Fact Sheet

Cluster 3 Specific issue – Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and other Provisions of the Treaty

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva,
May 1, 2013

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

The United States welcomes this opportunity to address the important NPT issues of nuclear safety and security as well efforts to discourage potential abuse of the Treaty’s right to withdraw.

Mr. Chairman,

The March 2011 Fukushima accident demonstrated the importance of enhancing international cooperation among governments, industry, and multilateral organizations to ensure the safe and responsible use of nuclear power.  Although nuclear safety is the responsibility of each sovereign nation, promoting nuclear safety is in our collective interest.  To that end, we urge all countries with nuclear power reactors to conduct safety reviews and ensure that their own reactors meet the highest, most up-to-date standards of safety.

In helping to lead by example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a comprehensive safety review of all operating U.S. nuclear power plants and regulatory requirements.  The NRC continues to evaluate and act on the lessons learned to ensure that appropriate safety enhancements are implemented at U.S. nuclear power plants.  The United States is also Party to the Nuclear Safety Convention as well as several other important international safety and liability conventions, which we urge all states – and in particular those operating nuclear power plants – to adhere to as soon as possible.

The United States also fully supports the IAEA’s efforts to advance nuclear safety worldwide, and has made regular extrabudgetary contributions to fund IAEA programs in this area.  The United States remains an extremely strong supporter of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, and welcomes efforts by the IAEA and Member States to promote its implementation.  We would also like to thank the IAEA and Japan for organizing and hosting the December 2012 Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, and to reaffirm our commitment to continuing to build on progress that has been made and to work  together to implement lessons learned since the Fukushima accident.

Mr. Chairman,

Nuclear security also plays an indispensable role in preventing nuclear terrorism and advancing our nonproliferation and peaceful uses goals.  Since President Obama first convened a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, significant progress has been made.  Participants at the Second Nuclear Security Summit held last year in Seoul agreed to build on the objectives and measures set out in the 2010 Washington communiqué.  Participants also reaffirmed the necessity of working together to address the serious threat of nuclear terrorism and highlighting the essential role of the IAEA in supporting the efforts of Member States to effectively protect their nuclear materials.

The Summits are reinforcing key nuclear security principles, and the United States looks forward to working with the Netherlands and others to continue advancing a common approach to nuclear security at the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The Hague in 2014.  The IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security this July will provide another important opportunity to make progress in this important area.   In parallel, we will also continue our strong cooperation with others through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership, and efforts to assist states with implementing their obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  All these activities directly contribute to fulfillment of nuclear security measures highlighted in the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

Mr. Chairman,

At the 2010 Review Conference, Parties discussed the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty, in particular, how to respond in the event a State violates its Treaty obligations and then announces that it intends to withdraw from the NPT, pursuant to Article X.1.  This could present a critical challenge to the Treaty.  My delegation joins with others in believing that such instances of withdrawal should be discouraged and its adverse consequences addressed by NPT Parties.  While some progress was made on the issue at the 2010 Review Conference, we encourage a fuller discussion in the current NPT review cycle.

The United States would like to emphasize – again – that we do not seek to amend the Treaty to revise Article X.1, or to undermine the sovereign right of each state to determine what jeopardizes its “supreme interests,” the criterion for withdrawal specified in the Treaty.

With these Article X.1 rights come responsibilities.  If a Party were to withdraw from the Treaty, it would be an abuse of that right if the state were to then develop nuclear weapons using nuclear material, equipment, or technology that was supplied for peaceful purposes on the basis of that state’s NPT membership.  It is of particular concern that the safeguards agreement required by NPT Article III would normally terminate upon the withdrawal of a Party from the Treaty.  Subsequently, unless other arrangements are made, or other safeguards agreements already exist, the Party’s nuclear activities would no longer be subject to international verification.

Abuse of Article X.1, including through withdrawal by a Party while in violation of its NPT obligations, would undermine the integrity of the Treaty, in which all Parties have a clear interest, and may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.  As reflected in Part 1 of the 2010 Final Document, many Parties have underscored that, under international law, a withdrawing Party is still responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal.  Even if withdrawal is carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, it would not affect any other existing legal or political commitments between the withdrawing State and any other Party, including those related to alternative IAEA safeguards arrangements.

Mr. Chairman,

It is clear that NPT Parties could benefit from further discussion of measures that could be taken to discourage abuse of Article X.1.  A number of ideas have been proposed, to include actions by the NPT Parties, the UN Security Council, and the IAEA, both prior to and in the wake of a notice of withdrawal.  These proposals include ideas regarding consultations, verification, and supplier state actions and are contained in working papers or national statements submitted by Russia and Ukraine, the EU, and many other Parties, including the United States.  We look forward to further developing these proposals in order to elaborate recommendations for the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Cluster 3:  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva,
April 30, 2013

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very pleased to have the chance to speak today to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as called for under Article IV of the Treaty.  We will address the important issues of safety and security during the third specific issue session.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States has consistently been a leader in providing financial, technical, and political support to strengthen this important pillar of the Treaty, including through bilateral agreements and our contributions to programs being implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).   U.S. support to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation program has been significant and long-standing.   Last year, the United States contributed nearly 22 million dollars to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), and we pledged over four million dollars in additional funding towards training, fellowships, and cost-free experts.  We encourage all countries to meet their TCF obligations, which provide critical stability in the planning and implementation processes.

Over and above our TCF contributions, the United States in 2010 pledged $50 million over five years to a new IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), and to work with others to match that pledge.  PUI support provides the Agency with additional resources and flexibility to respond to urgent and unanticipated needs, such as monitoring radioactivity in the marine environment from the Fukushima accident and responding to sustained drought in the Sahel region.

The United States has now contributed nearly $26 million to the PUI.   This includes over $2 million in new PUI funding to enhance nuclear infrastructure capacity building in states introducing or expanding nuclear power.  And in the next several weeks we will commit additional PUI funding for projects on food safety in Latin America, sustainable uranium mining and milling in Africa, protection of the marine environment, and a pilot project to strengthen national capacities to interpret hydrological data and improve the sustainable use of water resources.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States would like to welcome the contributions of 13 other countries to PUI and the many other parties that support related efforts to enhance peaceful nuclear cooperation.

