The United States is deeply disappointed by the failure of the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to conclude a protocol on cluster munitions.

The past four years of negotiations in the CCW offered a rare opportunity to place the major users and producers of cluster munitions, who represent between 85 and 90 percent of the world’s stockpiles, under a legally binding set of prohibitions and restrictions regarding cluster munitions for the first time.  The protocol would have led to the immediate prohibition of many millions of cluster munitions; placed the remaining cluster munitions under a detailed set of restrictions and regulations; and subjected member states to a detailed list of additional obligations on issues such as clearance, transparency and destruction, all of which would have led to a substantial humanitarian impact on the ground.

In fact, the protocol would have prohibited a greater number of cluster munitions for the United States alone than the Oslo Convention has prohibited for all of its member states combined.

In the wake of this outcome, the United States will continue to implement its own voluntary policy to prohibit by 2018 the use of cluster munitions with more than a one percent unexploded ordnance rate, and we encourage other countries to take similar steps.   The United States will also continue to serve as a world leader in addressing the humanitarian impact of cluster munition and other explosive remnants.  Since 1993, the United States has provided more than $1.9 billion to mitigate the threat from explosive remnants of war and other conventional weapons destruction in 81 countries.

Office of the Spokesperson

For Immediate Release
November 16, 2011

2011/1946

On-the-Record Briefing

Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bill Lietzau on the
U.S. Position on the Convention on Conventional Weapons
Negotiations on Cluster Munitions Protocol

November 16, 2011

Via Teleconference

MR. VENTRELL:  Good morning, everyone.  This is Patrick from the Press Office.  Today, we have Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Koh and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Bill Lietzau to discuss the U.S. position on the Convention on Conventional Weapons negotiated on a protocol on cluster munitions.

Ground rules for this call is that there are – the comments are on the record.  And without further ado, I’m going to turn it over to our speakers, and then after they’re done with opening remarks, we’ll take some questions.

Harold and Bill.

MR. KOH:  Yeah.  It’s Harold Koh here, the legal advisor.  The United States has been a high-contracting party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, the CCW, for a number of years.  This is the first time in a review conference in which we’re a party both to the convention and all five of the existing protocols.  The question here is whether we should support a sixth protocol, which is under discussion, about cluster munitions.  And our position is that we should, based on the chair’s text that’s currently before the conference.

We wanted to dispel at the outset the notion that in some way we are trying to detract from the Oslo Convention, which is a separate treaty outside the framework of the CCW, which also addresses clusters.  We see the two as complementary, not as competitive.  Nothing that we are saying or supporting would diminish or detract from the Oslo Convention, and we think that the protocol that’s under consideration here takes a significant step toward a goal that everybody shares, which is to address comprehensively the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions.

Just to make this concrete, many countries in the world are not parties to Oslo and are unlikely to become so, and that they represent 85 to 90 percent of the world’s cluster munition stockpiles.  So a question then becomes:  How do you regulate that 85 to 90 percent holders if they’re never going to join the Oslo Convention?  And the obvious answer is to try to bring regulation into the CCW, where they do participate.

Under discussion right now is a ban on cluster munitions that are produced before 1980.  If that were adopted as part of this protocol upon ratification and entry into force, it would immediately prohibit over 2 million cluster munitions or more than 100 million submunitions, which is about one-third of the entire U.S. stockpile of cluster munitions.  To put it directly, if this rule is adopted, it would prohibit more cluster munitions for the United States alone, than the Oslo Convention has prohibited for all of its member states combined.  And we think that this is a very significant humanitarian impact and should be supported.  It’s true for other countries as well.  For example, Ukraine announced that if this rule were adopted, it would prohibit more than a third of their existing stocks, almost 700,000 tons.  Millions of the Russians’ munitions would be banned as well.  So, we think that this protocol would have an immediate and tangible humanitarian effect.

The two other advantages of adopting this protocol are that it would create a detailed set of rules about clusters, including obligations with regard to transparency, cooperation, clearance, assistance to victims, and technological assistance.  And a third advantage is that the draft protocol is designed to evolve and grow stronger.  There are a very detailed set of technical annexes that would adapt to technical developments that might occur with regard to these kinds of munitions, and as well as commitments to review the annexes and to get more comprehensive provisions over time.

So, we think that it is clearly complementary to the norms that are out there.  The United States is deeply committed to conventional weapons destruction.  We’ve provided more than $1.9 billion toward that goal since 1993 in some 81 countries, and we think that this is a step in the same direction.  We obviously want to address humanitarian considerations while also addressing military concerns, which Bill Lietzau here is from the Department of Defense and can address.  But that is the posture in which we are approaching this conference which is going on now in Geneva.

MR. LIETZAU:  I have nothing to add.  I think Harold said it all.  The Department of Defense completely supports the protocol negotiation going on right now in the CCW, and we completely support the CCW as an appropriate and prudent way to limit and to appropriately balance the humanitarian interests and military necessity that come into play when we deal with weapons systems like this.

