United Nations
Geneva, Switzerland
January 31, 2012

Mr. President, Mr. SYG, Colleagues:

We appreciate  the President’s attempt to stimulate thinking on how to move the CD toward accomplishing its founding purpose – to negotiate formal treaties.  We share the frustration and impatience about the deadlock in this body, a message voiced here directly by my Secretary of  State last year.

Let me, however, comment on some of the assertions in working paper 1929 that has just been circulated.

For example, the paper asserts that endless debates over a Program of Work have prevented the Conference from discussing substantively the issues on its agenda which would “lay the basis for negotiations.”

On the contrary, there have, for many years, been focused discussions on all agenda items even in the absence of a Programme of Work.

These discussions have taken place in a variety of venues, in informal and formal meetings and plenaries, in coordination meetings, and even on the margins of the CD.  Delegations have on occasion brought in experts to speak to these issues in more depth.

Among the purposes of these discussions was that of determining which issues on the CD’s agenda could most productively be advanced for negotiation. Time and again, the discussions demonstrated that FMCT was the such issue.

The paper also questions whether priority should be given to negotiating an FMCT in the CD. The fact is that this body exists to negotiate treaties related to, among other things, nuclear disarmament.

We all know tremendous progress that has been achieved between the United States and Russia in reducing their arsenals through a step-by-step process.

As a practical matter, several more such steps will be necessary before such negotiated reductions can become multilateral.

We also know that one of the conditions for moving to truly low numbers of nuclear weapons and eventually to zero is halting the production of new material for such weapons.

This is why FMCT is the next logical step for multilateral efforts. An FMCT would be a significant step, an essential one, a worthy achievement for the international community’s only standing multilateral disarmament body.  In fact, 189 states endorsed that goal in the NPT Final document Action Plan.  Are we to simply reject that goal and discard the Action Plan which has been widely
hailed as a road map for the future?  Our answer is a resounding NO.

The paper also suggests that the CD’s lack of productivity calls for shortening its sessions, or putting it on “standby,” a step whose effects could, in practical terms, prove hard to reverse.  Budget resources, once redeployed, can be hard or impossible to regain.

I think the real point is, since the international community has established its priorities, how can it go about implementing them?

The international community has previously agreed on the importance of FMCT, and on pursuing FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament.  That decision was made with serious purpose: the CD provides the conditions under which the stakeholders are present and should be able to negotiate seriously.

Putting the CD on “standby” or shortening its meetings would remove the most logical venue…  In the absence of the CD, other options to pursue this priority will surely be sought, probably including some less conducive to providing a consensual outcome and meeting our respective security interests.

To “set aside” FMCT would be tantamount to this Conference declaring its failure as a negotiating body.  For its part, the United States is not prepared to accept defeat.

Nor are we willing to accede to an action that would signal to our publics that we do not have the energy or the interest to do the hard work that disarmament agreements entail.  I am proud to represent a President who has rallied the international community to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.  We cannot walk away from that endeavor.

The paper also questions whether the CD’s agenda is the cause of the impasse and suggests the convening of a Special Session on Disarmament to review the disarmament machinery generally. While there may be merit in reviewing our agenda, which frankly is rooted deeply in the Cold War, long past, the fact is that we, the members, are the masters of our agenda.  If we believe such a review is warranted, we can discuss it.

However, this is not the time for us to be signaling lesser interest or less energy to pursue the international community’s disarmament agenda.  Again, addressing fissile material is central to the goal of nuclear disarmament, not some alien element or parasite that has “wormed” its way into our midst.

It is time for us to renew our efforts to find a way to address the concerns that have made it impossible for negotiations to begin.  We believe that the greatest assurance derives from the CD’s consensus rule, which ensures that all states’ national security interests can be protected in negotiations.

Finally, welcome to our new colleague from Russia, Ambassador Borodavkin.  I note the reference in his statement to a new compromise proposal designed to get this body back to work, a compromise which we can certainly support in the spirit of flexibility and political will which is so often called for in this body and a compromise offered within the “logical framework” mentioned by our distinguished Algerian colleague Ambassador Jazairy.