In particular, we welcome the partnership of Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, France, Indonesia, Brazil, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Kazakhstan, and we encourage other states to contribute to this effort.

 In the area of food security, we particularly appreciate the partnerships of Japan and South Africa in supporting an IAEA project on the establishment and strengthening of veterinary diagnostic laboratories in Africa.  We are interested in developing new partnerships to fully implement this high priority project that will help prevent disease and increase livestock productivity.

We would also like to commend the IAEA for launching the Ocean Acidification International Coordination Center at last year’s Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development.  The United States and several other IAEA Member States are providing PUI support for this project.   We encourage others to contribute, particularly as the Agency turns its focus to the environment in 2013.  For contributors who do not support nuclear power, this project and the PUI more broadly provide a good way to direct support toward non-power applications of nuclear technology.

Mr. Chairman,

The catastrophe at Fukushima in 2011 has not altered the underlying factors that have led to an increased interest in nuclear power, including increasing global demand for energy and concerns about climate change, energy security, and uncertainty about fossil fuel supplies.  The United States strongly supports the safe and secure expansion of nuclear power for NPT Parties that are in compliance with their obligations under the Treaty, and we look forward to participating in the upcoming International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21^st Century in St. Petersburg.  We appreciate the efforts of the IAEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and Russia for organizing and hosting this important event.

Such conferences can usefully highlight the global scale of ongoing nuclear cooperation.  For our part, the United States has in place bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 48 countries, the IAEA, and Taiwan, and we are negotiating others with States that share our commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nonproliferation.  The global market for access to peaceful nuclear technology is robust and working: from 2009-2012, for example, U.S. exports to NPT Parties were valued at $13.6 billion.

We also strongly support international efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle.  This includes the IAEA fuel bank that has been funded through contributions from the United States, the EU, the UAE, Kuwait, Norway and the U.S. Nuclear Threat Initiative, as well as complementary initiatives approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.  The United States also recently established the American Assured Fuel Supply, which is using over 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium removed from military programs and down-blending it to low enriched uranium to be available to states facing an interruption in fuel supply.  This serves as a powerful example of the mutually reinforcing nature of the NPT’s pillars.

Such multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle will help facilitate implementation of Article IV, support our common goal of expansion of peaceful nuclear energy without increasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, and reinforce the option of states to rely on the global market for their fuel service needs.

Mr. Chairman,

I appreciate the opportunity to reaffirm the importance we attach to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to learn more about other NPT Parties’ peaceful uses priorities and how we can best cooperate to support these efforts.   Support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is a critical component of the NPT and global efforts to achieve sustainable development goals, and we are proud to be in the company of many that share our goal of expanding support in this area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

]]> http://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/04/30/cluster-3-peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-energy/feed/ 0 http://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/04/29/middle-east-zone/ http://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/04/29/middle-east-zone/#comments Mon, 29 Apr 2013 16:37:39 +0000 EB http://geneva.usmission.gov/?p=25487

Thomas M. Countryman, U.S. Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation

Statement by Mr. Thomas M. Countryman
Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation

Department of State
United States of America

Regional Issues
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee

2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

April 29, 2013

As delivered

Mr. Chairman,

The United States continues to support universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we seek to further strengthen and uphold the Treaty.  Developments in the Middle East continue to present challenges to the NPT and to our collective security.

The United States remains committed to convening a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.  We regret that it proved impossible to meet last year as envisioned in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.  This was not a breach of the Action Plan as some suggest – but it was a major disappointment.  Still, we are not discouraged.  We missed an important deadline – but we have not yet missed the opportunity to transform the security environment of the region.

In fact, unprecedented diplomatic efforts continue to be directed at making the conference a reality.  But the responsibility to hold the conference does not fall solely to the Conveners and Facilitator.  We remain prepared to assist in any way requested, but leadership must also come from the states of the region.  They will be responsible for the big idea – creating the political and security conditions that would make a WMD free zone an achievable concept.  And they need to start now by showing creative thinking on an idea that is smaller in scale, but big enough to get us to the first step, to Helsinki.

Direct engagement of the concerned parties is the pathway to a successful and meaningful conference.  Participation in Helsinki of all regional states, as the Action Plan foresees, will only be possible if each State believes its key concerns can be addressed within the agenda of the Conference.  And that agenda simply cannot be dictated from outside the region – it must be consensual among the States who must live with the agenda.  To agree to dialogue, with the aim of reaching consensus on such an agenda, is not a concession.  To impose pre-conditions on a dialogue serves only to delay its initiation, without changing its substance.

The United States fully appreciates, and I personally sympathize with, the disappointment and frustration that the Conference was not held in 2012.  These reactions are justified.  However, we all share a responsibility to move beyond frustration, and back toward direct, meaningful engagement among the regional parties.  We should not expect meaningful steps toward bringing all regional parties together to occur in a room this large.

Mr. Chairman,

This brings us to the important role of the Facilitator.  The United States has full confidence in Ambassador Laajava and welcomes his report.  Laajava is the most fair-minded, creative and patient diplomat I know.  His team has been untiring in an effort to take the first step on an initiative that has never been accomplished on the planet, creation of a WMD-free zone in a region where both states and non-state actors daily use weapons, one against another.  We agreed with Ambassador Laajava’s conclusion:  before we can take a step to Helsinki, we need first to take one half-step – to direct multilateral consultations.  We urge all states of the region to recognize the opportunity presented by these direct preparatory consultations and that they can be arranged soon.  I continue to believe that a conference could be held at an early date, within months, if there existed the political will of the relevant parties to reach consensus on an agenda and other arrangements for the conference.

Mr. Chairman,

Certain proponents of the conference speak as if the only issue to be discussed is Israel.  However, an honest discussion must also take into account the large quantities of chemical weapons held by Syria, and the fundamental challenge that would be posed by Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.