MR. VENTRELL:  Okay.  Thank you.  Operator, can we go to our first question, please?

OPERATOR:  Okay.  At this time, if you would like to ask a question, please press *1.  You will be prompted to record your name.  To withdraw your question, you may press *2.  Once again, at this time, if you would like to ask a question, please press *1.  One moment, please, for our first question.

Our first question is from Steven Myers.  Your line is open.

QUESTION:  Hi, gentlemen.  Thanks for doing this.  Could you explain in detail what the difference between the Oslo process and this would be in terms of what would and wouldn’t be allowed?  You said that they’re not in conflict, but rather, complementing each other.  But what is the distinction between the two that leads you to prefer the process in Geneva rather than Oslo?

MR. KOH:  Well, first, we don’t prefer it.  We think it’s complementary.  So we think that if you are a supporter of one, it doesn’t mean you should be opposed to the other.  The major difference is that the Oslo convention was adopted outside as a sort of standalone framework.  And a significant number of countries entered and there was a set of norms adopted.  The norms – we don’t challenge that those are the operative norms in this area.

The question is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has existed for many years and has addressed a huge range of issues.  Its major focus is on adopting protocols that lead to humanitarian impact by immediate effects on stocks.  And the – as I said in the opening, I think the key is that Oslo has a high standard, but many countries have not joined, including many countries that are in the CCW, and that therefore, while the norms of Oslo have been important and, we think, continue to announce a standard which is the one that many look to in this area, its impact in terms of actual destruction of clusters has been less than those in Oslo might have hoped.  The adoption of this protocol would immediately eliminate over 2 million clusters for the United States, which is more than Oslo has already prohibited for all the member states combined.

So I think the question is:  How can these two things be made to work together rather than competitively?  Another way to look at it, Steven, is that there are three groups within the CCW process.  There are the Oslo members, there are those who are working toward this humanitarian goal, and then there are others who are unlikely to participate in Oslo ever.  And the question is:  How can those who are interested in promoting the humanitarian impacts achieve an outcome that affects everybody who’s part of the CCW process?

MR. LIETZAU:  Steven, I’ll just add I completely agree.  I think that Harold Koh captured the primary difference, being that it’s being negotiated in the CCW, which we think is exactly the right place for this kind of negotiation.  Substantively, just to help you identify the technical – the most relevant – the most interesting technical differences is – and that’s that if you go to Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Oslo Convention, you’ll see that certain munitions are excluded from the definition of cluster munition, and then the treaty then proceeds to bar all cluster munitions, but with the exclusion of those – these particular – these munitions that have these particular parameters that are based on weight, numbers of submunitions and things like that.

What this complementary agreement would do is it would also permit those items to be excluded, but then it would provide another mechanism for excluding from use restrictions a munition, and that would be with the – a – having no more than a 1 percent unexploded ordinance rate across the range of intended operational environments.  And I – we believe that that criteria is a specific, objective, measurable criteria that actually is, in many ways, more targeted to the humanitarian concerns that we have than even some of the other criteria.  So that’s how it’s complementary.  It would not permit any weapons other than those that fit either the Oslo criteria or this even more rigorous criteria.

MR. VENTRELL:  Operator, if we can go to the next question, please.

OPERATOR:  Our next question is from Farrah Zughni.  Your line is now open.

QUESTION:  Hello.  I understand that the alternative draft protocol that’s been proposed by Mexico, Austria, and Norway is actually more ambiguous in its language, and I understand that they’re doing this as a strategy because they would like countries that have a more stringent understanding to be able to abide by that more stringent understanding, while cluster producers like the U.S. and Russia can take a more general understanding.  And I was wondering, is that the case?  And if so, why might the U.S. find that objectionable?

MR. KOH:  Well, these countries are our friends.  We think we share broad goals.  The question is how can the two texts, the one that’s the chair’s text, which has an immediate impact on destruction, be in some way merged or joined with language from the alternative draft protocol.  We – at a conference like this, it’s easier to get a result that includes the goals of the different groups if you can actually have a single text, and that’s all that’s going on right now.  I mean, the reason to have the conference is to have these kinds of diplomatic discussions.

OPERATOR:  Our next question is from Josh Rogin.  Your line is now open.

QUESTION:  Thanks, guys.  And I joined the call late, so I apologize if you covered this, but could you tell us about – your thinking about when you would submit either one of these things to – for Senate ratification?  Is it fair to say that the question initially was one you would never submit for Senate ratification?  And can you talk more about the criticism of your – of the chair’s draft proposal, namely that it doesn’t kick in fully until 2018?  Thank you.

MR. KOH:  We didn’t hear the second part, Josh.

QUESTION:  One of the criticisms of the draft proposal has been that it permits the use of certain classes of cluster munitions until 2018, matching Secretary Gates’s policy established in 2008.  Could I have your comment on that?  And also, what are the plans for engagement with the Senate?

