospects for a successful conference in Helsinki, and will ensure that our shared objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction remains an elusive goal.

On-the-record-briefing
Via Teleconference
May 2, 2012

 Statement by
Department of State
United States of America

Cluster 1

First Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

May 3, 2012

Delivered by Ambassador Laura E. Kennedy,
Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament

Cluster 1 – U.S. Statement

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted the nuclear dangers of the 21^st century and declared that, to overcome these threats, the United States reaffirms our enduring commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  Speaking in Seoul this past March, the President reaffirmed U.S. support for this goal and highlighted the near-term, practical steps that the United States is taking to move in that direction.

At the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, NPT Parties pulled together to reaffirm their support for the Treaty as a vital instrument of global security and their own security.  Essential to that reaffirmation was the Parties’ agreement on a forward-looking Action Plan that includes steps toward the goal of nuclear disarmament.  The United States is committed to working with all other countries to implement the Action Plan effectively.  By supporting the Action Plan, the United States reaffirms our commitment to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency as necessary building blocks of nuclear disarmament.

The United States is committed to leading by example by working toward fulfilling the nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament obligations of Article VI of the NPT and the commitments in the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has been reducing our inventory of nuclear weapons for more than four decades.  By September 2009, the U.S. nuclear stockpile was reduced by 84% to approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads from its peak of approximately 31,000 nuclear warheads in 1967.  During this period, the United States unilaterally reduced our non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90%.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which entered into force on February 5, 2011, is a further demonstration of the commitment of the United States to work toward President Obama’s ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons.  When the Treaty is fully implemented, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will reach their lowest level since the 1950s.  The rigorous and extensive verification provisions of the New START Treaty testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations.  I would like to encourage all delegations to attend the side event on the New START Treaty that will be presented by the United States and the Russian Federation today at 13:15 in this Plenary Hall.

When President Obama signed the New START Treaty in April 2010, he said that the United States will pursue a future agreement with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons – strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.  To this end, the United States seeks to promote strategic stability and to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia.

As President Obama repeated in Seoul in March, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will not be reached quickly.  The President noted that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on the security commitments undertaken by the United States.  The President also said in Seoul that, after New START is implemented, we will still have more nuclear weapons than we need.  The United States is now conducting the follow-on analysis called for in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to set goals for future nuclear reductions in line with strategic requirements.  Meanwhile, the NPR has ruled out the development of new U.S. nuclear warheads and new missions and capabilities for existing warheads.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has also demonstrated leadership through unilateral transparency measures.  Examples include the U.S. release in 2010 of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile figures and articulation in the 2010 NPR of the reduced role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national strategy.  In addition, the U.S. nuclear community is exploring the technical steps needed to ensure irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency as essential building blocks of nuclear disarmament.  We are also considering ways to collaborate with other NPT Parties in this undertaking.

Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (also known as the “P5”) have met regularly to discuss our commitments in the Conference’s Action Plan.  Following the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences, the United States will host a P5 conference in Washington June 27 – 29, 2012.  The P5 process now underway is expanding the long-standing U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament dialogue into an ongoing process of P5 engagement on issues related to nuclear disarmament, consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Mr. Chairman, in the area of nuclear testing, President Obama pledged in his Prague speech that his administration would pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  The Administration has been engaging with the U.S. Senate on the CTBT, laying the groundwork for positive Senate reconsideration of the Treaty.  At the same time, the United States has continued to support completion of the CTBT’s monitoring and verification regime.

The last U.S. test of a nuclear explosive device was in September 1992.  Since then, the United States has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.  The United States remains committed to this moratorium, and calls upon all states to refrain from nuclear explosive testing.  The 2010 NPR reiterated that the United States no longer requires nuclear explosive testing to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our remaining nuclear weapons, relying instead on our long-standing Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Mr. Chairman, with regard to fissile material, the United States has not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons since 1964 or produced plutonium for weapons since 1988.  The United States has worked with Russia for a number of years to eliminate excess stocks of HEU and plutonium that could be used in nuclear warheads.  In July 2011, the United States and Russia brought the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its 2006 and 2010 Protocols into force, committing each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium.  This is enough for a total of 17,000 nuclear weapons.  The United States remains committed to completing an agreement with Russia and the IAEA to enable the Agency to verify each side’s disposition programs.  The United States also remains committed to negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty that would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices as an essential and the next logical multilateral step toward disarmament and an important foundation for future nuclear reductions.  We deeply regret that the Conference on Disarmament has failed to take up treaty negotiations, but we will continue with our partners to look for a productive path forward.

