December 23, 2011
2011/2188

On-the-Record Briefing

Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation
Thomas Countryman on Outcomes Related to the
7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference

December 23, 2011
Via Teleconference

MR. VENTRELL:  Hi, everyone.  This is Patrick from the Press Office.  Today we have with us Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Affairs Mr. Thomas Countryman.  He’s going to conduct an on-the-record session today to discuss outcomes related to the 7th Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention Review Conference which concluded in Geneva, Switzerland yesterday.  After his initial opening remarks, he will take questions.

And so without further ado, I’m going to turn it over to the assistant secretary.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Thank you, Patrick, and good afternoon, everyone.  The United States is pleased with the outcome of the 7th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that was adopted yesterday in Geneva.  The final document adopted a program for what we call the intercessional period, the next five years before the next review conference, that will focus on three major topics:  first, strengthening implementation of the convention, that is, the implementation legally and practically by each of the states party; second, a regular and systematic review of scientific and technological developments in the life sciences relevant to the convention; and third, continuing to build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including capacity building in bio-safety, bio-security, disease surveillance, preparedness, and response.

These are the three areas that the United States emphasized when Secretary Clinton spoke to the conference on December 7th, and we’re pleased, of course, that they are the focus of the final document.  They were adopted not because the United States pushed them but because we selected the topics that it is clear the majority of states party agree are essential for future development.  These are the very topics at the intersection of public health and international security that will help all the nations of the world confront some serious challenges in the years ahead.  And so we are happy to see that these are the primary focus of the intercessional period.

Throughout the convention, the review conference, and throughout the period leading up to it, the United States consulted closely with countries around the world, not only our closest allies but many in the non-aligned movement as well, in order to get to this consensus document.  We set a positive tone throughout the conference, of course highlighted by the Secretary’s speech in Geneva on December 7th.  And afterward, the delegation led by Ambassador Laura Kennedy did an absolutely outstanding job of both listening to the concerns of our partners and putting forward a positive agenda that has resulted in consensus.

So we are happy with the results.  We think they are significant for not only the United States as we move ahead on advancing the President’s national strategy for countering biological threats, but that they have the same value for all of our partners around the world who share this concern about potential biological and toxic threats.

And with that, I’d be happy to take some questions.

MR. VENTRELL:  Operator, can we go ahead and see if there are questions?

OPERATOR:  Thank you.  We will now begin the question-and-answer session.  If you would like to ask a question, please press *1 and record your name.  One moment, please, for the first question.

Our first question comes from Daniel Horner with Arms Control Today.

QUESTION:  Hi, Mr. Ambassador.  Thank you for doing the call.  I had a couple questions.  First, before the conference, there was quite a lot of discussion about expanding the mandate of the intercessional process to give it more power to make some decisions.  And as I understand it, that wasn’t part of the final document.  And then also, there’s been a lot of discussion about the implementation support unit, expanding that, increasing staff and so on.  And my understanding was that didn’t really happen either.  Can you give some details on those elements, please?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Yeah, thank you, Daniel.  The United States, like many other delegations, favored both a modest expansion of the implementation support unit – and to remind others who are new, this is a very lean treaty.  There is a unit of only three people tasked with implementing the intercessional work of this convention.  We favored a modest expansion of that number.  In today’s financial environment, even that modest expansion was not acceptable to some members, some states’ party, and so that expansion did not make it into the consensus document.

On the question of decision-making in the intercessional process, again, we favored a very modest innovation that would allow decisions to be taken still only by consensus, as in the review conference itself, so that the convention and the process could be a little bit more nimble.  Again, there were concerns expressed by some other states about the implications of allowing even a limited range of decisions to be made in the intercessional process, and so that was not adopted.  Still, I think that these are modality issues rather than issues of substance, and it doesn’t change our assessment that we’re satisfied with this outcome.

OPERATOR:  Once again, if you’d like to ask a question, please press *1.

One moment for the next question.

Next question comes from Nicole Gaouette with Bloomberg News.

QUESTION:  Hi, Mr. Ambassador.  Thanks for doing this.  You’ve mentioned that one of the priorities is going to be building capacity to deal with disease outbreaks.  Were there any specifics – specific plans or goals that you set out?  And if so, could you share?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  No.  The final document of the review conference does not go into that kind of detail in terms of setting goals.  Rather, what it does is identifies the topics that will be covered by the meetings of expert groups and the meetings of state parties that take place each of the next five years.  So the goal is expressed only in general terms of building capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of biological weapons – in other words to cover natural outbreaks as well as intentional attacks, since you need the same response mechanism for both.  And these will include such topics as biosafety, biosecurity, preparedness, surveillance, response, and crisis management.

Now, so the specifics are not covered in the final document, but of course the United States has a well established set of programs through a number of different agencies.  From the State Department and my bureau, we have the Biosecurity Engagement Program.  We have similar initiatives, each with a slightly different focus from Health and Human Services, from the National Institutes of Health, from the Center for Disease Control, from the Department of Defense, from USAID, all with a common goal of enhancing public health, and each of which touches in some way on this issue.

So we have very well developed programs of – for example, disease surveillance and disease containment that are already active around the world.   The BWC RevCon has proven – or the BWC itself has proven to be a unique tool – a multidimensional, multinational tool – that can bring together in this annual conferences not just diplomats but also scientists, public health officials, law enforcement officials, those who will have the very challenging job at this nexus of public health of public security in case we ever face such an emergency.

So to make it shorter, the document doesn’t do that kind of detail, but the United States, like many other countries, has very detailed and developed programs that we will continue to implement.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

OPERATOR:  Question comes from Daniel Horner with Arms Control Today.

QUESTION:  Hi.  Yeah.  A couple other questions, if I could.  First of all, in her remarks, Secretary Clinton talked about bolstering international confidence.  As you mentioned, that’ll be one of the topics for the intercessional process.  But were there any concrete commitments by the parties to do that, to increase transparency and so on, by the United States or any other parties?

And then secondly, with regard to the previous question I asked, you said you had favored some very modest changes, which weren’t adopted.  Can you talk a little bit about why those changes weren’t adopted, given that they were rather modest, as you characterized them?  Thanks.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  On the first question, one of the things you’ll see in this 40-page final document is that the conference acknowledged the need to enhance state parties participation in confidence-building measure submissions.  Each of the states parties should submit an annual report talking about its biological activities.  In practice, it’s only about half the states party that do so on a regular basis.  And so increasing the participation rate and making the information that’s submitted more relevant, more valuable to other states, was a good topic of discuss and one that will continue in the intersessional process.

QUESTION:  Pardon me.  If I could just follow on that.  It’s basically calling for greater adherence to a commitment that was previously made, right?  There’s not any new commitment on transparency or anything related to conference-building and a verification or anything along those lines?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Yeah.  I think that’s a fair statement, but with a couple of comments.  One that the intersessional process will look at the question, can we make the prescribed format for these confidence-building measures more informative, more useful, and less onerous so that they are filled more frequently.

