U.S. Statement AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

by John Mohanco,
Deputy Director
for the Office of Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs, Department of State
Geneva, June 13, 2006

Thank you Mr. President. Our Delegation has listened with interest to the discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. As with FMCT and other issues, we see that the CD, meeting in plenary session, can hold meaningful discussions, of both breadth and depth, on any topic of interest to its members. As Assistant Secretary Rademaker stated on May 18, the United States supports discussion by the CD of both “traditional” and “new” issues with the aim of identifying any that might be ripe for more serious consideration.

After listening to these particular discussions, however, our Delegation is more convinced than ever that issues relating to the supposed weaponization of space definitely do NOT command consensus in this body. Let us see why, Mr. President.

The United States was one of the principal movers behind the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which we continue fully to support. This important treaty has served the international community well for nearly four decades. During that time, human beings have traveled to the Moon, and learned to function continuously aboard space stations. China recently joined Russia and the United States in conducting manned spaceflights, and citizens from over a dozen countries have flown in space. The use of space-based remote sensing and communications satellites has increased exponentially, making valuable contributions to both international security and economic well-being. Space-based navigation and timing has become a standard for activities that range from time-critical emergency rescue to enabling the automatic payment of gasoline purchases. All in all, the principles of the Outer Space Treaty - including free and unhindered access to space by all nations -) have been critical to these successes.

It is worth noting, Mr. President, that these developments have happened, at least in part, because of the freedom to conduct defense-related activities in space, so long as those activities are consistent with the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. None of the great developments in space would have occurred without the driving requirements of national security; certainly, the great boon of satellite-based
navigation and timing never would have been pursued if military space activities had been banned. The States Party to the Outer Space Treaty have demonstrated that the peaceful use of space is completely consistent with military activity in space. Threats to the peaceful use of space, like threats to the peaceful use of the oceans or of the atmosphere, come not from the existence of military hardware, but from those who would disturb the peace, no matter the environment.

Mr. President, our Delegation has reviewed carefully the paper on transparency and confidence-building measures that China and Russia have put forward as CD/1778. There is nothing inherently wrong with exploring new confidence-building measures, but the CD is not the appropriate venue for such discussions. The practices of the space community evolve as our individual capabilities improve, and discussions among states on how to manage those practices are appropriate. Such discussions, however, do not constitute valid reason for proposing new arms control measures for outer space.

CD/1778 notes that the existing Outer Space Treaty, together with the liability and registration conventions, already allows for confidence-building measures, including the possibility of observing launches, plus consultations regarding the possibility that given activities in outer space could interfere with other space activities. As an example, CD/1778 discusses the possibility of notifications regarding scheduled spacecraft maneuvers which may result in dangerous proximity to spacecraft of other states. The Outer Space Treaty calls for appropriate international consultations before proceeding with an activity which could cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other states; a spacecraft-to-spacecraft collision would be an example of such harmful interference. As CD/1778 makes clear, "it is impossible to create a universal and comprehensive model of transparency and confidence-building measures. The current structure of voluntary consultation measures in the existing instruments regarding the use of outer space allows the application of appropriate measures on a case-by-case basis."

Some argue, Mr. President, that the present outer space regime is insufficient in that it only addresses stationing weapons of mass destruction in space, and not weapons of any type. The United States and other countries represented in this body have looked frequently at the possibility of banning anti-satellite weapons or other space-related weapon systems, but we always find that such a ban is impossible to define in a way that excludes practical and important uses of space-related systems. Many proponents of additional measures apparently assume that it is easy to identify what is or is not a weapon in outer space. This certainly is not the case, Mr. President, as anything in outer space with the ability to alter its trajectory could be a weapon. This includes any of the current meteorological, communications, remote sensing, or navigation satellites currently in orbit. Any of these could, in principle, have its orbit altered so as to collide with another satellite, with obviously harmful results to the target.

Any space-based object with sufficient fuel also can be de-orbited to strike the Earth. Delegations no doubt remember the concern occasioned when Skylab de-orbited, when the Kosmos satellite crashed in Canada, and the care taken with the de-orbiting of the Mir space station. Indeed, any large object in orbit, whatever its peaceful purpose, can cause great harm by falling from orbit. We have merely to look at the impact crater in Arizona, the mass extinction at the end of the Cretaceous Era, or the 1908 event at Tunguska to see the damage that simple rocks and balls of ice can cause when they fall from orbit.

Mr. President, the question of definition - of the inherently dual-use potential of any space object -) is a basic barrier to any attempt even to discuss bans on space weapons in any meaningful way. Delegations nonetheless could spend a great deal of time speculating about the kinds of exotic outer space weapons that might be developed years, or even centuries, from now. However, this would place us in the same position as the fictional scientist who, dissatisfied with the fact that dragons do not exist, devoted a year of study to the topic and determined that there were three types of dragons, each of which failed to exist in an entirely different manner.

Let us be clear about the intent of much of this speculation, Mr. President. Many proponents of a ban on space weaponry argue that, unless such weapons are banned soon, some government -- usually identified, scurrilously, as the United States -- somehow will begin an arms race in outer space. History demonstrates, however, that this is hardly a reasonable speculation. Some countries have gone so far as to test anti-satellite weapons in space over a period of several years, while others have conducted surface-based research which could be used for anti-satellite missions. Notice, however, that such research has not created a push for deploying weapons in space, nor has it generated the feared arms race in space. For our part, the United States does not have any weapons in space, nor do we have plans to build such weapons.

On the other hand, the high value of space systems -) for commerce and in support of military operations - long has led the United States to study the potential of space-related weapons to protect our satellites from potential future attacks, whether from the surface or from other spacecraft. As long as the potential for such attacks remains, our Government will continue to consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets.

Mr. President, the United States remains committed to the peaceful exploration and use of space by all nations for peaceful purposes. “Peaceful purposes” includes appropriate defense activities in pursuit of national security and other goals.

We take seriously our commitment to carryon all U.S. activities in the exploration and use of outer space in accordance with international law, including the Outer Space Treaty, which incorporates by reference the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and of promoting international cooperation and understanding. It is in our interest that other States take their commitments in this regard seriously, as well. Our Government has, far and away, the lion's share of assets in outer space. Thus, we have the most to risk from activities that could harmfully interfere with this significant outer space infrastructure.

The Cold War is over, Mr. President, and there is no arms race in outer space. Thus, there is no -- repeat, no -- problem in outer space for arms control to solve. To the contrary, there is unprecedented international cooperation in civil and commercial space activities, including among former Cold War adversaries. There already exists an extensive and comprehensive system for limiting certain uses of outer space, and the existing multilateral outer space regime already adequately deals with the issue.

Given these incontrovertible truths, Mr. President, our Delegation reiterates its call on this Conference to provide early agreement on the draft mandate contained in CD/1776 to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the next logical step for this forum. As demonstrated by today's debate, delegations may continue to use this plenary to conduct in-depth reviews of all issues of interest to Member States, including outer space, and we welcome continuing exchanges of views on all issues. Thank you, Mr. President.