The United States is gravely concerned about the Iranian nuclear program.  Iran is not just in violation of its international nuclear obligations, but is contemptuous of those obligations, and of the instruments that create those obligations:  the United Nations Security Council, the IAEA Board of Governors, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself.

Since many undeclared elements of its nuclear program became public in 2002, Iran has yet to cooperate fully with the IAEA or negotiate seriously with the P5+1 to address the international community’s legitimate concerns.  As detailed in numerous reports by the IAEA Director General, the IAEA has credible information that raises serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program, including activities by Iran related to the development of a nuclear payload for delivery by a ballistic missile.  The IAEA’s findings, compounded by Iran’s longstanding noncompliance with its international nuclear obligations, call into question Iran’s stated claims that its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.  We are disappointed that Iran has missed numerous opportunities to address the international community’s concerns.

Mr. Chairman, the United States does not dispute the right of states that comply with their nonproliferation obligations to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  Regrettably, Iran has persistently failed to respect multiple Security Council resolutions that Iran must cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment.  As President Obama has stated, Iran can enjoy peaceful nuclear power while still meeting its international obligations and providing clear assurances to the international community that it is not pursuing a nuclear weapon.

With regard to Syria, it has been nearly two years since IAEA Director General Amano reported that the facility destroyed in 2007 at Dair Alzour was “very likely” a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency pursuant to Syria’s safeguards agreement.  Consequently, in June 2011 the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement and, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, referred the matter to the UN Security Council.  To date, Syria has not taken any concrete steps to address the outstanding serious questions about its clandestine nuclear activities.  The Asad regime’s brutal campaign of violence against the Syrian people and the resulting unrest cannot be an excuse for not cooperating with the IAEA.  Syria remains obligated to remedy its noncompliance immediately and demonstrate a constructive approach in its relations with the IAEA and the international community.

Noncompliance should be a matter of serious concern to NPT Parties.  As agreed in the 2010 Action Plan, it is vitally important that all NPT Parties support the resolution of all cases of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards and other nonproliferation requirements.  The Treaty and the regime can only be as strong as the Parties’ will to uphold the Treaty’s integrity.

The remainder of the text provided below will be delivered at a later date.

Thank you.

[Note:  The remaining text was not delivered but was distributed in the hall.]

Mr. Chairman,

North Korea also presents serious challenges to the NPT and international peace and security.  North Korea’s provocations, including its recent nuclear and missile tests, its belligerent rhetoric, and other destabilizing actions have received resounding and overwhelming international condemnation.  The United States has made it clear that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.  North Korea must comply with its international obligations and commitments or face further isolation.

The United States and our allies and Six-Party partners remain committed to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner.  The United States  remains open to authentic and credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, which require North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to also say a few words about the current situation in South Asia.  The United States remains deeply concerned by the dangers posed by the continuing buildup of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia.  Consistent with our shared vision of a world without nuclear weapons, the United States has repeatedly called on India and Pakistan to restrain their nuclear and missile programs; end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons; and support the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.  In that regard, it is with concern and deep disappointment that we note Pakistan’s reluctance to support the start of such negotiations.

We would welcome meaningful trust- and confidence-building between these nuclear-armed states; we must find ways to reduce regional tensions and diminish the risk that nuclear weapons could be used, either intentionally or accidentally, in a crisis.

We furthermore continue to encourage both India and Pakistan to play a positive role in the global nonproliferation community and take steps to prevent proliferation, including bringing their strategic trade controls in line with the guidelines of the multilateral supplier regimes, and we support, in a phased manner, India’s goal of joining the four multilateral export control regimes.  Finally, let me stress that we remain cognizant of our nonproliferation commitments and objectives when considering how to conduct our bilateral relations with any country.  Our activities with both India and Pakistan continue to be consistent with our NPT obligations and with our commitment as members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  The United States remains committed to working with all countries in a concerted effort to resolve these important regional challenges, in order to uphold the integrity and credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

***

Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva,
April 26, 2013

As Delivered
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the opportunity to highlight steps underway to reinforce the NPT’s nonproliferation pillar and associated elements of the Action Plan.  This includes support for IAEA safeguards and nuclear weapon-free zones, as well as significant developments that continue to challenge the Treaty’s authority.

More detail can be found in the U.S. working paper on this issue.

U.S. Support for IAEA Safeguards

Mr. Chairman, IAEA safeguards as required under Article III of the NPT are fundamental to the effective functioning of the international nonproliferation regime.  This is reflected in the Action Plan and its calls for universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements; support for the IAEA safeguards system; and compliance with nonproliferation obligations.

The United States recognizes the role of strong, effective safeguards in preserving the NPT bargain.  In Prague in 2009, President Obama affirmed the importance of ensuring that the IAEA has the resources and authorities needed for its vital nonproliferation mission.

As it has for many years, the United States is providing significant voluntary support to IAEA safeguards, above and beyond our assessed contribution to the IAEA budget.  This assistance is helping the Agency to enhance its abilities in areas such as environmental sampling, remote monitoring, information technology, and related areas.  We have also provided over $14 million in extra-budgetary contributions for the new Safeguards Analytical Laboratory and nuclear material laboratory.  This major project will equip the Agency with the world-class technology it needs to conduct independent safeguards analysis.

U.S. Support for IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol

Mr. Chairman, IAEA safeguards are only effective if the relevant agreements are in force and fully implemented.  We are encouraged that four NPT Parties brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements since the 2010 Review Conference.  This leaves only 13 Parties without such an agreement in force.

The IAEA has made clear that it requires full implementation not only of comprehensive safeguards agreements, but also the Additional Protocol in order to provide credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state.  A comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an Additional Protocol, should properly be viewed as the international standard for IAEA safeguards.

We welcome the fact that 119 states, including eighteen since 2010, now have an Additional Protocol in force.  Twenty four others have concluded negotiations on the Additional Protocol.  This sends a clear signal that the Additional Protocol is a recognized norm for the international safeguards regime.  We urge all Parties to bring this instrument into force as soon as possible.

In this regard, the United States welcomes the steps taken by the Government of Burma to conclude an Additional Protocol and modify its outdated Small Quantities Protocol.  We look forward to the implementation of these decisions and stand ready to offer any assistance requested.