Mr. Chairman, an early and significant demonstration of U.S. commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament was the 1969 U.S. decision to unilaterally dismantle our biological weapons program, and our leadership role in negotiating the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).  Over the years, we have also contributed to strengthening the BWC and have led efforts to address changing threats through the BWC.  Most recently, for example, Secretary Clinton unveiled a new U.S. Bio Transparency and Openness Initiative at the 2011 BWC Review Conference.

With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the United States remains fully committed to achieving 100 percent destruction of chemical weapons as soon as practicable, consistent with the Convention’s imperatives of public safety, environmental protection, and international transparency and oversight.  We have destroyed approximately 90% of our chemical weapons stockpile, and provided financial and technical aid to other CWC States Parties for the elimination of their declared CW stockpiles.

The United States is also a participating State or State Party to Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, which constitute the three conventional arms control pillars in Europe.  We continue to actively engage with NATO Allies, Russia, and other partners to determine current and future requirements in an effort to modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe.

The United States has contributed to conventional weapons disarmament efforts in other ways as well.  For example, we have ended all use of persistent landmines, provided more than $1.9 billion in aid in over 80 countries for conventional weapons destruction programs, and cooperated with countries to destroy approximately 33,000 man-portable air defense systems in over 30 countries.

Mr. Chairman, the United States recognizes the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon states to make progress toward nuclear disarmament.  But all NPT Parties can contribute to the Treaty’s disarmament goals, both by pursuing disarmament steps themselves and by taking other steps to help create the conditions for such progress.  This is by necessity an area of shared responsibility.  In addition, progress on disarmament under the NPT is integrally linked to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for which we all have shared responsibility – nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, implementation of President Obama’s Prague agenda and the 2010 NPT Action Plan is well underway.  Much progress has been achieved, yet much remains to be done.  The United States will continue to work toward fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the Action Plan.  The United States will also continue to urge other NPT Parties to do the same.  As Article VI makes clear, all NPT Parties have a role to play in disarmament.

General Debate
First Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

April 30, 2012

(As Prepared)  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  On behalf of the United States Delegation, let me add my voice to those delegations that have congratulated you on your selection to chair the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee to lay the groundwork for the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.  You, like many of us here today, are a veteran of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and we share a desire to build on the encouraging results of that conference and move the agenda forward.  I want to assure you of our Delegation’s commitment to work with you and our NPT partners to ensure the success of this body and, through our work, to sustain and reinforce the NPT.

Mr. Chairman, the United States looks forward during this PrepCom meeting to sharing detailed information on our efforts over the past two years to follow-up on the commitments we made in 2010.  So I will not take time this morning to catalogue these activities.  Let me say, however, that the United States continues to take those commitments seriously, and we have been working – and will continue to work – to translate them into actions and accomplishments.  We look forward, as well, to hearing from other Parties on their own efforts to implement the Action Plan adopted by the 2010 RevCon.  We all have a role to play in bringing the 2010 Action Plan to fruition.

Today, I would like to share some thoughts on how the United States is approaching this Preparatory Committee meeting and the 2015 review cycle.

Lessons Learned from the 2010 NPT Review Conference

We are concentrating on using the lessons learned from 2010 as we prepare for 2015.   This new NPT review cycle follows our successful collaboration during the 2010 NPT Review Conference.  That Conference was an exercise in constructive and creative multilateralism.  The NPT Parties defied the skeptics who saw a treaty regime under siege and little chance of agreement among so many states with such a wide range of views on such a broad and often contentious agenda.

By reaching across traditional regional and political lines, NPT Parties worked together successfully to find common ground.  That effort produced a unique and unprecedented NPT Action Plan that was adopted by consensus, a real achievement given both the sheer number and complexity of the issues and the variety of perspectives and priorities countries brought to the table.  This Plan reflects agreement on a forward-looking agenda that encompasses both essential principles and specific actions that each Party can take to reinforce the NPT and contribute to the achievement of the Treaty’s fundamental objectives.

The Action Plan, however, also reflects the limits of multilateralism when the goal is consensus.  It does not contain every state’s list of priorities, particularly because it does not address some very serious challenges to the Treaty, to the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime, and to international security in general in a level of detail justified by the gravity of these challenges.  In particular, the Action Plan does not address as clearly and strongly as it should have the unresolved cases of noncompliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations.  Nonetheless, the Plan covers most NPT issues, reflects a balanced approach to the three pillars of the NPT, and does acknowledge that full compliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations, like progress on nuclear disarmament and access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, is essential.  The Plan remains an excellent point of departure for our efforts that begin during this Preparatory Committee meeting.