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller

Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller
Opening Statement at the Conference on Disarmament

Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Geneva, Switzerland

As Delivered

Thank you very much Mr. Secretary General, Mr. President. At the outset of my remarks, please allow me to congratulate Ecuador, and you personally, on your assumption of the first Presidency of the 2012 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Ambassador  Kennedy and I wish you well as you guide the work of this Conference forward; you may count on the U.S. delegation’s full support.

I  would also like to extend our best wishes to the other CD Presidents for the 2012 session – Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, and Germany. We look forward to working with all of you  during this year.

Accomplishments 

I  spoke at the CD’s opening session last January and I am pleased to be here again  to highlight the progress on arms control and disarmament that has been made over  the course of the past year.

The  New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. Implementation is going well and continues to contribute positively to the U.S. – Russian relationship. The treaty represents  a strong foundation for further bilateral reductions and an important step on  the path towards a world without nuclear weapons.  Discussions between our two governments on the next steps are underway.

I  am also pleased to report that the U.S.-Russian  Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) and its Protocols came into force in 2011.  The PMDA commits the United States and the Russian Federation each to dispose of no less than 34
metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium – enough material in total for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons.

Expanding beyond bilateral issues, the five Nuclear Weapon States have started a regular dialogue on verification issues and confidence-building measures related to nuclear disarmament, as part of our commitment to carry out our Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligations.

The United States is proud to be at the leading edge of transparency efforts – publically declaring our nuclear stockpile numbers; participating in voluntary and treaty-based inspections measures; working with other nations on military to military, scientific and lab exchanges, sponsoring site visits and frequently briefing others on our nuclear programs and disarmament efforts.

The United States is committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we have been engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of the Treaty.  As we move forward with our process, we call on all governments to declare or reaffirm their commitments not to conduct explosive nuclear tests.  We thank and congratulate Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia for ratifying the Treaty in the past year.  We ask that all the remaining Annex 2 States join us in moving forward toward ratification.

I am also gratified to report progress on the extension of treaty-based negative security assurances through regional Nuclear Weapons Free zones.  The Obama Administration transmitted the relevant Protocols of the African and South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.   We were also glad that the Nuclear Weapon States and the states of ASEAN resolved long standing differences related to the South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone’s Protocol language: Along with the other NPT depositary states, we have lent our strong support to the efforts of the facilitator for the 2012 Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone Conference, Finnish Under Secretary Jaako Laajava.

Regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States is proud of the progress made towards a world free of chemical weapons. We continue to make steady progress in destroying our chemical weapons. By April of this year, we anticipate we will have destroyed 90% of our stockpile.  The remaining 10% will be destroyed while assigning highest priority to ensuring the safety of people, protecting the environment, and complying with national standards for safety and emissions, as called for in the Convention.

Last month, the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention met here in Geneva for their Seventh Review Conference.  They agreed to a standing set of agenda items that cover national implementation, developments in science and technology and assistance and cooperation, all of which will serve to strengthen the effect of the treaty and help bridge the interrelated work being undertaken in the security, public health, law enforcement and scientific communities.  This was done under the able direction of our CD colleague, Ambassador Paul van den IJsell. 

Mr. President, before proceeding further on CD matters, please allow me to discuss recent developments regarding the European Union’s proposal for a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.”

Over the past four years, United States and European experts have regularly consulted on drafts of the EU “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities.” After an extensive interagency review of the EU’s initiative, the United States has decided to enter into formal consultations with the European Union and spacefaring nations to develop an International Code of Conduct, because the long-term sustainability of the space environment is at risk from space debris and irresponsible activities.

As Secretary Clinton announced on January 17, the United States is prepared to work in active partnership with all governments to develop a Code that can be adopted by the greatest number of spacefaring nations around the globe.

We believe that an international Code can help strengthen the long-term sustainability of space and promote safe and responsible use of space, while at the same time ensuring the inherent right of self-defense is not impaired.  As more countries and companies field space capabilities, it is in our mutual interest that they act responsibly.  A widely-subscribed International Code can
encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who act otherwise, while reducing risks of mishaps, misperceptions, mistrust, and misconduct.