Mr. Chairman, I remind the delegations that the United States is doing its part on safeguards.  We have made over 290 nuclear facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards under our Voluntary Offer safeguards agreement, and under our Additional Protocol declared over 330 nuclear-related activities and hosted complementary access visits by IAEA inspectors.  We take these steps to demonstrate our readiness to accept safeguards procedures similar to those required of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Additional Protocol is an essential tool for safeguards.  But as called for in the Action Plan the safeguards system should be “assessed and evaluated regularly to strengthen its effectiveness and improve its efficiency.”  In this regard, we wish to register our support for ongoing work by the IAEA Secretariat under the State Level Concept to optimize the Agency’s capabilities and to implement safeguards in a manner that provides it with the best possible opportunity to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.

U.S. Support for NWFZs

Mr. Chairman, the United States believes that nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties can provide a valuable regional reinforcement to the NPT and the global nonproliferation regime.  This is an active element of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The United States is a party to Protocols I and II of the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.  We have also signed and are pursuing ratification of the relevant Protocols to the South Pacific and African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties.  We stand ready to sign the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as soon any remaining concerns are addressed, and we are actively consulting the other nuclear weapon states and Parties to the Central Asia zone in order to be in a position to sign that Treaty’s Protocol.

The United States will address the important issue of a Middle East WMD free zone in a later statement.

Nonproliferation Challenges

Mr. Chairman, compliance with the Treaty’s nonproliferation obligations is of paramount importance.  The Action Plan calls for “addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system” and “resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations.”  The vast majority of NPT Parties have upheld their commitments.   Unfortunately, there remain a few exceptions that we wish to highlight and will describe in greater detail in a later statement.

In particular, Iran has persistently failed to comply with its NPT safeguards obligations and relevant UN Security Council resolutions.  We take note of the most recent round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran held in Almaty, Kazakhstan.  It is clear from these talks that significant differences remain.  But the absence of progress on this track does not excuse Iran from its international obligations.

Rather than cooperate with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding concerns, including those relating to possible military dimensions, Iran continues to expand its program in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions to suspend enrichment and other sensitive nuclear activities.

In the case of Syria, more than two years have passed since the Board of Governors found it in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement for the clandestine construction of a nuclear reactor.  As reported by the IAEA Director General, the facility destroyed in 2007 should have been reported to the Agency pursuant to Syria’s safeguards agreement.  We call on Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA and remedy this matter without delay.

North Korea also remains a serious concern.  The United States strongly condemns the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013 and its continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile programs in direct violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.  We urge North Korea to refrain from further provocations, and to comply with its commitments and obligations to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, all NPT parties must stand together to meet the Treaty’s legal obligations, and respond without hesitation to violations.  Treaty violations are not to be tolerated as inconvenient facts.  We should recognize them for what they are: challenges to the integrity of an international regime that has served us so well over many decades, and deal with them accordingly.

As President Obama said at Prague in 2009, “[R]ules must be binding.  Violations must be punished.  Words must mean something.  The world must stand together to prevent the spread of [nuclear] weapons.”

An NPT with a robust nonproliferation pillar benefits all NPT Parties.  It provides essential confidence that states are meeting their nonproliferation obligations.  And confidence facilitates the broadest possible access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and will help create conditions for achieving the peace and security of a world without of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Delivered

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Chairman, the United States recognizes the importance of security assurances to states that have forsworn nuclear weapons and that abide by their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.  We would like to summarize once again the U.S. commitment to providing such assurances.

The United States released its Nuclear Posture Review in April 2010, after completing a comprehensive assessment of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and force posture.  One result of that assessment was that the United States strengthened its long-standing negative security assurance associated with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in several ways.

Specifically, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review declared that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.  This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT.

Even for states not eligible for this assurance, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear that the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or our allies and partners.  It is in the U.S. interest and that of all nations that the nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever.

At their 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO Allies acknowledged the importance of the negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.  The Allies further recognized the value that these statements can have in seeking to discourage nuclear proliferation.

Mr. Chairman, the United States also supports well-crafted nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) that are vigorously enforced and developed in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.  We are a Party to both Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, one of which provides a legally-binding negative security assurance.  In recent years, the United States has worked toward extending legally binding negative security assurances by pursuing ratification of protocols to a number of other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.  The United States has signed the Protocols to the African and South Pacific NWFZs, and the Obama Administration sent those Protocols to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent.  The nuclear-weapon States (or “P5”) and ASEAN have negotiated a revised Protocol to the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ) Treaty that resolved outstanding differences, and we hope that the Protocol signing can take place soon.  The United States also remains committed to consulting with the Central Asia NWFZ (CANWFZ) Parties to reach an agreement that would allow the P5 to sign the Protocol to that treaty.  A longer term goal is achievement of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.  The United States supports the goal of a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and remains committed to working actively with the facilitator, co-conveners and all states in the region, to create the conditions for a successful Helsinki Conference, an issue we will address further under Cluster II.  Allow me to note that consistent with the UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, the mandate for any zone cannot be imposed from outside or without the consent of all concerned states.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, we recognize that NPT States that forgo nuclear weapons and are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations have a legitimate interest in not being subject to nuclear threats or attacks.  The strengthened U.S. negative security assurance announced in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, together with our support of nuclear-weapon-free zones, demonstrates an enduring commitment on the part of the United States to providing such negative security assurances.  At the same time, it underscores the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and affirming the responsibility we all share to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Office of the Press Secretary

Background Conference Call by White House Official on Syria

Via Telephone

1:23 P.M. EDT

MS. HAYDEN:  Hi, guys.  Thank you very much for joining on what I know is short notice, but we wanted to have an opportunity to provide you with a little bit of context to the letters you’ve seen that were sent today from the White House’s Director of the Office of Legislative Affairs, Miguel Rodriguez.  Those letters were to Senator McCain and Senator Levin.  You’ve probably also seen Secretary Hagel’s comments, and we just wanted to give an opportunity to answer some questions.