The Three Pillars

The NPT is the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a key element of the international security architecture.  It is both an essential legal barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons and the only international agreement with nuclear disarmament as one of its objectives.  While the Treaty is very much a product of its time, it has also stood the test of time.  It may, in fact, be even more important today than in the past.

The NPT’s basic bargain, as President Obama has noted, remains sound:  countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  These three pillars–nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy–remain mutually reinforcing.  Adherence to and full compliance with the NPT by all states would make a significant contribution to reducing nuclear dangers.  A global nonproliferation regime that is strong and reliable serves as an essential foundation for efforts to reduce existing nuclear arsenals to lower numbers leading to their eventual elimination.  Without this foundation, progress toward nuclear disarmament cannot be assured.  And without this foundation, the fullest possible access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will not be realized.

It is imperative, therefore, that all NPT Parties recommit themselves to ensuring the health and vitality of this essential international agreement by advancing each of the Treaty’s three pillars together.  The Treaty and the regime cannot thrive unless each pillar thrives.  All Parties must accept responsibility for taking appropriate steps to contribute to the achievement of each of the Treaty’s fundamental objectives, whether collectively or individually.   The Action Plan provides an achievable blueprint for advancing together each of the Treaty’s pillars, but it requires the involvement of all Parties.

A World without Nuclear Weapons: The U.S. Record

Three years ago in Prague, President Obama reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.  He set out a comprehensive disarmament and nonproliferation agenda to advance toward that goal.  President Obama reiterated that commitment and noted the progress on that agenda when he said recently in Seoul,

“American leadership has been essential to progress in . . .  taking concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons.  As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this is our obligation, and it’s one that I take very seriously.”   

A world free of nuclear weapons requires both disarmament and nonproliferation. The United States has made clear on many occasions that it understands its special responsibility to take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear disarmament.      The United States is making progress on disarmament, and we will detail those efforts this week.  We remain equally committed to doing our part to strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT, and we will detail those efforts, as well as our commitment to the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the days ahead.

The Nonproliferation Challenge

All NPT Parties can and must contribute to the norm of nonproliferation established by the NPT.  The health of the entire regime depends on it.  The security of every state depends on it.

The Action Plan’s blueprint for bolstering nonproliferation is clear.  There is no greater threat to the integrity and vitality of the Treaty than the unresolved cases of noncompliance.  Because of the corrosive effect of noncompliance on international confidence in the NPT, we must redouble our efforts to encourage full compliance with Treaty obligations.  It is the responsibility of all of us to make clear that violating the NPT, and I would add, abusing the Treaty’s withdrawal provision, will have consequences.  This cannot be a concern of merely one state or a group of states.

Fundamental to bolstering nonproliferation is supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, and contributing to international efforts to strengthen its ability to verify the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials and technology.  The importance of the Agency’s role in NPT implementation cannot be overstated.  By providing credible assurances of states’ compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, IAEA safeguards build confidence among neighbors and the international community at large.  As agreed in the 2010 Action Plan, NPT Parties should work together to ensure that the IAEA has the authority and resources needed to fulfill its vital safeguards mission, including through the broader implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.  The number of states adhering to the Protocol is steadily increasing, with 14 states having brought it into force since we met in 2010.  We welcome this important step by governments that recognize the tremendous reinforcement it gives to the IAEA in fulfilling its mission and the signal it sends to their neighbors about the peaceful nature of their nuclear activities.

A strong and reliable nonproliferation regime makes it possible for NPT Parties to continue to realize the promise of the Treaty’s Article IV – international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy – not only to generate power, but to contribute to the welfare of our people in such diverse areas as human health, water resources, agriculture, and food security.  The United States takes great pride in being the largest single contributor to these important programs.  And we have built on our traditional support by pledging an additional $50 million to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative, which seeks to expand support for peaceful uses programs by $100 million before the next Review Conference.

