Media Note

Washington, DC

February 7, 2012

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Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 1 On Procedures for Conducting Demonstrations of Recording Media and/or Telemetric Information Playback Equipment

February 7, 2012

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Taking into consideration that the Parties have conducted the initial demonstrations, required by the Treaty, of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties shall conduct subsequent demonstrations, in accordance with the Treaty, of recording media and/or telemetric information playback equipment using the following procedures:

1. During the demonstration the providing Party shall:

(a) describe its telemetric signal conversion processes (from reception to recording) associated with the recording medium and telemetric information playback equipment to be demonstrated, or provide data on telemetry systems that enable the conversion of telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast;

(b) demonstrate each type of recording medium to be provided to the receiving Party in accordance with subparagraph 6(a) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Telemetric Information. Each such recording medium that is being demonstrated shall contain a recording of the following examples of telemetric information:

(i) actual telemetric information that was broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM; or

(ii) information with characteristic features of telemetric information that is broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM.

In this connection, the recording contained on the recording medium that is being demonstrated must be suitable for demonstrating the playback of the telemetric information on the appropriate telemetric information playback equipment;

(c) describe each type of recording medium that is being demonstrated, as well as describe the recording methods and formats that are used for each type of recording medium;

(d) demonstrate all the telemetric information playback equipment in a manner that allows the receiving Party to observe a display or indicator that demonstrates that the telemetric information playback equipment is operating properly. Such telemetric information playback equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of recording media that are being demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph;

(e) answer questions of the receiving Party pertaining to its ability to play back telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media;

(f) for the examples of telemetric information recorded on the recording media that are being demonstrated, provide corresponding illustrative examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media that meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information, and corresponding illustrative examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information that meet the requirements of paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information.

2. Upon completion of the demonstration, the providing Party shall provide to the receiving Party all the demonstrated recording media with the examples of telemetric information recorded on them, examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media and examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information on the recording media, as well as other information that is additionally provided in order to achieve the objectives of the demonstration.

3. The Demonstration must be sufficient for the receiving Party to be able to get an idea of the full set of telemetric information playback equipment, as well as the technical requirements necessary for playing back the examples of telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media.

4. During the demonstration the procedures for playing back telemetric information shall be demonstrated. The providing Party shall provide a description of those types of modulation, methods, modes, and recording formats, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information contained on recording media that allow the receiving Party to convert the telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast.

5. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2-6 of Part Six of the Annex on Telemetric Information, which are applicable to the trainee team members, shall also apply to representatives of the receiving Party participating in demonstrations.

7. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 2 On the Amount of Telemetric Information on ICBM and SLBM Launches That Each Party Shall Provide

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

1. For each launch of an ICBM or SLBM for which telemetric information is provided in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, the Party conducting the launch shall provide telemetric information to the other Party beginning from the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the ICBM or SLBM, until:

(a) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or;

(b) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or

(c) the expiration of one second after loss of active control of the missile’s control system (when the active stage of the missile does not respond to control signals), if such loss occurred prior to separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM, or until the moment of loss of the telemetric signal coincident with such loss of active control, whichever occurred earlier.

2. Each Party shall provide, in the interpretive data for the telemetric information, names of data elements and their location in the telemetry frame, as well as descriptions necessary to identify the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Media Note

Washington, DC
November 2, 2011

QUESTION: The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) highlighted that the greatest nuclear threat is not a large-scale nuclear exchange, but the danger that terrorists could acquire nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon. What are the tangible plans here, both for the United States and internationally?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: President Obama focused on this problem by organizing an international conference that took place in Washington in May of 2010, the Nuclear Security Conference. He gained high-level commitments from leaders around the world to put fissile material that could be used for weapons purposes under better lock and key over the next four years. This effort has been extraordinarily successful, in my view. Some of the fissile material caches around the world – since the time I was at the Department of Energy in the 1990s – we had been having trouble getting governments to move on them. The results have been good. The previous administration started on a lot of good initiatives on counterterrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and those are continuing. Indeed, some of them have their roots back in the Clinton administration with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. All in all, this administration has bolstered existing activities but also set in train new activities to enhance physical protection and control, to try to get at the roots of the nuclear terrorism threat.

QUESTION: Fukushima, of course, has raised a lot of concerns about safety at nuclear plants around the world – but also security at those plants. In proliferation terms, should countries eliminate all reprocessing?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: This is an interesting question and it has many technical aspects to it. To be honest, I’m not a technical expert so I don’t want to grapple with it. All I can say is the United States continues to place an emphasis on not reprocessing fissile materials or spent fuel for the production of plutonium.

QUESTION: If Iran satisfies all the outstanding requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany), should it be allowed to enrich for civil purposes only?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We continue to believe, as we have stated before, that Iran has a right to a peaceful nuclear power program, but only when it is in full and transparent compliance with its international nuclear obligations.

QUESTION: Speaking of Iran, is laser enrichment likely to make the complex footprint of an enrichment facility easier to hide in the future?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: This is a highly technical matter and it’s again not in my bailiwick. I do remember wrestling with this issue – we’ve been wrestling with it for many years. This was one of the core issues that we had with the Russian Federation back in the 1990s, with our concern about provision of laser isotope technologies to Iran. That was a goodnews story in that the Russian Federation, at that time, stepped back from those technology programs with Iran and has since turned into a very good partner with us, trying to work on the Iran nuclear program and its accompanying issues for the international community. So it’s been a longstanding problem out there. The United States has been concerned about it for many, many years.

QUESTION: Why is the fuel bank idea proceeding at such a glacial pace?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I actually think it’s a great idea, and I have been impressed because the fuel bank idea broke into new territory. It is a very sound public – private partnership. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has been the creator of this effort, and establishing that kind of partnership involving a major nongovernmental organization, an international organization like the IAEA, and then interested governments, such as the U.S. government – this is a remarkable innovation. I think that they’ve been doing very well in terms of moving the fuel bank along, and it doesn’t surprise me that it’s taking a while to work out the relationship among these very different actors. But I really take my hat off to all those involved, starting with NTI, for launching this significant innovation. I think it will bear fruit; it’s just going to take time to work through the details.

QUESTION: In December 2010, the Senate passed New START. Where are we now, nearly one year later? In Moscow and Washington, what does treaty implementation look like behind the scenes?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The implementation is going great, not to put too fine a point on it. The first comprehensive exchange of the database took place within two months of entry into force of the treaty. What I always like to say about the New START treaty database is that it is a living document: We have six-month comprehensive updates, but practically every single day there are notifications passed between Washington and Moscow to update the exact real-time status of weapons in our forces. So if an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] moves from operational deployment to a maintenance facility, that is notified on a given day; if a bomber moves again for maintenance purposes or exercise purposes – that’s notified. There are regular notifications occurring every day, and well over 1,500 notifications have been exchanged now under the treaty. We are keeping pace with each other on inspections; we’re up to 12 inspections each at this point. Under the New START treaty, we are each allowed 18 inspections a year so we’re coming up to about the half-way point for the year.

QUESTION: And what about the concerns expressed leading up to ratification?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: There were some major issues that were raised during the ratification debate about the treaty and whether it would answer questions or solve issues. Actually, it is providing us with some really sound information on what’s going on inside the Russian nuclear forces. And the Russians can say the same: They are learning what’s going on in the U.S.

QUESTION: What have been the most enlightening answers so far?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Under the terms of the treaty, the Russians exhibited to us their new RS-24 mobile missile, so we have gotten a good opportunity to see it with boots on the ground.

