The Secretary announces that President Obama has designated Rose Gottemoeller as the Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security (T).  Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller will remain in her role as Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC). As Acting Under Secretary, Gottemoeller will advise the Secretary on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

Ellen Tauscher is departing the T bureau.  She has agreed to serve part-time as the Secretary’s Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense.  Special Envoy Tauscher will work on strategic security issues in our relationship with the Russian Federation.
(end text)

Media Note

Washington, DC

February 7, 2012

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Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 1 On Procedures for Conducting Demonstrations of Recording Media and/or Telemetric Information Playback Equipment

February 7, 2012

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Taking into consideration that the Parties have conducted the initial demonstrations, required by the Treaty, of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties shall conduct subsequent demonstrations, in accordance with the Treaty, of recording media and/or telemetric information playback equipment using the following procedures:

1. During the demonstration the providing Party shall:

(a) describe its telemetric signal conversion processes (from reception to recording) associated with the recording medium and telemetric information playback equipment to be demonstrated, or provide data on telemetry systems that enable the conversion of telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast;

(b) demonstrate each type of recording medium to be provided to the receiving Party in accordance with subparagraph 6(a) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Telemetric Information. Each such recording medium that is being demonstrated shall contain a recording of the following examples of telemetric information:

(i) actual telemetric information that was broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM; or

(ii) information with characteristic features of telemetric information that is broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM.

In this connection, the recording contained on the recording medium that is being demonstrated must be suitable for demonstrating the playback of the telemetric information on the appropriate telemetric information playback equipment;

(c) describe each type of recording medium that is being demonstrated, as well as describe the recording methods and formats that are used for each type of recording medium;

(d) demonstrate all the telemetric information playback equipment in a manner that allows the receiving Party to observe a display or indicator that demonstrates that the telemetric information playback equipment is operating properly. Such telemetric information playback equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of recording media that are being demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph;

(e) answer questions of the receiving Party pertaining to its ability to play back telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media;

(f) for the examples of telemetric information recorded on the recording media that are being demonstrated, provide corresponding illustrative examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media that meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information, and corresponding illustrative examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information that meet the requirements of paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information.

2. Upon completion of the demonstration, the providing Party shall provide to the receiving Party all the demonstrated recording media with the examples of telemetric information recorded on them, examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media and examples of interpretive data for the telemetric information on the recording media, as well as other information that is additionally provided in order to achieve the objectives of the demonstration.

3. The Demonstration must be sufficient for the receiving Party to be able to get an idea of the full set of telemetric information playback equipment, as well as the technical requirements necessary for playing back the examples of telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media.

4. During the demonstration the procedures for playing back telemetric information shall be demonstrated. The providing Party shall provide a description of those types of modulation, methods, modes, and recording formats, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information contained on recording media that allow the receiving Party to convert the telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast.

5. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

6. The provisions of paragraphs 2-6 of Part Six of the Annex on Telemetric Information, which are applicable to the trainee team members, shall also apply to representatives of the receiving Party participating in demonstrations.

7. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

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Bilateral Consultative Commission: Agreement Number 2 On the Amount of Telemetric Information on ICBM and SLBM Launches That Each Party Shall Provide

The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

1. For each launch of an ICBM or SLBM for which telemetric information is provided in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, the Party conducting the launch shall provide telemetric information to the other Party beginning from the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the ICBM or SLBM, until:

(a) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or;

(b) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or

(c) the expiration of one second after loss of active control of the missile’s control system (when the active stage of the missile does not respond to control signals), if such loss occurred prior to separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM, or until the moment of loss of the telemetric signal coincident with such loss of active control, whichever occurred earlier.

2. Each Party shall provide, in the interpretive data for the telemetric information, names of data elements and their location in the telemetry frame, as well as descriptions necessary to identify the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

Done at Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

United Nations
Geneva, Switzerland
January 31, 2012

Mr. President, Mr. SYG, Colleagues:

We appreciate  the President’s attempt to stimulate thinking on how to move the CD toward accomplishing its founding purpose – to negotiate formal treaties.  We share the frustration and impatience about the deadlock in this body, a message voiced here directly by my Secretary of  State last year.

Let me, however, comment on some of the assertions in working paper 1929 that has just been circulated.

For example, the paper asserts that endless debates over a Program of Work have prevented the Conference from discussing substantively the issues on its agenda which would “lay the basis for negotiations.”

On the contrary, there have, for many years, been focused discussions on all agenda items even in the absence of a Programme of Work.

These discussions have taken place in a variety of venues, in informal and formal meetings and plenaries, in coordination meetings, and even on the margins of the CD.  Delegations have on occasion brought in experts to speak to these issues in more depth.

Among the purposes of these discussions was that of determining which issues on the CD’s agenda could most productively be advanced for negotiation. Time and again, the discussions demonstrated that FMCT was the such issue.

The paper also questions whether priority should be given to negotiating an FMCT in the CD. The fact is that this body exists to negotiate treaties related to, among other things, nuclear disarmament.

We all know tremendous progress that has been achieved between the United States and Russia in reducing their arsenals through a step-by-step process.

As a practical matter, several more such steps will be necessary before such negotiated reductions can become multilateral.

We also know that one of the conditions for moving to truly low numbers of nuclear weapons and eventually to zero is halting the production of new material for such weapons.

This is why FMCT is the next logical step for multilateral efforts. An FMCT would be a significant step, an essential one, a worthy achievement for the international community’s only standing multilateral disarmament body.  In fact, 189 states endorsed that goal in the NPT Final document Action Plan.  Are we to simply reject that goal and discard the Action Plan which has been widely
hailed as a road map for the future?  Our answer is a resounding NO.

The paper also suggests that the CD’s lack of productivity calls for shortening its sessions, or putting it on “standby,” a step whose effects could, in practical terms, prove hard to reverse.  Budget resources, once redeployed, can be hard or impossible to regain.

I think the real point is, since the international community has established its priorities, how can it go about implementing them?

The international community has previously agreed on the importance of FMCT, and on pursuing FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.  That decision was made with serious purpose: the CD provides the conditions under which the stakeholders are present and should be able to negotiate seriously.

Putting the CD on “standby” or shortening its meetings would remove the most logical venue…  In the absence of the CD, other options to pursue this priority will surely be sought, probably including some less conducive to providing a consensual outcome and meeting our respective security interests.

To “set aside” FMCT would be tantamount to this Conference declaring its failure as a negotiating body.  For its part, the United States is not prepared to accept defeat.

Nor are we willing to accede to an action that would signal to our publics that we do not have the energy or the interest to do the hard work that disarmament agreements entail.  I am proud to represent a President who has rallied the international community to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.  We cannot walk away from that endeavor.

The paper also questions whether the CD’s agenda is the cause of the impasse and suggests the convening of a Special Session on Disarmament to review the disarmament machinery generally. While there may be merit in reviewing our agenda, which frankly is rooted deeply in the Cold War, long past, the fact is that we, the members, are the masters of our agenda.  If we believe such a review is warranted, we can discuss it.

However, this is not the time for us to be signaling lesser interest or less energy to pursue the international community’s disarmament agenda.  Again, addressing fissile material is central to the goal of nuclear disarmament, not some alien element or parasite that has “wormed” its way into our midst.

It is time for us to renew our efforts to find a way to address the concerns that have made it impossible for negotiations to begin.  We believe that the greatest assurance derives from the CD’s consensus rule, which ensures that all states’ national security interests can be protected in negotiations.