The other comment is that, very much a part of the Secretary’s speech on December 7th, and what we stressed repeatedly throughout the conference, is that all nations can make greater efforts in transparency that go beyond the requirements of the Convention.  The United States is trying to set an example in this regard.  So for example on the sidelines of the conference we did a number of public events that talked about our bio-preparedness program at home – how we manage it, that talked about the kind of assistance we do with many countries around the world.  We demonstrated with a interactive display how the United States posts online its annual report to the BWC.  It’s not required to make these documents public, but we think it sets a good example for not only other countries but the public to have access to the information that we report.  And I think this was well-received.

Although, there’s no new specific requirement on transparency as a means to build confidence and national implementation.  There’s no new specific requirement, but I think it’s the trend, and I think there is growing support among the states party to demonstrate that kind of transparency.  We’ll continue to try to be one of the leaders in that field.

And I’m sorry.  You’re other question was about very modest changes.  The – it’s hard to say exactly why.  I mean, the easy answer is because it’s a consensus-based organization, and that means if a few people feel strongly enough about it, they can prevent this change being made.  I think on the – and so even for the modest budget increase that would be required to expand the size of the ISU, this was a legitimate concern for countries that are feeling financial pressure these days.  On the question of decision-making, again, we don’t think it was a radical change, because the principle of consensus would still be protected.  But again, for some smaller countries, it might have meant that the – they would have to send representatives to every, single meeting, because there would always be the potential of a decision being made.

That’s the argument we heard.  I think there were other arguments with less validity against these two ideas.  But I think in the end, it is concerns about budget that prevented what we thought were modest and very beneficial steps forward from being taken.  But once again, we do not let that detract from our satisfaction with the result on the substance.

OPERATOR:  Okay.

MR. VENTRELL:  Do we have any other questions in queue?

OPERATOR:  No further questions.

MR. VENTRELL:  Okay, everyone.  Happy holidays to all of you, and thanks, Assistant Secretary for the briefing.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN:  Okay.  Thanks to all of you.  I hope you have a great holiday.

# # #

FACT SHEET ON THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

“We will continue to face new and emerging biological threats that will require the coordinated and connected efforts of a broad range of domestic and international partners.  As we take action to counter these threats, we will work together to advance our own health security and provide for the improved condition of all humanity.”

-  President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
November 23, 2009

On December 22 in Geneva, the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) ended the meeting of the treaty’s Seventh Review Conference (RevCon) on a high note by endorsing a multinational work program for the next five years that promises to revitalize global efforts to reduce biological threats and advance objectives set forth in the President’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.  States Parties announced their agreement to focus on three broad areas proposed by the United States: the strengthening of national implementation of the BWC; science and technology developments relevant to the treaty; and cooperation and assistance to build global capacities for preventing and controlling disease outbreaks, whatever their origin.  The RevCon Final Document provides a critical framework to bring together international security, health, law enforcement, and science communities to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and how to best manage them.  As Secretary of State Clinton noted in the U.S. opening statement, shoring up our domestic and international defenses against intentional attacks will make it easier to detect and respond to naturally occurring outbreaks, providing benefits for every country in every region.

Advancing the National Strategy

The ambitious work program adopted by the Review Conference is an important step toward reinvigorating the BWC as a premier venue for multinational collaboration on concrete activities to help counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism.  States Parties agreed that efforts on the three priority standing issues would continue from one year to the next – an approach the United States had advocated as key to enabling real progress at the international level.

·         To strengthen national implementation of the BWC, States Parties agreed to begin annual discussions of topics such as enforcement of national legislation, coordination among law enforcement institutions, and best practices for enhancing implementation.

·         States Parties concluded that there is a need for regular and systematic review of scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, and they emphasized the importance of education and efforts to raise awareness of dual-use concerns among those working in the biological sciences.  States Parties took the additional step of identifying topics for the working group on Science and Technology to consider each year, starting in 2012, with advances in enabling technologies, such as those for sequencing, synthesizing, and analyzing DNA.

·         States Parties also agreed on the need to build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of biological weapons.  During the next five years experts will address, inter alia, capacity-building in biosafety and biosecurity, preparedness, response, and crisis management; States Parties also decided that a database system to facilitate requests and offers for assistance among States Parties will be created.

Building Confidence in Compliance

The States Parties acknowledged the need to enhance participation in voluntary confidence-building measures (CBMs) submissions.  As a first step, States Parties undertook a review to improve the treaty’s annual CBM reporting system – the first time since 1991 that such a review had been done – and they committed to continuing the effort during the next five years.  The United States asked States Parties to further focus on developing constructive approaches to strengthening BWC implementation and to building confidence that all Parties were living up to their obligations.  Because the dual-use nature of biological work makes it impossible to verify compliance through traditional arms control means, the United States urged that countries create their own openness and transparency measures to demonstrate confidence in compliance.

·         Leading by example, Secretary Clinton announced a new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, featuring a U.S.-hosted International Forum on Health and Security in mid-2012 to share views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch programs, as well as continued tours of U.S. biodefense facilities and exchanges among American scientists and their counterparts from other countries.

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BWC Review Conference – U.S. Highlights International Assistance,

 Need for Coordinated Preparedness and Response

“We must come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger – whether it is a pandemic like H1N1, a terrorist threat, or a treatable disease.” – -  President Obama, United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2011

On December 7, 2011 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton addressed the Seventh Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference (BWC RevCon) to stress that the Obama Administration has made the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction a top priority, and views the risk of a bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and foreign policy priority.  In an age when people and diseases cross borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a transnational threat, and the United States must protect against them with transnational action.

Along the margins of the formal BWC Review Conference sessions, U.S. Conference on Disarmament Ambassador and BWC Representative Laura Kennedy hosted three events that provided an overview of the U.S. approach to several critical BWC areas.  These events were open to all conference participants, including delegates, industry and international and nongovernmental organization representatives and journalists.

The December 8 event focused on showcasing the goals and underlying rationale of the U.S. biodefense program. (Read more)  The December 9 event featured senior U.S. Government policy officials and program managers who spoke to the depth and breadth of U.S. Government international cooperation and assistance efforts in health and the life sciences under Article X of the BWC.  The event showcased the programs of the U.S. Departments of State, Health and Human Services (including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health), Agriculture and Defense.  The December 13 event demonstrated the need for greater coordination and preparation to deal with biological incidents, whatever the cause, demonstrating the interlinked goals of Article VII and Article X of the BWC. The event included presentations from representatives of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Relief Assistance.  Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Department of Global Capacities, Alert and Response, World Health Organization also participated in the discussion.

The three week Review Conference opened on December 5 and concludes December 22, 2011.