QUESTION: Where are the United States and Russia on tactical nuclear weapons talks right now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The president made it clear the day he signed the treaty on April 8, 2010, that we would be ready to turn next to further reductions in strategic and non-strategic (or tactical) nuclear weapons, as well as deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Those two categories -non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapons – are categories we’ve never tried to wrestle with in arms reduction negotiations, so there is considerable homework that has to be done. First, with our NATO allies: The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review will prepare a NATO-wide position on a number of issues, but one of them has to do with non-strategic nuclear weapons and the Alliance position with regard to them. And second, in Washington: Pursuant to the Nuclear Posture Review, we are pursuing further analysis on what reductions we can take. All that, however, has not prevented us from saying to the Russians, we need to start talking now about preparations for the next negotiations. What kinds of concepts are we going to need to wrestle with this time? They identify non-strategic nuclear weapons differently than we do, so there are some definitional and terminology issues we have to talk to them about. There are also issues with regard to transparency. We’re saying: Why wait for the next negotiation? There should be transparency activities we can agree upon between Moscow and Washington, so there’s a real push to try to get the Russians to start talking and having a serious discussion on some conceptual, technical, and definitional issues. We hope that we’ll be able to get down to that soon, but it’s a very active homework period right now.

QUESTION: Leading up to New START, a number of policy makers found it vital to retain no fewer than around 1,500 strategic weapons. But arms reduction is not necessarily the same as de-legitimization. With this in mind, how can newer nuclear weapons countries be persuaded that they should discard their own stocks?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The United States gives substance to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments by leading by example, which should in turn lend credence to our efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and to isolate and pressure countries like Iran and North Korea who are not complying with their NPT obligations. A prime example is the New START treaty, which will result in a 30 percent reduction in deployed nuclear weapons over the previous treaty ceiling. Also, President Obama has clearly stated his intent to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. Since then, the United States revised its long-standing negative security assurance by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are a party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT. We are also working very hard to promote commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Conclusion of such a treaty would certainly be an important, concrete step in limiting production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes, and thus a further step toward the president’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: And what about the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty? In the past, the United States has stated a preference to negotiate the treaty within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). As you are well aware, the CD remains blocked. Is the CD even a viable option for the treaty anymore?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The United States would prefer – would highly prefer – for the Conference on Disarmament to be the venue for negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty because the CD has been such a successful institution in the past; a number of treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the CTBT, have been negotiated in the CD or in its predecessor organization, so we see it as the best international venue to negotiate a treaty. But as Secretary Clinton said last February, “Patience can’t last forever,” and it is pretty clear that patience is definitely wearing thin. The P5 is resolved to wrestle this problem to the ground, I’ll put it that way. The P5 has definitely started to gather among ourselves some solid coordination, to try to break the back of this problem. Our priority is to get this thing going in the CD, and we’re just going to have to work it.

QUESTION: What are the possible reforms, if any?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Well, we don’t think it’s necessary to tinker with the machinery of the CD. There are always changes you can make, but the key, in my view, is not a machinery issue or a structure-of the- CD issue. The particular rules of procedure, like the consensus rule, for example, are to everyone’s advantage. You have the opportunity as a country to ensure national security interests are firmly supported by having a consensus rule in place, so we don’t see tinkering with the machinery as the way to go. We really want to get to the substance and to be able to make the case to concerned countries that this negotiation can and will be in their national security interest.

QUESTION: This year marked the 20th anniversary of the closure of the Soviet Semipalatinsk nuclear site in Kazakhstan, where 456 out of 715 nuclear tests were carried out during the Cold War. What can we learn from this anniversary?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: When the Soviet Union dissolved, the Republic of Kazakhstan declared itself a non-nuclear weapons state under the Non- Proliferation Treaty and closed the Semipalatinsk Test Site. Since then Kazakhstan has been a strong voice on behalf of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, while engaging in efforts to mitigate the effects of past Soviet testing practices for their people and territory. As important as this anniversary is, it reminds us that the way to finally preclude nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions is through universal signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its entry into force.

QUESTION: The site has served as a realtime training ground for inspectors. Are there more projects and drills planned there?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Indeed, Kazakhstan has offered on several occasions the use of sections of the former Semipalatinsk Test Site for the purpose of conducting training for on-site inspection surrogate inspectors and for testing of equipment that might be used during the conduct of an on-site inspection once the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force. The most recent major exercise of this type was the 2008 integrated field exercise. Such training and testing exercises are carried out by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization in coordination with the host country.

QUESTION: In 1999, the US Senate had little confidence in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, questioning whether the treaty could be verified. That feeling has changed in the past decade with the implementation of the International Monitoring System – which isn’t fully complete, but mostly. Is there a chance now that the CTBT could be sent to the Senate?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The president has made it clear that he has as a high priority the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; he has also said that he’s not going to place any deadlines on exactly when it will go before the Senate. It has been 12 years since the vote about ratification of the CTBT went down in flames, so the Senate really has to look at this whole issue again. As George Shultz has said, those senators who voted against the treaty in 1999 need to have the information available to them so that they can make the decision to vote for the treaty now they need to know that it’s right to vote for the treaty. I’m paraphrasing Secretary Shultz’s words, but that’s the gist of it, and that’s the effort we have underway now. Not only is the International Monitoring System (IMS) more than 85 percent deployed at this point and that’s a big change since 1999, when the IMS construction hadn’t even started – it’s already paying dividends for natural disasters like Fukushima; both the seismic and radiological information is really responsive. So I think the IMS system is proving its worth already. But, in addition, the U.S. has its own verification capabilities that have been developed over the past 12 years, so all of that information needs to get before the senators. They need to have a chance to absorb it, ask questions, discuss, and debate it.

QUESTION: And the stockpile stewardship program?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: That’s the other major issue, of course. In 1999, again, I was working in the Department of Energy. In those days we had only a couple years’ experience with science based stockpile stewardship and now we have a decade-plus experience. I know our national labs, like Livermore, Sandia, and Los Alamos, feel very positive about the productivity of the science-based stockpile stewardship program, what it does for science at the labs, and what it does for understanding the safety and effectiveness of US weapons systems. The president said, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, US weapons must be safe, secure, and effective,” so we have a good story to tell with regard to science-based stockpile stewardship and we think the labs will join us in telling that story.

QUESTION: After New START, will the CTBT be an easier sell or a more challenging one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I think they are both challenging. New START was challenging and I think the CTBT is going to be challenging. It’s going to be a serious debate, there’s no question about it, but the good thing about the New START debate is that it really brought people up to date on these issues. It had been a long time since any senator or staff members had had to grapple with nuclear security and nuclear policy issues. In some cases, there was a new generation of staff members coming in who had never had to work on a treaty before, so it was really an opportunity for all of us to absorb the substance and really think through some of these issues. I think that’s going to serve us very well when we get down to the debate and discussion over the CTBT. There’s already a base of knowledge among the senators and their staffs.

QUESTION: In 1985, Donnie Radcliffe interviewed White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, who said that women are not “going to understand throwweights.” In 2011, you and your female colleagues – of whom there are several – hold nuclear policy in your hands. How has this gender shift influenced arms control?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It hasn’t.

QUESTION: You are known in the nuclear community for your unbeatable and unshakable skills as a negotiator. One Russian editor wrote that it would “be difficult, almost impossible to outplay her.” You clearly are the master of your craft. But have there been negotiations in which you just couldn’t get the handle that you wanted?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: No.

QUESTION: Your colleagues describe you as someone who doesn’t take credit for her work. Humility in DC? What is this all about?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: You can get a lot done in this town if you don’t care who gets the credit – somebody said that once – was it President Truman? No, he was the one who said if you want a friend in this town, get a dog. Now I don’t have a dog, but I do agree you can get a lot done in this town if you don’t care who gets the credit.