MR. LIETZAU:  I’ll defer to Harold on the – engaging with the Senate.  I can say that DOD supports the chair’s text and the draft protocol that we would hope could result from that.  And we, in fact, think that we would be able to find favorable reception in the Senate as well.

With respect to the second question, remind me.  That was the –

QUESTION:  One of the criticisms from the NGO community is that the current draft, the chair’s draft protocol, would allow large classes of cluster munitions to still be used until 2018.

MR. LIETZAU:  Yeah.  So, you’re asking about the deferral period, and is that – is it or is it not problematic.  I would say – I would argue, having been in a number of negotiations like this one, not in this one, but when you see that countries have pushed for a deferral period, then you know you’ve got a serious convention on your hands.  Because what you’re talking about is someone who is absolutely committed to implementing the provisions of the protocol, but as a practical matter, they have to change their operations; they have to make changes in the way they do business in order to get to compliance.

So as a general – so – and that’s the case – that would be the case for the United States, and I know it would be the case for many other countries as well.  These are very high standards that the protocol would require, and getting our munitions to comply with those standards and our operations to comply is something that you can’t just do with a switch.  It’s something that you have to do with careful planning.  It costs money and it takes some time.  So I think that what you have there is an indicator that this would be a serious convention with practical effect, as Harold mentioned in his beginning remarks.  Here, we’re targeting the 85 to 90 percent of the cluster munitions out there, the producers and users of those cluster munitions, and we’re doing it in a way that would – bringing them aboard is not that easy.  It’s something that would take some time for them to be able to achieve.

QUESTION:  And Harold, are you satisfied?

MR. KOH:  Well, obviously, the step one, Josh, is to get the protocol.  Step two is to submit it, and there are steps along the way for advice and consent.  You know that it’s a challenge under our constitutional system to get 67 votes.  There would have to be a hearing process, et cetera.  But I think that we would be delighted to be in that position.

I think the main point is at the moment, there are cluster users and producers who are unregulated.  They are not part of the Oslo process and they will never be part of the Oslo process.  This protocol would have impact on everybody who is part of the CCW process.  And for that reason, it would have an immediate impact in terms of how people would have to prepare their stocks and what they might have to do to start moving toward the process of destruction and regulation.  Nobody thinks that this is the last step, but it’s a very important step to bringing this into a regime of regulation.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

OPERATOR:  Our next question is from Viola Gienger.  Your line is now open.

QUESTION:  Hello.  This is Viola Gienger from Bloomberg News.  The opponents of this protocol, the human rights groups and the arms control advocates, know this issue pretty well.  Why do you think it requires this extra time, this deferral, for such a long period?  In fact, it’s even beyond 2018, as I understand it, another 12 or 18 years – 12 years after the treaty enters into force.  Why do you think that it requires that much time, when they apparently do not?

MR. KOH:  Well, I think the more important question is that there’s nothing that inhibits people who want to join Oslo to move forward in Oslo.  The question is are you going to get anything in the CCW, right, and that many countries are not party to Oslo and will never be party to Oslo.  So those who support Oslo are free to move forward with the regulatory scheme in Oslo, and to encourage more to join.  The question is what kind of protocol on clusters can be adopted within the CCW framework.

Now obviously, there are issues to be worked out.  The draft of the protocol is still being discussed.  There are multiple texts on the floor.  But I think that the question is:  Are you better coming away with a regime of regulation created in the CCW that’s complementary to that one in Oslo?  Or are you better having Oslo, which covers relatively few countries and has very little impact – or has had less impact than we would have hoped – with regard to the actual elimination of weapons?

QUESTION:  But do you have some indication that you – or some pledges already that if this protocol goes through, you’ll get X number of countries signing on that are not part of the Oslo process?  Do you have some commitment to that already – have received commitment?

MR. KOH:  The commitment comes in the adoption of the protocol, which is – then becomes binding on those states within the CCW who ratify that protocol.  So it’s an important step toward their becoming bound by legal rules, when right now they’re not bound.  And they do not intend to enter Oslo, and they wouldn’t be bound there either.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

OPERATOR:  At this time, I would like to remind all participants, if you would like to ask a question, please press *1.  And our next question is from Gabriella Sotomayor.  Your line is now open.

QUESTION:  Thank you very much.  (Inaudible) is particularly concerned that the adoption of the draft protocol in its current form, which set an important precedent in international humanitarian law.  And they say that it would be the first time that states will have adopted a treaty of humanitarian law that provides less protection for civilians than a treaty already enforced.  So the same position is a lot of delegations and United Nations, so what is your opinion on this?

MR. KOH:  Well, I’m an international lawyer.  There are all kinds of treaties that are followed by other treaties in the same or connected areas, and the question is:  Can those treaties be made to work together?  What you’re looking at is a regime of control.  And I think the statement, “We have an Oslo convention that has led to the destruction of less than a million clusters,” should be a reason to block a protocol that would immediately lead to the destruction of 2 million clusters.  It places those who value the humanitarian impact as opposing the adoption of a protocol.