 First Side Event on U.S. Biodefense Programs, December 8, 2011

Panelists:

• Thomas Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation

• Daniel Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary for Homeland Security for Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security George Korch, Senior Science Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Second Side Event on U.S. Assistance Provided Under Article X of the BWC, December 9, 2011

Panelists:

• Kathryn Harris, Foreign Affairs Advisor, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense Kathryn Insley, Deputy Director, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, U.S. Department of State

• Scott Dowell, Director, Division of Global Disease Detection and Emergency Response, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

• Michael Johnson, Deputy Director, Fogarty International Center, U.S. National Institutes of Health

• Selwyn Jamison, Program Manager for Bioterrorism Prevention, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation

• Rebecca Katz, Public Health Scientist, Biological Policy Staff, U.S. Department of State

Third Side Event on International Preparedness and Response, December 13, 2011

Panelists:

• Isabelle Nuttall, Director of the Department of Global Capacities, Alert and Response, World Health Organization

• Gregor Malich Head of Project, NRBC Operational Response in the Department of Operations of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

• George Korch, Senior Science Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

• Scott Dowell, Director, Division of Global Disease Detection and Emergency Response, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

• Nance Kyloh, Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

To view the presentations at these events, please see links

Click here to view Deputy Under Secretary Daniel Gerstein December 8 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Dr.George Korch December 8 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view George Korch December 9 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Scott Dowell December 9 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Selwyn Jamison December 9 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Michael Johnson December 9 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Harris  & Insley December 9 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Scott Dowell December 13 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Dr. Geroge Korch December 13 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view Nancy Kyloh December 13 powerpoint presentation

Click here to view U.S. Mission Geneva’s photos of these and other events.

# # #

Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. Special Representative for Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Issues

Ambassador Laura Kennedy, Assistant Secretary of State Tom Countryman, Deputy Under Secretary of DHS Gerstein and HHS Science Advisor George Korch discussed the whole of government approach to biodefense and emergency preparedness.

On December 8, 2011, the U.S. Delegation to the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference (BWC RevCon) hosted a side event on the United States Biodefense Program open to all conference participants. After presentations from the four senior U.S. government policy-makers, the panel answered questions from the audience of more than 100 conference delegates, industry and nongovernmental organization representatives, and journalists.

Panelists:

• Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Special Representative for Biological Weapons Convention Issues
• Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation
• Daniel Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and
• George Korch, Senior Science Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Services for Preparedness and Response

Ambassador Kennedy welcomed the audience and opened the discussion by emphasizing “the essential nature of international cooperation and assistance and the importance of sharing, whether it is material, best practices, or knowledge.”

Assistant Secretary Countryman then outlined the key premises that underlie the U.S approach to addressing the spectrum of a potential bio attack and the comprehensive U.S. approach: threat awareness; prevention and protection; surveillance and detection; and response and recovery. Assistant Secretary Countryman went on to describe the U.S. system as multi-disciplinary and multi-agency at the federal, state and local levels, in consultation with community actors and private industry.

In his presentation focused on the development of medical countermeasures, Dr. Korch described how the U.S. Biodefense program is designed to respond to the “major public health emergencies which arise from bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, use of nuclear or radiological devices, emerging or pandemic diseases, and finally those that are characterized as the unknown threats.”  Dr. Korch emphasized that the United States engages at every step from basic scientific research, to product development, to distribution and stockpiling at home and abroad.

“All aspects of our inter-agency are working together in order to have a comprehensive biodefense program,” said Deputy Under Secretary Gerstein, adding that the United States’ program emphasizes “mechanisms to ensure that we are in compliance with the letter and the spirit of the BWC.”

The three week review conference opened on December 5 and Secretary Clinton delivered the U.S. national statement on December 7.  

Click here to view Deputy Under Secretary Gerstein’s powerpoint presentation.

Click here to view Dr. Korch’s powerpoint presentation.

Click here to view U.S. Mission Geneva’s photos from the events.

(end text)

Secretary Clinton Addresses the BWTC Conference

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesperson

For Immediate Release: December 7, 2011
2011/T56-17

Remarks

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

At the 7th Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference

December 7, 2011
Palais des Nations
Geneva, Switzerland

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you, Mr. President.  And I would also like to express my appreciation to all of the delegates and to my colleague, Minister Rosenthal, for his comments.  I want to thank the Implementation Support Unit for all the efforts to advance the work here.

I want to start by acknowledging that our countries have accomplished a great deal together under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  One hundred sixty-five states have now committed not to pursue these weapons, and I am delighted to welcome Burundi and Mozambique to the Convention, and I join in urging all states who have not yet done so to join.

President Obama has made it a top goal of his Administration to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, because we view the risk of a bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority.  In an age when people and diseases cross borders with growing ease, bioweapons are a transnational threat, and therefore we just protect against them with transnational action.

The nature of the problem is evolving.  The advances in science and technology make it possible to both prevent and cure more diseases, but also easier for states and non-state actors to develop biological weapons.  A crude, but effective, terrorist weapon can be made by using a small sample of any number of widely available pathogens, inexpensive equipment, and college-level chemistry and biology. Even as it becomes easier to develop these weapons, it remains extremely difficult – as you know – to detect them, because almost any biological research can serve dual purposes.  The same equipment and technical knowledge used for legitimate research to save lives can also be used to manufacture deadly diseases.

So of course, we must continue our work to prevent states from acquiring biological weapons.  And one of the unsung successes of the Convention is that it has engrained a norm among states against biological weapons.  Even countries that have never joined the Convention no longer claim that acquiring such weapons is a legitimate goal.  But unfortunately, the ability of terrorists and other non-state actors to develop and use these weapons is growing.  And therefore, this must be a renewed focus of our efforts during the next 14 days, as well as the months and years ahead.

Now, I know there are some in the international community who have their doubts about the odds of a mass biological attack or major outbreak.  They point out that we have not seen either so far, and conclude the risk must be low.  But that is not the conclusion of the United States, because there are warning signs, and they are too serious to ignore.

Terrorist groups have made it known they would want to acquire and use these weapons.  And in the 1990s, the apocalyptic cult, Aum Shinrikyo unleashed two attacks in Tokyo by spraying a liquid containing anthrax spores into the air and unleashing sarin gas into the subway.  In 2001, we found evidence in Afghanistan that al-Qaida was seeking the ability to conduct bioweapons attacks.  And less than a year ago, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula made a call to arms for – and I quote – “brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.”

We all have an interest in ramping up our efforts to prevent outbreaks and attacks and then to be prepared to respond if they do occur.  The 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States killed five people and sickened 17.  More than 10,000 were required to go on to antibiotics.  A mass outbreak could cripple an already fragile global economy by cutting off the movement of people, goods, and sparking food shortages.  And of course, a victim of an attack could just as easily travel from one country to another.

So shoring up our domestic and international defenses will make it easier to detect and respond.  We need public health systems that can quickly diagnose outbreaks, whatever their source, and mobilize the right medical resources and personnel.  By making any one country more secure, we make the international community more secure at the same time.