QUESTION: Knowing what you know, what keeps you awake at night?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I’ll circle back to the question you asked at the outset – it has to do with terrorism involving fissile materials and weapons of mass destruction overall. I really do agree with the theme that was laid down so clearly in the Nuclear Posture Review that the greatest threats today in this realm do not have to do with a massive strike from the Russian Federation. It’s just not the Cold War anymore. We have to deal with the hangover from the Cold War, the thousands of nuclear weapons that are still out there in deployed or non-deployed status. The president is quite intent on continuing a step-by-step approach in that regard. The Russians, too, signed up for it. And we have started to work with the P5, so it’s not just the Russian Federation and the United States – but it’s a P5 activity that we’ve begun to talk about verification and transparency and reporting. All of this is something that’s pursuant to the NPT Review Conference of May 2010 and the action plan that came out of it. What really causes me nightmares is what the NPR pointed to as the biggest threat, which is terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. So that’s where, I think, we really have to put a lot of energy and attention in years to come.

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Rose Gottemoeller says New START has allowed the U.S. and Russia to cooperate on nuclear security "in a much more easy and straightforward way."

By MacKenzie C. Babb
IIP Staff Writer
Washington,
26 October 2011 

The New START arms-reduction treaty, an agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce each nation’s nuclear arsenals to their lowest levels in more than a half century, has been “a great success” since its February implementation, according to a senior U.S. diplomat.

“It really does provide both of us, both Russia and the United States, a good day-to-day insight into the operations of our mutual strategic forces,” Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said. The deal is “great for mutual confidence and predictability.” Gottemoeller spoke about the treaty at a briefing on nuclear arms control at the Foreign Press Center in New York October 20.

Since the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) entered into force February 5, the assistant secretary said, the two sides have exchanged full data about their strategic nuclear forces. As of September 1, the United States reported 1,790 nuclear warheads while Russia reported 1,566.

The new treaty requires each country to reduce its forces during the next seven years to 1,550 nuclear warheads, down from the current limit of 2,000 warheads and 700 launchers.

In addition to trading data, the United States and Russia have conducted thorough on-site inspections of each other’s nuclear facilities, including both deployed and nondeployed weapons. Gottemoeller, who is the assistant secretary for arms control, verification and compliance, said these inspections have taken place on operational bases as well as at maintenance, repair and testing facilities and have gone “very smoothly.” She added that the checks have gotten off to a quick start, with the United States conducting 12 inspections and Russia 11 since the treaty’s implementation.

The assistant secretary also stressed the success of the treaty’s notification system.

Every time a missile moves, even in the course of routine deployments, such as going for maintenance or repair, notification is shared. Gottemoeller said there have been 1,500 notifications since the treaty’s implementation, which has helped to build mutual respect and confidence between the two countries.

The assistant secretary also highlighted the importance of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, which comprises U.S. and Russian nuclear experts who meet twice each year to discuss compliance issues and other routine questions. The commission met for the first time in April and gathered again October 19 for a two-week meeting in Geneva to work out basic treaty issues that have emerged since implementation.

Gottemoeller said the treaty speaks to “the accomplishments of the broader U.S.-Russian relationship over the last couple of years” and is a “great story in terms of our efforts to move toward elimination of nuclear weapons.”

The treaty, which replaces the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the 2002 Moscow Treaty, will remain in force 10 years after ratification. It does not block efforts to create missile defense systems.

President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed the New START agreement April 8, 2010. The treaty is a critical centerpiece in President Obama’s foreign policy program and reflects his broader world view. Obama was awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to foster arms control and nuclear nonproliferation efforts worldwide.
(end text)

Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND)
Washington, DC
September 19, 2011

(As Prepared)

Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here with so many successful, motivated, and patriotic women dedicated to making our nation safer and the world more peaceful.

I want to thank Representative Camper for the great introduction. More importantly, I want to thank her for being a strong supporter of the New START Treaty. By speaking out and advocating for the treaty, she helped deliver two very important Republican votes for the Treaty: Tennessee Senators Lamar Alexander and Bob Corker.

For treaties in the Senate you need a two-thirds vote for approval. So we had to get 67 votes and we got 71. As Senator Kerry remarked, in today’s political climate, “70 votes is yesterday’s 95.”

I also want to thank WAND for all the superb work it has done to empower women to be effective lawmakers and influential citizens. WAND has helped galvanize women on national security issues, like the New START Treaty.

President Obama is committed to a more peaceful world by seeking a world free of nuclear weapons. He cautioned that achieving that goal will take patience and persistence. But in setting the destination, President Obama also mapped out the concrete steps we can take to get there, making the journey far less daunting.

He set out four general guideposts: progress on disarmament, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, preventing nuclear terrorism, and promoting safe and secure nuclear power.

If we follow all of them, we are likely to get where we are going. If we ignore some of them, we risk getting off track.

Reducing existing arsenals bolsters efforts to prevent additional states from getting nuclear weapons. Smaller arsenals and fewer states with nuclear weapons lessen the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Transparent, safe nuclear power does as well.

In contrast, if we neglect disarmament or ensuring high standards for safe nuclear power, the risks increase of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. And if additional states get nuclear weapons, those states with nuclear weapons will be less likely to disarm.

The interrelationship of all these issues is why the Prague Agenda set out by the President is not a menu where you pick and choose, but a roadmap with concrete steps.

I’ve been asked to speak about two specific steps related to disarmament and nonproliferation: the New START Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The first is a success story in the making, while the second seems like a never-ending story. But this Administration and I are determined to see it through to a happy ending. With your support, we will.

Two years ago in Prague, President Obama said the United States—as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon—had a moral responsibility to act to reduce nuclear dangers.

We have done so.

We issued a Nuclear Posture Review that reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture. The review declared the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States and our allies and partners. The longer term goal is to create the conditions to safely make that the sole purpose of our nuclear forces.

We also answered that call for leadership by negotiating and ratifying the New START Treaty with Russia.

The United States and Russia are the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals. The New START Treaty will obligate us to reduce our deployed strategic nuclear warheads to their lowest levels since the 1950s.

Since the Treaty entered into force in February, we have been busy implementing it in a very pragmatic, professional, and positive way. The United States and Russia have exchanged data, held exhibitions, and notified each other on the status of our strategic forces. Indeed, we have exchanged more than 1,300 notifications.

And we are conducting on-site inspections. To date, the United States has conducted 10 inspections in Russia, while Russia has conducted 9 inspections in the United States. Without the New START Treaty, our inspectors would not have been able to put their boots on the ground at Russian weapons bases.

The access and information provided by the New START Treaty enhances predictability and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. The risks of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and mistrust would be significantly greater without the New START Treaty.

As we implement New START, we are preparing for further nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia and, eventually, other countries. Our overall objective with Russia is to seek future reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed.

Under the President’s direction, the U.S. Government is reviewing our nuclear requirements. The Departments of Defense and State and other agencies will consider what forces the United States needs to maintain strategic stability and deterrence. Potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures will be evaluated.

As we consider further reductions, we are making the investments to ensure the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as nuclear weapons exist. Our intention over the next 10 years is to invest $88 billion in the nation’s nuclear infrastructure.

It may seem counterintuitive, but these investments will allow greater reductions because the same infrastructure is used to eliminate warheads. And with greater confidence and capability in our infrastructure and people, we will not have to keep so many warheads in reserve.

A healthy and robust infrastructure also means we do not have to test nuclear weapons, which is something that we have not done since 1992. Despite abiding by the CTBT’s main obligation—not testing—for nearly 20 years, the CTBT remains politically controversial.

Our goal going forward is to leave the politics aside and explain to the Senate and the public why the CTBT will enhance our national security. This is something that I hope all of you can help us do.

Our case for Treaty ratification consists of three primary arguments.

One, the United States no longer needs to conduct nuclear explosive tests.

Two, a CTBT that has entered into force will obligate other states not to test and provide a disincentive for states to conduct such tests.

And three, we now have a greater ability to detect testing, a capability that will be enhanced by the CTBT, including its monitoring system and inspection provisions.

Let me take these points one by one.