Finally, welcome to our new colleague from Russia, Ambassador Borodavkin.  I note the reference in his statement to a new compromise proposal designed to get this body back to work, a compromise which we can certainly support in the spirit of flexibility and political will which is so often called for in this body and a compromise offered within the “logical framework” mentioned by our distinguished Algerian colleague Ambassador Jazairy.

Interview with Rose Gottemoeller
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
On-the-Record

Washington, DC
January 19, 2012

Interview with Judy Dempsey from the International Herald Tribune and special contributor to the Munich Security Conference

QUESTION: Late last year, the Americans broke off conventional arms control talks with Russia. Why?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: The situation simply could not continue indefinitely. The Russian Federation had “suspended implementation” of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in December 2007. Last fall, we decided we needed to take action. Together with a group of other Treaty signatories–NATO allies and partners Moldova and Georgia–we agreed to halt implementation of the Treaty with Russia. We continue to implement the CFE Treaty with all the other states-parties. We were sending a message; we considered it to be a rational countermeasure, and did it more in sorrow than in anger. It was a message to Russia that we would like to see them come back into implementation of the Treaty. The United States is committed to revitalizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe and continues to consult on finding a way forward with our Treaty partners.

QUESTION: What could restart negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Right now, I think we’re in a good place. It is still premature to talk about negotiations, but ceasing the implementation of the CFE Treaty toward Russia actually opens up an environment to explore new opportunities for the future of conventional arms control in Europe. But first we need to do some very basic work on the concepts and substance, together with our allies and partners, including the Russians. Everybody knows that the CFE Treaty simply is not relevant anymore to the current security situation in Europe. It was negotiated at a time when the Warsaw Pact was still standing against us.

QUESTION: It was a Cold War relic?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: What we have now is an opportunity for a regime that would be clearly post Cold War. We need to think ahead about what will be most helpful, contributing to resolving the frozen conflicts and strengthening regional security. I think the Russians have the same interest in stable and predictable security relationships as other countries.

QUESTION: If you look at the entirety of Russia’s security outlook, tactical nuclear weapons are an important card, because its conventional forces are so weak. Where do we stand with regard to tactical nuclear weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: It is true that the Russian military doctrine is quite clear on the strategic importance they give to tactical nuclear weapons. But we need to pull the aperture wider. When President Obama signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, he said that the United States would like to negotiate further reductions in three categories of nuclear arms: in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, in non-deployed strategic nuclear weapons (for example, held in storage facilities) and in non strategic nuclear weapons, the so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which are the ones that concern Europe. The President made it very clear that we want to tackle all three categories in the next arms reduction negotiations with Russia.

QUESTION: But why should the Russians agree to cuts in tactical weapons?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: Again, you have to look at the full picture. The Russians have always said that they are concerned about U.S. up-load capabilities…

QUESTION: …meaning that the U.S. could relatively quickly bring back a substantial number of reserve nuclear weapons from storage…

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: …and that could be a part of the picture for future negotiations. I am not saying that we are making an official proposal at this point. But you have to have an idea what the trade-offs might be.

QUESTION: So far, there really has not been much movement on tactical weapons.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: I would not say that. In fact, there has been movement in two areas: First, the United States has made it clear that we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about the issues affecting further reductions. And we want to begin talking sooner rather than later about transparency measures that we might pursue even before we get back to the negotiating table. And so, we are looking at some ideas in that regard. In the meantime, there is some important homework that we have to do within the NATO Alliance–the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is taking place right now. We know that NATO is committed to an extended deterrent and will remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist. In May, we are going to have the NATO summit in Chicago. That is an opportunity to reach some conclusions on what NATO policy is going to be with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Does missile defense complicate things?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY GOTTEMOELLER: We hope not! (laughs) Because we talk until we are blue in the face to make the point that we believe cooperation on missile defenses in Europe would be very much in the interests of the Russian Federation. Our goal is to reach agreement on a political framework to move missile defense cooperation forward and strengthen the overlapping capabilities that we have. We want to address the common threat that ballistic missiles pose for security in Europe, including for Russia. Through this cooperation, Russia would see first-hand that this system is designed and capable to defend only against missiles originating from the Middle East. At the same time, we have been trying to convey to them also that U.S. and NATO missile defenses in Europe are not intended nor will they be capable to undermine the Russian strategic offensive armed forces. The Russians remain to be convinced. But I don’t think it’s a hopeless situation. Not by any stretch of the imagination.

(end text)

Thank you for your kind introduction. I am honored to have been invited to speak at this conference, named in honor of the preeminent example of U.S.-Israel space cooperation, Ilan Ramon. I would like to thank the Fisher Institute, the Israel
Space Agency, and the Ministry of Science and Technology for the opportunity to present to you an American perspective on space security.

Defining “Space Security”

Each of us here at this conference has a different interpretation of what “space security” means that stems principally from our respective country’s national interests and the contributions that space systems make to our security, economy, and daily lives. Based on the U.S. National Space Policy and other Presidential guidance, as well as our obligations under international law, we in the United States associate “space security” with the pursuit of those activities that ensure the sustainability, stability, safety, and free access to, and use of, outer space in support of the vital interests of all nations. This is reinforced by several other related principles in the U.S. National Space Policy:

•  It is in the shared interest of all nations to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.
•  All nations have the right, in accordance with international law, to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, “peaceful purposes” allows for space to be used for national and homeland security activities.
• The United States considers the space systems of all nations to have the rights of passage through, and conduct of operations in, space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be con­sidered, in the U.S. view, an infringement of a nation’s rights.

Past Conversations on Space Security

When this conference was first held under a different name in 2001, a general theme emerged from the international presentations that “a clear ‘race’ for presence in and utilization of space [was] under way, involving many nations around the
world—with diverse technological and economic prowess, as well as strategic and political orientation. […] This ‘race’ [bore] only [a] partial resemblance to the ‘race to the moon’ or ‘the U.S.-Soviet space race,’ as it [was] only partly influenced by rivalry and competition between specific rivals or adversaries.” It was noted that the ‘race’ was facilitated by lower barriers to entry, and
that while emerging spacefaring nations were lagging behind established space powers in utilizing the opportunities inherent in space, they were becoming ever more determined and competent on harnessing space for a variety of activities.

The Space Environment Today

In many ways, today’s space situation is even more pronounced than it was a decade ago. Today, the benefits derived from space assets permeate almost every aspect of our lives worldwide. Space systems enable personal communications devices; facilitate the operations of global markets; enhance weather forecasting and environmental monitoring; enable global navigation and transportation; expand our scientific frontier; provide national decision makers with global communications, command, and control; and scores of other activities worldwide.

Space is no longer an environment accessed nearly exclusively by two superpowers or a few countries. Barriers to entry are lower than ever, and many countries are enjoying access to and the benefits of space in unprecedented numbers. Today, space is the domain of a growing number of satellite operators; approximately 60 nations and government consortia operate satellites, as well as numerous commercial and academic satellite operators. Paradoxically, while it is becoming increasingly easier to access as well as to benefit from space, space is also becoming increasingly congested and contested. This situation means we need to think carefully through how we can all operate there safely and responsibly. Our goal is to ensure that the generations that follow us can also benefit from the advantages that space offers.

Decades of space activity have littered low Earth orbit with debris, and as the world’s spacefaring nations continue to increase activities in space, the chance for collision increases correspondingly. The U.S. Department of Defense tracks roughly 22,000 objects in orbit, of which only 1,100 are active satellites. While some pieces of debris are simply “dead” satellites or spent booster upper stages still orbiting, and others are the results of accidents or mishaps, such as the 2009 Cosmos-Iridium collision, some debris is the result of intentionally destructive events, such as China’s test in space of an anti-satellite weapon in 2007. Experts warn that the quantity and density of man-made debris significantly increase the odds of future damaging collisions. Threats to the space environment will also increase as more nations and non-state actors develop and deploy counter-space systems. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets.