Two years ago, the Obama Administration released our national strategy for countering biological threats, which is a whole-of-government approach designed to protect the American people and improve our global capacity.  We support our partners’ efforts to meet new international standards in disease preparedness, detection, and response.  We are helping make laboratories safer and more secure, engaging 44 countries in these efforts this year.  And since 2007, we’ve conducted more than a dozen workshops to help train public health and law enforcement officials.

But there is still more to do, and I want to briefly mention three areas.  First, we need to bolster international confidence that all countries are living up to our obligations under the Convention. It is not possible, in our opinion, to create a verification regime that will achieve this goal.  But we must take other steps.  To begin with, we should revise the Convention’s annual reporting systems to ensure that each party is answering the right questions, such as what we are each all doing to guard against the misuse of biological materials.

Countries should also take their own measures to demonstrate transparency.  Under our new Bio-Transparency and Openness Initiative, we will host an international forum on health and security to exchange views on biological threats and discuss the evolution of U.S. bioresearch programs.

We will underscore that commitment by inviting a few state parties to the Convention to tour a U.S. biodefense facility next year, as Ambassador van den Ijssel and the UN 1540 Committee did this past summer.  And we will promote dialogue through exchanges among scientists from the United States and elsewhere. In short, we are intending and our meeting our obligation to the full letter and spirit of the treaty, and we wish to work with other nations to do so as well.

Second, we must strengthen each country’s ability to detect and respond to outbreaks and improve international coordination.  As President Obama said earlier this year at the UN, “We must come together to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it’s a pandemic like H1N1, or a terrorist threat, or a terrible disease.”  Five years ago, 194 countries came together at the World Health Organization and committed to build our core capacities by June 2012, and we should redouble our efforts to meet that goal.  We will support the WHO in this area, and I urge others to join us.

Finally, we need thoughtful international dialogue about the ways to maximize the benefits of scientific research and minimize the risks.  For example, the emerging gene synthesis industry is making genetic material widely available.  This obviously has many benefits for research, but it could also potentially be used to assemble the components of a deadly organism.  So how do we balance the need for scientific freedom and innovation with the necessity of guarding against such risks?

There is no easy answer, but it begins with open conversations among governments, the scientific community, and other stakeholders, in this forum and elsewhere.  We have recently had our U.S. President’s Commission on Bioethics develop ethical principles that could be helpful in this dialogue, and we urge a discussion about them.  Ambassador Kennedy and the U.S. team look forward to working with all of you for a strong set of recommendations.

And let me conclude by saying we know the biological threats we face today are new, but our commitment to face threats together is not.  More than 85 years ago, after the horrors of World War I, the international community took a stand against the use of poison gases and bacteriological weapons.  And nearly a half-century later, that shared commitment brought us together to adopt the Biological Weapons Convention.  So in that same spirit, let us move forward to address the challenges we face together in the 21^st century.

Thank you very much.

# # #

For Immediate Release: December 6, 2011

2011/T57-17

Background Briefing

Senior State Department Officials on Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference

December 6, 2011
Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva, Switzerland

MODERATOR:   All right, everybody.  We are in Geneva, where we just completed a fascinating day.  And tomorrow the Secretary will be addressing the Biological Weapons Review Conference, which happens once every five years.  To give you a sense of tomorrow’s event, we have two folks with us.  We have [Senior State Department Official One], hereafter known as Senior State Department Official Number One.  Sorry about that, [Senior State Department Official One.]

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  Or make her Number One.  She’s going to speak first.

MODERATOR:  [Senior State Department Official One] and I have known each other a long time without a consideration.  And then we have [Senior State Department Official Two] whose title is [title redacted], another old friend, hereafter Senior State Department Official Number Two.  Take it away, [Senior State Department Official One.]

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  Actually, I – we’ll let [Senior State Department Official Two] begin.

MODERATOR:  Take it away, [Senior State Department Official Two]

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  Okay.  Maybe I’ll just start really quickly.  Well, in addition to the title that [Moderator] mentioned, last year I was asked to be – take on a different hat, an additional one as [Senior State Department Official]. And this was very much to prepare over the following year for this review conference.  And as you know, this Administration has placed a premium on arms control and nonproliferation.  The Biological Weapons – its full title is Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention – is one of the three pillars of the global WMD regime.  It is the first treaty to ban an entire class of weapons, that is, biological and toxin weapons, entered into force in 1975.

And so again, as you know, this Administration has placed a premium on arms control, nonproliferation, multilateral engagement.  In particular, this is an area that this Administration early on took an interest in.  The major review that was issued by the Obama Administration was only the second to come out of the White House, which was issued in 2009.  So the President specifically asked the Secretary of State to head our delegation out here.  She’ll give our national statement tomorrow.

Now, the focus really is that, one, this is a cornerstone, as I said, of the global nonproliferation regime.  But we are trying to make sure that this Convention is adaptable and is focused on the 21^st century challenges out there.  When the treaty came into force, basically we thought in terms of state actors.  We all know that that world has changed.  As a matter of fact, it’s 10 years since the United States experienced a biological incident.  The anthrax letters killed a number of American citizens, caused billions of dollars in damage.  So we know, from first hand, the havoc that can be wrought.  Japan suffered a terrorist incident with biological weapons.  And indeed, you look at al-Qaida.  They have put out bulletins.  You’ve seen things where they have called for people to work on biological and chem weapons.  So it’s a real threat.

But the positive side of that story, in terms of adapting this Convention to 21^st century challenges is that when you develop the tools to deal with a biological weapons incident, the result of which is disease, the same tools give you the same benefits for the global health security, because disease is disease, whether it’s the result of a weapons incident, whether it’s manmade, whether it’s the result of, say, a lab accident.  So when you build the national capacities around the world to deter, detect, and deal with disease outbreaks, then you build capacity that’s got benefits for global health in general.

As a matter of fact, the Secretary has spoken about health security in speeches in the past, so it’s – again, this is certainly a long term interest approach.  So as I say, it’s keeping to reconfigure this treaty to meet those challenges.  And so [Senior State Department Official Two], I think, is going to talk about some of the elements that you could – themes that the Secretary may speak about, programmatic aspects we’d like to hear about.

But ultimately, in this brochure you’ve got some reference materials and a description of some of the programmatic elements we’re looking for.  It’s not a press – it wasn’t designed as a press kit, but if you find it useful we just brought it along.

Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  This will be the first time that we’ve asked the Secretary of State to speak at this review conference.  This is the seventh held.  The themes that you’ll hear her talk about tomorrow are first, to essentially lay out why we think that continued cooperation against biological threats is important, the universality of a threat given travel times and the connectedness of the world today, and also the interconnectedness of the solutions – of the remedies.  How building your national capacity to detect and respond to any biological threat enhances the security of the whole world, and that we do this together.

Second, she’ll give a brief recount of the United States’ efforts to comply with the Convention, which of course, includes destroying all of our biological weapons back in the 1970s.  But more importantly is a proactive agenda we cooperate with dozens of countries including many in the less-developed world, not only through State and the ISN bureau, but through DHS, AID, CDC, DOD – all of these agencies play a role.  We think we have a very positive record of cooperation.