From 1945 to 1992, the United States conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests – more than all other nations combined. The cumulative data gathered from these tests have provided an impressive foundation of knowledge for us to base the continuing effectiveness of our arsenal. But historical test data alone is insufficient.

Well over a decade ago, we launched an extensive and rigorous Stockpile Stewardship program that has enabled our nuclear weapons laboratories to carry out essential surveillance and warhead life extensions.

Every year for the past 15 years, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy from both Democratic and Republican Administrations, and the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories have certified that our arsenal is safe, secure, and effective. And each year they have affirmed that we do not need to conduct explosive nuclear tests.

The lab directors tell us that Stockpile Stewardship has provided a deeper understanding of our arsenal than they ever had when testing was commonplace. We know more now about our nuclear weapons than when we used explosive testing. Think about that for a moment.

Our current efforts go a step beyond explosive testing by enabling the labs to anticipate problems in advance and reduce their potential impact on our arsenal—something that nuclear testing could not do. I, for one, would not trade our successful approach based on world-class science and technology for a return to explosive testing.

Despite the narrative put forward by some, this Administration inherited an underfunded and underappreciated nuclear complex. We have worked tirelessly to fix that situation and ensure our complex has every asset needed to achieve its mission, and to do it without explosive testing.

The President has committed to programs that we believe require an investment of $88 billion in funding over the next decade. These investments will help maintain a modern nuclear arsenal, retain a modern nuclear weapons production complex, and nurture a highly trained workforce. At a time when every part of the budget is under the microscope, our pledge to pursue these programs demonstrates our commitment and should not be discounted. To those who doubt our commitment, I ask them to put their doubts aside and invest the hard work to support our budget requests in the Congress.

I do not believe that even the most vocal critics of the CTBT want to resume explosive nuclear testing. What they have chosen instead is a status quo where the United States refrains from testing without using that fact to lock in a legally binding global ban that would significantly benefit the United States.

Second, a CTBT that has entered into force will hinder other states from advancing their nuclear weapons capabilities. Were the CTBT to enter into force, states interested in pursuing or advancing a nuclear weapons program would risk either deploying weapons that might not work or incur international condemnation and sanctions for testing.

While states can build a crude first generation nuclear weapon without conducting nuclear explosive tests, they would have trouble going further with any confidence. Without explosive testing, more established nuclear weapons states seeking to deploy advanced nuclear weapon capabilities that deviated significantly from previously tested designs also would have serious doubts about reliability.

Finally, we have become very good at detecting explosive testing. If you test, there is a very high risk of getting caught. Upon the Treaty’s entry into force, the United States would use the International Monitoring System (IMS) to complement our own state of the art national technical means to verify the Treaty.

In 1999 when the Senate first considered the CTBT, not a single certified IMS station or facility existed. We understand why some senators had doubts about its future, untested capabilities. But today the IMS is nearing completion. 286 of 337 monitoring facilities have been installed. They work and provide valuable data all day, every day.

While IMS capabilities continue to grow, our national technical means remain second to none and we continue to improve them. Taken together, these verification tools would make it difficult for any state to conduct nuclear tests that escape detection.

We have a strong case for CTBT ratification. We look forward to objective voices providing their opinions on this important issue.

Soon, the National Academy of Sciences, a trusted and unbiased voice on scientific issues, will release an unclassified report examining the Treaty from a technical perspective. The report will look at how U.S. ratification would impact our ability to maintain our nuclear arsenal and our ability to detect and verify explosive nuclear tests.

Let me conclude by saying that successful U.S. ratification of the CTBT will help facilitate greater international cooperation on the other elements of the President’s Prague Agenda. It will strengthen our leverage with the international community to pressure defiant regimes like those in Iran and North Korea as they engage in illicit nuclear activities. We will have greater credibility when encouraging other states to pursue and enforce nonproliferation objectives.

In short, ratification helps us get more of what we want. We give up nothing by ratifying the CTBT. We recognize that a Senate debate over ratification will be spirited, vigorous, and likely contentious.

The debate in 1999, unfortunately, was too short and too politicized. The Treaty was brought to the floor without the benefit of extensive Committee hearings or significant input from Administration officials and outside experts.

We will not repeat those mistakes. We are committed to taking a bipartisan and fact-based approach with the Senate.

For Republicans who voted against the Treaty in 1999 and might feel bound by that vote, we have one message: Don’t be. The times have changed. Stockpile Stewardship works. We have made significant advances in our ability to detect nuclear testing.

As my good friend George Shultz likes to say, those who opposed the Treaty in 1999 can say they were right, but they would be right to vote for the Treaty today.

A nuclear test ban has been sought for more than 50 years.

President Obama has said that the elimination of nuclear weapons might not happen in his lifetime.

Progress on nuclear issues often seems agonizingly slow.

But we cannot and must not shy away from the task of adjusting our nuclear policies to 21^st century realities just because it is difficult. As President Obama said, we will get there with your persistence.

Thank you. I am happy to answer any questions.

to the Commonwealth Club, Lafayette Library and Learning Center

Lafayette, CA
July 28, 2011

As prepared

Good evening. Thanks for coming out tonight. I suppose you considered it safe because you knew I would not be asking for your vote.

I was fortunate to represent such great citizens as you for 13 years in Congress. You were so well informed on all the issues, in part because of the fantastic work of the Commonwealth Club and, of course, Dr. Duffy. All of us are safer today due to Gloria’s efforts while working at the Pentagon to secure and eliminate dangerous weapons throughout the former Soviet Union after the Cold War.

Despite Gloria’s great work and that of many others, we are still wrestling with dangerous legacies of the Cold War rivalry and adjusting our national security policies to reflect 21^st century threats. That is what I am here to speak with you about.

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The massive U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals inherited from decades of superpower confrontation are poorly suited to address the security challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Rejecting the notion that the world must glumly accept living with the fear of nuclear annihilation, President Obama two years ago in Prague declared the U.S. commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Although his words were galvanizing to many, some have criticized the President as naïve, and the goal as impossible or undesirable.

One of my predecessors likes to say that rather than a world without nuclear weapons, he would prefer a world where only one government has nuclear weapons. We tried that once and it did not last very long.

What is often overlooked about the President’s goal is that he emphasized the practical steps toward achieving the goal that would make us safer. He acknowledged that it would take patience and persistence to reach the final destination. He conceded it might not happen in his lifetime. Yet, not to try, he argued, was to surrender to fatalism and the inevitable spread and use of nuclear weapons.

Tonight, I am going to discuss how far we have come on those practical steps and where we are headed on efforts to reduce existing arsenals (disarmament) and halt the spread of nuclear weapons (nonproliferation).

Disarmament and nonproliferation are two sides of the same coin. Countries with nuclear weapons will be reluctant to disarm so long as they face the prospect that other states may acquire such weapons. Similarly, countries might pursue nuclear weapons because their neighbors or others possess them. You cannot succeed on nonproliferation without continued progress on disarmament.

And the reverse is true as well: this Administration’s success in concluding the New START Treaty has helped to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

Disarmament and arms control efforts enhance international security and promote international unity on preventing new nuclear states and nuclear terrorism.

Nonproliferation helps create the security conditions needed to make further progress on reducing the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons.

Since the President’s Prague speech, we have made significant progress on both reducing nuclear forces and strengthening the nonproliferation regime.

A core principle of the President’s approach is accountability. States do not exist in a vacuum and their actions affect and influence the decision making and strategic calculus of other states.

As the President said in Prague, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something.”

We have followed through. When North Korea announced a nuclear test, this Administration led the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 1874, imposing the toughest international sanctions to date against North Korea.

This Administration also has united the international community to pressure Iran to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions and its international obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. For instance, Russia passed up substantial profits to deny an Iranian request for an advanced air defense system.

Syria also is being held accountable. The International Atomic Energy Agency in June ratcheted up scrutiny of Syria’s nuclear activities by reporting them to the UN Security Council.