The international community is more reliant on space than ever and the long-term sustainability of our space activities are at serious risk from a number of sources such as space debris, as well as from potential mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust, and irresponsible actors and their actions. Irresponsible acts against space systems have implications beyond the space environment, disrupting services upon which civil, commercial, and national security sectors around the world depend, with potentially damaging consequences for all of us and to future generations. Ensuring the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment—through measures such as providing prior notifications of launches of space launch vehicles, establishing “best practices guidelines,” and warning of risks of collisions between space objects—are in the vital interest of the
United States and the entire world community and enhance our mutual security interests.

Space Security and Sustainability in 2012

Given the increasing threat, we must work with the community of spacefaring nations to preserve the space environment for all nations and future generations. 2012 will be a defining year for advancing this goal, with:

• Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities;
• Initial meetings of a U.N.-established Group of Government Experts on Space TCBMs;
• The introduction of space security in the discussions in the Group of 8 (G8); and
• The continuing work of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on the “Long Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.”

One of the ways the United States is moving forward with ensuring the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of space in 2012 is through our pursuit of near-term, voluntary, and pragmatic transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs). TCBMs are means by which governments can address challenges and share information with the aim of creating mutual
understanding and reducing tensions. Through TCBMs we can address important areas such as orbital debris, space situational awareness, and collision avoidance, as well as undertake activities that will help to increase familiarity and trust and encourage openness among space actors. The United States, as guided by President Obama’s National Space Policy, will work with other space actors to pursue pragmatic, near-term TCBMs to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, space.

An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities

Perhaps one of the most beneficial multilateral TCBMs for ensuring sustainability and security in space could be the adoption of “best practice” guidelines or a “code of conduct.” As many of you are aware, on January 17, the United States announced that it had decided to join with the European Union and other spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. In her statement announcing the decision, Secretary Clinton said, “The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors. […] Unless the international community addresses these challenges, the environment around our planet will become increasingly hazardous to human spaceflight and satellite systems, which would create damaging consequences for all of us.” The United States views the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct as a good foundation for developing a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct focused on the use of voluntary and pragmatic TCBMs to help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust in space. As more countries field space capabilities, it is in all of our interests that they act responsibly and that the safety and sustainability of space is protected. An International Code of Conduct, if adopted, would establish guidelines to reduce the risks and dangers of debris-generating events and increase the transparency of operations in space to avoid the danger of collisions.

The Obama Administration is committed to ensuring that an International Code enhances national security and maintains the United States’ inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, a fundamental part of international law. The United States would only subscribe to such a Code of Conduct if:

• it protects and enhances the national and economic security of the United States, our allies, and our friends, and;
• it does not hamper, limit, or prevent the United States from using space for peaceful purposes, including national security related activities.

Group of Government Experts on Outer Space TCBMs 

The United States is also anticipating beginning work this year in the Group of Government Experts (or GGE) on Outer Space TCBMs established by UN General Assembly Resolution 65/68. We support the full consideration of all helpful proposals for bilateral and multilateral TCBMs. Such proposals could include measures aimed at enhancing the transparency of national security space policies, strategies, activities and experiments or notifications regarding environmental or unintentional hazards to spaceflight safety. International consultations to prevent incidents in outer space and to prevent or minimize the risks of potentially harmful interference could also be a helpful TCBM to consider. We look forward to working with our international colleagues in a GGE that serves as a constructive mechanism to examine voluntary and pragmatic TCBMs that enhance stability and safety, and promote responsible operations in space.

Space Security and Sustainability in the G8

The United States has also introduced discussions on the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment in the G8 because we believe that this body, which contains a number of major spacefaring nations, could play a useful role in this field and will draw further attention to the importance of ensuring space for future generations.

UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Finally, in addition to “top-down” initiatives, the United States believes that efforts to adopt space TCBMs should also be built upon “bottom-up” initiatives developed by government and private sector satellite operators. Therefore, the United States is taking an active role in the Working Group of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) on long-term  sustainability. The Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability on Outer Space Activities will be a key forum for the international development of “best practices guidelines” for space activities. We believe that many of the best practice guidelines
addressed by this working group are foundational to our efforts to pursue TCBMs that enhance stability and security. In fact, the United States is serving as the co-Chair of the Expert Group on Space Debris, Space Operations and Tools to Support Collaborative Space Situational Awareness showing our commitment to making progress to enhance spaceflight safety and to preserving the use of space for the long-term.

Ensuring Space Security and Sustainability for Future Generations

Looking back at the Cold War space race that began over a half century ago, to the space “race” described at this conference over a decade ago, to the congested and contested space environment we face in 2012, it is clear that the space environment continues to change in dynamic and challenging ways. Today, the world is increasingly inter-connected through, and increasingly dependent on, space systems. The risks associated with irresponsible actions in space mean that ensuring the long-term sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment is in the vital interest of the entire world community. I believe that 2012 will be a defining year for space security, and the work we all will do in responding to the challenges of, and the threats to, the space environment can help us preserve space for all nations and future generations.

Thank you very much.

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller
Opening Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Geneva, Switzerland

As Delivered

Thank you very much Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President. At the outset of my remarks, please allow me to congratulate Ecuador, and you personally, on your assumption of the first Presidency of the 2012 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ambassador  Kennedy and I wish you well as you guide the work of this Conference forward; you may count on the U.S. delegation’s full support.

I  would also like to extend our best wishes to the other CD Presidents for the 2012 session – Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, and Germany. We look forward to working with all of you  during this year.

Accomplishments 

I  spoke at the CD’s opening session last January and I am pleased to be here again  to highlight the progress on arms control and disarmament that has been made over  the course of the past year.

The  New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Implementation is going well and continues to contribute positively to the U.S. – Russian relationship. The treaty represents  a strong foundation for further bilateral reductions and an important step on  the path towards a world without nuclear weapons.  Discussions between our two governments on the next steps are underway.

I  am also pleased to report that the U.S.-Russian  Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) and its Protocols came into force in 2011.  The PMDA commits the United States and the Russian Federation each to dispose of no less than 34
metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium – enough material in total for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

Expanding beyond bilateral issues, the five Nuclear Weapon States have started a regular dialogue on verification issues and confidence-building measures related to nuclear disarmament, as part of our commitment to carry out our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations.

The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts – publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, sponsoring site visits and frequently briefing others on our nuclear programs and disarmament efforts.

The United States is committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we have been engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the Treaty.  As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitments not to conduct explosive nuclear tests.  We thank and congratulate Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia for ratifying the Treaty in the past year.  We ask that all the remaining Annex 2 States join us in moving forward toward ratification.

I am also gratified to report progress on the extension of treaty-based negative security assurances through regional Nuclear Weapons Free zones.  The Obama Administration transmitted the relevant Protocols of the African and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.   We were also glad that the Nuclear Weapon States and the states of ASEAN resolved long standing differences related to the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone’s Protocol language: Along with the other NPT depositary states, we have lent our strong support to the efforts of the facilitator for the 2012 Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference, Finnish Under Secretary Jaako Laajava.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States is proud of the progress made towards a world free of chemical weapons. We continue to make steady progress in destroying our chemical weapons. By April of this year, we anticipate we will have destroyed 90% of our stockpile.  The remaining 10% will be destroyed while assigning highest priority to ensuring the safety of people, protecting the environment, and complying with national standards for safety and emissions, as called for in the Convention.