And finally, she’ll lay out three areas in which we propose this review conference consider for further action.  I should note that the review conference does not amend the Convention.  What we do is we meet and agree on items we want to focus on in the next five-year period.  We have found the last two five-year periods, what they call the intercessional period, to be extremely valuable in bringing together not only many different countries, but filling a room not just with arms control specialists and diplomats but with scientists, industry, law enforcement officials, defense officials, for a genuinely multi-sectoral approach to global health security.

So she’ll put out ideas in three areas – first, the interface of health and security, that is what can we do to enhance the surveillance and response capability of all nations?   Secondly, a proposal on national implementation – how can we get states to report more regularly more useful information about their compliance with the Convention in a way that promotes transparency and builds confidence among state’s party that the Convention is respected? And third, on science and technology, to have a discussion about measures the scientific community needs to take to build the consciousness of the risks of bio-science research.  We know the tremendous benefits.  We wish to encourage those.  But a good discussion about responsible, ethical behavior by researchers in this intercessional period is what we’re pushing for.  So again, none of these proposals change the Convention; they are, rather, ideas for where to focus our work in the next five-year period.  Many other countries are making similar ideas.

I’ll close just by highlighting two areas that I think will not be so highlighted in the end.  There are a couple of areas where there are disagreements within the Convention state’s party.  One is in the area of verification.  A number of states look at the BWC as they look at other arms control agreements, the Nuclear Nonpro Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention, and ask, why don’t we have a protocol for verification for intrusive inspections?  The United States and a number of other countries believe that the very nature of biological research is such.  It is so decentralized, it requires relatively simple equipment, fairly simple level of scientific knowledge, that you simply cannot design a verification mechanism that would work in the way that the IAEA works in the nuclear field.  So this is one area where there are different views among state’s party.

Second is what we call Article 10.  Article 10 of the Convention requires states to exchange information and technology.  We believe, as I said, the U.S. has an excellent record, along with many other developed nations, in genuine two-way exchange with countries on scientific knowledge, on technology, on best practices.  Some states, particularly in the nonaligned movement, believe there should be a more centralized, regularized mechanism to require and enforce this kind of technology exchange.

Now as I said, these are two longstanding issues in the Convention.  I don’t expect either one of them to prevent us from having a successful inclusion – conclusion of a very forward-looking agenda for the next five years.  There’s far more consensus than there is discord among the members of the Convention.

And with that, I think we have a few minutes for questions.

QUESTION:  Can I ask just one simple one?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  Mm-hmm.

QUESTION:  I get that essentially what you do at these revcons is to look at what you’re going to work on for the next five years.  Do you believe that the Convention itself does need to be formally adapted, the language changed, presumably re-ratified by everybody, to deal with the 21^st century threats that you were talking about, or not?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  If I might, I would say no, we’re not looking for any amendment because we think it’s flexible enough, and [Senior State Department Official One] mentioned this intercessional process that’s been a huge success of these last five years.  What we’d like to do is further enhance and institutionalize that process.  So instead of, say, having this group [Senior State Department Official One] was talking about, this huge convening forum here that brings together diplomats, scientists, NGOs, law enforcement, animal and health experts together, instead of, say, just come in, having a meeting and then sort of going away, our idea is to have an institutional process where you have working groups.  And I think we sketch out sort of three baskets there where you would develop recommendations then for the state’s parties, that you have a continuing dialogue.

And again, the rapid pace of change in biological sciences is so extraordinary that, for example, science and technology is one of the areas that we’d like to see a working group or an ongoing one established to try and keep up with that.  For example, there’s the other non-nuclear (inaudible) of the chemical weapons convention obviously deals with chemical weapons.  But what’s fascinating science here is you have a convergence of chemical and biological areas.  You could now chemically synthesize biological pathogens.  So it’s extraordinary how rapid a change.  And we believe that you need to, as I say, institutionalize this dialogue to try and stay ahead of that curve, both for traditional arms control security issues and also because, as we were talking about, this sort of health security and the extraordinary challenges we face in today’s global world where we all know disease knows no borders.

QUESTION:  Can you say which countries are pushing for – if any, are pushing for the verification protocol?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  So far – you’ll see in your packet an example of a summary of a U.S. proposal.  We posted on the website of the Convention our specific language for proposals, and a number of other countries have done the same.  So far, we have not seen any country that has posted a proposal for a verification mechanism.  It’s a common element of rhetoric among a number of non-aligned states and among a number of allied states as well, who simply disagree with us about the impossibility of concluding such a mechanism.  So there’s a wide array of states that believe a Convention like this needs a protocol for verification.

QUESTION:  There’s not a risk of something like the (inaudible), where there’ll be an in-run around the normal process by some group of like-minded countries?

QUESTION:  I’ll take that one as a yes.  (Laughter.)

QUESTION:  I don’t know the details.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  I think for one, this Convention runs by consensus.  And as [Senior State Department Official One] said, that by and large there’s sort of a traditional attachment to the goal of the verification regime.  That’s, for example, the position of the neutral/non-aligned movement, which is about a hundred and – it’s a huge chunk of the (inaudible) the international – it’s (inaudible), for example.

But as I say, it’s more sort of a standard thing, but not the big sort of floor piece.  I would perhaps identify – I mean, Iran is one country that, for example, the prepcon that we had here last April, which went extraordinarily smoothly, Iran was the one country that was isolated in terms of trying to specify a specific focus on verification at the review conference.

QUESTION:  Wouldn’t we like a verification process with Iran, so we can go in there and start poking around?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  Well, one – this goes back to this notion of the changing nature of the threat out there.  In terms of biological terrorism, how do you conceivably verify that?

MODERATOR:  I think the point that [Senior State Department Official Two] is trying to make is that false verification is worse than no verification, in the sense that it gives you this sense of security that is not warranted.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  We’ve got no bias against verification.  We have a bias in favor of things that work.  And we simply don’t believe you can design a verification mechanism in this field that will achieve the goal of giving genuine confidence about other countries’ programs and intentions.

QUESTION:  But is that because they – the threat now is really not so much countries as opposed to the non-state actors?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  It’s not because of that, but I agree with the sentence.  We think there is more reason to be concerned about sub-national actors and terrorists than about states.  The BWC has been an enormous success in establishing an international norm that really treats biological weapons, as the preambles say, as abhorrent to the conscience of mankind.  And even those countries that have not signed the Convention would not dream of making the argument that they have the right to pursue such a program.

MODERATOR:  Do you want to go a little deeper on why you can’t verify?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  Well again, the dual-use nature.  Because the same facilities that can produce equipment that would be used as a biological weapons – are the same facilities, the same substances that are vital for our industry, pharmaceuticals, our health, and so on.  So it’s how you distinguish between the essential, vital, peaceful uses of the biological field and something that would be a biological agent.  And as I say, that’s a huge problem just within, say, State programs.  But then when it comes to, say, terrorism – and unlike the nuclear field, where you need massive infrastructure, complex programs, and so on, it’s – especially with the geographic changes in technology, it’s not that difficult to synthesize the materials.  I mean, sort of –

MODERATOR:  Anybody can do it in their basement.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  In their garage.  That A-student in high school biology.