We expect to actively participate in the international discussions on an international Code throughout this year and beyond.  As part of this process, the United States looks forward to the multilateral experts’ meetings that the European Union plans to convene in the near future.

We also look forward to the Group of Government Experts on outer space TCBMs that is scheduled to convene this summer.  We
see this as a key opportunity to develop practical measures to enhance transparency and confidence building and sustain the peaceful exploitation of outer space. 

The Impasse at the CD 

Mr. President, while the international community has been active and achieved results in many areas during the past year, the Conference on Disarmament appears to be no closer to an “honest day’s work” than it was last January.

Despite herculean efforts by a number of CD Member States, the CD continues to languish, and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the next logical and necessary step in the multilateral nuclear disarmament process, remains no closer to negotiation.

We did see some rays of hope last year. Australia and Japan hosted a series of extensive FMCT technical experts’ discussions on the CD’s margins that allowed the international community an opportunity to exchange views and gain perspectives in a sustained and organized way.  The Chairs’ summaries of these discussions will make a useful contribution to our collective body of
knowledge when eventual FMCT negotiations begin.

The United States initiated consultations among the P5 and others on unblocking FMCT negotiations in the CD and to prepare our own countries for what certainly will be a prolonged and technically challenging negotiation.

Last
summer, the Secretary-General of the United Nations asked Member States to continue their dialogue on ways to improve the operation and effectiveness of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery, in particular the CD.

In the view of the United States, all of these efforts have been worthwhile, but regrettably, none has achieved the desired result of moving this body forward on FMCT negotiations and work on other important issues.

Mr. President, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the CD last February, she had stressed that, “Global nuclear
security is too important to allow this matter [FMCT] to drift forever.

At the most recent session of the UNGA First Committee, we all witnessed and experienced the growing international frustration with the status quo here in Geneva.  Not surprisingly, and with no small amount of justification, many in the international community are losing patience with the current situation in the CD.

Every government represented in this room has national security concerns and obligations associated with an FMCT, including my own.  But as responsible governments, we also have a collective obligation to and responsibility for international peace and
security, to which an FMCT would significantly contribute.

An FMCT is as vital as ever

The FMCT is not some sort of deliberate diversion from “real” nuclear disarmament.  Along with the CTBT, an FMCT is an absolutely essential step for global nuclear disarmament.

Simply stated, we can’t get to the end, if we don’t start at the beginning. A verifiable end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.  How can we make
progress towards a world without nuclear weapons while some states continue to produce the key component for building up their nuclear arsenals?

A universal halt to the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons is essential.  Some states have already declared a
moratorium on such production, but others have not. Some, such as the United States, have reduced their military stocks of fissile material, whereas others are actively engaged in further production.

The path to a world without nuclear weapons will require many steps.  The next logical step in halting the increase of nuclear arsenals is an FMCT.

Mr. President, in Action 15 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s Action Plan, all States Parties agreed that the CD should begin immediate negotiation of an FMCT.  The United States remains firmly committed to an FMCT as a tangible contribution to our “full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI,” as stated in that Action Plan.  As the 2015 NPT review process gets under way this year, every NPT State Party has a responsibility to help make an FMCT a reality. In fact, every nation should share in the work that will create the conditions necessary to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free world. 

Looking Ahead 

Here in Geneva, and New York, and in capitals around the world, there has been a vigorous debate over the state of the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery in general and the CD impasse, in particular.

I have been speaking about this at various venues and I will reiterate my thoughts here.  Some people have spoken about amending the consensus rule at the CD, in order to break the current logjam.  The United States does not share the view that the impasse in the CD is the result of its procedural rules.  On the contrary, we believe that the consensus rule has served CD members well by providing assurance that individual member states’ national security concerns can be met.