Last month, the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention met here in Geneva for their Seventh Review Conference.  They agreed to a standing set of agenda items that cover national implementation, developments in science and technology and assistance and cooperation, all of which will serve to strengthen the effect of the treaty and help bridge the interrelated work being undertaken in the security, public health, law enforcement and scientific communities.  This was done under the able direction of our CD colleague, Ambassador Paul van den IJsell. 

Mr. President, before proceeding further on CD matters, please allow me to discuss recent developments regarding the European Union’s proposal for a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.”

Over the past four years, United States and European experts have regularly consulted on drafts of the EU “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.” After an extensive interagency review of the EU’s initiative, the United States has decided to enter into formal consultations with the European Union and spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct, because the long-term sustainability of the space environment is at risk from space debris and irresponsible activities.

As Secretary Clinton announced on January 17, the United States is prepared to work in active partnership with all governments to develop a Code that can be adopted by the greatest number of spacefaring nations around the globe.

We believe that an international Code can help strengthen the long-term sustainability of space and promote safe and responsible use of space, while at the same time ensuring the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired.  As more countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our mutual interest that they act responsibly.  A widely-subscribed International Code can
encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing risks of mishaps, misperceptions, mistrust, and misconduct.

We expect to actively participate in the international discussions on an international Code throughout this year and beyond.  As part of this process, the United States looks forward to the multilateral experts’ meetings that the European Union plans to convene in the near future.

We also look forward to the Group of Government Experts on outer space TCBMs that is scheduled to convene this summer.  We
see this as a key opportunity to develop practical measures to enhance transparency and confidence building and sustain the peaceful exploitation of outer space. 

The Impasse at the CD 

Mr. President, while the international community has been active and achieved results in many areas during the past year, the Conference on Disarmament appears to be no closer to an “honest day’s work” than it was last January.

Despite herculean efforts by a number of CD Member States, the CD continues to languish, and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the next logical and necessary step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process, remains no closer to negotiation.

We did see some rays of hope last year. Australia and Japan hosted a series of extensive FMCT technical experts’ discussions on the CD’s margins that allowed the international community an opportunity to exchange views and gain perspectives in a sustained and organized way.  The Chairs’ summaries of these discussions will make a useful contribution to our collective body of
knowledge when eventual FMCT negotiations begin.

The United States initiated consultations among the P5 and others on unblocking FMCT negotiations in the CD and to prepare our own countries for what certainly will be a prolonged and technically challenging negotiation.

Last
summer, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member States to continue their dialogue on ways to improve the operation and effectiveness of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery, in particular the CD.

In the view of the United States, all of these efforts have been worthwhile, but regrettably, none has achieved the desired result of moving this body forward on FMCT negotiations and work on other important issues.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the CD last February, she had stressed that, “Global nuclear
security is too important to allow this matter [FMCT] to drift forever.

At the most recent session of the UNGA First Committee, we all witnessed and experienced the growing international frustration with the status quo here in Geneva.  Not surprisingly, and with no small amount of justification, many in the international community are losing patience with the current situation in the CD.

Every government represented in this room has national security concerns and obligations associated with an FMCT, including my own.  But as responsible governments, we also have a collective obligation to and responsibility for international peace and
security, to which an FMCT would significantly contribute.

An FMCT is as vital as ever

The FMCT is not some sort of deliberate diversion from “real” nuclear disarmament.  Along with the CTBT, an FMCT is an absolutely essential step for global nuclear disarmament.

Simply stated, we can’t get to the end, if we don’t start at the beginning. A verifiable end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.  How can we make
progress towards a world without nuclear weapons while some states continue to produce the key component for building up their nuclear arsenals?

A universal halt to the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons is essential.  Some states have already declared a
moratorium on such production, but others have not. Some, such as the United States, have reduced their military stocks of fissile material, whereas others are actively engaged in further production.

The path to a world without nuclear weapons will require many steps.  The next logical step in halting the increase of nuclear arsenals is an FMCT.

Mr. President, in Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s Action Plan, all States Parties agreed that the CD should begin immediate negotiation of an FMCT.  The United States remains firmly committed to an FMCT as a tangible contribution to our “full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI,” as stated in that Action Plan.  As the 2015 NPT review process gets under way this year, every NPT State Party has a responsibility to help make an FMCT a reality. In fact, every nation should share in the work that will create the conditions necessary to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world. 

Looking Ahead 

Here in Geneva, and New York, and in capitals around the world, there has been a vigorous debate over the state of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery in general and the CD impasse, in particular.

I have been speaking about this at various venues and I will reiterate my thoughts here.  Some people have spoken about amending the consensus rule at the CD, in order to break the current logjam.  The United States does not share the view that the impasse in the CD is the result of its procedural rules.  On the contrary, we believe that the consensus rule has served CD members well by providing assurance that individual member states’ national security concerns can be met.

There may be a case for some modifications to how decisions are taken on small procedural items at the CD, but those issues are not at the heart of the impasse. The road will remain blocked until all members of the CD are convinced that commencing negotiations is in their national interest, or at least, not harmful to those interests. The United States is working hard to make the case to those countries with reservations about the FMCT that starting negotiations is not something to fear.

Of course, for any negotiation to be substantive and worthwhile, the key states most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved.  When it comes down to what is in the best interest of international security, the negotiating venue for the FMCT is of
less importance than the participants. As a matter of pragmatism, however, the CD – which includes every major nuclear capable state – remains the best option for achieving a viable, effective FMCT.

Once FMCT negotiations have begun, CD members will face many complex and contentious issues, including the difficult issue of scope. We are well aware that CD members are divided on this issue.  Ambassador Shannon’s Report to the CD, from which the Shannon Mandate is derived, highlighted these disagreements. His Report of his consultations made it abundantly clear that members could not agree on this key issue, nor on many others.  What members did agree on is embodied in a key line in that Report following a listing of those contentious issues. That crucial line said: “…it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.”

The U.S. position is clear: FMCT obligations, including verification obligations, should cover only new production of fissile material.  Step-by-step approaches to arms control and nonproliferation have been very successful over the years.  A step-by-step approach would serve us well with an FMCT. One essential step in the process should be a legal ban on the production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware that many CD members have a different view and this issue will be the subject of vigorous debate.  That is what
negotiations are for, and the United States is ready to have that debate.  What is not helpful is an effort to “pre-negotiate” the outcome of any negotiations by an explicit reference to existing stocks in a negotiating mandate.

We would not be alone in seeing this as a thinly-veiled effort to prevent negotiations from getting underway.

Regarding the possibility of the CD simultaneously negotiating on the four core issues (FMCT, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and prevention of an arms race in outer space); it is not a practical option.  It is difficult to see how a body that has not negotiated any of these topics over the last sixteen years could take on the responsibility for negotiating all four at one time.  The CD should focus on one major negotiation at a time, as it did during the CTBT negotiations.   Given the reality that an FMCT would set the stage for further progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, it has been repeatedly endorsed by CD member states as the priority nuclear disarmament negotiation.

Conclusion

Mr. President, we hope that 2012 will be the year when the Conference on Disarmament emerges from its prolonged impasse
and once again contributes to international peace and security by beginning negotiations on an FMCT.

The CD and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, all of which were contentious in their own right and took years to complete. But in each case, the nations and people who assembled in this historic chamber persevered, and helped to create a multilateral arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament structure that supports the security of the international system to this very day.

An FMCT will make a critical contribution to this international security architecture. As Secretary Clinton said last February, this agreement is “too important a matter to be left in a deadlock forever.”