QUESTION:  So if I might push just a little bit more on that.  So basically, right now, as you go towards this revcon, is this really your main concern about these verification –

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  No.

QUESTION:  No.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL TWO:  I mean, it’s an issue out there.  We’ve tried to sort of reframe the debate as have a lot of countries, in terms of talking about enhancing confidence in our minds.

QUESTION:  What about proliferation?  What about – I mean, verification obviously, but what about proliferation?  I think that’s a much greater concern than verification.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  And our proposals are aimed at that.  The programs that we do through State, Defense, DHS, are designed at providing the kind of security at biological research facilities around the world that will prevent the misuse or the diversion of any of these materials.  So that’s an active step against proliferation.  We also believe that enhancing a country’s ability to detect early a biological outbreak and to respond effectively is, in fact, a deterrent against the development of biological weapons.  If all countries are well-prepared to respond, the value, either to a state or to a terrorist organization, of biological weapons will decline.  So it’s a – inherently both a health security measure and a deterrent measure.

MODERATOR:  Anything else?

All right, guys.  Thank you very much.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ONE:  Thanks.

MODERATOR:  Appreciate it.

QUESTION:  Thank you.

# # #

  Update: It has Been Announced that Secretary of State Clinton will address the Conference on December 7.

The United States, along with 164 other nations, will take part in the 7^th Biological Weapons Review Conference (BWC RevCon) in Geneva, from December 5-22, 2012.  The high-level U.S. delegation will include: Ambassador Laura Kennedy, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Special Representative for Biological Weapons Convention Issues; Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; and George Look, Senior Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in the National Security Staff.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Coordinator for Threat Reduction efforts; Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Programs; and Daniel Gerstein, the Deputy Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology, will also attend portions of the Conference.

At the review conference, States Parties will discuss ways to prevent biological terrorism; build global capacity to combat infectious diseases; new scientific and technological developments; and options to strengthen confidence building data exchanges under the BWC.

The BWC RevCon, held once every five years, plays a critical role in reviewing the treaty and charting next steps.  Formed in 1975, the BWC is the premier international forum that addresses biological threats, and is evolving to meet changing world needs.  Accordingly, the BWC charges members of the security, health, scientific, law enforcement and business fields to better address biological threats, whether intentional, accidental or natural.

Each State Party pledges to never develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents with no justification for peaceful purposes; and (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  Parties also pledge to not assist others in acquiring such weapons, and to take national measures to preclude the acquisition or use of biological weapons by individuals.

(end text)

Learn more about the BWC:
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/F1CD974A1FDE4794C125731A0037D96D?OpenDocument

Learn more about the State Department’s Nonproliferation policies and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at:
www.state.gov/t/isn.

Thomas Countryman
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation

Charting the Future of Biosecurity: Ten Years After the Anthrax Attacks
Center for Biosecurity – University of Pittsburgh Medical Center

Pittsburgh, PA
October 4, 2011
Thank you, Anita, and to all the distinguished speakers and guests. I’m sorry I wasn’t able to be here all day. I first want to bring greetings from my boss, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher. She is on her way to Romania and asked me to fill in. I am very excited after only a week on the job that I to get to speak to a group that has made such important contributions to national goals of security and international goals of nonproliferation. As you have heard all day I’m sure, it is not only your expertise, your engagement, your advice that contributes to national security, it’s also your work, as we just heard from Senator Talent, to raise the public consciousness that will make a difference as we confront these threats.

My job today is to speak a little about the international aspect, using the tool of the Biological Weapons Convention and what we can expect in the next five years.

Today’s anniversary is somber as we look back ten years at the anthrax attacks – it is the right moment to look ahead, as we have been doing, to figure out what we need to do to be prepared to move ahead with the essential goals of biosecurity.

That is what I’ll do with regard to the BWC – to look ahead – but first, if you’ll bear with me, look back for a few minutes.

The year 2001 was not only the year of the anthrax attacks. A few months before, in the summer of 2001, the U.S. officially withdrew its support for negotiations on a legally binding verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. At that time, the ideas that we put forth seemed, to some of our closest allies, to be inopportune. Nevertheless, the anthrax events themselves demonstrated the importance of what we were proposing. Those attacks demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the verification protocol in addressing what we might call “classical” biological weapons threats – states programs and even more the threat posed by non-state actors. By 2002, some of the states that we cooperated with, that were skeptical about our approach were conscious that the anthrax attacks here in Washington had changed the debate. The measures that we had proposed suddenly seemed relevant and important even to those who had been the strongest advocates of a verification protocol focused on state activity. Getting countries to put in place domestic laws to deal with perpetrators of such acts, making labs safer and pathogens secure and training life scientists on the potential danger of the misuse of their work, all of these were very relevant to countering the threats that were revealed to the world in October 2001.

Our proposals foresaw – and the anthrax demonstrated – that when it came to the proliferation of biological weapons and the risk of an attack, the world community faced a greater threat, from a wider range of sources, based on a new calculus. They understood that the BW threat from non-state actors needed to be addressed, and focusing on what countries were doing domestically to counter this real-world threat from sub-state actors was both critical to our collective security and to achieving the goals of the Biological Weapons Convention.

This approach as we rolled it out in 2003-2005 intersessional period, was at first very Western-oriented. The procedures that we proposed and highlighted were very much centered on the methodologies of the technologically advanced industrialized world and put forth without gaining much buy-in from lesser developed nations. But the BWC quickly showed that it had this very important role of showcasing best practices for countering a wide range of biological threats. We demonstrated then, and we remain convinced today, that our approach must include measures to help with human, animal and plant diseases and their consequences. As we progressed, those countries that were actively engaged in the process brought their best scientists and practitioners to give briefings and interact with the diplomats and their counterparts from other countries. Fairly rapidly, a much wider array of states and other nongovernmental and intergovernmental actors recognized the relevance of this approach not just to their national security but to their public health. So, over those years, attendance by States Parties doubled in the first year from that of the Protocol negotiations and continues to increase year by year.

Between 2007 and 2010, the Biological Weapons Convention Work Program resumed its focus on biosafety and pathogen security, national implementation and codes of conduct for scientists, and also focused on disease surveillance capacity building and assistance in the event of a suspicious outbreak or alleged use of BW. This focus on disease surveillance, and the demonstration that SARS, H1N1 and H5N1 knew no boundaries – that concerted national and international coordination was needed – brought home the value of the work ongoing in Geneva. The meetings were no longer just for diplomats; we had participants from all parts of the world and had the interaction of the disarmament, scientific, law enforcement, academic and private sector communities. These meetings stimulated significant activity at the national level and increased the knowledge base around the world in best practices in biosafety and biosecurity, disease surveillance, in science education. This new approach started with limited and modest goals but it was clearly a success.