In many areas of law, you have multiple legal rules which have different impacts, and the question is how to make them work together.  And I think the critical point is we – obviously, the human rights and arms control groups – we have enormous respect for their work and we share their goals.  The question is whether it’s really true that the adoption of this protocol automatically waters down Oslo when, in fact, it brings under regulation a large number of countries who everybody knows will never be part of Oslo.  I think that’s the real question:  Why doesn’t it create a stronger framework that covers more countries and requires more destruction than the present state of the law?

MR. LIETZAU:  If I could just add, I think that the answer to your question is very similar to the last question as to why the NGOs and human rights organizations would sometimes want to oppose this.  And the answer would be for the same reasons that the other major users and producers would need the additional time to get ready.  The – Human Rights Watch is not a major user and producer, so of course they’re not going to be as familiar with the needs of meeting the military necessity concerns that a military force has.

And in this case, what we’re really talking about is the humanitarian effect, not just having a treaty which would appear on its face to have more stringent restrictions than another.  Here, we’re looking at actually having an effect.  So the real answer comes down to that 85 to 90 percent of the cluster munitions out there, and getting a regime that would cover those when another regime is not covering it

MR. KOH:  This is Harold Koh again.  Just accept the basic notion that many of the countries who are party to the C – who participate in the CCW will never becomes party to Oslo.  If this protocol comes into force and binding for them, three things happen immediately.  They have to destroy pre-1980 clusters; they enter a framework of regulation where they have to report on their stocks – the level of international cooperation and victim assistance – and third, the protocol develops over time to adapt to technological developments which could otherwise be used to avoid rules.

So for that group of nations who are in the CCW who are otherwise subject to no rules, this brings them within a regime of regulation.  It does nothing to hurt Oslo, in our view, and the two therefore are complementary.  It expands the impact of the regime that we’re all trying to create here.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

OPERATOR:  I’m showing no further questions at this time.

MR. KOH:  Great.  Thank you very much.

#   #   #

Opening Statement for the United States Delegation by
Phillip Spector, Head of Delegation

As delivered

November 14, 2011

Thank you Mr. President.

On behalf of the United States of America, I welcome the opening of the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. I’m particularly pleased to acknowledge that this the first review conference in which the United States is participating as a High Contracting Party to the Convention and all five existing protocols.  We strongly encourage other States Parties that have not done so to consider ratifying the Convention and all of its protocols, and we strongly support the plan for Universalization of the Convention and its protocols.

I want to stress the importance the United States attaches to the CCW as a forum that has been able to successfully bring together States with diverse national security concerns. Some have suggested revisiting some of the protocols; we do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to reopen the CCW protocols, which already have substantial humanitarian value. We also have concerns about certain other proposals for areas of new exploration, some of which are simply inappropriate for the CCW. Ultimately, we believe that the future vitality of the CCW rests both in implementing the existing protocols and ensuring that the CCW remains a robust and meaningful framework that brings states together to balance military necessity with humanitarian concerns to reduce the suffering of civilians.

To that end, I want to begin by recognizing the efforts of, and express our deep appreciation for, the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), Gary Domingo of the Philippines. Over the past two years, Gary has proved a skillful diplomat in helping to advance a draft that we believe should serve as the basis for a Sixth Protocol to address the most urgent humanitarian concerns regarding the possession, transfer, and use of cluster munitions.

The United States believes that now is the time to conclude a legally binding CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions based on the Chair’s text. A CCW protocol based on this text offers the only chance of bringing the world’s major cluster munitions users and producers — who represent between 85 and 90 percent of the world’s cluster munitions stockpiles, and are not in a position to join the Oslo Convention — into a legally binding set of prohibitions and regulations.

The ban on cluster munitions produced before 1980 would immediately, upon ratification and entry into force, prohibit over 2 million cluster munitions – representing more than 100 million submunitions — of the total U.S. stockpile of more than 6 million cluster munitions. In other words, the pre-1980 rule alone will prohibit more cluster munitions for the United States than the Oslo Convention has prohibited for all of its member states combined. We know the protocol will have a strong impact on other states as well. At the last GGE, Ukraine announced that the pre-1980 rule would prohibit more than a third of their existing stocks, which amount to almost 700,000 tons of their cluster munitions. And you just heard that the protocol would ban millions of Russia’s munitions as well. What is emerging is that the protocol would immediately prohibit many millions of the world’s most dangerous clusters munitions, an impact several times that of the Oslo Convention.
However, the draft protocol does not end there. The Chair’s text would immediately prohibit the transfer of all cluster munitions that do not possess a safeguard. And the Chair’s text would commit states to a legally-binding, time-bound framework for the prohibition of all cluster munitions without a safeguard. For the United States, the ban on weapons produced after 1980 without safeguards would prohibit millions more of its cluster munitions, the vast majority of its remaining operational stocks.