But accountability applies beyond just a few states. All countries in the world that possess nuclear technologies, material, and expertise must be responsible for ensuring that those items are safe and secure from theft or misuse. In addition, states that serve as commerce or transportation hubs must be mindful of not facilitating illicit transfers.

Indeed, vigilance is the responsibility of all countries because the consequences of a single nuclear weapon detonating anywhere in the world would have global consequences.

Seeking to cultivate a culture of greater accountability, President Obama hosted 46 countries at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. The Summit highlighted the need to work together to secure nuclear material and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and terrorism. Participants agreed to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years. To measure our progress, South Korea will host another summit next March.

In international relations, cause and effect can be hard to determine. But there is no question that our efforts to strengthen nuclear security and unify the international community on North Korea, Iran, and Syria have been aided by the Administration’s efforts to live up to its own treaty commitments and lead by actions, not just words.

One year after the President’s Prague speech, the United States issued its Nuclear Posture Review, which aims to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture. That review declares that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States and our allies and partners. The longer term goal is to create the conditions to safely make that the sole purpose of our nuclear forces.

To reinforce the security benefits to be gained by states forgoing nuclear arms, the Nuclear Posture Review declared that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. In other words, a state that abides by its commitments to forswear nuclear weapons does not need to fear the use of such weapons against it.

Another act of leadership by this Administration was negotiation and ratification of the New START Treaty with Russia. The Treaty entered into force in February following the Senate’s approval last December. When it is fully implemented, the New START Treaty will result in the lowest number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the United States and Russia since the 1950s.

Earlier this month, Secretary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov brought an agreement into force committing each country to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, which represents enough total material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

In short, the two years since the President’s Prague speech have been exceedingly productive. Nevertheless, we will not rest on our laurels. I can tell you with certainty that President Obama and Secretary Clinton will not let us do so. Despite the many pressing global challenges, the President has directed us to keep up the momentum and lay the ground work for additional progress.

With this in mind, I want to share our current and future plans to advance both nuclear weapons reductions and nonproliferation. Again, you cannot really do one without the other.

Signing and ratifying treaties generally get all the hype, but the real benefits come from implementation. This is true for the New START Treaty.

The Senate debate on the Treaty last December received significant media attention, but there has been barely a blip of coverage since, so let me update you on implementation.

The United States and Russia have exchanged data, held exhibitions, and notified each other on the status of our strategic forces. In fact, we have exchanged more than 1,000 notifications since February. We also have begun conducting on-site inspections. To date, we have conducted seven inspections inside Russia, while it has done five here.

The access and information derived from this Treaty provide important predictability and stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. Without that access and information, the risks of miscalculations, misunderstandings, and mistrust would be greater.

As we implement New START, we are preparing for further nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia. Under the President’s direction, the U.S. Government is reviewing our nuclear requirements. The Department of Defense and other agencies will consider what forces the United States needs to maintain strategic stability and deterrence and consider factors such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures.

As we consider further reductions, we are making the investments to ensure the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as nuclear weapons exist. Our intention over the next 10 years is to invest $85 billion in the nation’s nuclear infrastructure, including both Lawrence Livermore and Sandia national laboratories.

It may seem counterintuitive, but these investments will allow greater reductions because the same infrastructure is used to eliminate warheads, and with greater confidence and capability in our infrastructure and people we will not have to keep so many spare weapons.

In addition to our internal review, our approach to the next nuclear reductions agreement will be informed by the ongoing NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. The primary task of the NATO posture review is ensuring that NATO has the “appropriate mix” of conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities necessary to respond to 21^st century threats. From our perspective, we want to ensure that NATO’s posture and policies are not inconsistent with the positions laid out in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.

We have made clear that NATO reductions should occur in the context of Russia taking reciprocal measures to adjust its nuclear posture, including reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Our overall objective with Russia is to seek future reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons: strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads, including non-deployed weapons.

No previous arms control agreement has included provisions to limit and monitor non-deployed warheads or non-strategic warheads. To do so will require more demanding approaches to verification that will require extensive consultations between us and Russia.

As we work to reduce the excessive leftover weapons from our Cold War confrontation with Moscow, we also must counter the threats of today.

One of the serious challenges that we face is from ballistic missiles, which can be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

This Administration is dedicated to developing and deploying effective missile defenses. The Phased Adaptive Approach approved by President Obama in 2009 provides a more effective and a more timely response to the most likely missile threats that we will face in the foreseeable future.

But you do not need to ask this Administration to toot its own horn, ask our NATO allies. For the first time last year, NATO fully embraced our proposed missile defense approach of protecting all European members’ territories and populations. That was a very significant milestone given the past contentiousness of this issue.

While getting our NATO Allies to support this effort was a significant challenge, we have now embarked on an even tougher task: convincing Russia to join us in cooperation on missile defense. We believe that such cooperation can provide Russia confidence that our missile defenses will strengthen strategic stability and enhance both nations’ capabilities to defend against emerging missile threats.

At the same time, the President has made clear that cooperation with Russia will not in any way limit U.S. or NATO missile defense capabilities and that the NATO alliance alone bears responsibility for defending NATO’s members.

With both Russia and China, we want to transcend traditional thinking on strategic stability, often associated with Mutually Assured Destruction, and instead build toward a new concept of Mutually Assured Stability.

This would be a new approach to achieving stability. It would create incentives for achieving cooperation and avoiding conflict. Mutually Assured Stability would be based on mutual interest, respect, and peaceful cooperation. While differences would remain, states would share an overriding interest in peace and stability that is underpinned by arms limitations, nuclear and conventional, and other confidence-building measures.

That is why this Administration is dedicated to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—CTBT—and negotiation and ratification of the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty—FMCT. Both agreements can help limit the modernization and expansion of arsenals among other countries with nuclear weapons, as well as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those countries that do not have them.

Let me first address the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. We are committed to working with members of both parties in the Senate to ratify the CTBT, just as we did for New START. We have no illusions that this will be easy. But we intend to stress three essential points as we make our case to the Senate and the American people.

First, CTBT ratification serves America’s national security interests because it will help lead other states to ratify the treaty and thus strengthen the legal and political barriers to a resumption of nuclear testing, which would fuel the nuclear build up in Asia. It will help prevent the further advancement of nuclear capabilities in unstable regions, strengthen our leverage with the international community to pressure defiant regimes that engage in illicit nuclear activities, and lend the United States greater credibility when encouraging other states to exercise restraint or hold others accountable.

Second, we are in a stronger position today than ever before to effectively verify the Treaty through the International Monitoring System set up under the Treaty and our own strengthened national capabilities. The International Monitoring System demonstrated in 2006 and again in 2009 its ability to detect underground nuclear explosions – despite being incomplete.

Third, our nuclear stockpile has been kept safe, secure, and effective for almost two decades without nuclear testing. As I mentioned earlier, President Obama is committed to increase funding for the U.S. nuclear laboratories and the full nuclear complex to ensure that we can continue to have confidence in our stockpile without testing. Indeed, our nuclear experts say they know more about how our nuclear weapons work than we did when we explosively tested them.

In essence, we have been abiding for 20 years by the CTBT’s main obligation—not testing—without the benefit of locking other states into that same commitment.

I should note that Glenn Seaborg, whose name adorns this wonderful learning center, was a champion of a test ban. In a book published 30 years ago—16 years before the CTBT was completed—he argued that such a ban would help increase stability, impede arms races, and lend greater credibility to U.S. efforts to stop the spread of the bomb. His reasoning was right then and it is right now.

Prohibiting tests is in our national interest and so is ending the worldwide production of fissile material for weapons purposes. That is the objective of an FMCT. We do not need more fissile material that could be used to make more bombs, especially when we know terrorist groups are seeking to get their hands on such material anyway that they can.