This call is on background attributable to a White House official.  With that, I’ll turn it over to your unnamed official to go ahead and get started, and then we’ll take some questions.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Thanks, Caitlin.  I’ll just say a few introductory comments.

You all presumably have the letter that was sent up to the Hill; if you need it we can provide that.  The letter was in response to a letter that was sent to the President yesterday, April 24th, from Senator McCain, Senator Levin, Senator Corker, Senator Menendez, Senator Chambliss, Senator Ayotte, Senator Casey and Senator Graham.  And the question that was posed in that letter was:  Has the Assad regime or Syrian elements associated with or supported by the Assad regime used chemical weapons in Syria since the conflict began in March 2011?

I’ll just highlight a few parts of the letter by way of opening, and then take your questions.  What I will say is, for some time now, as you know, the President has directed the government to closely monitor the potential use of chemical weapons within Syria.  Given our concern that as the situation deteriorated and the regime became more desperate, they may use some of their significant stockpiles of chemical weapons.

What we say in the letter is that our intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin.  This assessment is based in part on physiological samples.  Our standard of evidence must build on these intelligence assessments as we seek to establish credible and corroborated facts.  For example, the chain of custody is not clear, so we cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions.

We go on to reaffirm that the President has set a clear red line as it relates to the United States that the use of chemical weapons or the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups is a red line that is not acceptable to us, nor should it be to the international community.  It’s precisely because we take this red line so seriously that we believe there is an obligation to fully investigate any and all evidence of chemical weapons use within Syria.

We are currently pressing for a comprehensive U.N. investigation that can credibly evaluate the evidence and establish what took place in association with these reports of the use of chemical weapons.  At the same time as that U.N. investigation is underway — and we’re seeking to make it more comprehensive — we’re also working with our friends and allies as well as the Syrian opposition to procure, share and evaluate additional information associated with reports of use of chemical weapons so that we can establish the facts.

And I think the point here is that given the stakes involved, given how serious the situation is, and what we have learned, frankly, from our own recent experience, intelligence assessments are not alone sufficient.  Only credible and corroborated facts that provide us with some degree of certainty can then guide our decision-making and inform our leadership of the international community.

So with that, I’ll move to take your questions.

Q    Thanks so much for doing the call, and thank you for your service.  Secretary Kerry told lawmakers today that the intelligence assessments referenced, with various degrees of confidence, two instances of chemical weapons use inside Syria.  Were these the two alleged uses in Damascus and Aleppo in March?  Or was this also the alleged use in Homs in December?  And do you believe that President Obama’s red line has been crossed?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Thanks for the question, Josh.  Let me just say a number of things.  I don’t want to speak in detail about intelligence assessments, because portions of them, of course, are classified and the intelligence community is best positioned to characterize in detail their assessments.  I will say, for instance, the incident in Aleppo that you referenced, in March, was one of the reports that we’ve been following up on, and in fact was a precipitating factor in the call for the U.N. investigation.  And, in fact, the Syrian government itself said that they would support a U.N. investigation.  What we’ve made clear is that U.N. investigation needs to be comprehensive.  It needs to look into all reports of chemical weapons use, and it needs to have credible access in order to ascertain exactly what took place.

As relates to the numbers of incidents, I won’t go beyond what Secretary Kerry said.  Again, what we are saying is that the intelligence community does assess, with varying degrees of confidence, that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria.  And we’ll continue to seek to gather additional facts associated with that assessment.

On your red line question, it is absolutely the case that the President’s red line is the use of chemical weapons or the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups.  However, I also want to underscore that given how important this issue is and how important these decisions are, our standard of evidence has to build on these intelligence assessments.  So the intelligence assessments inform our decision-making.  We want to continue to investigate above and beyond those intelligence assessments to gather facts so that we can establish a credible and corroborated set of information that can then inform our decision-making.

So currently, again, we have benefited from a lot of rigorous intelligence work.  That intelligence work is based on a mosaic of information.  There is evidence associated with that, including physiological samples.  At the same time, we believe it’s necessary to continue to investigate to corroborate that information and to have a strong, firm, evidentiary basis for the way in which we consult our friends and allies in the international community on this issue and the way in which the President will ultimately makes decisions.

So we are continuing to do further work to establish a definitive judgment as to whether or not the red line has been crossed and to inform our decision-making about what to do next.

Q    Just a point of clarification on the last — you said you need a better or a strong, firm, evidentiary basis to do what exactly?  I mean, what is on the table here, both with your allies and, as you said, for the presidential decision?  What are the range of those options?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Sure.  Thanks for the question.  So, as you know, we currently have a number of lines of effort in Syria, ranging from our humanitarian assistance to our significantly-increasing, nonlethal support to the opposition.  At the same time, though, the President has tasked that there be a full range of options for him to consider for additional action in Syria.

And if, again, we reach a definitive determination that this red line has been crossed based on credible, corroborated information, what we will be doing is consulting closely with our friends and allies in the international community more broadly, as well as the Syrian opposition, to determine what the best course of action is.

I don’t want to get into those hypotheticals at this juncture, but suffice it to say all options are on the table in terms of our response, and it could run a broad spectrum of activity across our various lines of effort in Syria, which already include diplomatic initiatives, already include assistance to the opposition.  But again, at the President’s direction, there are additional options and contingencies that we prepared for that we would have to consider as we make a determination about chemical weapons use.

Q    Thank you so much.  Senator McCain has called on the White House to establish a safe zone for Syrian civilians.  In light of this new evidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons, would the White House consider that?  And my second question is, the President has called on President Assad to step down.  He said that he lost his legitimacy.  Who does he hold responsible in this incident in terms of using chemical weapons?  Is still President Assad responsible for that?  Thank you.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Sure, let me just take the second question first.  As we say in the letter, we believe — the United States intelligence community assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons, again, with varying degrees of confidence.  At the same time, we’re seeking to establish additional facts associated with that assessment.  We reference the chain of custody, so in terms of our efforts to confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions it occurred.