That is the last ten years. Of course, today, the threat has not gone away. We fully recognize that a major biological attack on one of the world’s major cities could cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack. And while the United States is still concerned about state-sponsored biological warfare and proliferation, we are equally, if not more, concerned about an act of bioterrorism due to the rapid pace of advances in the life sciences.

And so today, it is time for still more ambitious thinking.

As we go to the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in December in Geneva, our steps should line up with the aims of President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats which was announced at the BWC two years ago. This strategy has a clear, overarching goal … to protect against the misuse of science to develop or use biological agents to cause harm.

Let me outline – or I’m sure for this group, remind you of – the broadest goals of the national strategy:

First, that we will work with the international community to promote the peaceful and beneficial use of life sciences, in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention’s Article Ten, to combat infectious diseases regardless of their cause.

Second, we will work to promote global health security by increasing the availability of and access to knowledge and products of the life sciences to help reduce the impact from outbreaks of infectious disease, whether of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin.

Third, we will work toward establishing and reinforcing norms against the misuse of the life sciences. We seek to ensure a culture of responsibility, awareness, and vigilance among all who use and benefit from the life sciences.

And fourth, we will implement a coordinated approach to influence, identify, inhibit, and interdict those who seek to misuse scientific progress to harm innocent people.

These are the goals of the National Strategy that inform our approach and they have a few specific implications for our work between now and the Review Conference in December and beyond.

We will continue to seek timely and accurate information on the full spectrum of threats and challenges so that we can take appropriate actions to manage the evolving risk.

We will make clear, as we have in the National Strategy that the revolutionary advances that are taking place in the life sciences are overwhelmingly positive. We need to embrace and support those developments while taking balanced, appropriate, steps to minimize the risks posed by potential misuse.

To remain effective, the Biological Weapons Convention must continue to adopt to the wider range of biological threats we will face in this century. We need to continue to translate these strategic goals, which are shared overwhelmingly by the other States Parties to the BWC, to enhance the BWC still further.

We want to enhance the effectiveness of this Convention as the norm against biological weapons, through our actions and not only through our words. We have consulted widely, and we have listened widely, on how we can all benefit from a range of tools that increase mutual confidence; from specific confidence-building measures, to more frequent consultations, to proactive, national steps that demonstrate compliance by states.

We will seek endorsement of expanded efforts to prevent bioterrorism by strengthening national legislation and oversight in the States Party, fostering greater understanding of the scope of national implementation measures that the Convention requires and enlisting the support and cooperation of the international scientific and commercial sectors in these efforts.

We know that the best time for international assistance should come before, and not after, a biological weapons attack. We will continue to focus on providing targeted and sustainable international assistance, joined by other donors in the international community, aimed at building the national capacities in all countries to detect and respond to a disease outbreak, regardless of the cause, and identifying and addressing barriers to effective international response. We will take a multi-sectoral approach as and seek assistance from other donors. And I think you see also, and have seen today, this is very much a multi-sectoral approach in terms of the number of U.S. agencies that are actively working with partners overseas, from Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, State, Agriculture, and the Department of Defense. The FBI also positively influenced many at the BWC when they showed their so-called “crim-epi” training in which they train law enforcement and health officials to work together to preserve evidence during a disease incident.

The intersessional process in between each Review Conference has been effective – and where the real work of the BWC has been done – more than in the Review Conference that will be in the spotlight in December. The intersessional process has brought together national security, public health, law enforcement, scientific and academic communities, private industry, and intergovernmental organizations that did not previously interact with the BWC, such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Organization for Animal Health. The Biological Weapons Convention has become, and should be, fully utilized as a forum to share information with all states of the bilateral and regional activities that relate to the BWC, to consult with each other on new avenues of bilateral and multilateral engagement, and to seek the support of the international community for national protection efforts. These activities, those States Party now realize will enhance their real-world capability and real-world security.

We need to build on past meetings so that the BWC continues to be the premier forum for this multi-sector information exchange, coordination, and cooperation. The intersessional process has proved more important and productive than I think was realized at the earlier Review Conferences. Nearly all the states that are party to the BWC are now active participants in this important work as well as the various international organizations that I have mentioned.

We would like the Review Conference in December to reinvigorate, or to give added vigor, to this intersessional process, to continue this expert-level interaction and to look to more concrete results in such discussions. For example, we think that the convening authority of the BWC could bring in the emergency management community in greater efforts to determine the capabilities and resources needed in the event of an outbreak. We could do a better job sharing lessons learned regarding regulations that are needed to assist efforts at response and recovery efforts. We should have in-depth discussions about the latest developments in science and technology that could affect the BWC and we should be very open within the U.S., and the other leading BWC members, about sharing how we comply with our BWC obligations.

Doing more in this forum will cost a little more for the international community – that is the bad news. If we want international experts to produce specific recommendations and results, we will need more time to meet and work than we have in the past. We’re making better use of electronic platforms, but at the end of the day, if we want the BWC to contribute more to our security, we will have to contribute a little more to it. And has that has been pointed out, that’s never easy, and is especially difficult today given what State and AID and others are facing with budget cuts. But the good news is that we’re talking about a remarkably cheap investment. The BWC is supported by a staff of only three people. Right now the experts meet for only five days a year. Fairly small increases here can make a huge difference in the results we can deliver through this Convention.

Let me mention one more goal for this Review Conference for it is one of our oldest goals for the BWC and still valid today. We want to establish universal adherence. Universal membership will strengthen the global norm against the use of disease as a weapon and reinforce the international community’s determination that such use would be, as the preamble to the BWC states, “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” There is reason to hope for additional membership. The process I have just described is becoming clear to others – that this process is not only about national security but also about their self-protection against a range of threats not just from other states but also from non-state actors, and all who have participated as States Party have gained in their capacity to respond to such threats. We think this gives added incentive to get those few states that have not yet become members of the BWC to join up and achieve this goal of universal adherence.

Just to sum up, the BWC and the parties to it have kept current with countering modern day threats. This is the right moment as we go to this Review Conference in December to reinforce our resolve to take additional practical steps to move forward jointly toward our greater mutual security.

We are bringing specific ideas to the Review Conference, we are consulting widely and we are listening to our partners in other countries and to our own indispensible partners – the scientific and business communities in the United States as we move forward. Thank you for your time and the opportunity to share our thoughts on how to use the Biological Weapons Convention to help with the critical challenges which we face.

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
September 22, 2011

“To stop disease that spreads across borders, we must strengthen our systems of public health. We will continue the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. We will focus on the health of mothers and children. And we must come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger – whether it is a pandemic like H1N1, a terrorist threat, or a treatable disease. This week, America signed an agreement with the World Health Organization to affirm our commitment to meet this challenge. Today, I urge all nations to join us in meeting the WHO’s goal of making sure all nations have core capacities to address public health emergencies in place by 2012. That is what our commitment to the health of our people demands.”

