As prepared for delivery Garold Larson at the seminar “Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Sponsored by Geneva On this 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), I am pleased to be here to represent the United States, an original signatory and one of the three Depositary Governments for the Treaty. President Bush has reaffirmed the strong support of the United States for the NPT and our commitment to work diligently to strengthen it further. The Treaty represents a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and makes a critical contribution to international security. One testament to its success is that today nearly every country in the world is a Party to the Treaty. On this important occasion, I would like to review some of what the NPT has – and unfortunately has not – accomplished. It is well known that in 1963, five years before the Treaty was first signed and in the year of his tragic death, President John F. Kennedy said: “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have (nuclear) weapons.” By the end of the 1970s, and even today – 45 years after President Kennedy’s prediction – the number of states that possess, or are thought to possess, nuclear weapons could be counted on the fingers of two hands. Many more are technically capable of obtaining such weapons, but they have refrained from doing so. Four States with nuclear weapons gave them up voluntarily. The NPT is in part responsible for these significant nonproliferation successes. The Treaty, particularly the core nonproliferation provisions of Article I and II, is the foundation of an international regime that has helped to minimize the number of states that have actually obtained nuclear weapons. In order to deter the diversion of nuclear material from the peaceful uses to nuclear explosives, Article III requires non-nuclear-weapon state Parties to accept safeguards on all of their nuclear material through an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Over 150 Parties have such agreements in force, including all of those with significant nuclear activities, though we are disappointed that the remaining 30 non-nuclear-weapon state Parties do not yet have NPT safeguards agreements in force. We strongly encourage them to fulfill their legal commitments under the Article III. The IAEA, through these agreements, plays a vital role in supporting the Treaty by uncovering and reporting safeguards violations. Unfortunately, despite the Agency’s best efforts, such violations did occur in the 1980s and 1990s in the cases of Iraq and North Korea. These difficult experiences, however, helped lead to a significant strengthening of the NPT regime – the creation of the Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements. The primary purpose of this Protocol is to give the IAEA increased information and additional access rights to detect nuclear activities and material not declared by a state under its safeguards agreement. The Protocol bolsters confidence in the NPT and the nonproliferation regime. Parties now should recognize it, in combination with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, as the new standard for effective safeguards. The Additional Protocol is in force for over 90 NPT Parties, and we again urge those that have not done so to bring one into force. Article III also requires that NPT Parties not provide nuclear material or equipment especially designed or prepared for the use of such material to a non-nuclear-weapon state, unless the relevant material is subject to safeguards. Another NPT success has been the formation in 1971 of the NPT Exporters, or Zangger Committee, named for its first chairman, to implement this provision. This committee adopted a list of items that “trigger” safeguards under Article III, which created the basis for international nuclear export controls. The Committee continues to meet regularly to coordinate implementation of this Article III provision. These Treaty requirements for safeguards and export controls, and the fact that Article IV of the NPT promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, have facilitated another critical success story. Not only has the use of nuclear energy for electricity continued to grow, but the wide range of other nuclear applications, including in the fields of agriculture and food production, environmental technology, water resource management, and medical research and treatment, is benefiting an increasing number of people throughout the world. In 1970, when the NPT entered into force, there were 12 operating power reactors in states that eventually joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Today, according to the IAEA, there are 196 power reactors in such countries. This, along with the many other benefits that nuclear applications afford to mankind, would not have been possible without the NPT’s assurance that cooperation on nuclear energy among its Parties would remain peaceful. The NPT has also been remarkably successful in the area of nuclear disarmament. Article VI calls for an end to the nuclear arms race, a goal that has already been achieved. It also calls for good faith negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. Such negotiations between the United States and Russia have taken place for a large portion of the period since the NPT was signed, and they continue today. These negotiations, as well as national decisions about nuclear programs, have resulted in dramatic reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear weaponry. Most of you are familiar with the United States record on nuclear reductions, but allow me to note a few of our most significant accomplishments. Not only do we now possess fewer nuclear weapons than when the Treaty was signed 40 years ago, but we have reduced our arsenal by half since 2001. Today it is smallest it has been since the 1950s. We stopped producing enriched uranium and separated plutonium for weapons decades ago, and do not plan to produce these materials for weapons in the future. We have also removed 174 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium and 61 MT of plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons, enough material for nearly 15,000 such weapons. Thirteen years ago Treaty Parties decided that the NPT’s success warranted its indefinite extension. My government worked hard to promote that decision, and we believe that it was a major victory for nonproliferation and international peace and security in general. Unfortunately, and notwithstanding this notable success, we have witnessed during the past two decades the proliferation and misuse of nuclear technology, in some cases by Treaty Parties. The United States remains very concerned that Parties like Iran have violated their commitments and thereby undermined the Treaty. Parties should take concrete action to confront and deter noncompliance and encourage violators to come back into compliance. Parties should also identify and embrace steps to deter future Treaty withdrawals by violators and to ensure that violators’ misuse of the benefits of the NPT do not endanger the security of other Parties. Such action will help to preserve and strengthen the Treaty’s nonproliferation undertakings. Finally, the United States believes that the remaining States that are not parties to the Treaty should join it as non-nuclear-weapon states. One of the best ways to create the conditions for NPT universality is to work for the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, particularly in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. Having achieved so much over the last 40 years, but now contending with serious challenges to the Treaty, its Parties should dedicate themselves over the next 40 years – in the words of the Treaty’s Preamble – “to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States.” Combined with strict compliance with Treaty obligations, this kind of peace-making is the surest pathway to reach NPT universality and create the conditions enabling us to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.
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