Our preference is to negotiate an FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament, but that body has been deadlocked by Pakistan. Thus, the United States is joining with other key countries to start preparations for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) elsewhere until the Conference can get down to work.

Although that is a pretty full agenda, we also have our eyes squarely on Iran, Syria, and North Korea, and the dangers posed by further proliferation.

After two decades of clandestine nuclear activities, Iran continues to refuse to comply with its international obligations. Iran is moving in the opposite direction of addressing international concerns by declaring its intention to triple its capacity to enrich uranium to nearly twenty percent. Iran also continues to move forward with its enrichment and heavy-water related activities, all in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

As we have repeatedly said, we do not dispute Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program. But, with rights come responsibilities. Iran has a responsibility to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities.

We are going to maintain pressure on Iran unless and until it engages in a constructive way and complies with its international obligations.

The same goes for Syria. It must uphold its international obligations, including providing access to any site or information deemed essential by the International Atomic Energy Agency to complete its investigation into Syria’s clandestine nuclear activities.

Our policy on North Korea remains the same: we do not accept North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. We remain committed to the 2005 Joint Statement and its core goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

We urge all countries to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 fully and transparently. And we are encouraging all states to take all measures necessary to impede North Korea’s efforts to develop its nuclear and missile programs and engage in proliferation activities.

The United States continues to consult closely with partners in the Six-Party process. We were pleased last week when the North and South Korean negotiators met with each other on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit.

To determine whether North Korea is serious, Secretary Clinton announced that the United States has invited a senior North Korean official to New York for talks this week.

Nevertheless, we have made it consistently clear that before any resumption of Six-Party Talks, North Korea must improve relations with South Korea and demonstrate a change in behavior, including taking irreversible steps to denuclearize, complying with international law, and ceasing provocative behavior.

As the President said, the United States will lead efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, but we cannot do it alone. We require the contributions of all, and we need to make use of all the resources and tools available.

One of the most important tools is the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, whose mission is to help countries maintain appropriate nuclear safeguards, safety, and security, while also verifying that civilian nuclear programs are not being used covertly for weapons.

We are seeking to improve the IAEA’s abilities to investigate potential and actual undeclared nuclear activities and to apply effective and efficient safeguards at declared nuclear facilities to ensure they are not abused or misused.

A key initiative is getting all countries to adopt what is called an Additional Protocol to give the IAEA additional authorities to do its job. All told, nearly 140 states, including the United States, have either signed or concluded Additional Protocols since 1997. We are engaging with those states who have not yet signed an Additional Protocol to do so.

As more countries potentially turn to nuclear power, the IAEA will be vital to providing confidence that the threat of nuclear proliferation does not grow with the demand for nuclear energy.

Underscoring our efforts to support peaceful uses of nuclear energy, this Administration has pledged $50 million in new funding for IAEA activities toward that end and we are encouraging other countries to raise another $50 million.

Describing the Cold War era, President Obama said generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a flash of light. Our purpose is to help create a world where future generations can harness the benefits of the atom, while not having that same fearful knowledge.

For our part, the United States declared in the Nuclear Posture Review that we would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our Allies and partners. This should come as no surprise given our military’s ever increasing emphasis on precision and the avoidance of non-combatant casualties and collateral damage. Attributes not associated with nuclear weapons. The NPR states that it is in the U.S. interest and that of all other states that the 65-year record of non-use be extended forever.

The only guaranteed way to realize that goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons, which, as I have described, will be a gradual process. But we cannot proceed at a glacial pace. Delay or inaction on either disarmament or nonproliferation will erode momentum until both grind to a halt.

Let me conclude by returning to an observation by Glenn Seaborg in his book of 30 years ago. While hopeful that the political will was emerging for a test ban, he lamented that Washington and Moscow had settled for driving testing underground in the early 1960s than going for a complete ban. As a result, he judged that the value of a test ban had diminished over time because the United States and Soviet Union were negotiating at a higher and more dangerous level.

Yet, he warned, “If we allow the present opportunity to slip away, however, the next one, if there is a next one, will be at a level still higher and still more dangerous.” The Obama Administration is determined not to let our opportunities slip away. We are focusing carefully on each practical step to ensure our footing on steady ground as we follow the President’s path to a more peaceful world without nuclear weapons.

Thank you. I welcome any questions that you have.

April 8, 2011

[Joint Statement #1 from Geneva, Switzerland]

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Have reached the following mutual understanding:

The four-hour time period provided for in subparagraph 14(a) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty for provision at the point of entry of notifications provided for in subparagraphs 14(a) and 14(b) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty should be calculated from the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the room determined by the inspected Party and intended for the examination of equipment, which is situated within the airport associated with the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party, as provided for in paragraph 4 of Section IV of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty.

If the inspection team intends to return to the point of entry in order to conduct a sequential inspection, the four-hour time period provided for in subparagraph 14(a) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty for provision at the point of entry of notifications provided for in subparagraphs 14(a) and 14(b) of Section VI of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty should be calculated from the time of the arrival of the inspection team at a location, selected by the inspected Party, within the point of entry.

The time of the arrival of the inspection team at the room or location referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Joint Statement should be recorded in the inspection activity report as the time of arrival or return of the inspection team at the point of entry.

Media Note

Washington, DC

April 9, 2011

Opening Meeting of the BCC: United States and Russian delegations at the U.S. Mission in Geneva: US Mission Photo by Eric Bridiers

Washington, DC
March 29, 2011

The Prague Agenda: The Road Ahead

Thank you very much Jessica. I’m delighted to have this opportunity to speak at Carnegie’s 2011 International Nuclear Policy Conference. I look around this room and see so many familiar faces who have been leaders in the topics of nuclear weapons, arms control, and nonproliferation. Your fresh ideas, insights, and serious thinking about these issues have never been more valuable to me than in my current position. I have spent enough hours on these topics over the past two years in the White House to see firsthand how valuable the fresh intellectual capital you provide is. Thank you for all that you do.

The reason I have spent so much time on these issues is quite

straightforward: President Obama. In the course of briefing the President every day-I think I passed the 400 morning briefing point recently-chairing interagency meetings, and coordinating U.S. government policy, I’ve seen firsthand how the President’s deep commitment and personal involvement is the driving force behind our nuclear strategy.

As a U.S. Senator and presidential candidate, President Obama made nuclear nonproliferation the centerpiece of his national security agenda. When he came into office, we had a full range of difficult legacy issues to address-two wars, combating terrorism, a deep financial crisis. The President was, however, determined to also pursue an affirmative agenda-what the United States, and American leadership, would stand for in the world. And at the center of that affirmative agenda was a new nuclear strategy for the United States.

Two years ago in his speech in Prague, the President declared his vision for achieving the “peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” and he laid out a plan of action for near term practical steps to move in that direction. There are four interrelated elements to the President’s Prague agenda.

First, to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons by those states that already possess nuclear weapons, starting first with Russia and the U.S. which together still control over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Second, to prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons by strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and by holding accountable those states that have violated their obligations, such as Iran and North Korea.

Third, to prevent nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and strengthening international cooperation on nuclear security.

Fourth, to develop new mechanisms to support the growth of safe and secure nuclear power in ways that reduce the spread of dangerous technologies.

During the two years since the Prague speech, we have made significant progress in each of these four areas.

. In June 2009, in response to North Korea’s second nuclear test, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1874, which imposes the toughest sanctions to date against North Korea, including additional measures to interdict shipments of prohibited cargo to and from North Korea.

. In September 2009, the United Nations Security Council-meeting for the first time under the chairmanship of a U.S. President-unanimously approved Resolution 1887, endorsing the key elements of President Obama’s Prague agenda.