Some of the many side events scheduled for the PrepCom will allow us to take advantage of our presence here in Vienna to share valuable information on the Agency’s diverse programs, including safeguards and cooperation on peaceful nuclear applications.  Such increased awareness among Parties can help reenergize our governments, their Vienna missions, and the IAEA itself in our collective efforts to implement many of the actions contained in the 2010 Final Document.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, let me close by reading a quote from President Obama’s message to the third Preparatory Committee meeting in 2009 that set the tone for our work at the 2010 Review Conference.  He said,

“I recognize that differences are inevitable and that NPT Parties will not always view each element of the treaty in the same way.  But we must define ourselves not by our differences, but by our readiness to pursue dialogue and hard work to ensure the NPT continues to make an enduring contribution to international peace and security.” 

The United States recognizes there is no easy way forward.  The agenda we have endorsed will require hard work – political will is essential, but may not be enough.  The United States remains committed to pursuing dialogue and to working hard to find common ground so that all of us will be able to count on a strong NPT as we continue our journey toward a world without nuclear weapons.

On the occasion of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon), the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their unconditional  support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  We are pleased to provide this information on P-5 activities since the 2010 NPT RevCon to the Preparatory Committee, in addition to any national contributions.

We welcome the adoption by the NPT RevCon in May 2010 of a balanced Final Document across all three pillars of the Treaty – nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  The success of the 2010 RevCon and inclusion in the Final Document of a consensus Action Plan demonstrates the international community’s shared commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT; in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security; based on the principle of undiminished security for all; and underlining the vital importance of nonproliferation for achieving this goal.

We reaffirm our commitment to the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT RevCon, our determination to meet our commitments, and to work with all States Party to the NPT to strengthen the Treaty during the years leading up to the 2015 RevCon.  Doing so will help ensure that it can continue to protect global peace and security from the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and effectively address the current and pressing challenges that we face.  Every State can and should contribute to this goal, through concerted efforts to prevent proliferation challenges and the threat of nuclear terrorism, and to achieve general and complete disarmament.  We stress the importance that all States Party fully implement and comply with the Treaty and call upon all States Party to implement the provisions of the Action Plan in all its aspects.

As nuclear-weapon States, we reaffirm our enduring commitment to the fulfillment of our obligations under Article VI of the NPT. We are pleased to recall that we met in Paris from 30 June – 1 July, 2011, for our first follow-up meeting to the 2010 NPT RevCon, with a view to considering progress on the commitments we made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the September 2009 London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament.  We met with the determination to work together in pursuit of our shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI, including engagement on the steps outlined in the 2010 RevCon’s Action 5, as well as other efforts called for in the Action Plan.

We continued our previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form.  We recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and we will continue our discussions within the P5 with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with our commitments under Action 5 of the 2010 RevCon final document.  We decided to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and, to that end, we are pleased to announce that we have established a dedicated working group, to be led by China.  In this regard, enhancing our understanding of each other’s thinking about nuclear weapons is an important building block for strengthened and continuing P-5 engagement toward nuclear disarmament.  Having shared information on our respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, we followed this up with an expert-level meeting in London on 4 April at which UK scientists and technical experts shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative—a research project on nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.  At the P-5 meeting P-5 experts offered comments on the Initiative.  We also stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards.  As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, we shared views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty, while recognizing the provisions of Article X.

At the Paris meeting, we also recalled our commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization.  We called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.  The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.  We call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this Treaty.  We reiterated our support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), within a balanced work programme based on the CD 1864 program of work, on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) for the purpose of banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.  We committed to renew our efforts with other relevant States toward achieving this goal.  In that context, we met again, with other relevant parties, during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and in Geneva, and will continue to provide information on our efforts.  We will follow up on our discussions and hold a third P5 Conference in Washington on June 27-29, 2012.

We recall the unprecedented progress and efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency and note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower levels than at any time in the past half-century.  Our individual contributions to systematic and progressive efforts in this respect have been and will be highlighted by each of us nationally.  All other States must contribute to fulfilling these disarmament goals by creating the necessary security environment, resolving regional tensions, promoting collective security, and making progress in all the areas of disarmament.

We support the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which entered into force on 5 February 2011 and is now being implemented.  When it is fully implemented, the Treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia since the 1950s.  We believe it to be a significant step in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, and by promoting mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation can help build a stronger basis for addressing the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  We also welcome the announcement by the United Kingdom in 2010 of reductions in the numbers of warheads and missiles on board its nuclear deterrent submarines, and a reduction in its overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180, a process which began in 2011 and is due to be completed by the mid 2020s.  We also welcome the recent achievement by France of the objectives announced in 2008, resulting in the reduction by one-third of the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft of the airborne component and leading to an arsenal totalling today fewer than 300 nuclear weapons.  We also welcome China’s reaffirmation to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security, and of its policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, as well as its unequivocal commitment that China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