If the CD fails to deliver an FMCT negotiation this year, we will again have shirked our responsibility to move forward towards a world without nuclear weapons…. We recognize that this is a crucial year for the CD as an institution and that the UN General Assembly is monitoring our progress closely. Let’s seize the opportunity to make real progress here and restore the vibrancy of this once vital institution.  Business as usual is a recipe for disaster.

We look forward to consulting and working with the CD Member and Observer states as the 2012 session proceeds. Time is short and the stakes are high.

Thank  you, Mr. President.

    Photo Gallery

11:58 AM EST

Briefer: Victoria Nuland, Spokesperson

[Begin excerpt]

QUESTION: Syria?

MS. NULAND: Yeah.

QUESTION: This major date is today, the 19th, so I just was wondering – I saw that you suggested that this thing maybe should not go on forever, that certain progress has to be met, and this isn’t a solution, just having monitors – what you’re looking for in the report as a – as the meetings take place this weekend, and secondly, what you really hope for in terms of post-report and how to really stop the violence in Syria.

MS. NULAND: Well, we did talk about some of these issues yesterday, Brad. The Arab League is now meeting on Saturday and Sunday, to 21st to 22nd. We do want to give the Arab League a chance to receive the report of its monitors, to absorb it. We want to talk to them as we have been in the lead up to this about what comes next. And as we’ve said, it’s a mixed picture with these monitors. In places where the monitors have been able to deploy, we have seen the Syrian opposition able to mount large, peaceful demonstrations. We’ve seen journalists, including international journalists, able to join them. The concern is simply that in places where monitors are not present, or sometimes after monitors withdraw from the scene, we’ve seen the violence continue, we’ve seen the violence in some cases exacerbated.

So as the Secretary herself said last week when we had the foreign minister of Qatar here, we don’t think the situation in Syria can continue as it is indefinitely. So we look to the Arab League to make some assessments, to talk to all of us, but certainly what we want to do, moving forward, is to work in lockstep with the Arab League to strengthen our approach in the UN Security Council, to have a strong resolution, and also to continue to work globally to tighten constraints on the Assad regime.
As I said yesterday, we firmly believe that countries that are continuing to trade with Syria, and particularly those that are trading arms, need to really think hard about the fact that they are now contributing to fueling the violence and to lining the pockets of a regime that is clearly still exacting incredible violence against innocents.

QUESTION: But what you’re saying with regard to the Arab League monitors is that while they are doing some good on the ground, there’s nothing that’s essentially stopping the violence. Is there a long-term kind of, I won’t say strategy, but I’ll say kind of idea of how it’s possible to really effectively stop the violence in Syria at this point?

MS. NULAND: Well again, this is a matter that we are consulting with lots of allies and partners, including Arab League, who has had this opportunity to have their own people on the ground to talk to Syrians of all stripes about what will be most helpful. So those are consultations that we want to have continue. Certainly, we believe that we’ve got to increase the economic pressure on the Assad regime to change course. He does stand largely alone, with the exception of support he continues to get from Iran. But that pressure can increase. And we want to make it clear that the goals that the Arab League put forward in its agreement with the Syrian regime, which the Syrian regime has not lived up to, are the goals that all of us share. And that’s the standard that we want to see.

QUESTION: So Toria –

QUESTION: And just lastly, on today’s reports you had one – on the one hand, reports of tanks and equipment being pulled out of a town north of Damascus, but there’s also reports of deaths elsewhere in the country. Do you see this is as just kind of more of the same, that there’s a give and pull, but essentially no change in behavior from the regime?

MS. NULAND: Yeah. Fundamentally, our view is that the Syrian regime has not lived up to any of the four commitments that they made. The violence has not stopped; we do not have the heavy weaponry pulled out of all cities and towns; we do not have political prisoners out, in fact, they’re continuing to collect political prisoners; and we obviously don’t have international journalistic presence; et cetera. So we are looking for all of those things, as is the Arab League.

I think there will be a question going forward that where these monitors have been able to work, they have been – they have provided an opportunity for the Syrian opposition to demonstrate and have its views heard and come out into the street. But the concern is that the minute that they leave a town, the violence continues.

So we need to hear what the Arab League has to say about that, and then we need to think about how we work together.

QUESTION: So –

MS. NULAND: Said.

QUESTION: For the time being, you’re saying that the initiative or the lead should remain with the Arab League and be ceded by the United States and the Europeans and the United Nations –

MS. NULAND: Absolutely not. Said, you’re putting words in my mouth today.

QUESTION: I’m just trying to understand.

MS. NULAND: Our point is simply that the Arab League has had this 150 sets of eyes on the ground. They’ve been all over Syria. We want their view about how best to support the aspirations of the Syrian people for change, their view of how best to end the violence as part of our discussion going forward, and so we look forward to having those consultations. But we’re continuing our work in New York, we’re continuing our work with countries around the world to tighten the –

QUESTION: Two quick follow-ups. First, when did the clock run out? I mean, I know you addressed this before, but as far as the State Department is concerned, when does the clock run out on these monitors?

MS. NULAND: Again, Said, we want to hear what the Arab League has to say about this, and we want to consult with them. So I’m not going to prejudge where we’re going to go on their mission.
Okay?

QUESTION: When do you expect to hear from the Arab League on this? They’re meeting this weekend. Is there a meeting set up for Monday or –

MS. NULAND: Well, I think you know that Assistant Secretary Feltman stays in very close contact with the foreign ministers of all of those countries. He’s talked to virtually all of them in advance of the meeting. I expect that we will start to hear from them on the weekend, and presumably they’ll also issue some comments publicly. So I think by the time we see each other on Monday, we’ll have a good sense of where they want to go, and we’ll be working together on what’s next.
QUESTION: You had mentioned that Assad is standing alone except for Iran. Is it your view that Russia isn’t supporting Assad at this point in word or in deed, and do you have any updates – and I apologize if this was covered yesterday – on that ship that arrived – the Russian ship that was – that issue was raised with Moscow?

MS. NULAND: Well, certainly we see strong statements out of Moscow that the violence needs to end. We are back in dialogue with Moscow on a UN Security Council resolution, and that’s a good thing. I think we have a difference of view about who’s at fault here. We have a difference of view with regard to appropriate language still in the UN Security Council, what will be most helpful. But again, I think this is why we can all benefit, including the Russian Federation, from a report from these guys who have actually been in these towns and hear what they think.

QUESTION: And the – sorry. The ship?

MS. NULAND: Andy’s talking about the ship that left a port in Cyprus and reportedly made it to Syria with weapons. We have, as you know, asked for clarification from the Russian Federation. This was a subject of discussion with the Embassy. It was also raised by Deputy Secretary Burns when he was in Moscow. Our understanding is that the Russian side continues to look into who was responsible and what happened precisely.

QUESTION: And you haven’t been able to – or have you been able to verify what that ship brought?

MS. NULAND: We have not been able to independently verify it. We have the reports from the Cypriots who saw some of the cargo, but we don’t – we haven’t been able to independently verify.
Please.

QUESTION: Yes. France has said that the report of the monitors, the Arab League, should be submitted to the UN Security Council for further action. Do you support this request?

MS. NULAND: Well, again, I think the Arab League needs to make its own report, and then we need to work together on how to take the results of that mission and bring the ideas and recommendations that the Arab League comes out of this process with to the Security Council so that we can have a strong resolution that reflects the experience that the monitors have had. So I think from that perspective, we are on the same page, but again, we don’t want to get ahead of the Arab League making its report.