. In April 2010, President Obama hosted a historic Nuclear Security Summit of 47 nations and three international organizations in Washington at which leaders pledged specific steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and support the President’s proposal to lock down all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. This was the largest gathering of nations hosted by the United States since the UN founding conference in San Francisco in 1945.

. Also in April, President Obama issued an updated Nuclear Posture Review that reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture by declaring that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and our allies and partners.

While there still is a narrow range of contingencies where American nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring conventional or chemical or biological weapons attacks, we have committed to take concrete steps to make deterring nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear forces. Our new doctrine also extends U.S. assurances by declaring that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

. In May, the NPT Parties met for a successful Review Conference, approving a final document endorsing a balanced approach to advance the three pillars of nuclear nonproliferation, peaceful uses, and disarmament.

. In December, after years of negotiations, the IAEA Board of Governors took a major step-approving the establishment of an IAEA fuel bank, which will help assure the reliability of fuel supply and assist countries to use nuclear energy without building fuel cycle facilities.

. Finally, just before Christmas, the Senate approved the New START Treaty, which President Obama and President Medvedev signed last April in Prague. By significantly reducing levels of U.S. and Russia deployed strategic weapons, the Treaty represents a commitment by the world’s two largest nuclear powers to the goal of disarmament. In addition, the Treaty strengthens the reset in relations between Washington and Moscow that is helping us to address the most urgent proliferation threats we face in Iran and North Korea.

Those of you who know me know that I’m not prone to hyperbole or, for that matter, seeing the upside in things. But all in all, I think it’s fair to say that the two years since the President’s Prague speech have been exceedingly productive. Despite this progress, however, we will not rest on our laurels. And I can tell you with certainty that President Obama won’t. Despite the many pressing global challenges that are competing for his attention, he has directed us to keep up the momentum and lay the ground work for additional progress.

So, with this in mind, I’d like to discuss our plans to advance each of the four dimensions of the President Prague agenda.

First, to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons, we are beginning to implement the New START Treaty with Russia. Last week, we exchanged data with Russia on nuclear facilities, and the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the Treaty’s implementing body, is launching its first meetings in Geneva this week. On-site inspections conducted under the Treaty will begin next month. When the Treaty is fully implemented, it will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear warheads since the 1950s, the first full decade of the nuclear age.

As we implement New START, we’re making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions. Under the President’s direction, the Department of Defense will review our strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile, which stands at approximately 5,000 warheads, including both deployed and reserve warheads. To develop these options for further reductions, we need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence.

Even as we consider further reductions, President Obama has also made clear that the United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal necessary to defend the U.S. and our allies and partners for as long as nuclear weapons exist. To ensure that objective, President Obama is seeking major funding increases to upgrade the Department of Energy’s nuclear complex. Indeed, as we made clear during the START debate, we intend to invest $85 billion in the nation’s nuclear infrastructure over the next 10 years.

We will need Congress to support the President’s budget to ensure these critical investments are made. These investments will not only ensure a safe, secure and effective arsenal. They will also facilitate arms reductions. In fact, if Congress approves the President’s funding program for the nuclear complex, it allow us to reduce the size of our nuclear stockpile because we will be able to maintain a robust hedge against technical problems with a much smaller reserve force.

Once it is complete, this review of our strategic requirements will help shape our negotiating approach to the next agreement with Russia, which we believe should include both non-deployed and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. A priority will be to address Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

We will work with our NATO allies to shape an approach to reduce the role and number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia takes reciprocal measures to reduce its nonstrategic forces and relocates its nonstrategic forces away from NATO’s borders.

In advance of a new treaty limiting tactical nuclear weapons, we also plan to consult with our allies on reciprocal actions that could be taken on the basis of parallel steps by each side. As a first step, we would like to increase transparency on a reciprocal basis concerning the numbers, locations, and types of nonstrategic forces in Europe. We will consult with our European allies and invite Russia to join with us to develop this initiative.

Achieving the next round of strategic arms reductions will be an ambitious task that will take time to complete. No previous arms control agreement has included provisions to limit and monitor non-deployed warheads or tactical warheads. To do so will require more demanding approaches to verification. We are ready to begin discussions soon with Russia on transparency and confidence building measures that could provide the basis for creative verification measures in the next round of U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions.

In parallel with these discussions with Russia, President Obama is committed to developing and deploying an effective missile defense system to defend the U.S. and its allies against emerging missile threats from such countries as Iran and North Korea. The Phased Adaptive Approach approved by President Obama in 2009 provides a more effective and a more timely response to the most likely missile threats that we will face in coming years. It is widely regarded as a substantial improvement over the prior program. And NATO fully embraced this new approach at the Lisbon summit last November. And when you think how contentious the subject of missile defense has been, especially in Europe, for many years, this is a very significant milestone and a tribute to what’s possible when the United States works with allies and partners in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual interest.

As the President has repeatedly said, our missile defense program does not threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent. Against this background, President Obama and President Medvedev have agreed to develop a program of U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation. We believe that such cooperation can provide assurances to Russia that our missile defenses will not undercut strategic stability, while enhancing the ability of both nations to defend against emerging missile threats. For example, shared early warning data can increase the effectiveness of our missile defense system in Europe, while the U.S. and NATO retain the responsibility for defending themselves against ballistic missile threats.

Even as the U.S. and Russia move to reduce our nuclear arsenals, we must also support multilateral arms control efforts that can help to constrain the programs of other countries that possess nuclear weapons.

While the U.K. and France have substantially reduced their arsenals from Cold War levels, a nuclear build up is underway in Asia, as several countries are modernizing and expanding their nuclear forces.

China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. Nonetheless, the lack of transparency in China’s program, including its pace and scope and the strategy and doctrine guiding it, raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.

To address these issues, our Nuclear Posture Review proposes that the U.S. and China engage in a strategic security dialogue that can increase confidence and ease concerns that drive nuclear expansion. We have encouraged our Chinese counterparts to begin a dialogue with us on the nuclear strategies, policies, and programs of both sides-and we will continue to do so. We cannot have a truly comprehensive relationship with China without dialogue on strategic issues.

At the same time, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – the CTBT – and the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty – the FMCT – can help to limit the modernization and expansion of arsenals among countries that already have nuclear weapons, even in the absence of a new arms control measures that would cap and reduce all nuclear arsenals.

Let me first address the Test Ban Treaty. We are committed to working with members of both parties in the Senate to ratify the CTBT, just as we did for New START. We have no illusions that this will be easy. But we intend to stress three essential points as we make our case to the Senate and the American people. First, CTBT ratification serves America’s national security interests because it will help lead others to ratify the treaty and thus strengthen the legal and political barriers to a resumption of nuclear testing, which would fuel the nuclear build up in Asia.

Second, more than a decade since the Senate last considered – and rejected – the CTBT, we are in a stronger position to effectively verify the Treaty through the global monitoring system set up under the Treaty and our own strengthened national capabilities.

Third, our experience with the stockpile stewardship program has demonstrated that the U.S. can maintain an effective and reliable nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing. In fact, as I noted, President Obama has funded, and is committed to continue funding for, the U.S.

nuclear laboratories at increased levels to ensure that we have the facilities, resources and personnel needed to retain the nuclear forces to defend the United States and our allies.

On the FMCT, President Obama has announced his support for a new international treaty to verifiably end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would clearly reduce the risks of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Our preference is to negotiate the FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament, but it is becoming increasing doubtful that the Conference can achieve consensus to begin such negotiations. As a consequence, we will begin consultations with our allies and partners to consider an alternative means to begin FMCT negotiations. To be successful, we will encourage all permanent members of the Security Council and other relevant parties to participate in this effort.