Next, the draft protocol continues from there to place any cluster munitions that remain under a extensive set of additional binding legal restrictions, among them ones that further constrain use and transfer. And, states would be bound to comply with a detailed set of other rules concerning cluster munitions, including obligations with regard to clearance, transparency, international cooperation, victim assistance, and technology assistance, to name just a few. Absent a protocol, none of these new binding legal obligations would be present.
Finally, the Chairman’s draft protocol is designed to evolve and grow stronger over time, built around technical annexes that can adapt to the technical developments that will inevitably occur and inure to the benefit of civilian populations around the world, and with commitments to review the Annexes and endeavor to agree on additional comprehensive provisions during review conferences.

The United States recognizes the important contributions of the Oslo Convention in this area. The proposed Protocol VI is designed to be fully complementary with the Oslo Convention, not to undermine it. And as the framework CCW Convention and the Chair’s text emphasizes, nothing in here diminishes or detracts in any way from existing international law. We are optimistic that the draft protocol takes a significant step toward our shared goal of addressing comprehensively the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions.

The Chair’s text achieves our negotiating mandate to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations. We recognize that this has been a complex negotiation, and that all sides may not be fully satisfied. We have heard discomfort from Oslo states and major users and producers alike, but that is the very essence of a strong compromise. A compromise that, as we have heard in the room today, would have a real and immediate impact on 85 to 90 percent of the world’s CMs – new legally binding rules for weapons that are not prohibited today.

Mr. President, for the United States, the path forward is clear. We have moved gradually towards this text over time, and it reflects the center of gravity of the room. After so many years of productive negotiations, a Sixth Protocol that would bring major users and producers of cluster munitions under a binding legal regime for the first time is finally within reach — we must not let this rare and unique opportunity slip away. We look forward to our discussions these two weeks; we must act now to realize this humanitarian aim.
Thank you, Mr. President.

GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS MEETING
CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

Opening Statement for the United States Delegation by
Melanie Khanna, Legal Adviser,
U.S. Mission to the UN and Other International Organizations in Geneva,

Head of Delegation

August 22, 2011

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to thank you and the Friends of the Chair for your excellent work guiding us through the negotiations this past year.  These have not always been easy discussions.  However, you have led us with thoughtfulness, creativity and a steadfast commitment to the important work of this body.  You have brought us very far, and we commend you for your work.

Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in the informal meeting you convened last week, the United States continues to believe that a CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions that provides a substantial humanitarian impact on the ground is an essential and achievable goal.  A CCW Protocol along the lines of the Chair’s text that imposes meaningful requirements on the countries that are the major users and producers of cluster munitions and who hold approximately 90% of the world’s stockpiles would be an important and undeniable step forward from a humanitarian viewpoint —with the effect of immediately prohibiting more than 2 million U.S. cluster munitions alone.

We are encouraged by the notable progress in our discussions.  It is remarkable to reflect on how far we have come from the earliest days of our GGE discussions, when we didn’t contemplate that we could achieve a legally binding agreement requiring the immediate prohibition of millions of older cluster munitions and imposing immediate requirements on the development and production of all new cluster munitions.

After much discussion and compromise, we found ourselves earlier this year considering a sweeping draft protocol that first, imposes an immediate ban on pre-1980 cluster munitions without safeguards, a ban that would extend to more weapons for the United States alone than are currently covered by the entire Oslo Convention, as well as an immediate ban on the development and production of new weapons that do not meet the requirements in Technical Annex B; second, after an optional deferral period, imposes a ban on all cluster munitions produced after 1980 without certain features, which  would prohibit millions more cluster munitions for the United States alone; third, places the use of any cluster munitions that remain under a set of new requirements; and fourth, in addition to all of the above, contains a detailed list of requirements in areas such as clearance, assistance to victims and transparency, or national reporting.

And the protocol has only continued to evolve throughout this year, with changes that aim to further strengthen the humanitarian impact of the Protocol, including the removal of any deferral period for the ban on the transfer of cluster munitions,  new deadlines for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, an across the board requirement that states at all times use only munitions with the lowest possible unexploded ordnance rate consistent with military requirements, clarifications in Articles 4 and 5 that the number of cluster munitions that may be retained for certain training purposes must be the “minimum necessary for such purposes,” and language reflecting an intention to continue to review and endeavor to strengthen the Protocol over time, to name just a few.  Given the evolution of the text in our negotiations to date, there’s ample reason to doubt those who assert that no evolution of the text is likely through future review processes.

As we near the November Review Conference, we know there are those on both sides for whom the protocol does not fully satisfy.  To be certain, there are particulars the United States would change if it were possible.  However, we believe the current draft represents a very strong and desirable basis for compromise that genuinely meets many of the persistent concerns of both sides and provides an immediate and significant humanitarian impact on the ground.