We emphasize the importance of the prohibition of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in realizing the objective of Article VI of the NPT and urge all countries which have yet to do so to sign, ratify and bring into force the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).  We are pleased with the outcome of the BTWC Review Conference, which was able to set out the program of work for the next five years in areas we see as high priorities – strengthening national implementation measures, identifying and responding to developments in science and technology and international cooperation and assistance.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines the security of all nations.  It sets back the cause of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and imperils the prospects for strengthening international cooperation in nuclear energy, including the role we wish to see such cooperation play in combating climate change and ensuring sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy.  We reaffirm that all States Party must ensure strict compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT and work actively to ensure that others comply with their nonproliferation obligations.   We remain deeply concerned by the challenge that non-compliance by Treaty Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT regime.

We welcome the constructive and useful discussions between the E3+3 and Iran in Istanbul April 14.  As reflected in the E3+3 statement issued there, we seek a sustained process of serious dialogue, where Iran and the E3+3 can take urgent practical steps to build confidence and lead to compliance by Iran with all its international obligations.  We will be guided in these efforts by the step-by-step approach and the principle of reciprocity.  The NPT forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement on Iran’s nuclear program, to ensure all the obligations under the Treaty are met by Iran, while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.  We expect that subsequent meetings of the E3+3 and Iran will lead to concrete steps toward a comprehensive negotiated solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

We remain concerned by Iran’s persistent failure to comply with its obligations under UNSC resolutions and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions.  We stress the need and urgency for Iran to reach an agreement with the IAEA on a structured approach, including on access to relevant sites and information and based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those relating to possible military dimensions, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18, 2011.

We also remain concerned about the DPRK’s nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment program.  We strongly urge the DPRK to fulfill its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, and to fully comply with all its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, including abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and immediately ceasing all related activities.  We note with serious concern the 13 April launch by the DPRK and call on the DPRK to refrain from further actions which may cause grave security concerns in the region, including any nuclear tests. We reaffirm our firm support for the resumption of the Six Party Talks at an appropriate time.

We underline the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  As agreed in the 2010 Action Plan, we call on all States that have not yet done so to bring into force IAEA Additional Protocols as soon as possible.  As also agreed in the Action Plan, we call for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements in States Party in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, and encourage all States Party with pre-2005 small quantities protocols that have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.  We welcome the fact that 138 States have signed an Additional Protocol and that 115 States have an Additional Protocol in force.  We note the IAEA’s view that the Protocol is of vital importance for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurance, not only that declared nuclear material is not being diverted from peaceful uses, but also that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State.  We believe that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol should become the universally recognized standard for NPT verification, and stand ready to offer the necessary support to States wishing to bring a Protocol into force.

We remain committed to ensuring that the IAEA has sufficient technical, human, and financial resources, as well as authority to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities, including verifying non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and ensuring that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or nuclear activities.  Where non-compliance is established by the IAEA Board of Governors, the case should, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, be brought to the immediate attention of the UN Security Council to determine whether it constitutes a threat to international peace and security.  We emphasize the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats.

We reaffirm our support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee and note the important role of these two international export control mechanisms in securing the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  In this context we welcome the NSG action to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies.  We urge all States to take appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

We note the importance attached by non-nuclear weapon States to security assurances and their role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.  In 1995, we issued separate statements on security assurances as noted in Security Council resolution 984 (1995).  Some of us have subsequently issued statements about their assurances.  We note that protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties offer a means for codifying negative security assurances in a legal framework. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament in the context of an agreed Program of Work.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones that are established in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty and the Guidelines from the UN Disarmament Commission’s 1999 Session and are fully complied with have made and continue to make an important contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, and to achieving nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.  We are pleased to report on the substantive progress made in the process of moving towards signature of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).  We will continue to work with the States Party to SEANWFZ further in this direction, in particular, on the earliest possible signing of the Protocol to the Treaty by the Nuclear Weapon States.  We confirm our commitment to continue working with the States Party to the treaty establishing the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone towards resolving all the outstanding issues in relation to the Treaty and its corresponding Protocol.  

We are committed to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and we support all ongoing efforts to this end.  We welcome the steps taken by the three NPT Depositary States (the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and the UN Secretary General toward convening a Conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.  We welcome the announcement on October 14, 2011, by the Spokesman for the UN Secretary General on behalf of Ban Ki-moon and the three NPT Depositary States about the appointment of Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, as facilitator and the designation of Finland as the host government for this Conference.  We note the IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East held in Vienna on November 21-22, 2011, and the joint intervention made by the representatives of the NPT Depositary States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America at the Forum.  We express hope for a successful Conference to be attended by all the States of the Middle East.