There may be a case for some modifications to how decisions are taken on small procedural items at the CD, but those issues are not at the heart of the impasse. The road will remain blocked until all members of the CD are convinced that commencing negotiations is in their national interest, or at least, not harmful to those interests. The United States is working hard to make the case to those countries with reservations about the FMCT that starting negotiations is not something to fear.

Of course, for any negotiation to be substantive and worthwhile, the key states most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved.  When it comes down to what is in the best interest of international security, the negotiating venue for the FMCT is of
less importance than the participants. As a matter of pragmatism, however, the CD – which includes every major nuclear capable state – remains the best option for achieving a viable, effective FMCT.

Once FMCT negotiations have begun, CD members will face many complex and contentious issues, including the difficult issue of scope. We are well aware that CD members are divided on this issue.  Ambassador Shannon’s Report to the CD, from which the Shannon Mandate is derived, highlighted these disagreements. His Report of his consultations made it abundantly clear that members could not agree on this key issue, nor on many others.  What members did agree on is embodied in a key line in that Report following a listing of those contentious issues. That crucial line said: “…it has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the ad hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.”

The U.S. position is clear: FMCT obligations, including verification obligations, should cover only new production of fissile material.  Step-by-step approaches to arms control and nonproliferation have been very successful over the years.  A step-by-step approach would serve us well with an FMCT. One essential step in the process should be a legal ban on the production of
fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware that many CD members have a different view and this issue will be the subject of vigorous debate.  That is what
negotiations are for, and the United States is ready to have that debate.  What is not helpful is an effort to “pre-negotiate” the outcome of any negotiations by an explicit reference to existing stocks in a negotiating mandate.

We would not be alone in seeing this as a thinly-veiled effort to prevent negotiations from getting underway.

Regarding the possibility of the CD simultaneously negotiating on the four core issues (FMCT, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and prevention of an arms race in outer space); it is not a practical option.  It is difficult to see how a body that has not negotiated any of these topics over the last sixteen years could take on the responsibility for negotiating all four at one time.  The CD should focus on one major negotiation at a time, as it did during the CTBT negotiations.   Given the reality that an FMCT would set the stage for further progress in reducing nuclear arsenals, it has been repeatedly endorsed by CD member states as the priority nuclear disarmament negotiation.

Conclusion

Mr. President, we hope that 2012 will be the year when the Conference on Disarmament emerges from its prolonged impasse
and once again contributes to international peace and security by beginning negotiations on an FMCT.

The CD and its predecessor bodies have a long history of delivering landmark agreements, all of which were contentious in their own right and took years to complete. But in each case, the nations and people who assembled in this historic chamber persevered, and helped to create a multilateral arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament structure that supports the security of the international system to this very day.

An FMCT will make a critical contribution to this international security architecture. As Secretary Clinton said last February, this agreement is “too important a matter to be left in a deadlock forever.”

If the CD fails to deliver an FMCT negotiation this year, we will again have shirked our responsibility to move forward towards a world without nuclear weapons…. We recognize that this is a crucial year for the CD as an institution and that the UN General Assembly is monitoring our progress closely. Let’s seize the opportunity to make real progress here and restore the vibrancy of this once vital institution.  Business as usual is a recipe for disaster.

We look forward to consulting and working with the CD Member and Observer states as the 2012 session proceeds. Time is short and the stakes are high.

Thank  you, Mr. President.

    Photo Gallery

FACT SHEET ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

“We will continue to face new and emerging biological threats that will require the coordinated and connected efforts of a broad range of domestic and international partners.  As we take action to counter these threats, we will work together to advance our own health security and provide for the improved condition of all humanity.”

-  President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
November 23, 2009

On December 22 in Geneva, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) ended the meeting of the treaty’s Seventh Review Conference (RevCon) on a high note by endorsing a multinational work program for the next five years that promises to revitalize global efforts to reduce biological threats and advance objectives set forth in the President’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.  States Parties announced their agreement to focus on three broad areas proposed by the United States: the strengthening of national implementation of the BWC; science and technology developments relevant to the treaty; and cooperation and assistance to build global capacities for preventing and controlling disease outbreaks, whatever their origin.  The RevCon Final Document provides a critical framework to bring together international security, health, law enforcement, and science communities to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and how to best manage them.  As Secretary of State Clinton noted in the U.S. opening statement, shoring up our domestic and international defenses against intentional attacks will make it easier to detect and respond to naturally occurring outbreaks, providing benefits for every country in every region.