What we also say is that we believe that any use of chemical weapons in Syria would very likely have originated with the Assad regime.  We believe that the Assad regime maintains custody of chemical weapons within Syria, and we believe that they have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to escalate their use of violence against the Syrian people.  So we are very skeptical that the reports of use of chemical weapons could be attributed to anyone other than the Assad regime in Syria given our belief that they remain in custody of those chemical weapons.

We’ve also made it clear that President Assad, as the leader of the Assad regime, is ultimately responsible for the security of those chemical weapons and responsible for ensuring that they are not used.  So ultimately, he is accountable for any use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.  And President Assad and those around him should know that the world is going to continue to carefully monitor this issue and bring forward information as we have it and as we are doing today, and that ultimately, if it is established in a credible and confirmable way that there was a use of chemical weapons by the regime, we do believe that President Assad is ultimately accountable for that action.

With respect to the option that you referenced from Senator McCain, I don’t want to get into a specific hypothetical scenario beyond saying that we will consummately have prepared contingency planning for different scenarios in Syria.  I think the military has spoken to the fact that they do prudent planning in terms of preparing a range of options for different contingencies.  But what we will ultimately do is going to be informed by what we believe is going to make the greatest difference.  And that is a judgment that we want to reach not just by ourselves, but in close coordination and consultation with other countries — beginning with our close allies, countries like the British and the French, who have closely worked with us on this issue of chemical weapons and on the issue of Syria more generally; also the countries in the region that we’ve been working very closely with — Turkey, our Gulf partners, Jordan.

So this will be a process in which we not only seek to evaluate and confirm instances of use of chemical weapons, but as it relates to our response, we’ll be reviewing our own contingency planning.  But we’ll also be in close consultations with our friends and allies as well.

Q    Secretary Hagel had indicated that this conclusion, these assessments had been reached in the past 24 hours.  Could you talk to us about what happened in the last 24 hours and whether you saw any change in the situations at Syrian chemical weapons depots?  And also, just to clarify on your answer on Aleppo, you had said that that was one of the incidents the U.S. had been following up on.  Did you mean that that is one of the two incidents that Kerry was referencing?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  First of all, I don’t want to confirm any particular incident as being confirmed at this point, given the fact that these are intelligence assessments and they’re based on a broad range of information — some of it classified.  What I was confirming is that the incident in Aleppo is one that prompted further investigation and we believe merits further investigation.

With respect to your other question –

MS. HAYDEN:  Margaret, this is Caitlin.  Can you just repeat the other part of your question please?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Oh, it was Hagel, sorry, yes.  So with respect to Secretary Hagel’s comment about the last 24 hours, the way I’d characterize that, Margaret, is that we are constantly reviewing our intelligence as it relates to chemical weapons.  We have been doing so for several months.

I would also note that we are the ones who often raise the profile of the issue of chemical weapons precisely because we saw things that were concerning to us within Syria.  And as we made clear in the letter, we raise those issues publically, we raise those issues privately in seeking to deter the use of chemical weapons.

As a part of that process, we also continually kept Congress informed of our assessments of chemical weapons and our efforts to investigate reports of the use of chemical weapons.  In the last 24 hours, a determination was made to respond to the letter that we received from the several senators on an unclassified basis.

Given the fact that we have been developing additional information within our intelligence community and given the fact that we want to be responsive to Congress, to the international community and the American people on these issues, we felt it was the right and prudent thing to do to respond in an unclassified form to this letter.  So we took that decision last night, and the letter was delivered to Capitol Hill this morning.

As you also have no doubt seen, we were briefing the Congress on this issue as well today in our commitment to keep them fully informed.  So these are constantly updated intelligence assessments.  They evolve over time as we gather more information.  And the decision that was made in the last 24 hours was to finalize the assessment that we would provide, both in terms of our briefing to members of Congress today, but also in terms of deciding to respond to this letter in an unclassified fashion.

Q    Thanks for doing the call.  In Congress, Republicans and Democrats — the Democrat, Dianne Feinstein, just put out a statement — appear to believe that a red line has been crossed.  And Dianne Feinstein said if action isn’t taken now, the Syrian regime will see that there’s no sanction to even limited use of chemical weapons.  To what degree is the administration sensitive to the charge — both leveled by members of Congress and a fear that is within the Syrian opposition — that if nothing is done now, the Syrian regime, desperate, will only escalate its use of chemical weapons because nothing is being done after proof positive has been determined — at least by several governments, and partially by ours — and that the situation is so chaotic in Syria right now that the credible and collaborative or corroborative evidence standard the administration sets can never be reached?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  Thanks for the question, Major.  Let me just say a few things.  First of all, we’re already doing a significant amount in Syria, and we recently doubled our assistance to the opposition, including direct assistance to the Syrian military coalition on the ground.  So we have now $250 million worth of nonlethal assistance.  Again, that will include direct support to the people who are fighting on the ground as it relates to things like meals, medical equipment, body armor and things that are directly relevant to their efforts.  And we also have over $400 million in humanitarian assistance that we’re deploying and delivering into Syria as well — as well as dealing with the refugee crisis in neighboring countries.

With respect to your question on chemical weapons, I would say that we are the ones who took the determination to come forward with our assessment as it stands today, just as we have consistently raised the profile of the issue of chemical weapons.

The other countries that you reference, I think if you were to ask them, they’ll speak for themselves, but they are very much in the same position that we are in assessing that there is evidence of the use of chemical weapons, but there needs to be further investigation so that there is a clear, corroborated and credible basis for the decisions that we need to make.

So again, it’s precisely because we take the red line seriously that we feel like there needs to be clear, factual, evidentiary basis for our decisions.  And we will be continuing that investigation.  And frankly, we feel like even with the chaotic situation in Syria, there are ways for us to establish the facts.

Now, the simplest way is for the U.N. investigation to have the access that it needs to do a credible investigation, and that means people being able to get in on the ground and do the evaluations necessary.

But even without that investigation, we’re already working with the Syrian opposition, who can help us in corroborating reports and gathering evidence.  We’re working with other countries, like the British, for instance, who are also undertaking their own investigations and gathering their own information.  So we are also capable of collecting further information, evaluating that information and presenting it to the public.