We emphasize that the threat of the acquisition of nuclear weapons or related materials and technical expertise by non-state actors would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security.  We reaffirm the importance of full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.  We renew our commitment made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.   We urge States to accelerate their domestic approval of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, so that this Amendment can be quickly brought into force.  We also encourage all States Party to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

We recognize the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT reflected in Article IV to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.  We underline the particular importance of international cooperation, both through the IAEA and bilaterally, for States Party new to nuclear technology.  We are ready to work actively with States Party wishing to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses consistent with their NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.

We welcome the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurance of fuel supply and related measures, as effective means for facilitating nuclear cooperation in accordance with Article IV of the NPT and addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services, preserving the competitive open market, responding to the real needs of customers, and strengthening non-proliferation.  We welcome the IAEA Board of Governors’ decisions on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle to assure IAEA Members of an adequate nuclear fuel supply, which include the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) at Angarsk, which is now operational; the decision to establish a low-enriched uranium bank under the control of the IAEA at a location to be determined; and support for a nuclear fuel assurance mechanism that provides the option of an additional political assurance to complement commercial contracts.   We also welcome the Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU) reserve and the American Assured Fuel Supply, which is comprised of downblended uranium from weapons programs to establish a backup source of LEU, both of which are also operational.  We reaffirm our readiness to work with the IAEA and with other countries to explore and pursue approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that will facilitate access to the benefits of nuclear energy and serve all countries’ interests in preventing proliferation to state or non-state actors.

We regard the events at Fukushima, Japan, as a sobering reminder of the need for strong international cooperation on nuclear safety and reaffirm our commitment to work closely with one another for implementation in due course of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted at the Agency’s 55th General Conference and to promote the highest standards and best practices.  We recognize that we all benefit greatly from a rigorous peer review process conducted on a regular basis and that the international nuclear safety regime offers many opportunities for collaboration.

Regarding the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the cornerstone of the international safety regime, we welcome the extraordinary meeting of Contracting Parties to take place in August 2012, and we support a review that could result in measures to strengthen and improve the Convention.    We call on all countries with nuclear activities to adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety without further delay, so that they may benefit from the full extent of dialogue and resources available to Contracting Parties.  Regarding the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, we welcome the meeting of Competent Authorities that took place in April 2012.   We support a review that could lead to measures to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of this instrument.  Regarding the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, we support a review of measures that could lead to strengthening and improve the effectiveness of the Convention.  These measures could include updated implementation and reporting guidance so that the efficiency and substance of notifications made pursuant to the Convention will be further improved in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Action Plan.  We also call on the IAEA to consider further review of the relevant IAEA safety standards in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Action Plan to identify issues that may warrant examination and revision in light of the Fukushima accident.

We note that the importance of international nuclear safety and security cooperation extends beyond nuclear power to all non-power applications, many of which are the purpose of projects being funded under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme with the objective of improving the health and livelihood of millions of people using nuclear technology.

We call for the development of nuclear energy in a culture of openness and transparency, one which builds confidence among neighbors and stresses the importance of promoting the sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that ensures effective safety, security, non-proliferation conditions, and arrangements for civil nuclear liability for the benefit of all.

We note the potential for nuclear energy to facilitate achievement of thMillennium Development Goals and sustainable development, in addressing climate change, in providing energy security, and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture, water resource management, and industry.  We stress our long-standing support for the IAEA’s critical role in expanding access to these nuclear applications, together contributing more than $35 million towards the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund in 2011, plus further extra-budgetary contributions, including through the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other programs.

States Party have the right to withdraw from the NPT under Article X.  We call for the United Nations Security Council to address without delay any State Party’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty, including the events described in the required notice pursuant to Article X.  A State Party remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal.  We welcomed discussion of this issue at the 2010 RevCon and call for further discussion of modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards during NPT membership.

As we enter the review cycle leading to the 2015 Review Conference, we reaffirm our commitment to the goal of seeking a safer world for all and creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT.  We call on all States Party to work towards that goal by taking concrete measures to implement the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, which is based on a balance across the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.