As we finish our deliberations, our delegation is ready to work with you, the Friends of the Chair, and other interested delegations towards adoption of a Protocol in November.   We believe that if delegations are willing to genuinely cooperate and compromise, we have in our sights a binding protocol that will benefit civilian populations around the world.  This is not an opportunity we can afford to squander, given the real stakes for real people on the ground.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

***

Opening Statement for the United States Delegation by
Melanie Khanna, Legal Adviser,
US Mission to the U.N. and Other International Organizations in Geneva,

Head of Delegation

March 28, 2011

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by offering our thanks to you and all the Friends of the Chair for your continuing efforts to lead us toward consensus in these challenging negotiations. The United States remains committed to reaching an agreement on a legally binding protocol in the CCW to mitigate the humanitarian impact to civilian populations resulting from the use of cluster munitions. You of course have our full support as you lead us in this endeavor this week.

As my delegation has stated during earlier rounds of negotiations, we continue to believe that a CCW Protocol on Cluster Munitions that provides a substantial humanitarian impact on the ground is an essential and achievable goal. A CCW Protocol that imposes meaningful requirements on the countries that are the major users and producers of cluster munitions and who hold approximately 90% of the world’s stockpiles would be an important and undeniable step forward from a humanitarian viewpoint—with the effect of immediately prohibiting more than 2 million U.S. cluster munitions alone.

We are encouraged by the progress in our discussions, particularly our sense of the good cooperative spirit at our last session and general acknowledgement concerning the strengthening of the text, as well as continued acknowledgement that it will not be possible to reach consensus in the CCW on a text that replicates the Oslo ban. We note that your newest version of the text incorporates several changes that aim to further strengthen the humanitarian impact of the Protocol, including a newly proposed flat ban on all pre-1980 munitions, a new deadline for clearance of CM remants, and a requirement that states at all times use only munitions with the lowest possible unexploded ordnance rate, consistent with military requirements. We look forward to discussing these and other substantive changes in the text, which will obviously require close consideration and debate this week. We note that this draft also takes steps to make the entire protocol easier to understand, helpfully addressing concerns raised by some states at the last session that the earlier drafts were unduly ambiguous or complicated.

Our delegation is ready to work with you, the Friends of the Chair, and other interested delegations to resolve the outstanding issues before us. We believe that if delegations continue to work in the spirit of cooperation that prevailed during our last meeting in February, it will be possible to change the reality on the ground in a meaningful way to the benefit of civilian populations worldwide.

Melanie Khanna
Legal Adviser
United States Mission to the United Nations
Geneva, Switzerland

Opening Statement by the United States Delegation at the First Round of Negotiations in 2011 for a Protocol to the CCW to Combat Negative Humanitarian Effect of Cluster Munitions

As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations on your Chairmanship of our work this year. On behalf of the members of my delegation, we are extremely pleased to be here today to carry out the mandate of the GGE as agreed by CCW States Parties last November. As you have reminded us, that mandated calls on the GGE to “continue its negotiations informed by the Chair’s Text on a draft protocol on cluster munitions, and taking into account other past, present, and future proposals” to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, “while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.”

Mr. Chairman, let me confirm today that the United States remains committed to negotiate a legally binding Protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW to mitigate the threat to civilian populations resulting from the use of cluster munitions, and you have our full support. We realize many governments represented here are parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). However, many other States, including the United States, have determined that their national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms of the CCM. A comprehensive international response to the humanitarian concerns associated with cluster munitions must include action by those States that are not in a position to become parties to the CCM because those States produce and stockpile the vast majority of the world’s cluster munitions. The US stockpile alone is more than 5 million cluster munitions with over 700 million sub-munitions. The United States believes that it should be possible to reach agreement in the CCW on a protocol on cluster munitions that will have significant humanitarian benefits. The U.S. Delegation is committed to working cooperatively with delegations across the spectrum of views represented here to achieve this positive result.

We know that negotiations on a cluster munitions protocol in the CCW will continue to be difficult, and we realize that strong differences remain. Nevertheless, we believe that it is worth devoting a significant effort to achieve a successful result. A CCW protocol that imposes meaningful requirements on the countries that hold 85-90% of the world’s stockpiles of cluster munitions would be an important step forward from a humanitarian standpoint.

On behalf of the United States, let me reaffirm that we have come prepared to listen to all reasonable proposals and comments regarding the existing text. Having said that, we believe that the Chair’s existing text reflects much valuable work and that it represents a sound and – as the Brazilian Ambassador has said – “realistic” basis for discussions that have the potential to lead to a consensus outcome here – and that, Mr. Chairman remains our goal.

To that end, we hope to make a short presentation at some point this week, whenever you decide appropriate, that we hope will help illustrate the real significance of the Chair’s current draft, including pre-1980 date, and address some of the assertions just made by Norway about these weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Opening Statement for the United States Delegation

US Mission to the U.N. and Other International Organizations,

Head of Delegation
Melanie Khanna
Legal Adviser

Thank you Mr. President. I would like to start by congratulating you on your selection as President of the Meeting of the States Party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We are confident that you will lead us to a very conclusion of an important year, and I want to assure you that you have our full support and we are at your disposal.