Advancing the National Strategy

The ambitious work program adopted by the Review Conference is an important step toward reinvigorating the BWC as a premier venue for multinational collaboration on concrete activities to help counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism.  States Parties agreed that efforts on the three priority standing issues would continue from one year to the next – an approach the United States had advocated as key to enabling real progress at the international level.

·         To strengthen national implementation of the BWC, States Parties agreed to begin annual discussions of topics such as enforcement of national legislation, coordination among law enforcement institutions, and best practices for enhancing implementation.

·         States Parties concluded that there is a need for regular and systematic review of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and they emphasized the importance of education and efforts to raise awareness of dual-use concerns among those working in the biological sciences.  States Parties took the additional step of identifying topics for the working group on Science and Technology to consider each year, starting in 2012, with advances in enabling technologies, such as those for sequencing, synthesizing, and analyzing DNA.

·         States Parties also agreed on the need to build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of biological weapons.  During the next five years experts will address, inter alia, capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity, preparedness, response, and crisis management; States Parties also decided that a database system to facilitate requests and offers for assistance among States Parties will be created.

Building Confidence in Compliance

The States Parties acknowledged the need to enhance participation in voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) submissions.  As a first step, States Parties undertook a review to improve the treaty’s annual CBM reporting system – the first time since 1991 that such a review had been done – and they committed to continuing the effort during the next five years.  The United States asked States Parties to further focus on developing constructive approaches to strengthening BWC implementation and to building confidence that all Parties were living up to their obligations.  Because the dual-use nature of biological work makes it impossible to verify compliance through traditional arms control means, the United States urged that countries create their own openness and transparency measures to demonstrate confidence in compliance.

·         Leading by example, Secretary Clinton announced a new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, featuring a U.S.-hosted International Forum on Health and Security in mid-2012 to share views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch programs, as well as continued tours of U.S. biodefense facilities and exchanges among American scientists and their counterparts from other countries.

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New York, NY
October 19, 2011

Statement by Victoria  Nuland
Spokesperson

August 30, 2011

Following up on their commitment made during the July Paris Conference, the P-5 met in Geneva on August 30 to take stock of developments regarding the Conference on Disarmament (CD). They discussed how to achieve at the earliest possible date in the CD their shared goal of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. They expressed their determination to this end.  In that context, they look forward to meeting again, with other relevant parties, during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee.

# # #

Rose Gottemoeller speaking at a press conference at the UN in Geneva (archive photo)

Remarks by Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, at a High Level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament

New York, NY
July 27, 2011

Mr. President, Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

The United States welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General to convene last September’s High Level Meeting on “Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations,” in the hopes that it would spur progress on FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We co-sponsored the related UNGA Resolution on “Follow-up to the high-level meeting” and we also welcome this opportunity today to take stock of where we are ten months later. The United States shares your commitment to progress and your interest in seeing this process carried forward.

Mr. President, two years ago in his speech in Prague, President Obama affirmed the commitment of the United States “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” and laid out a plan of action for near term practical steps to move in that direction. Since then, significant progress has been registered. I won’t detail all of it here, but I would like to highlight a few successes because they stand in stark contrast to the continuing failure to begin negotiations on a priority objective – a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

A key arms control achievement of the past year is the entry-into-force of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation this past February. Implementation of the Treaty is well underway. As of last weekend, we and the Russian Federation had exchanged 1,000 notifications in implementation of the treaty regime. Furthermore, we have conducted 13 inspections, six by the Russian Federation and seven by the United States. We are keeping pace in our implementation efforts.

In May, President Obama also submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, the protocols of the African and South Pacific nuclear-weapon free zones treaties. And we are in discussion with parties to the Southeast Asia and Central Asia nuclear- weapon- free- zones treaties in an effort to reach agreement that would allow the United States to sign the Protocols to those treaties, as well.