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U.S. Department of State
Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller
Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences Annual Meeting

Washington, DC
April 29, 2012

Science, Scientists, and International Security

Thank you so much for having me today. I am so pleased to be here at your grand reopening. The building looks beautiful and I am so glad to have you so close by again. As you have heard, I am now the Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, as well as the Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. I think I win the prize for the longest title in Washington.

While wearing my various hats, I spend a lot of time thinking about the application of science and technology to arms control and international security. As we watch the successful implementation of the New START Treaty, we are now thinking about the next steps.

Negotiators worked hard to find innovative new mechanisms to aid in the verification of the New START Treaty and the results of that work are already evident. Our experience so far is demonstrating that the New START Treaty’s verification regime works, and will help to push the door open to new types of inspections. Such inspections will be crucial to any future nuclear reduction plans.

And there is no doubt that we are facing new challenges, such as monitoring smaller and smaller units of account, e.g. warheads, or items that are inherently dual use in chemistry or biology.

Nowadays, we verify that countries are fulfilling their arms control treaty obligations through a combination of information exchange, notifications of weapon status, on-site inspections, and National Technical Means (NTM). When these elements work together we have an effective verification regime.

Ambassador Paul Nitze’s definition for effective verification, devised several decades ago, still stands – “if the other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily significant way, we would be able to detect such violations in time to respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation.”

That definition continues to be the benchmark for verifying compliance; but the world is changing, as is the nature of what we need to monitor and verify.

For example, if we are looking for ways to design a verifiable treaty that regulates the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, we come across a problem we have not dealt with before: tactical weapons are small, easy to hide, and hard for an inspector to inventory; what is worse, we don’t all have the same definition of a non-strategic weapon.

If we move beyond looking at non-strategic nuclear weapons to examine overall reductions to our nuclear forces, we need to take a long, hard look at the entire nuclear enterprise, from production to deployment and storage, and finally to dismantlement, and identify greater opportunities to create novel monitoring regimes that bring us closer to the goal of that President Obama has set of a world without nuclear weapons.

We need to find new signatures that are measurable and help us to verify treaty obligations, while not divulging sensitive information that may compromise mutual security and deterrence. After all, we will be accepting such obligations for our nuclear weapons, too. In a treaty setting, all obligations will be totally reciprocal.

As we move forward towards an approach to nuclear monitoring that looks at the entire cradle to grave lifecycle of warheads, the dichotomy between controls on fissile materials and strategic arms control disappears. Previously, one set of experts might consider strategic nuclear missiles, another might analyze only naval nuclear reactors, and a third group might analyze fissile material. Eventually, we will need to merge the thinking in all of these diverse areas.

We also need to look at ways to expand the applications of existing agreements. For example, we are exploring opportunities to capitalize on the success of the Open Skies Treaty verification regime. For those of you unfamiliar with the Treaty, it establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its signatories. Open Skies is one of the most wide-ranging international arms control efforts to promote openness and transparency in military forces and activities.

New ideas for the Open Skies Treaty involve both the possibility of applying the current regime to a wider array of treaty concerns, and the design of possible new cooperative aerial reconnaissance regimes that might be included to support verification of future agreements. We are also looking at possible novel applications for the Open Skies infrastructure. One example would be in the area of disaster relief.

Further, while we spend a lot of time focusing on nuclear weapons, the other weapons of mass destruction—particularly biological weapons—pose even greater challenges for arms control policy, because they are inherently dual use assets and, thus, difficult to disentangle from normal industrial or commercial processes.

Here, too, we need creative thinking about how to facilitate transparency in the biotech sector without compromising sensitive or proprietary information. Another problem with biotech transparency is that findings are potentially easy to misinterpret. There are legitimate reasons to study many pathogens, as we will discuss further on this panel. The risk of opening the US biotech industry to false accusations is a real concern, as is the inherent difficulty of unambiguous detection of foreign offensive BW activity. We need to be creative in our thinking here, as so far we have concluded simply that meaningful monitoring of biological activities that can clearly distinguish peaceful uses from weapons is not possible. We hope that some clever team will prove us wrong.

There are similar concerns about chemical weapons in the wake of advances in science and technology and the chemical industry. A modern chemical weapons production facility may look exactly like a typical civilian chemical production facility. A country could use the same facilities for both legitimate and weapon purposes with a relatively simple “swap out” of piping and equipment. Unless you happen to detect the effluent while they are processing a chemical weapon batch, it is possible you would not know what is being produced.

To help meet all these new challenges, a question that I’ve been asking myself, my staff and experts around the world is: what are some new tools and technologies that we could incorporate into arms control verification and monitoring for all weapons of mass destruction? I am particularly interested in how we can use the astonishing advancements in information technologies over the past decades, and how they can aid in the verification of arms control treaties and agreements.