During the course of this week, we have already had productive discussions on this year’s work regarding the Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and Amended Protocol II on Landmines. This year, we have also engaged in serious negotiations of a Protocol on Cluster Munitions.

The United States remains fully committed to reaching an agreement on a legally binding protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW to mitigate the humanitarian impact to civilian populations resulting from their use. We have made important progress during this past year, and are now much closer to reaching a successful outcome to our admittedly difficult negotiations. Under the guidance of the Chairperson of the GGE, Gary Domingo, and the very able Friends of the Chair, we have a draft text before us that balances military utility and humanitarian objectives, and that would – if subscribed to by major users and producers of cluster munitions – immediately upon entry into force prohibit the use and transfer of a very large proportion of the world’s cluster munitions – a much larger proportion, in fact, than are currently covered by the Oslo Convention.

We recognize, especially with the Convention on Cluster Munitions’ recent entry into force, that some delegations and NGOs may view these negotiations as being unnecessary. We strongly disagree. A CCW Protocol that imposes meaningful requirements on approximately 90% of the world’s stockpiles would be an important step forward from a humanitarian standpoint.

The current Chairman’s text incorporates an immediate ban on a specific group of cluster munitions, namely those that have been produced before 1980 that do not incorporate any safeguards. This ban would include a large portion of those weapons that have been cited as being the most likely to have unacceptable humanitarian effects. For the United States, accepting a protocol with this provision would require us to permanently set aside from use, and to ultimately destroy, approximately 50 % of our cluster munitions stocks. Other provisions of the Protocol that become effective after optional deferral periods would cover an even higher percentage of the U.S. arsenal.

I am not suggesting that the current text constitutes our final document. There are still difficult discussions ahead. But we now have a text that genuinely reflects some of the persistent concerns of both sides, and provides an immediate and significant humanitarian impact. The standards incorporated in the current text would be subject to evolution over time by agreement. The current text also includes exemptions deemed critical by various states – some by Oslo states and some by major users and producers.

We have truly reached an important juncture. We have the possibility of agreement within our grasp. Both sides have been presented with a draft which may be difficult for them to accept. For the Oslo States who want to see a complete ban on most types of cluster munitions (namely those defined as cluster munitions in the CCM), this agreement will not fully satisfy. For the major “users and producers,” many provisions in the current draft are very far reaching indeed. We must move ahead deliberately, taking into account each other’s genuine efforts and concerns.

We are convinced that an agreement is possible in the next year. With continued cooperation and political will, these negotiations can come to a conclusion that will change the reality on the ground in a meaningful way. I urge all states here to support continuation next year of our negotiating mandate, updated to include reference to the Chair’s most recent text. Proposals to alter the substance of our mandate are likely to meet with counterproposals and bog us down. I would therefore strongly encourage us all to avoid prolonged debate about changing the substance of our mandate in favor of an approach that will carry us forward efficiently and cooperatively.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Melanie Khanna, Head of Delegation

24 November 2010

Thank you, Mr. President and congratulations on your election to the Presidency. On behalf of the members of my delegation, we are pleased to be here as a party to the Convention and all of its protocols, and you have our full support.

The United States is strongly committed to continuing its global leadership in eliminating the humanitarian risks posed by landmines.

Since 1993, the United States has provided more than $1.8 billion toward humanitarian mine action and removing explosive remnants of war in 80 countries. Hard copies of the Department of States Conventional Weapons Destruction program report on assistance, the ninth edition of To Walk the Earth in Safety, are available at the back of the room. The report is also posted on the Department of State’s Website (http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/index.htm).

To further advance the humanitarian goals reflected in Amended Protocol II, the United States has ended use of all non-detectable anti-vehicle landmines, in addition to non-detectable anti-personnel landmines that are covered by Amended Protocol II. The United States will also end all use of persistent mines, both anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, by the end of this year.

We participated actively in the informal Expert Group meeting this April and found it valuable to exchange views on best practices related to implementation of the Protocol. We wish to thank both of the Protocol II coordinators for their excellent reports and work this year. We believe that it is important to call attention to Parties’ responsibilities with respect to IEDs. We are prepared to support the coordinator’s ideas for future discussion, but we believe the specific recommendations require some refinements so as to ensure we are not purporting to create new obligations or duplicating work already being done in other fora. We have shared our thoughts on this with the coordinator and are prepared to continue to consult with him and other interested States Parties so as to finalize language on recommendations for our continued work on IEDs.

On a separate topic, we appreciate the coordinator’s paper regarding the termination of original Protocol II and we strongly encourage those who are not yet party to amended Protocol II to consider joining as soon as possible. Until such time as all Parties to original Protocol II are party to amended Protocol II, we will not be in a position to support termination of original Protocol II. We can, however, support the coordinator’s current recommendations for taking this issue forward.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Points on IED Coordinator’s report:

The United States agrees that prevention of IED use is an important objective and that it is appropriate to discuss aspects of this problem in the context of the Amended Protocol II.