QUESTION: Or France; you don’t want to get ahead of France.

MS. NULAND: (Laughter.) Please, in the back.

QUESTION: For the past six days, people have been in the streets of Bucharest and other major cities in Romania. What is the view of the organization about this popular protest, and what do you think is the way out for the authorities to get over these social tensions? Thank you.

MS. NULAND: Well, as we have seen, we have countries around Europe, we have countries around the world that are dealing with popular reaction to some of the austerity measures that the financial crisis has led governments to take. What we would say to Romania and Romanians is the same thing that we say to others around the world and what we said to Greece and Greeks at the time, which is that we support the right of people around the world to protest and express their views peacefully, but we call on both protestors and authorities to refrain from any violence.

QUESTION: How could the authorities react over this glitch?

MS. NULAND: Well, we’re obviously not going to dictate how Romania deals with its internal issues. These are decisions for the Government of Romania to take in consultations with the parliament and with their people. My comment was simply in response to the fact that we do have folks protesting the austerity. All of us have to make individual national decisions, and we’re all trying to do that, what our policy is to help deal with the financial crisis that we face.
Please.

QUESTION: Toria, going back to Syria.

MS. NULAND: Yeah.

QUESTION: Would you go as far as to call for the indictment of Bashar al-Assad, as the Australian foreign minister has suggested today?

MS. NULAND: I think we’ve been very clear that we think he needs to step aside. We do not think that he is the man to lead his country in a democratic direction. That is, I think, a plenty strong statement from the United States. We are interested in supporting the aspirations of the Syrian people to have a better future, and we do not think that’s going to happen with him on the scene.
Please.

QUESTION: On Pakistan.

QUESTION: Can we just –

MS. NULAND: Wait a minute. We’re all over the place now.

QUESTION: Just a follow-up.

MS. NULAND: Let’s finish Syria. We’re going to go back to Pakistan. Please.

QUESTION: Regarding his question concerning calling for Assad to be brought to The Hague, you wouldn’t do that because you want to keep the objective on him leaving power, and you feel that might box him in and make him want to stay even more?

MS. NULAND: We are focused at increasing the pressure on him and his regime to stop the violence and to allow a process of change to go forward. We think that’s going to have to include him leaving power. Let’s see if we can achieve those objectives in the first instance.

QUESTION: But considering the monstrosity of his alleged crimes that you’ve detailed from this podium, it would not be absurd to think that this Administration thinks he should be held accountable for those one day?

MS. NULAND: Well, obviously, those who have been responsible for the violence in Syria are going to have to be held accountable, but first and foremost, we need to see that violence stop.

[end excerpt]

Remarks by
Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance

University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
January 17, 2012

(As Delivered)

Today, I would like to shake things up a bit and talk about something a little different – the changing nature of diplomacy in the Information Age. Technology and innovation have changed the conditions for statecraft in the 21^st century. Treaties and agreements are not being formulated in vaulted, smoke-filled rooms across green baize tables, among grizzled diplomats with endless amounts of time.

For better or for worse, diplomacy now often happens more in the open, and at comparatively break-neck speeds. The world has changed and we diplomats have to to adapt and thrive under new circumstances. The information age is changing how we conduct diplomacy today. To illustrate that fact, I’d like to take you back first to the 19th century’s revolution in diplomatic technology – the telegraph.

When the Civil War ended in 1865, international diplomacy moved at the speed of our fastest ships. One year later, the game changed completely. With the completion of a transatlantic cable linking the United States and Europe, the State Department was able to establish a telegraphic office to handle the new method of communication.

This new technology accelerated diplomacy and also centralized foreign policy by reducing the independence of diplomats. It was costly thought: Succinctness was especially important given the expense involved in sending telegraphs. Diplomats took the brevity message to heart, some more than others. In 1881, the U.S. Minister to Russia, John W. Foster, earned the distinction of sending the shortest diplomatic dispatch ever. Relating the news of the death of Tsar Alexander II, he simply wrote “Emperor Dead.”

While there were many positive aspects of this new rapid communication system, there were also downsides, such as decreased time for reflective decision-making, increased pressure for immediate responses, and increased workloads for coding, decoding and otherwise handling telegrams. New possibilities emerged, too, for electronic espionage.

The State Department had to learn how to make the most out of this new technology without letting it damage or disrupt the business of diplomacy. Eventually, the telegraph was fully embraced, changing diplomacy as we know it. If you’re interested in knowing more about this fascinating history, check out the book by State Department Historian David Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy. Another fascinating book is Tom Standage’s The Victorian Internet, which looked at the impact of the telegraph from multiple angles.

The telegraph, of course, was not the first game-changer: think of the role the printing press played in an earlier time. Now we are in another era of revolution, this time also driven by new information technologies.

My experience negotiationg the New START Treaty put me right in the middle of this revolution, and I’d like to share with you my reflections, based on that experience. We are facing new problems, but also opportunities. We have to start innovating, ditching outdated thinking and embracing new tools of diplomacy.

I would like to make it clear that this is not a policy speech, this is an ideas speech. It is actually the second in a series of idea speeches aimed at challenging us all to do some new thinking. The first speech was called “From the Manhattan Project to The Cloud: Arms Control in the Information Age.” That speech, delivered at Stanford University last October, centered on how the information revolutions can help us to do better at verifying arms control treaties and agreements. The remarks are available on the State Department website, if you would like to read them.

So my next step is to focus on how the information revolution is affecting diplomacy.

21^st Century Statecraft

New concepts, I recognize, are not invented overnight, and no one yet understands the full range of possibilities inherent in the information age. My boss, Hillary Clinton, has been a great champion of 21st Century Statecraft, which places a big premium on internet freedom, civil society, and innovation.

In January of 2010, Secretary Clinton gave a groundbreaking speech on internet freedom, establishing the United States as the global leader in the promotion of freedom of expression in the Internet Age. This past December, the State Department opened a Virtual Embassy in Tehran in support of the Secretary’s vision. When she announced the launch of this first-ever virtual embassy for Iran, she made clear that we want to communicate directly to the people of Iran and to support a more direct and robust engagement between our people. The virtual embassy is a hub in Persian and English for information not only on U.S. policy towards Iran, but also a place for insight into American culture and society, to find visa information, and to learn about opportunities to study in the United States.

Internet freedom is the foundation for what Secretary Clinton called Civil Society 2.0. This initiative matches organizations with technology tools and tech-savvy volunteers to help raise digital literacy, strengthen the information and communication networks of NGOs, and amplify the impact of civil society movements. As we’ve seen throughout the Arab Spring, technology can be a powerful catalyst for the growth of civil society groups.

Another component of the 21^st Century Statecraft Initiative focuses on bringing innovation to the Department of State and modernizing the practice of statecraft. Of interest to you: we are incorporating new standards for hiring to find young, technology minded staff, emphasizing new media platforms to reach younger and more tech-savvy audiences, and revising the Foreign Service exam to test for problem-solving skills necessary in today’s world.

Our efforts to innovate and bring to bear new media platforms can help save lives. Nine days after Japan’s catastrophic earthquake, two very urgent pleas for help were sent to the Twitter account of our Ambassador in Japan, John Roos. A Japanese hospital needed to transfer 80 seriously ill patients from a hospital just outside the recommended evacuation range around the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The tweets requested help from the U.S. military to evacuate the patients. Through Ambassador Roos, this vital information was provided to U.S. Forces-Japan, and miltary transportation was quickly arranged to move the patients to another hospital.