The United States remains committed to securing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and we are engaging the United States Senate and the American public on the merits of that treaty.

And, as already reported by the distinguished representative of France, the NPT Nuclear Weapon States – the P5 – met in Paris 30 June-1 July to engage on issues bearing on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, and in particular steps outlined in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. This was a continuation of discussions begun in London in 2009 and will continue with a third conference in the context of the 2012 NPT Prepcom. These meetings are helping to build a process for P5 dialogue on transparency, nuclear doctrine, and on verification, recognizing that such a dialogue is needed if we are to establish a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts.

Mr. President, the United States has spared no effort to initiate negotiations in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons; completion of such a Treaty continues to be the top multilateral priority for the United States and the vast majority of others, and would be a major international achievement in nonproliferation and disarmament. At a time when significant progress has been registered in other areas of arms control and disarmament, it is all the more disappointing that a single state has prevented the CD from again taking its place on the disarmament stage and undertaking negotiations to reach that long overdue objective.

The preference of the United States is to negotiate the FMCT within the Conference on Disarmament. We welcomed the initiative of Australia and Japan to organize serious technical FMCT discussions on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament this year. The activity proved to be productive, substantive, and collegial. But this does not obscure the central fact that the CD remains blocked and we are no closer to FMCT negotiations today than we were two years ago when a compromise Program of Work was adopted by consensus by all 65 CD members.

It is because of this continuing stalemate that we have launched consultations to move this issue forward. We are encouraged, therefore, that the P5 agreed in Paris to take steps prior to the next UNGA to renew efforts with other relevant partners to promote such FMCT negotiations, and we are planning these activities now. Mr. President, turning to the issue of the UN disarmament machinery and how it functions – or does not function – I note that this is often a subject of discussion. For example, “improvements” motivated the 1978 decision to create the Committee on Disarmament – renamed Conference soon after – by the then Member States of the CD’s predecessor body. They judged that certain changes, such as a rotating Presidency and membership expansion, would render the body more representative and more productive; the decisions of those States were recalled in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament.

More recently, serious thought and a number of interesting ideas have emerged regarding reform of the Conference on Disarmament and other disarmament machinery. But we should consider such proposals with our eyes wide open, realistic about what the root cause of the current deadlock is. While the machinery could certainly benefit from a tune-up, it is not the underlying cause of the breakdown in the CD. The Conference on Disarmament has produced good results in years past –the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CTBT. Put simply, when countries share an objective they can move it forward in the CD, and this is an experience we wish to see repeated, starting with the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Mr. President, the UN Secretary- General has offered recommendations on how to proceed with a review of multilateral disarmament affairs and his Advisory Board has provided us a thoughtful report. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has also provided stimulating food for thought. We have a wealth of ideas. A panel of “eminent persons,” the CD itself, or some others, might usefully continue exploration, to include recommendations on the following:

· How to revamp or reconsider the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which, after yeoman’s efforts, has been unable to reach consensus for a number of years on any agenda item;

· How to update the Geneva CD. Its Decalogue and agenda could be updated to reflect the current international security environment. Members should also review some of its other procedures and recommend changes that would encourage greater continuity and focus.

· How to provide for continuity on an agreed CD work from year to year, such as automatic rollover of an agreed program of work;

· How to protect national security interests while preventing abuse of the consensus rule; and

· Whether expansion of the CD would improve CD efficiency, and how to reflect universal disarmament goals in deliberative and negotiating bodies, while maintaining their efficacy and assuring that states’ security concerns are respected and protected. This is the fundamental issue. In this regard, we view that theoretically working at 193 will inevitably pose complexities. I might note that the CD in its current composition, expanded since 1996 to 65 Member States, has yet to demonstrate its ability to function as a negotiating body.