But I would say that given our own history with intelligence assessments, including intelligence assessments related to weapons of mass destruction, it’s very important that we are able to establish this with certainty and that we are able to present information that is airtight in a public and credible fashion to underpin all of our decision-making.  That is I think the threshold that is demanded given how serious this issue is.

But I think nobody should have any mistake about what our red line is.  It is when we firmly establish that there has been chemical weapons use within Syria, that is not acceptable to the United States, nor is the transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist organizations.  And the people in Syria and the Assad regime should know that the President means what he says when he set that red line.  And keep in mind, he is the one who laid down that marker.  He’s the one who directed that we provide this information to the public.  And he’s the one who directed that we do everything we can to further investigate this information so that we can establish in credible, corroborated, factual basis what exactly took place.

Q    Two questions.  One, could you give us any more detail on the physiological samples?  Are we talking about soil samples, some other form of material?  And secondly, on the question coming up, what Major asked earlier — if you’re having to wait until you establish this comprehensive case, this evidentiary case you talked about, is there a risk that Assad, who has kind of ratcheted up the use of weapons steadily throughout this war, might feel emboldened to take it to the next level?  I mean, if this is something that’s going to take you weeks or even months to establish definitively, isn’t there a risk that Assad will somehow see that as a pretext to go even further in his use of weapons?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  On your first question, I don’t want to get into the details of the physiological evidence because it’s still rooted in intelligence gathering.  The fact is these assessments, which the intelligence community can speak to, are based on a broad mosaic of information.  Some of it is physiological.

The point I’d make that’s relevant here to our follow-through is that we do have the ability to gather that type of information, precisely because we are working with countries in the region and we’re working with the Syrian opposition.  So we continually gather that type of evidence ourselves.  We do believe that the United Nations should have more direct access into Syria to form a credible investigation of their own.  But in the interim, we’re also going to continue to work with our friends and allies in the opposition to gather as much evidence as we can.

With respect to your second question, I think what the Assad regime needs to know is that we are watching this incredibly closely.  And just the fact that we were able to establish the assessments that we already have collected points to how closely we are monitoring chemical weapons within Syria.  Were he to undertake any additional use, he would be doing so under very careful monitoring from us and the international community.

With respect to the reports of use already, we are already gathering facts associated with those reports so we can establish the type of evidentiary basis that I spoke about.  So I think the message to the Syrian regime should be perfectly clear, even with what we are doing today, which is that we are going to be methodical, rigorous and relentless in gathering the relevant information and putting it together so we can establish exactly what happened around these reports of chemical weapons use.  And if there are any additional reports, we’re similarly going to be following through on those as well, and we’re going to be doing so in the context where the entire world, the international community, is focused on this issue.

So there should be no mistaking our determination not just to get to the bottom of these reports, but to send a message that as we establish the facts here and as we continue to stick to a red line that makes clear that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable to us, the United States of America is committed to following through on what the President said, which is that Bashar al-Assad and his regime will be held accountable for these types of actions.  And I think we’re joined by other like-minded friends and allies who share that view.

Q    Can you tell us whether the physiological samples that you received are associated with any deaths?

WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL:  I don’t want to get into the details of the physiological samples, just because they’re rooted ultimately in intelligence.  What I will say is that as we have a mosaic of information that informs our intelligence judgments, we also have a capability to gather this type of evidence.  And that’s an ongoing process that’s underway.

And we’re not the only ones who are engaged in that effort.  We’re able to speak to the Syrian opposition, for instance, in our efforts to corroborate this information.  So this information picture continues to fill in.  That’s what informed the letter that was delivered to the Hill today.  And that’s what will inform our continued efforts to establish the facts of what happened associated with these reports of chemical weapons use, and associated with the broader challenge of chemical weapons in Syria in general.

I’ll just conclude by saying that we, number one, will continue to be deeply engaged in the situation in Syria.  And I think you’ve already seen the upward trajectory of our assistance and our contact with the opposition as representative of our commitment to bring about a transition in Syria.  The President has been consulting with other leaders.  He had the Emir of Qatar here the other day.  We have King Abdullah coming here shortly.  So we have an ongoing set of consultations about Syria already on chemical weapons.  We’ll continue to provide information to Congress and the public as we gather it.

And that’s I think what you see today with the effort to be transparent with what we know, which is reflected fully in the letter that was delivered and the briefings that have been delivered on the Hill.  And so we’ll continue to keep people informed going forward as this situation develops.

END
1:49 P.M. EDT

Ambassador Laura Kennedy
Permanent Representative of the United States to the Conference on Disarmament and
U.S. Special Representative for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Issues

Cluster 1 Specific Issue: Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee
2015 Review Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Geneva,
April 25, 2013

Mr. Chairman,

From the outset of his administration, President Obama has supported the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and the solid practical steps that the United States is taking to move in that direction. This step-by-step approach to disarmament is the most effective means to increase stability, reduce nuclear dangers, and fulfill our obligations under the NPT.

The U.S. leads by example in fulfilling obligations under the NPT and the commitments set out in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The United States is committed to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency for nuclear disarmament. The United States is also working with other NPT Parties to implement the Action Plan across all three pillars.

The United States has been reducing its nuclear weapons for more than four decades. By September 2009, the U.S. nuclear stockpile was reduced by 84 percent to approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads from its peak of approximately 31,000 nuclear warheads in 1967. During this period, the United States unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear warheads by 90 percent.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia, now in its third successful year in force demonstrates our commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. When the Treaty limits apply in 2018, the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will be capped at their lowest level since the 1950s. The rigorous and extensive provisions of the Treaty testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations. I hope delegations were able to hear Acting Undersecretary Gottemoeller’s briefing on New START with her counterpart negotiator Russian Deputy Defense Minister Antonov.

When President Obama signed New START in 2012, he made clear his commitment to further reductions and to pursuing discussions with Russia on further reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons − strategic, non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. In his 2013 State of the Union address, the President reiterated his commitment to further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. To this end, the United States seeks to promote strategic stability and increase transparency on a reciprocal basis with Russia. Earlier this month, the President’s National Security Advisor had comprehensive and constructive discussions with several Russian officials, including President Putin, on a range of bilateral and global issues.