To advance the second element of the President’s Prague agenda-non-proliferation-we’re continuing our efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, as proposed by Security Council Resolution 1887 and the NPT Review Conference. In particular, we’re working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that the Agency has the resources, technology, and authority it needs to conduct effective monitoring and inspections, especially when doubts are raised about whether nations are fulfilling their international obligations. We have strongly supported the agency’s investigations of the North Korean-supplied Al Kibar reactor in Syria and nuclear weaponization activities in Iran. We encourage Director General Amano to report to the Board of Governors on the results of these investigations as soon as possible.

The world’s efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are, of course, challenged by Iran and North Korea. I have spent an enormous amount of time on these challenges. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests, revealed a previously covert enrichment program, and continues to develop long range missiles. As President Obama has said, “North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program is increasingly a direct threat to the security of United States and our allies.”

For its part, Iran continues to pursue an enrichment program in defiance of numerous UN Security Council resolutions and refuses to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve questions about its past weaponization activities. Of all NPT parties – and we have made this point directly to the Iranians — Iran is the only country that has been unable to convince the International Atomic Energy Agency that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

Unless we can meet the challenge posed by Iran and North Korea, additional countries in the Middle East and East Asia could well leave the NPT and develop their own nuclear weapons, thus reversing any movement towards disarmament. Moreover, Iran and North Korea are challenging the viability and credibility of the treaties and institutions that form the bedrock for disarmament. No matter how much we strengthen the regime on paper, it will be meaningless if countries feel they can violate the rules with impunity. As President Obama said in his Prague speech, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons.”

On North Korea, since President Obama took office, we have made clear that we were prepared to talk directly with the North Koreans and that we are open to an agreement that would also provide security for North Korea. The Six-Party Joint Statement of 2005 provides the framework for such an agreement. At the same time, President Obama made clear that North Korea can never find the security that it seeks unless if fulfills its commitments to complete denuclearization and abides fully by the terms of its international obligations. We and our partners have underscored that North Korea must begin taking irreversible steps towards denuclearization before it can obtain the benefits it seeks from the international community.

North Korea chose not to take such a path, instead reverting to its old pattern of provocation followed by demands for compensation. We have refused to reinforce that pattern. Instead, we have tightened international sanctions, including financial measures and an arms embargo. We have established an unprecedented level of cooperation with our allies South Korea and Japan, and worked closely with China and Russia as well.

In response to this solidarity and pressure, in recent months North Korea has begun talking about a return to Six Party Talks, which it declared irrevocably dead last summer, and been making other gestures indicating a desire to return to talks. What we are insisting upon is that negotiations not repeat the old pattern, but rather that North Korea first needs to engage with the South and address issues surrounding its military provocation and then take significant and irreversible steps toward the goal of denuclearization. Those steps must include monitored suspension of their newly declared uranium enrichment program.

President Obama has also long understood the regional and international consequences of Iran becoming a nuclear weapons’ state. That is why we are committed to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. From his first days in office, he has made clear to Iran that it has a

choice: it can act to restore the confidence of the international community in the purposes of its nuclear program by fully complying with the IAEA and Security Council resolutions, or it can continue to shirk its international obligations, which will only increase its isolation and the consequences for the regime. There is no escaping or evading that choice.

Already, Iran is facing sanctions that are far more comprehensive than ever before, and as a result it finds it hard to do business with any reputable bank internationally; to conduct transactions in Euros or dollars; to acquire insurance for its shipping; to gain new capital investment or technology infusions in its antiquated oil and natural gas infrastructure-and it has found in that critical sector, alone, close to $60 billion in projects have been put on hold or discontinued. Other sectors are clearly being affected as well as leading multinational corporations understand the risk of doing business with Iran and are no longer doing so.

Unless and until Iran complies with its obligations under the NPT and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions, we will continue to ratchet up the pressure. We will not close the door on diplomacy. Like all NPT Parties, Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear energy. But it also has a responsibility to fulfill its obligations. There are no short-cuts and we will not take our eye off the ball. Even with all the events unfolding in the Middle East, we remain focused on the strategic imperative of ensuring that Iran does acquire not nuclear weapons.

We look to others who share our desire for disarmament to join us in giving Pyongyang and Tehran a clear choice between full compliance and increasing pressure and consequences.

With regard to the third element of the President’s nuclear strategy – nuclear security – the idea to host a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington was President Obama’s personal initiative and reflects his conviction that nuclear terrorism poses the most extreme threat to international security. The President was very satisfied that the Washington summit built high level political support for nuclear security and created a concrete work plan to support a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years.

With about one year to go before the next Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in spring 2012, we are very confident that we will be able to demonstrate significant progress toward fulfilling the work plan agreed to in Washington. Since April 2009, for example, thousands of kilograms of nuclear materials – hundreds of bombs worth – at over 20 sites around the world have already been removed or eliminated.

Notably, Kazakhstan has moved 13 tons of fissile material to more secure internal storage, and fissile material has been entirely removed from Libya, Chile, Turkey, Serbia, and Romania. And Ukraine and Belarus have committed to removing all the Highly Enriched Uranium from their territories by the time of the Seoul summit. We are working at home and around the world to convert research reactors so they no longer use HEU fuel. In locations where material elimination is not possible, we have worked with other governments to lock down materials through robust security enhancements. Countries are also beefing up transport security and response forces.

But nuclear security is more than about protecting material with guards, guns, and gates. It also means addressing the human element by establishing a security culture and training programs for the personnel responsible for protecting nuclear materials. Since the Washington summit, we have signed agreements with Japan, China, South Korea, and India to establish and work together at regional “Centers of Excellence”

to provide training and education for nuclear security officials. During the President’s recent trip, Brazil agreed to consider establishing a similar regional center for Latin America. Other training facilities are being established in Italy, Kazakhstan and Algeria.

Nuclear security requires funding, but it is money well spent. For its part, the Obama Administration has committed an additional $10 billion to the Global Partnership to help countries pay for nuclear and biosecurity upgrades. In this respect, I want to emphasize the President’s commitment to securing adequate funding for the U.S. nuclear security and nonproliferation programs in the FY 2011 and FY2012 budgets. Even in these difficult financial times, we cannot afford to skimp on essential national security needs.

Finally, we’re making progress on the fourth element of President Obama’s Prague agenda-building a new international framework to support peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risk of proliferation. Clearly, all nations with nuclear energy programs will need to take full account of the lessons to be learned from the Fukushima accident in Japan, since the safe operation of nuclear power plants and safe storage of nuclear waste must be our paramount concern, wherever we live. Here in the United States, we will test our assumptions, review our procedures, and strengthen our regulations. This crisis also highlights the importance of strengthening the IAEA’s mandate to establish and continuously improve nuclear safety standards and guidance, and supporting the agency’s programs to assist Member States in the application of those standards.

At the same time, the need for low-carbon sources of electricity will continue to grow in the decades ahead, which means that nuclear power will remain an important element in the global energy portfolio. And we must be just as vigilant in minimizing proliferation risks as we are in minimizing safety risks. That is why the United States has been working with nations around the world to ensure that they can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation.

In this respect, we will continue to work within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to reach agreement on tougher criteria governing the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies for civil purposes. We will also continue to work with the IAEA to implement the fuel bank concept and other multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. And we are committed to developing commercial concepts for nuclear fuel leasing, so all countries can benefit from nuclear energy without spreading dangerous technology and materials.

In conclusion, despite many pressing challenges around the world and here at home, I am here to express President Obama’s strong and enduring commitment to the Prague agenda. As the President noted in Prague, “some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked — that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and people possess the ultimate tools of destruction.” He said, “such fatalism is a deadly adversary” tantamount to conceding “that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” This we cannot accept.

We cannot succeed without your help. This community of international nuclear experts and former officials, think tank and business people, academics and activists-you provide the essential bedrock for government action. You are often able to do things that governments can’t or won’t do. We look to you to stimulate initiatives, build public support, provide constructive advice and hatch creative ideas.

Working as partners, we can fulfill the Prague agenda and we can move closer to the vision that we share-the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Thank you very much.

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