In exploring new ways to proceed, we think that balance is needed. The status quo is unacceptable, but we should also guard against being overly ambitious, lest we lose our way. As we seek our way forward, we must keep our eye on the prize and, for most of the international community, that prize is a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as the next immediate multilateral nuclear disarmament step. Calls for yet another Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament are a distraction at best. An SSOD is not the only or the most practical vehicle for reform in light of its record of failure. Unless we have agreed objectives for such a session, we should better direct our efforts where progress can be made.

Thank you very much again, for this opportunity to speak.

Common Ground on the BWC: An Interview With U.S. Special Representative Laura Kennedy

Interviewed by Daniel Horner and Jonathan B. Tucker

Laura Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, was named last December to serve also as U.S. special representative on issues relating to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In that position, her principal focus is the treaty’s review conference later this year. Her previous diplomatic postings include a broad range of arms control assignments.

Arms Control Today spoke with Kennedy by telephone May 12. She described the U.S. approach to the BWC and the upcoming review conference, which is scheduled to take place December 5-22. The interview covered many of the topics that are expected to be central to the review conference, including verification, peaceful cooperation, and the BWC’s intersessional process.  (READ MORE)

Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at the UN General Assembly

Follow-up to the High Level Meeting Held on 24 September 2010:

Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament
and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations

NEW YORK,
27 JULY 2011

Monsieur le Président,

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

Mesdames et Messieurs les Ministres,

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs,

Allow me, Mr. Secretary General, on behalf of the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to thank you for convening this follow-up meeting to the High Level Meeting held on 24 September last year. We welcome the personal commitment and leadership you have shown on disarmament and non-proliferation. We fully support your continuing efforts to revitalize the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are deeply concerned by its long-running stalemate and lack of progress since last year’s meeting. It is crucial to reaffirm the negotiating role of the CD and to allow it to resume its substantive work without delay.

Ten months after the High Level Meeting, today’s follow-up meeting is a timely opportunity to reflect on the situation of the disarmament machinery and consider ways to make further progress on disarmament, international peace and security.

We welcome the numerous positive developments in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in the recent years. In particular, the adoption of a concrete and balanced Action Plan on all 3 pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the NPT Review Conference in 2010 has shown the international community’s firm commitment to reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and address nuclear issues with a global and pragmatic approach. Now, all State parties must work together to advance the implementation of the NPT Action Plan.

In this context, the P5 States are strongly determined to assume their responsibilities and play their part. At the High Level Meeting last year in September, France committed to organize the first P5 Follow-up Meeting to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Accordingly, on June 30^th and July 1^st, the P5 met in Paris, at Directors General and expert level, with a view to consider progress on the commitments they made at the NPT Review Conference and to contribute to the preparation of the next NPT review cycle. They discussed a wide range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It was the second time that the P5 got together in this format with this agenda. The first was the London Conference on Confidence-building Measures in 2009. The Paris Conference was therefore a significant and vital opportunity to further build mutual trust and confidence on nuclear matters. We’d like to share with you the general outcomes of our discussions, which were reflected in the Final Joint Press Statement issued at the end of the Conference.

As Nuclear Weapons States, we discussed how we intend to meet our disarmament obligations under the NPT, including engagement on the efforts called for in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, particularly the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting and other efforts. We continued our previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and on verification. Such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts.

We also shared views on measures to uphold the NPT’s non-proliferation pillar, to include how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the NPT, while recognising the provisions of Article X, and stressed the need to strengthen IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol and the reinforcement of IAEA’s resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

All States, NPT Parties and non-Parties, must contribute to fulfilling the overall objective of disarmament, by creating the necessary security environment, resolving regional tensions, promoting collective security, ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable, and making progress in all the areas of disarmament.

We are convinced that, as the sole standing multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the CD should maintain the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament.

We urge all CD Member States to agree without delay on a comprehensive and balanced program of work allowing the CD to resume its substantive work.

We recognise that one key element in the effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation is the negotiation of a Fissile-Material Cut-Off Treaty. An FMCT would help cut off the most important building blocks needed for nuclear weapons. We reiterate our support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the CD on an FMCT, including verification provisions.

In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P5 will, prior to the next UNGA, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

Furthermore, the P5 recall their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization./.

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Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
July 1, 2011