Right now we are in the brainstorming stage, and I have been particularly keen to speak to young people about these challenges. But I have also been eager to speak to the broad scientific community, bringing these ideas to our national laboratories and last year, before the JASONs. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to speak to the NAS. It is people like you who will help us turn these ideas into policy.

Our new reality is a smaller, increasingly-networked world where the average citizen connects to other citizens in cyberspace hundreds of times each day. They exchange and share ideas on a wide variety of topics, why not put this vast problem solving entity to good use?

New concepts, I recognize, are not invented overnight, and we don’t understand the full range of possibilities inherent in the information age. Today, any event, anywhere on the planet, has the potential to be broadcast globally in mere seconds. The implications for arms control and verification are interesting. It is harder to hide things nowadays. When it is harder to hide things, it is easier to be caught. The neighborhood gaze is a powerful tool.

Open source information technologies improve arms control verification in at least two ways: either as a way of generating new information, or as analysis of information that already is out there.

The DARPA Red Balloon Challenge is an example of the first. It demonstrated the enormous potential of social networking and also demonstrated how incentives can motivate large populations to work toward a common goal. Applying such ideas to arms control, a country could, for example, establish its bona fides in a deep nuclear reduction environment by opening itself to a verification challenge.

A technique like this — I call it a “public verification challenge” — might be especially valuable as we move to lower and lower numbers of nuclear weapons. Governments, in that case, will have an interest in proving that they are meeting their reduction obligations, and may want to engage their publics in helping them to make the case. It will then be incumbent on all of us to ensure that they cannot spoof or manipulate the verification challenges that they devise.

This kind of public verification challenge would augment standard international safeguards or verification of a country’s nuclear declaration. We have to bear in mind that there could be significant limitations based on the freedoms available to the citizens of any given country — an issue to tackle in thinking through this problem.

The Information Age is also creating a greater talent pool of individuals. Garage tinkerers, skunk works scientists, technologists and gadget entrepreneurs can reach a broader, diverse market for their products and services. These private citizens can develop web-based applications for any touch pad communication device. This “crowd sourcing” lets everyday people solve problems by getting innovative ideas out of their heads and onto the shelves.

The DOD, through DARPA, is now using crowd source competitions for the development of drones. We believe that this is also an approach that could work for arms control and nonproliferation verification, both technologies and concepts.

Open source technology could be useful in the hands of inspectors. Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding in the verification and monitoring process. For example, by having all safeguards and verification sensors in an inspected facility wirelessly connected to an inspector’s iPad, he or she could note anomalies and flag specific items for closer inspections, as well as compare readings in real time and interpret them in context. Some of this is already happening on an ad hoc basis.

My Bureau intends to pursue such ideas through competitions, posing challenge questions with arms control applications to the information community.

Through our Key Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) Program, we are seeking ambitious, innovative research proposals to address requirements outlined in an unclassified Verification Technology Research and Development Needs Document. This is the first time that our “Needs Document”, as we call it, has been available in unclassified form. We are inviting researchers and project managers to submit white papers with ideas for sustaining, researching, developing, or acquiring technologies relating to the verification of chemical, biological, nuclear and missiles arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments.

This is not just a paper exercise. Congress created the V Fund so that we could provide “seed money” to encourage the development of new technologies, or to adapt existing projects to the needs of arms control verification. We intend to use the resource well.

You can find more information by going to www.state.gov/t/avc/vtt. We look forward to seeing your ideas.

In the end, the goal of using emerging technologies and social networks should be to augment our existing arms control verification capabilities, and we will need your help to think about how it can be done. For example, could the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System’s ability to monitor for nuclear tests be supplemented by social networks? Could new information technologies help us to monitor for the cheating scenarios that concern us – like the ones involving very small nuclear explosions? This is a timely consideration. Your organization just published a comprehensive study on the verifiability of the CTBT, and we at State thank everyone who was involved in the hard work of producing that study, including Micah Lowenthal, Ben Rusek and two of my esteemed fellow panelists – Raymond Jeanloz and Dick Garwin.

Going forward, it is only with the ideas from inside and outside the government that we will find better tools to mine, fuse and analyze both classified and unclassified data, in order to compensate for situations where on-site inspection and/or national technical means are unavailable or need to be supplemented.

These are exciting challenges and I look forward to working with you to tackle them.

Thank you.