NATO has also made clear that it will consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the disparity between Russian and U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapon stockpiles in Europe.

The goal of a world without nuclear weapons will not be reached quickly. It will take sustained commitment and persistence and must be pursued through concrete, practical steps. In seeking this goal, the United States holds to the basic principles that it outlined in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the NPR: preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced force levels; reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist.

With regard to modernization, the 2010 NPR made clear that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads neither will it support new military missions nor provide for new military capabilities The United States has significantly reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and military strategy. Further steps can and should be taken. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. We will work to establish the conditions under which a universal policy that makes deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of nuclear weapons could be safely adopted.

The United States has also demonstrated leadership through unilateral transparency measures. U.S. released in 2010 its nuclear weapons stockpile figures and articulated in the NPR the reduced role of nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear community is exploring the technical steps needed to ensure irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency for further nuclear disarmament and we are also considering ways to collaborate with other NPT Parties in this undertaking.

Since the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the five nuclear-weapon States under the NPT (or “P5”) have met regularly to address and make progress on our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Last week, Russia hosted the fourth successful P5 Conference. The P5 process has expanded the long-standing U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament dialogue into an ongoing process of P5 engagement, consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the Action Plan.

In the area of nuclear testing, President Obama pledged that his Administration would pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Administration has been engaging with the U.S. Senate and laying the groundwork for positive Senate reconsideration of the Treaty. The United States is vigorously supporting completion of the CTBT’s monitoring and verification regime though both assessed and substantial voluntary funding.

Since 1992, the United States has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. The NPR reiterated that the United States no longer requires nuclear explosive testing to ensure the safety and effectiveness of our remaining nuclear weapons, relying instead on our long-standing Stockpile Stewardship Program. The United States calls upon all states, to refrain from nuclear testing.

I recall the joint statement by the P-5 on April 19 that affirmed the joint concern about the serious challenge posed by nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on February 12.

With regard to fissile material, the United States has not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons since 1964 nor produced plutonium for weapons since 1988. The United States has worked with Russia to eliminate excess stocks of fissile material that could be used in nuclear warheads. Under the 1993 U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement, 472 metric tons of Russian weapons-origin HEU, which is equivalent to about 18,900 nuclear weapons, has now been down-blended for use as commercial reactor fuel in the United States; that number is expected to reach the Agreement’s 500-metric ton target within this calendar year. In 2011, the United States and Russia brought the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its Protocols into force, committing each country to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium. This is enough for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. Disposition will be subject to IAEA monitoring and will irreversibly transform the material into forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons.

As we dispose of existing stocks of fissile material declared excess to defense needs, the United States remains certain that a verified end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is both essential and the next logical multilateral step towards disarmament. We have been working to initiate negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and we are disappointed at the CD’s lack of progress. We are also endeavoring to use available opportunities on the margins of the CD to make progress toward FMCT negotiations, including serious consultations among the states that would be directly affected by an FMCT. We are hopeful that the UN Group of Governmental Experts to be established by UN General Assembly Resolution 67/53 will also provide an impetus to the CD.

Since the darkest days of the Cold War, the United States has fully understood and shares concerns about the profound and serious consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons. We accord the highest priority to avoiding such use. As President Reagan said in 1984, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” It is in our interest, as well as that of all nations, that the now nearly 68-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons be extended forever. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons under the most extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

The United States recognizes the special responsibility of the NPT nuclear-weapon States to make progress toward nuclear disarmament. But all NPT Parties can contribute to the Treaty’s disarmament goals, both by pursuing disarmament steps themselves, such as initiating FMCT negotiations and adherence to the CTBT, and by helping to create the conditions for such progress. Progress on disarmament under the NPT is integrally linked to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for which we all have shared responsibility – nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States alike.

The U.S. working paper on disarmament submitted at this Preparatory Committee session provides additional details regarding U.S. progress toward nuclear disarmament, as well as a synopsis of U.S. non-nuclear disarmament and arms control efforts. I commend it to our colleagues.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that while much progress has been achieved, much remains to be done. The United States will continue to work step by step towards fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the Action Plan across all three NPT pillars. We urge other NPT Parties to do the same. As Article VI makes clear, all NPT Parties have a role to play in disarmament.

Let me conclude with an all too brief tribute to George Bunn who just passed away. George Bunn was one of my predecessors as US Ambassador to the CD. He played a crucial role, together with Soviet negotiators, in finding creative and enduring language during the negotiation of the NPT, the landmark treaty that unites us in the hall today. He was an extraordinary man who left an extraordinary legacy.

(end text)

In her presentation Under Secretary Gottemoeller outlined the treaty’s verification regime and the continued success of the treaty’s implementation.

See the presentation here:

The New START Treaty: An Overview of the Verification Regime (pdf)

Photo Gallery

Begin Message

On behalf of the United States, please accept my hopes for and personal commitment to a successful and productive meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

This summer, we celebrate the 45th anniversary of the signing of the NPT.  Although conceived in a different era when the hands of the Doomsday Clock pointed precariously towards disaster, the treaty’s goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains no less relevant today.  This is why, in 2009, President Obama re-affirmed our nation’s support for the treaty and called on all countries to join us in working to secure the peace and security of a world free of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The President’s agenda is rooted in the interest almost all of us share in preserving the treaty as a basis for global cooperation.  We will continue to do our part by taking action to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, their roles, and the likelihood of their use.  At the same time, we will work to strengthen international safeguards and encourage peaceful uses of nuclear energy by states that meet their obligations.  In response to those who abuse the treaty, we will continue to insist that violations be confronted with the urgency they require.  A treaty that is universally followed will best advance international security and nuclear energy’s contribution to peace, health, and prosperity.

I wish this conference well and offer my hope for a productive discussion that builds on the consensus action plan approved by the 2010 NPT Review Conference and that puts us on a path to success in 2015.

End Message

Go to Full Text of Assistant Secretary Countryman’s Statement