Statement to the Conference on Disarmament - FMCT
By Ambassador Christina Rocca
U.S. Permanent Representative

Geneva,
February 8, 2007

The United States believes strongly that negotiating a legally binding ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices cannot be delayed any longer. The international community has expressed a desire for such a treaty in one form or another for decades. Here in the Conference on Disarmament, the history of this issue is somewhat shorter, but equally unsuccessful, despite the overwhelming support that negotiation of such a treaty enjoys. The United States believes that last year's CD session set the stage for negotiations to finally begin, and that this year's organizational plan for the CD might prove to be a successful vehicle for this beginning. This opportunity must not be lost. As a matter of record, there is a draft text from which we may begin. It is at once disarmingly simple and understandably complex. To establish the legal norm in a treaty is, in itself, simple. The discussions necessary to codify this ban will be complex. Nevertheless, the goal of ending the production of fissile material is achievable. The world community expects it of us. Now, we must demand it of ourselves.

I note with interest the statement made earlier by the German Ambassador on behalf of the ED. According to that statement, the EU supports the immediate commencement of negotiations on FMCT "bearing in mind the Report of the Special Coordinator." This comment deserves further scrutiny. In that regard, it is instructive to review what the Special Coordinator had to say about the most contentious issues surrounding FMCT, so I will quote from the report at some length:

"During the course of my consultation, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile materials (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

"It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the ad hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raisingfor consideration in the ad Hoc Committee any of the above noted issues.

"Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an Ad Hoc Committee on Cut-Off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. "

So, what does it mean to "bear in mind" this report? If it means that there are many contentious issues that can only be resolved in the course of negotiations, then the United States is in full agreement. To that end, the mandate we proposed for such negotiations last year fully captures what is agreed and what is not. Our proposed mandate focuses on the one element on which we all agree, that is, that there should be a negotiation in the CD to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Beyond that essential point, our proposed mandate does not rule anything in during a negotiation, nor does it rule anything out; and it perfectly reflects the Shannon Report's conclusion that any delegation may raise any issue it deems important in the course of negotiations.

As to the Treaty itself, the United States has given considerable thought to what an FMCT should look like. The draft treaty that we have put forward sets forth the essentials needed for an FMCT that would meet the objective of ending expeditiously the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Our presentations last year made clear our position on some of the difficult issues we will encounter during the course of negotiations. To summarize our draft, the basic obligation under the treaty, effective at entry into force, would be a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The definitions set forth in the U.S. draft treaty on "fissile material" and "production" represent the outgrowth of the decade-long international discussion regarding what an FMCT should encompass. In our draft, stocks of already existing fissile material would be unaffected by the FMCT. Finally, also in keeping with past discussions of this issue, the production of fissile material for non-explosive purposes, such as fuel for naval propulsion, would be unaffected by the treaty.

Our draft Treaty contains all the elements necessary to support a negotiation and we urge our colleagues, as we begin our discussion of Agenda Item II, to focus attention on this document as the most efficient means to finally begin this process. We have just spent three informal sessions on nuclear disarmament. As we said during those discussions, a necessary step in the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons must of necessity be a ban on the production of nuclear material for those nuclear weapons. We also reiterate our view that, pending the conclusion of a Cutoff Treaty and the Treaty's entry into force, all states should declare publicly and observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, such as the United States has maintained since 1988.

Thank you.