We appreciate the efforts that coordinator has put into organizing and focusing our discussions on those areas most related to APII.

That said, we had some concerns with the recommendations for continuing our work as presented in the Coordinator’s paper. We sought clarification of these recommendations with the Coordinator to gain a better understanding of the intent of the recommendations and to share our ideas about how the CCW could best add value to existing and ongoing work in other fora.

Based on these conversations, we are prepared to be supportive of the coordinator’s key ideas, but believe the recommendations require some rewording.

For instance our work next year should not purport to create new obligations for states parties. We also want to be sure the scope of our work does not duplicate work that is being effectively undertaken in other fora.

We are prepared to consult with the coordinator and other interested states parties to finalize alternative language that will allow us to support the continuation of this work.

Melanie Khanna, Head of Delegation

22 November 2010

Thank you, Mr. President, and warm congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency.  On behalf of the members of my delegation, we are pleased to be here as a party to the Convention and all its protocols, and we extend a warm welcome to the eight new parties to Protocol V. We thank you, Mr. President, for your work in preparation for this meeting, and we extend our thanks also to all of the coordinators who have produced valuable reports, which we look forward to discussing this week.

The United States remains deeply concerned by the risks posed by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), and we are pleased to be a world leader in Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)-related assistance. For many years our HMA assistance programs have addressed both ERW and landmines. More recently we have expanded our assistance to include the destruction and stockpile security of excess and at-risk stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and conventional munitions. Since 1993, the United States has provided more than $1.8 billion for these Conventional Weapons Destruction Programs in over 80 countries. In 2010 specifically, the Department of State provided $160 million in assistance to 31 countries, and we continue to work bilaterally and multilaterally to reduce the threat to civilians. An important element of our assistance is the Quick Reaction Force, which is a deployable team of conventional weapons destruction experts that works in concert with U.S. Embassies and host nations to respond to critical risks posed by ERW. The United States also provides substantial survivors’ assistance around the world. All U.S. assistance in these important areas is need based; it is not predicated on the type of munition or its origin.

Although we have seen real progress in combating the threat of mines and ERW, conflicts do persist, threatening peace and stability around the world. Recognizing that governments and international organizations cannot do it all, the United States, through the Department of State, continues to expand our public-private partnership program. Our almost 60 partner organizations raise awareness and resources for mine action. These organizations educate civilians on the risks of ERW and assist ERW and landmine survivors with rehabilitation and reintegration into society, as well as with removing and destroying landmines and ERW.

The United States takes seriously Protocol V’s guidance on generic preventive measures to limit the creation of ERW. The U.S. Department of Defense carries out a robust Physical Security and Stockpile Management program for all U.S. munitions that include regular surveillance to ensure that weapons are performing effectively. Through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of State, we offer technical advice, training, and in some cases technical assistance to help states improve their stockpile management.

On the national level, in order to further reduce the threat of ERW, in June 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates adopted a new cluster munitions policy. The main feature of this policy is that, by 2018, the U.S. armed forces will not use cluster munitions that, after arming, result in more than 1 percent of unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational conditions. Implementation of this policy will substantially address the humanitarian concerns associated with the reliability rates of cluster munitions. This policy will affect over 95 percent of current U.S. stockpiles.

Mr. President, there are currently 69 States Parties to Protocol V. There are, however, over 110 States Parties to the Convention and we urge those States not yet a Party to Protocol V to consider ratifying or acceding to it in the near future. The United States recognizes the importance of the universalization of this Protocol and supports ongoing efforts towards achievement of just that.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Group of Governmental Experts Meeting
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

Opening Statement for the United States Delegation
by Melanie Khanna, Legal Adviser,
Head of Delegation
U.S. Mission to the U.N. and Other International Organizations

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by offering our thanks to you for your continuing efforts to lead us toward consensus in these difficult negotiations. We also extend our thanks to all of the Friends of the Chair for their good work to date.

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains committed to reaching an agreement on a legally binding protocol on Cluster Munitions in the CCW to address their humanitarian impact on civilian populations. In our many rounds of negotiations in Geneva, we have made important progress towards achieving such an agreement—much difficult work has been done, many compromises have been found, and significant areas for further compromise have been identified.

We recognize, especially with the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, that some delegations and NGOs may view these negotiations as having no value or even as counterproductive. Some have argued that an agreement on cluster munitions in the CCW that is different from the standard set by the Oslo Convention is not worthwhile. We strongly disagree. A CCW Protocol that imposes meaningful requirements on the countries that are the major users and producers of cluster munitions would be a very important step forward from a humanitarian standpoint.

We realize the work this week will be difficult and that significant differences remain, but our delegation has been giving our outstanding issues a good deal of thought intersessionally and is prepared to actively engage with other interested delegations to find the compromises that will be necessary to reach consensus as soon as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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