New START Negotiations

Now, how are we applying 21^st Century Statecraft to arms control? In my Bureau – the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, we are incorporating new technologies and methods to our tasks. If you haven’t checked out my Twitter stream, please do so! But beyond such day-to-day business, I’ve have seen the information revolution work first hand, while we were negotiating the New START Treaty.

The talks began following the first meeting between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev, which took place in April 2009 in London, where they agreed to launch negotiations toward a replacement treaty for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START – a treaty signed by President George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. That treaty was due to expire on December 5th, 2009, so we didn’t have much time.

I was privileged to be a junior member of the U.S. START delegation in 1990-91, an experience that served me well when negotiating the New START Treaty, its successor. I remember how things were done back then: masses of paper had to be shuttled among delegation members – we were constantly burning up Xerox machines, and faxes flowed from Geneva to Washington and back. Remember the fax machines? It’s disappeared like the dinosaur. In Geneva in 1990, if you had secret and urgent business with Washington, you had to sandwich yourself into a steaming hot secure phone booth and shout to make yourself understood at the other end.

When the New START negotiations began in April 2009, the world had changed. The U.S. and Russian delegations launched into the negotiations committed to conducting them in an atmosphere of mutual respect with a premium on keeping the tone businesslike, even when we did not agree. And we agreed to disagree in private. That was fortunate considering how easily either delegation could have broadcast negative comments that would have reached our respective capitals before we could pick up a phone.

I would say the biggest change in how we did business was email. Instead of burning up Xerox machines and waiting days or weeks for the paper to flow, we could get information around the delegation and to our leaders in Washington within hours, even minutes. Both classified and unclassified materials could be transmitted, decreasing necessary trips back to Washington.

After some discussion, we also agreed to exchange negotiating documents with the Russian team electronically, although on disks and not via email. Interestingly, the Russian MFA had not officially embraced email communication. Even CDs made a big difference to after-hours communication, however. There was a famous story about how in the 1990s, during the START talks, a member of the U.S. delegation had to hurl a satchel of negotiating documents over the fence of the Soviet mission to his counterpart, because no guard was there to open the gates late at night. Obviously, a CD could be handed more easily between the bars of the fence–which we did from time to time.

In my view, these new approaches to a formal negotiating process, especially our new digital toolbox, were a significant factor in the comparatively rapid pace of our negotiations–exactly one year from our first meeting to our last one. No longer bogged down by paper processes, we could make rapid progress. Nowadays, I don’t have to wait until the next time I travel to Geneva or Moscow to advance business with my counterparts; I can email or call from my home or office, or walk across the hall and have a video-chat in our conference room.

AVC Efforts

When we are not negotiating treaties, we are applying 21^st Century Statecraft in our day to day operations. We’ve has made some great strides in building our public outreach platforms, engaging with a wide variety of audiences both in and out of Washington, DC. We are digitizing public records, making it possible for you to read my latest speech–this one will be posted today–or toil through the New START Treaty’s article by article analysis. With a growing social media presence and an improved webpage, the Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Bureau is making information about our work clear, accessible and current. We have a Facebook page that is growing every day and as I mentioned already, I am the proud owner of a Twitter account. @Gottemoeller now has around 930 followers. I had no idea so many people would be interested in my 140-character thoughts. Of course, the State Department as a whole has one million followers over its 193 accounts. For now, I will focus on getting to one thousand. Have a look at it!

Our Office of Verification and Transparency Technologies (VTT) has been especially forward leaning in 21^st Century Statecraft. VTT is looking at ways to incorporate open source technologies into their work in ways that have never been tried before. They are looking at elevating “civilian power” with citizen-run verification and monitoring projects that could augment standard international safeguards or verification of a country’s nuclear declarations.

This year, VTT is getting ready to launch prize competitions, posing challenge questions with arms control applications to the internet masses. This kind of “crowd sourcing” allows us to tap into America’s collective intelligence in order to spur innovation, and solve tough problems. We are looking for garage tinkerers, technologists, gadget entrepreneurs, and even students in this room to help us advance our arms control and nonproliferation agenda. For example, Smart Phone and tablet apps could be created for the express purpose of aiding inspectors in the verification and monitoring process.

VTT has also been reaching outside of the State Department building. They hosted a transparency workshop for emerging leaders in the field where they we solicited the next generation of arms controllers, steeped in new technologies, for new ideas and ways to incorporate them into our diplomacy. Unlike the very formal government-to-government exchanges of the past, 21^st Century Statecraft requires input, innovation and engagement from all of us. We are constantly on the lookout for novel ways to solve problems, old and new.

We look to expand and grow all of these efforts in 2012.

To the Future

While embracing all these new tools and methods, there are certain things to keep in mind. Just like the State Department employees of the late 19^th century, we have to be wary of things like security and authenticity. Like the telegrams of yesteryear, emails, tweets and other documents sent through cyberspace can be corrupted or stolen. New technologies require new standards of security. Online communications can also be brief or hurried to the point of being vague; they can be easily misunderstood as rude or even insulting. So diplomats have to continue being diplomatic, now matter how fast they can tap out a Blackberry message.

Further, the ease of information transmission today can also work to our disadvantage. An email to a colleague at home can easily end up in the inbox of a reporter. As a colleague of mine likes to say, you are always one click away from the front page.

We also have the issue of speed. If the telegraph accelerated decision making time, the internet and the 24 hour news cycle have set it to warp speed. Just because we can go fast does not mean we always should. Thoughtful diplomacy just takes time. Indeed, taking a step back and letting things settle may help move the negotiating process forward.

There is also the issue of posterity. Records of negotiations, initiatives and projects are extremely important. They can guide future plans and provide context for current events. Thus, the cable archive of a formal negotiating record has always been a valuable tool for historians and practicioners alike. The more informal nature of a lot of new communications can create holes in our records and gaps in our understanding. We need to think about always tracking and archiving communications, big and small.

Finally, unforeseen disasters can and do arise. Anyone who has had their computer or email system crash can relate. We should be mindful of the ways in which new processes can be derailed and always prepare backup contingency plans.

Conclusion

With that I will stop, as I’d like to get your ideas on how to further incorporate new technologies into arms control diplomacy. How do you think we can blend diplomatic tools that have worked in the past with the new tools at our disposal? We need your ideas, and I very much look forward to our discussion.

Thank you.

December 23, 2011
2011/2188

On-the-Record Briefing

Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation
Thomas Countryman on Outcomes Related to the
7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference

December 23, 2011
Via Teleconference

MR. VENTRELL:  Hi, everyone.  This is Patrick from the Press Office.  Today we have with us Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Affairs Mr. Thomas Countryman.  He’s going to conduct an on-the-record session today to discuss outcomes related to the 7th Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention Review Conference which concluded in Geneva, Switzerland yesterday.  After his initial opening remarks, he will take questions.

And so without further ado, I’m going to turn it over to the assistant secretary.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Thank you, Patrick, and good afternoon, everyone.  The United States is pleased with the outcome of the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that was adopted yesterday in Geneva.  The final document adopted a program for what we call the intercessional period, the next five years before the next review conference, that will focus on three major topics:  first, strengthening implementation of the convention, that is, the implementation legally and practically by each of the states party; second, a regular and systematic review of scientific and technological developments in the life sciences relevant to the convention; and third, continuing to build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including capacity building in bio-safety, bio-security, disease surveillance, preparedness, and response.

These are the three areas that the United States emphasized when Secretary Clinton spoke to the conference on December 7th, and we’re pleased, of course, that they are the focus of the final document.  They were adopted not because the United States pushed them but because we selected the topics that it is clear the majority of states party agree are essential for future development.  These are the very topics at the intersection of public health and international security that will help all the nations of the world confront some serious challenges in the years ahead.  And so we are happy to see that these are the primary focus of the intercessional period.