–President Obama’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 22, 2011

This week President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly and urged the global community come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it is a pandemic, terrorist threat, or treatable disease. The United States is taking a multi-faceted approach to the full spectrum of challenges posed by infectious diseases, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or the result of a deliberate attack. Through fora such as the UN Security Resolution 1540, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the World Health Organization (WHO), the United States is pursuing a common vision where disease no longer threatens the security and prosperity of nations. The “Global Health Security” policy framework is derived from the common approaches that shape key U.S. strategies and initiatives: the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the National Security Strategy, Department of Health and Human Services National Health Security Strategy, and the Global Health Initiative.

Improving capacities to detect, report and respond to infectious diseases quickly and accurately lies at the heart of the global community’s ability to address all infectious disease threats, as reflected in the WHO’s International Health Regulations (IHR). The United States is committed to assisting countries in developing core capacities to assess, notify, and respond to infectious disease threats and to meet the WHO milestone of having these capacities in place by 2012. Coordinating across its diverse international health programs, the United States is focused on assisting host countries in meeting their IHR obligations.

Commitment to the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations
On September 19th, the United States took an important step by signing an agreement with WHO on “Global Health Security,” affirming our shared commitment to strengthen cooperation on shared health security priorities. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by Health and Human Services Secretary Sebelius, WHO Director-General Chan and establishes a framework for collaboration on common goals in the area of global health security to ensure that the international community effectively manages public health risks. It outlines a number of areas of cooperation, including: global alert and response systems, the International Health Regulations, public health networks, global health leadership, risk management, and preparedness.

Biological Weapons Convention
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which entered into force in 1975, is the first treaty to unequivocally ban the development and stockpiling of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The United States seeks to use an upcoming December Review Conference to advance the goals set forth in the President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, promulgating the view that effective BWC implementation requires multinational coordination and collaboration on concrete activities to counter biological proliferation and bioterrorism. The BWC Revcon offers an important opportunity to revitalize international efforts against these threats, helping to build global capacity to combat infectious diseases, prevent biological weapons proliferation and bioterrorism, and bring security, health, and scientific communities together to raise awareness of evolving biological risks and develop practices to manage them.

Global Health Initiative
President Obama’s Global Health Initiative (GHI), launched in May 2009, partners with countries to improve health outcomes through strengthened health systems, increased and integrated investments in maternal and child health, family planning, nutrition and infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases, and through a focus on improving the health of women, newborns and children. One of the key principles of the GHI focuses is strengthening health systems to save lives and achieve sustainable outcomes.

April 14, 2011

Role of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The risk of state development and possession of biological weapons, which drove the negotiation of the BWC nearly forty years ago, still exists today. However, the nature of the biological risk is far more complex than it was in 1975 when the BWC came into force. Advances in the life sciences have expanded both states’ ability to covertly pursue a broader range of biological weapons and sub-national actors’ capability for serious BW attacks. At the same time, the risk of severe natural outbreaks of infectious diseases has increased due to expanded travel across national borders. These increased risks have triggered intensive efforts to prevent and respond to large-scale outbreaks of infectious disease of natural or deliberate origin.

The BWC is sufficiently broad and flexible to address this expanded range of threats, and we should work together to do so. The Seventh Review Conference should consolidate and build on efforts since the last RevCon and focus on concrete actions to reduce the threat of disease as a weapon.

The U.S. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats notes that:

The risk [of acquisition and use of biological weapons] is evolving in unpredictable ways; advances in enabling technologies will continue to be globally available; and the ability to exploit such advances will become increasingly accessible to those with ill-intent as the barriers of technical expertise and monetary costs decline. Accordingly, no country can be complacent but instead must take action to ensure that advances in the life sciences positively affect people of all nations while reducing the risks posed by their misuse.

The BWC provides the premier forum for members of the security, health, scientific and law enforcement communities to come together to better understand and address biological threats. The RevCon can decisively direct this forum to pursue three critical objectives:

• Promoting confidence in effective BWC implementation and compliance
• Preventing bioterrorism; and
• Building global capacity to combat infectious disease.

Several important issues will require action at the RevCon:

• We need to establish a Mechanism for Identifying and Addressing the Impact of Advances in Science and Technology – Ensuring States Parties’ awareness of innovations in the life sciences and their implications for the BWC is essential to addressing 21st century challenges.

• We should work to update and strengthen the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) – Last revised in 1991, the CBM forms need to be updated to increase the relevance of State Parties’ submissions to build confidence in compliance. It is likely that a combination of RevCon action and continued work in the next intersessional period will be required. In our view, this is one important element of a constructive effort to increase mutual awareness and confidence in BWC Compliance. We should also explore other means of promoting transparency and confidence in this regard, the United States intends to promote, and if necessary lead unilaterally, in demonstrating greater national transparency, especially with respect to biodefense programs.

• Identify practical steps to achieve our shared goal of Universality – Currently, there are 32 countries that are not party to the BWC. Because repugnance to the use of disease as a weapon is a nearly universal norm, all States Parties should encourage countries to join the BWC, including provision of necessary support.

• We should ensure the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) is resourced in Proportion to its Future Workload – The three-person ISU has been a success by any measure since its creation during the Sixth RevCon in 2006. Although any expansion of the ISU staff or resources must be tied to specific tasks that will be agreed upon at the RevCon, we are prepared in principle to support a modest expansion.

• We must continue and expand our efforts to involve industry and academia – The United States will expand its efforts to heighten awareness about scientific and technical advances and dual-use technology that raise concern. Possible areas to explore are programs to bring together academic, industry, and government scientists to discuss life sciences and security challenges, and involve industry in development of technologies to enhance transparency and avoid misuse of biological activities.

Finally, we should agree on an intercessional Work Program that strengthens promotes concrete, specific action by States Parties to strengthen implementation of the Convention.

Priority Topics for intercessional work include:

• Promoting confidence in States Parties’ compliance with Article I and other obligations;

• Strengthening national implementation of the BWC, including oversight of relevant activities and the identification and promotion of specific risk-management practices;

• Strengthening and promoting outreach, education, and awareness to and of those engaged in the life sciences to reinforce strong norms of responsible, ethical, and safety- and security-conscious behavior;

• Building international capacity to detect and respond effectively to infectious disease outbreaks, particularly those of suspicious origin. The assistance provisions of Article VII are inherently limited by the requirement for a Security Council determination before they are triggered; a pragmatic approach to achieving the underlying goal of Article VII is to strengthen national detection and response capabilities and work to enhance international coordination in the event of a suspicious outbreak.

The Seventh Review Conference should place the BWC on a trajectory that: enhances the effectiveness of the treaty as a categorical norm against the misuse of the life sciences; leads to near-universal adherence; and provides the premier forum for members of the security, health, scientific and law enforcement communities to come together to address biological threats.

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