Throughout the convention, the review conference, and throughout the period leading up to it, the United States consulted closely with countries around the world, not only our closest allies but many in the non-aligned movement as well, in order to get to this consensus document.  We set a positive tone throughout the conference, of course highlighted by the Secretary’s speech in Geneva on December 7th.  And afterward, the delegation led by Ambassador Laura Kennedy did an absolutely outstanding job of both listening to the concerns of our partners and putting forward a positive agenda that has resulted in consensus.

So we are happy with the results.  We think they are significant for not only the United States as we move ahead on advancing the President’s national strategy for countering biological threats, but that they have the same value for all of our partners around the world who share this concern about potential biological and toxic threats.

And with that, I’d be happy to take some questions.

MR. VENTRELL:  Operator, can we go ahead and see if there are questions?

OPERATOR:  Thank you.  We will now begin the question-and-answer session.  If you would like to ask a question, please press *1 and record your name.  One moment, please, for the first question.

Our first question comes from Daniel Horner with Arms Control Today.

QUESTION:  Hi, Mr. Ambassador.  Thank you for doing the call.  I had a couple questions.  First, before the conference, there was quite a lot of discussion about expanding the mandate of the intercessional process to give it more power to make some decisions.  And as I understand it, that wasn’t part of the final document.  And then also, there’s been a lot of discussion about the implementation support unit, expanding that, increasing staff and so on.  And my understanding was that didn’t really happen either.  Can you give some details on those elements, please?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Yeah, thank you, Daniel.  The United States, like many other delegations, favored both a modest expansion of the implementation support unit – and to remind others who are new, this is a very lean treaty.  There is a unit of only three people tasked with implementing the intercessional work of this convention.  We favored a modest expansion of that number.  In today’s financial environment, even that modest expansion was not acceptable to some members, some states’ party, and so that expansion did not make it into the consensus document.

On the question of decision-making in the intercessional process, again, we favored a very modest innovation that would allow decisions to be taken still only by consensus, as in the review conference itself, so that the convention and the process could be a little bit more nimble.  Again, there were concerns expressed by some other states about the implications of allowing even a limited range of decisions to be made in the intercessional process, and so that was not adopted.  Still, I think that these are modality issues rather than issues of substance, and it doesn’t change our assessment that we’re satisfied with this outcome.

OPERATOR:  Once again, if you’d like to ask a question, please press *1.

One moment for the next question.

Next question comes from Nicole Gaouette with Bloomberg News.

QUESTION:  Hi, Mr. Ambassador.  Thanks for doing this.  You’ve mentioned that one of the priorities is going to be building capacity to deal with disease outbreaks.  Were there any specifics – specific plans or goals that you set out?  And if so, could you share?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  No.  The final document of the review conference does not go into that kind of detail in terms of setting goals.  Rather, what it does is identifies the topics that will be covered by the meetings of expert groups and the meetings of state parties that take place each of the next five years.  So the goal is expressed only in general terms of building capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of biological weapons – in other words to cover natural outbreaks as well as intentional attacks, since you need the same response mechanism for both.  And these will include such topics as biosafety, biosecurity, preparedness, surveillance, response, and crisis management.

Now, so the specifics are not covered in the final document, but of course the United States has a well established set of programs through a number of different agencies.  From the State Department and my bureau, we have the Biosecurity Engagement Program.  We have similar initiatives, each with a slightly different focus from Health and Human Services, from the National Institutes of Health, from the Center for Disease Control, from the Department of Defense, from USAID, all with a common goal of enhancing public health, and each of which touches in some way on this issue.

So we have very well developed programs of – for example, disease surveillance and disease containment that are already active around the world.   The BWC RevCon has proven – or the BWC itself has proven to be a unique tool – a multidimensional, multinational tool – that can bring together in this annual conferences not just diplomats but also scientists, public health officials, law enforcement officials, those who will have the very challenging job at this nexus of public health of public security in case we ever face such an emergency.

So to make it shorter, the document doesn’t do that kind of detail, but the United States, like many other countries, has very detailed and developed programs that we will continue to implement.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

OPERATOR:  Question comes from Daniel Horner with Arms Control Today.

QUESTION:  Hi.  Yeah.  A couple other questions, if I could.  First of all, in her remarks, Secretary Clinton talked about bolstering international confidence.  As you mentioned, that’ll be one of the topics for the intercessional process.  But were there any concrete commitments by the parties to do that, to increase transparency and so on, by the United States or any other parties?

And then secondly, with regard to the previous question I asked, you said you had favored some very modest changes, which weren’t adopted.  Can you talk a little bit about why those changes weren’t adopted, given that they were rather modest, as you characterized them?  Thanks.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  On the first question, one of the things you’ll see in this 40-page final document is that the conference acknowledged the need to enhance state parties participation in confidence-building measure submissions.  Each of the states parties should submit an annual report talking about its biological activities.  In practice, it’s only about half the states party that do so on a regular basis.  And so increasing the participation rate and making the information that’s submitted more relevant, more valuable to other states, was a good topic of discuss and one that will continue in the intersessional process.

QUESTION:  Pardon me.  If I could just follow on that.  It’s basically calling for greater adherence to a commitment that was previously made, right?  There’s not any new commitment on transparency or anything related to conference-building and a verification or anything along those lines?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Yeah.  I think that’s a fair statement, but with a couple of comments.  One that the intersessional process will look at the question, can we make the prescribed format for these confidence-building measures more informative, more useful, and less onerous so that they are filled more frequently.

The other comment is that, very much a part of the Secretary’s speech on December 7th, and what we stressed repeatedly throughout the conference, is that all nations can make greater efforts in transparency that go beyond the requirements of the Convention.  The United States is trying to set an example in this regard.  So for example on the sidelines of the conference we did a number of public events that talked about our bio-preparedness program at home – how we manage it, that talked about the kind of assistance we do with many countries around the world.  We demonstrated with a interactive display how the United States posts online its annual report to the BWC.  It’s not required to make these documents public, but we think it sets a good example for not only other countries but the public to have access to the information that we report.  And I think this was well-received.

Although, there’s no new specific requirement on transparency as a means to build confidence and national implementation.  There’s no new specific requirement, but I think it’s the trend, and I think there is growing support among the states party to demonstrate that kind of transparency.  We’ll continue to try to be one of the leaders in that field.

And I’m sorry.  You’re other question was about very modest changes.  The – it’s hard to say exactly why.  I mean, the easy answer is because it’s a consensus-based organization, and that means if a few people feel strongly enough about it, they can prevent this change being made.  I think on the – and so even for the modest budget increase that would be required to expand the size of the ISU, this was a legitimate concern for countries that are feeling financial pressure these days.  On the question of decision-making, again, we don’t think it was a radical change, because the principle of consensus would still be protected.  But again, for some smaller countries, it might have meant that the – they would have to send representatives to every, single meeting, because there would always be the potential of a decision being made.

That’s the argument we heard.  I think there were other arguments with less validity against these two ideas.  But I think in the end, it is concerns about budget that prevented what we thought were modest and very beneficial steps forward from being taken.  But once again, we do not let that detract from our satisfaction with the result on the substance.

OPERATOR:  Okay.

MR. VENTRELL:  Do we have any other questions in queue?

OPERATOR:  No further questions.

MR. VENTRELL:  Okay, everyone.  Happy holidays to all of you, and thanks, Assistant Secretary for the briefing.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Okay.  Thanks to all of you.  I hope you have a great holiday.

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